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Abstract
The history of the UNFCCC climate negotiations over the past 20 years has shown how difficult it is to reach
an international climate agreement that is both legally binding and environmentally effective enough to ensure
that humankind can avoid the worst consequences projected from climate change. Some experts even see the
world drifting towards a 4°C mean temperature rise. It is therefore necessary to start exploring what future,
non-cooperative climate change regimes might be expected to look like. One immediate consequence is that
adaptation to climate change has become increasingly relevant; on a humanitarian, political, economic and
the scientific level. The economic incentive structure of adaptation is different and, actually, more favourable
than that of mitigation, with respect to both their inter- and intratemporal externalities. The ability to adapt
makes a higher level of climate change tolerable. Furthermore, my research shows that adaptation empowers
the poor to develop and to enforce a more equitable use of the atmospheric carbon sink; it may potentially
also lead to an overall reduction of carbon emissions. Ultimately, it turns out that even in a non-cooperative,
asymmetric world, there are prospects for clean technology transfer and adaptation funding.
Drawing on the AK growth model with climate change developed by Buckle (2009a,b), the aim of this work
is (i) to create a tractable, transparent economic growth model that includes climate damages and emissions
abatement, (ii) to develop an adequate analytical representation of adaptation, and (iii) to analyze with the
help of game-theoretic methods how the option to undertake adaptation affects the strategic nature of climate
negotiations and, in particular, the outcome under a non-cooperative climate change regime.
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Motivation
A brief history of international climate negotiations
Twenty years ago, the world collectively recognized climate change as a fundamental threat to humankind
and adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC):
“The ultimate objective of this Convention [...] is to achieve [...] stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system [...]. The Parties should protect the climate system for the
benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly,
the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse
effects thereof. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties [...]
should be given full consideration.1
By today, the Convention has reached virtually full participation with 195 Parties.2 The duty of leadership
in combating climate change was assigned to the developed countries: All Parties agreed to tackle climate
change by measures such as introducing and improving monitoring of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
creating national action plans and raising the public awareness of climate change. However, only the Annex I
Parties, namely the developed countries as well as the so-called “economies in transition”, which included the
former Soviet Union countries, committed to “the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels
these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases”3, and the OECD countries
exclusively were obliged to “take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance [...] the transfer
of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing
country Parties” and “assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects”4.
The particular duties of the developed countries were further stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol, whose adoption
in 1997 might have been the greatest landmark of international climate diplomacy to date. The Kyoto
Protocol obliged the Annex I countries to reduce their GHG emissions5 by at least 5% below 1990 levels by
2008-2012, while no such quantifiable targets were imposed upon the other countries.6 This agreement was
1From articles 2, 3(1) and 3(2) of United Nations (1992), p. 4.
2See (=s.) http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php, last accessed on
07/05/2012.
3United Nations (1992), article 2(b), p. 7.
4Ibidem (=ibid.), article 2(b) , p. 7, articles 4(5) and 4(4), p. 8.
5Measured in CO2 equivalents (= CO2e).
6Compare (=cp.) United Nations (1998), article 3(1), p. 3, and article 10, pp. 9f.
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a result of the leadership paradigm, according to which the industrialized countries should go ahead, before
the developing countries would take over further commitments at some point in the future. The Protocol
established the Clean Development Mechanism, which is a scheme to stimulate clean technology transfer
and allowed emitters from the Annex I countries to accomplish mitigation projects in developing countries
and get the associated emissions reductions credited.7 At the Marrakech Accords (2001), funds were set up
to help developing countries explicitly with adaptation to climate change.8 The Kyoto Protocol has been
described as a useful learning experience9, and as “a local success but a global failure”10: The Kyoto target
seems to be fulfilled overall, not least because of the economic downfall of the Soviet Union and its Eastern
European neighbour states in the nineties, which makes global compliance easier. However, world emissions
have continued to rise, largely due to the boom of Asian economies such as China and India, which the Kyoto
Protocol did not oblige to emissions reductions.11 Furthermore, the Annex I country creating most emissions,
the USA, never ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Barrett (2009) writes that “nonparticipation by the US may
be seen as a failure by the US to behave responsibly, but it may also be seen as a failure by the agreement
to make participation attractive for the US”12. The Protocol has been critized for being watered down in
the further rounds of negotiations, which “reduce[d] the Kyoto Protocol to a symbolic treaty that codifies
more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes compliance a rather cheap deal”13. Barrett concludes
that “Kyoto was designed to be cost-effective but it has ended up being ineffective”14.
Negotiations on how to proceed after 2012 formally started at the 11th Conference of the Parties (COP11) in
Montreal (2005). As a central result of COP13, the “Bali Action Plan” was passed that allowed countries to
negotiate along two tracks under the frameworks of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Both tracks were
scheduled to finish at COP15 in Copenhagen, where a decision on the post-Kyoto legal climate architecture
was supposed to be made.15 Unfortunately, the conference in Copenhagen instead led international climate
policy to the brink of disaster. The COP15 meeting had received unprecedented amount of attention in the
advance. Climate change had been raised to a top level issue, and the conference itself was attended by 125
country leaders and almost 40.000 participants, welcomed in the expectation that they strike no less than
a deal to save the world. Nevertheless, Müller (2010) criticizes “the lack of political will and leadership
during the months leading up to the Conference” and stresses “that it is impossible − even for world leaders
− to make up for months and months of wasted time in 24 hours”16: In an unprecedented process some of
the world’s most powerful leaders, who arrived shortly before the closure of the conference, happened to find
themselves in charge of rescuing and conducting the negotiations, as their negotiators had failed to prepare
an agreement ready to be signed; the diplomatic turmoils are for instance documented in The Telegraph
(2009), Guardian (2009) and BBC (2009).
The major outcome of the conference was the Copenhagen Accord (2009), a three-page-document hastily
assembled in the last minutes and outside the two official negotiation tracks. The Copenhagen Accord was
reached initially amongst only 28 Parties of the UNFCCC (including the major emitter nations), but the
procedure lacked a COP mandate and the Accord was initially rejected by other Parties, so that it could not
7Ibid., article 12, pp. 11f.
8This description has drawn on Depledge (2004), pp. 36ff. and Grubb (2004), pp. 74ff.
9S. Grubb (2004), p. 109.
10Luterbacher (2010), p. 5.
11Cp. ibid., pp. 5ff.
12Barrett (2009), p. 16.
13Böhringer and Vogt (2004), p. 616.
14Barrett (2009), p. 36.
15Cp. Ott et al. (2008), p. 92. Christoff (2008) describes the painful process and political haggling to obtain global support
for the Bali Action Plan.
16Müller (2010), p. ii.
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be formally adopted at the end of the conference, but only be “taken note of”. As a consequence, the legal
status and significance of the Copenhagen Accord was unclear. It acknowledged the goal “to hold the increase
in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius”, but only vaguely endorsed “deep cuts in global emissions” for
that to happen. It embedded the “pledge-and-review” approach advocated by the USA, according to which
countries can make voluntary emissions reduction commitments.17 Furthermore, the Copenhagen Accord
stated that “in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed
countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of
developing countries”, and it is envisaged that “this funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public
and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance”18. However, the COP15 failed
to meet its fundamental objectives, namely to bring the two-track negotiations to an end and to decide on
“the fate of the Kyoto Protocol; the legal form and architecture of the future legal regime; and the nature
and extent of differential treatment between developed and developing States”.19
These decisions were also not taken at the following COP16 in Cancún, but some elements of the Copenhagen
Accord, such as the agreement on the 2°C target, were fed back into the official UNFCCC negotiation
process. The developing countries ensured that, if in doubt, their development would take priority over the
reduction goal.20 The pledge-and-review approach was certified. The results of COP17 in Durban in 2011
were widely regarded as encouraging. The COP decided that the Kyoto Protocol should be extended by a
second commitment period beginning in 2013 and ending either in 2017 or 202021, ensuring continuing legal
security of the Kyoto Protocol’s instruments. Furthermore, it was agreed that a new “protocol, another legal
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force [...] applicable to all Parties”22, hence potentially with
emissions targets for both developed and developing countries, should be negotiated by 2015 and come into
effect from 2020.23 A significant feature of the Durban Platform (United Nations (2011b)) is that it lacks
the usual differentiation between Annex-I and non-Annex-I countries, and the pointer to the “common but
differentiated responsibilities” is also missing. As Stavins (2012) summarizes, “in the Durban Platform, the
delegates reached a non-binding agreement to reach an agreement by 2015 that will bring all countries under
the same legal regime by 2020”24.
The absence of an effective cooperative climate regime may continue
The question of whether the world is now on a safe track to collectively prevent dangerous climate change
remains open for investigation.
Global CO2 emissions have in 2011 climbed up to 31.6 Gt, which marks a new all-time high. This is especially
due to the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China and India. If the trend is continued over the
next decades, it may possibly lead to a rise of global mean temperature by 6°C or more.25 New et al. (2011)
write that “most analysts would agree that the current state of the UNFCCC process and other efforts to
reduce greenhouse gases make the chances of keeping below 2°C extremely slim, with 3°C much more likely,
17Cp. Hunter (2010), p. 4.
18Copenhagen Accord (2009), paragraphs 2, 8. The sources of funding still remain unclear also after the most recent COP17,
s. Boston (2012), p. 11.
19Cp. Rajamani (2010), pp. 824ff. on the making of the Copenhagen Accord. Quote from p. 838.
20Cp. Rajamani (2011), pp. 500f.
21S. United Nations (2011a), paragraph 1, p. 1.
22United Nations (2011b), paragraph 2, p. 1.
23S. ibid. paragraph 4, pp. 1f.
24Stavins (2012), p. 3.
25Cp. International Energy Agency (2012) and Huffington Post (2012).
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and a real possibility of 4°C, should more pessimistic analyses come to fruition” and that “the implications
of these larger temperature changes require serious consideration”26.
Boston (2012) lists the features that make climate change a “super-wicked problem”27, which can be cate-
gorized in two groups, despite potential overlaps. Starting with predominantly economic-theoretical features
of the problem:
– Climate change is a collective action problem, and countries have a strong incentive to free-ride on
other countries’ emissions abatement efforts, while not abating themselves.
– Cause and consequence of climate change are temporally distant from each other. Today’s voters will
benefit from costly mitigation only in the very long-term, or not within their lifetime, reducing the
incentive for action.
– The asymmetries of countries with respect to their stages of development, their preferences, responsibil-
ities, vulnerability to climate change and available means might complicate the finding of an agreement.
– Substantial adjustment costs will have to be born to enable structural change of economies. For instance,
producers of fossil fuels may have little interest in a decarbonized world economy.
– Uncertainty over magnitude and spatial distribution of climate change and uncertainty about future
technological and societal developments make precise predictions over the future difficult.
Predominantly political-practical features of the problem are:
– The key role of the USA as the world’s second-largest GHG emitter, which is generally less willing to
sign global treaties, but whose leadership is crucial to motivate other key players such as China to move
onto a decarbonized development path.28
– The lack of a quick, straightforward technological solution.
– The risk of rising climate scepticism among citizens29 that may thwart support for immediate and
ambitious mitigation.
– The current financial crises that draws attention away from climate change.30
It is exactly these features that have thwarted stronger and more ambitious mitigation of climate change than
has been seen to date. While, especially after the setback of Copenhagen, the progress made in Durban seems
remarkable, the outcome can also be read as a successful attempt of less willing actors to buy time and further
delay significant action. For instance, it was negotiated during Copenhagen whether global emissions should
peak in 202031 - now, the ambition is to launch the new global treaty in that year. The sense of urgency
seems to have disappeared, while the International Energy Agency (2011) warns that, due to the long
life time of the energy-related capital stock, by 2017 the world economy will be locked into its existing,
26New et al. (2011), pp. 15 and 9.
27Boston (2012), p. 4.
28The complexity and significance of the American-Chinese relations with regard to climate change is addressed by Nagle
(2011).
29It should be mentioned that the great majority of political and scientific institutions and many companies nowadays have
subscribed to the goal of climate protection.
30Cp. Boston (2012), pp. 4ff.
31S. Guardian (2009).
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high-carbon capital stock, so that by 2035 the world will already have emitted the amount of CO2 that is
consistent with the 2°C target.32 Furthermore, while in Durban all Parties “agreed to agree” on a new legal
instrument, there is the risk that the world community will choose the least common denominator. This most
certainly would not be enough; the UNEP (2011) report concludes that the voluntary emissions reduction
pledges announced by several countries so far are not sufficient to reach the 2°C target33, which itself may
not even be ambitious enough to avoid any catastrophic impacts from climate change. The negotiation of a
more ambitious treaty will also require strong leadership - but who will want to provide it? At Copenhagen,
the global political leaders got their noses bloodied and might be wary of getting involved again at such a
level.
Twenty years have passed, during which a global, ambitious deal could have been struck, but apparently the
incentives were not sufficient enough for every country to do so. I do not see how Durban has changed the rules
of the climate game in a way that the fundamental obstacles listed above can be overcome. These obstacles
give rise to pessimism. With respect to the prospects for a future climate agreement, another failure like the
one which occurred in Copenhagen cannot be ruled out. I suspect it will be likely that another treaty following
the extended Kyoto Protocol will be agreed on to let all countries save face. However, it may lack teeth again,
not be ambitious enough and barely accommodate the least common denominator of the voluntary pledges
already made, making the treaty superfluous. As a consequence, instead of pinning hopes on a comprehensive
agreement that may not be enforced, Barrett (2009) advises to negotiate sectoral agreements, for instance
to regulate the CO2-intense aluminium industry, and establish innovation partnerships, which do not require
complete participation, for instance to promote the use of carbon capture and storage technologies in coal-fired
plants.34 Brechet and Eyckmans (forthcoming in 2012) find complementary evidence that “allowing for a
multitude of small fragmented agreements can yield better global welfare and environmental results compared
to a situation in which we would limit cooperation to big unique agreements only”35. To supplement the
common top-down approach to climate policy, Ostrom (2009) recommends a more polycentric approach to
encourage experimental efforts at multiple levels and to establish and build on mutual trust between citizens
and firms at the local scale.36
While, for understandable reasons, economic theory applied to climate change has to date largely focused on
identifying paths leading to a stringent global climate change mitigation agreement, for these reasons I fear it
is vital that investigations are started on what any future climate regime37 without a (stringent) agreement
may look like. Therefore, the absence of such a global agreement is the default assumption of this thesis, in
which a top-down perspective on climate policy is still adopted.
Adaptation versus Mitigation
In a non-cooperative scenario, the desirable level of global warming may not be defined by the needs of
the most vulnerable countries, but determined by those countries that can cope with climate change best
and benefit most from maintaining a cheap, high-carbon production infrastructure. If mitigation activities
32Cp. International Energy Agency (2011), p. 1f.
33Cp. UNEP (2011), pp. 8f. If the announced measures are implemented, global GHG emissions in 2020 will still be by 6-11
Gt CO2e too high for global warming to remain within the desired range.
34Cp. Barrett (2009), pp. 31ff.
35The quote is taken from the draft version, Brechet and Eyckmans (2009), p. 14.
36Cp. Ostrom (2009), cp. 30ff.
37Not referring to definitions from political science: A “cooperative climate regime” is built on a set of rules established in a
global, stringent climate change agreement, whereas a “non-cooperative climate regime” lacks such a treaty and any altruism is
ruled out by the interplay of self-interests of the actors.
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lack sufficient ambition, climate change will continue, and adaptation to climate change to cope with its
consequences will inevitably gain significance.
Compared to mitigation, adaptation has different political and economic characteristics and requires an
extension of current economic modelling, because:
– Mitigation goes to the root of the problem by reducing GHG emissions; adaptation does not stop
climate change from happening, but aims to reduce associated damages.
– As the carbon cycle causes a natural delay between emissions creation and global warming, it takes
time for mitigation to pay off. Adaptation is potentially subject to an investment cycle only, so that its
benefits accrue more immediately. In summary, adaptation suffers less from an intertemporal externality
than mitigation does.
– Mitigation carried out in one country helps all others that are adversely affected by climate change; but
if the other countries do not join its efforts, the country can do little to avoid climate change. Adaptation
benefits the initiator often exclusively, and is usually effective even if carried out unilaterally. Hence,
adaptation is much less affected by inter-country externalities than mitigation.
The strategic implications of adaptation becoming a significant policy option are however largely unexplored,
as authors are just starting to embed adaptation in their models. Therefore, this thesis sets out to address
the following questions:
– How can adaptation to climate change be adequately represented in economic models of climate change,
and what economic properties does it have?
– (How) does adaptation change the outcome of a non-cooperative climate regime, especially when the
countries are asymmetric?
– International assistance with mitigation and adaptation has been on the top of the agenda since the
adoption of the UNFCCC. In absence of a climate agreement, are there still prospects for clean tech-
nology transfer and adaptation funding to occur?
Returning to the list of features of the climate problem compiled by Boston (2012) presented above, the first
four economic-theoretical features are addressed to various extents in this thesis. The analysis of uncertainy
issues is kept at a marginal level and therefore leaves space for future extensions. The discussion of political-
practical features is outside of the scope of this work.
Overview
This section lays out the broad organization of the thesis. In part I, the mitigation module of the model used
in this thesis is developed. The adaptation module is crafted in part II. Part III analyzes non-cooperative
two-region games with mitigation and adaptation.
The first chapter of part I introduces integrated assessment modelling of climate change and describes the
structure of a number of such models, before turning to criticism about their treatment of technology,
climate damages and intra- and intertemporal equity. In the second chapter, conceptual model approaches to
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replicate the shape of the Environmental Kuznets Curve and to predict endogenous green technical change
are reviewed. These two first chapters lay the foundation for the discussion of SLICE (StyLized Integrated
assessment model of Climate and the Economy), which is introduced in chapter 3 and emerged from the
work of Buckle (2009a,b). In accordance with integrated assessment models, SLICE has a climate and
an economy module, but it is stylized in the sense that it produces qualitative insights, and it deviates
from standard approaches by adopting a welfare framework that is inspired by sustainable preferences as an
alternative to utilitarian discounting. Furthermore, it deviates by adopting additive rather than multiplicative
damages, by modelling mitigation as a process of clean capital accumulation, by considering potential limits
to substitution between climate change and man-made goods and by embedding technological and political
adjustment costs that thwart a transition to clean technologies. Chapter 3 also presents the first extension of
the basic model, so that the social planner can choose to invest in either a dirty or a clean capital stock used
in production. It turns out that the availability of a cleaner technology may not reduce the optimal level
of cumulative carbon emissions, and that this level may even rise in response to emissions-saving technical
progress. The reasons for these rebound effects to occur are explored in chapter 4. Chapter 5 points to a
weakness of the stylized integrated assessment model of Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan (2011)
caused by its damage module, and the chapter assesses the consequences of assuming alternative damage
modules in SLICE.
Part II turns the attention towards adaptation to climate change. Chapter 6 explores its characteristics
along four different dimensions and sketches adaptation measures in different sectors potentially affected by
climate change. In chapter 7, the results of adaptation cost studies are presented and their estimates critically
discussed. Researchers have started to incorporate adaptation in their models only recently. In pioneering
work, chapter 8 reviews and carefully assesses adaptation modelling approaches embedded in four integrated
assessment models and three stylized models. The review reveals that some of the models make an implicit
assumption on adaptation with respect to a fifth, so far unidentified characteristic of adaptation, which is
developed in chapter 9. Adaptation can either be assumed to cancel climate impacts completely or may only
be able to alleviate them. Chapter 9 argues that aggregate adaptation should be assumed alleviating. In
chapter 10, the adaptation module of SLICE is created. A novel adaptation modelling approach is taken.
It turns out that adaptation triggers an emissions-, as well as damage-stimulating rebound effect, which has
not been discussed in the literature so far. The implications of an adaptation poverty trap are explained.
Once the adaptation and the mitigation modules are synthesized, it becomes evident that, under a myopic
planner’s regime, the prospects for adaptation to approach optimal levels are better than those for mitigation.
In part III, the assumption of a single social planner maximizing world welfare in SLICE is given up. Chapter
11 reviews how game-theoretic tools have been applied to the climate problem mostly to find pathways
towards a stringent climate change mitigation agreement. Less work has been conducted on modelling on
clean technology transfer and adaptation funding, which may occur in cooperative scenarios with a single
planner, but are usually not a feature of non-cooperative Nash equilibria. In chapter 12, a two-region
framework is introduced to SLICE, and the outcomes of a range of scenarios are compared with each other.
The two regions are assumed asymmetric and therefore pursue different cumulative emissions targets. In
the simple Cournot game, the superior region (with the higher emissions target) is able to prevail its target
without having to compromise, leaving no scope for the inferior region (with the lower target) to develop at
all, as any non-zero production increases the overpollution of the inferior region. Only if it credibly commits
to at least satisfy its minimum consumption or is the leader of a Stackelberg game, the inferior region gets
hold of (segments of) the carbon cake, whose overall size is determined by the superior region. Apart from
the extreme case of a zero-emissions technology that enables development without affecting the emissions
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balance, the availability of a clean technology does not change the fundamental incentives of the game. In
striking contrast, adaptation empowers the inferior region with a means to alleviate climate damages largely
caused by the superior region; adaptation partially privatizes residual damages. Adaptation empowers the
inferior region to even fulfill the more ambitious sustainability constraint, which demands that the sum of
mid-term consumption and long-term damages is positive. However, in order to be able to adapt in the
long term, the inferior region must generate resources in the mid term. To avoid overpollution from this
economic activity of the inferior region, the superior region may reduce its emissions to lower the pressure
on the inferior region to produce and adapt. Ultimately, it turns out that even in a non-cooperative world –
even though fueled by selfish motivations - there may be incentives for the superior region to provide clean
technology transfer and adaptation funding.
Finally, the policy implications of this analysis and its limitations are discussed.
11
Part I
Mitigation
12
Chapter 1
Integrated Assessment Modelling of
Climate Change
1.1 Overview
A common tool to analyze and quantify the climate problem are integrated assessment models (IAMs). It
is vital to gain an understanding of the general structure of IAMs, their strengths and weaknesses, as the
model introduced in chapter 3, setting the foundation for my own work, shares some characteristics with
them. After a brief introduction to integrated assessment modelling (section 1.2), the prototype IAM, the
Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE), is discussed in depth in section 1.3. Further
approaches are reviewed in section 1.4. The problems of IAMs with regard to an adequate representation of
technology and technological progress, the damage functions and their treatment of equity issues are debated
in section 1.5. These problems undermine the credibility of IAM numerical estimates and have led to the
adoption of a stylized climate model (chapter 3) for the further work of this thesis.
1.2 Introduction to integrated assessment modelling
Integrated assessment has two characteristics. First, it conducts an interdisciplinary analysis, which combines
knowledge from different scientific disciplines that usually operate separately. Second, it aims at informing
policy and decision makers.1
Integrated assessment of climate change brings together insights from science and economics to approach the
climate problem. This is necessary, since climate change is a physical process that involves interaction of the
Earth with the atmosphere, but also comprises an economic dimension, which is apparent when policy makers
debate an appropriate policy response. For the dominating greenhouse gas (GHG) carbon dioxide (CO2), the
diverse links between the physical and the economic sphere are well captured in Figure 1.1: Economic activity
including processes such as production, transportation or land-use change leads to the emission of CO2. A
significant proportion of this is taken up by marine and terrestrial sinks and partially released years later;
this complex process is termed the carbon cycle. Climate change occurs as a result of CO2 accumulating
1Cp. Weyant et al. (1996), p. 371 and Parson (1995), pp. 463f.
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Figure 1.1: Feedback processes between economic and climate systems. Source: Edwards et al. (2005), p.
2.
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in the atmosphere. Climate dynamics, constituted by physics and chemistry, determine the corresponding
temperature increase. In an attempt to quantify the consequences of global warming, economists often draw
upon damage functions that monetize impacts. Due to their adverse effect on the economy, these costs (rarely
benefits) of climate change provide an incentive to adjust or transform the economy, for instance, to pursue
economic development which is fueled by low-carbon energy technologies. Such mitigation action should
result in CO2 emission reductions, and the cycle begins anew.
Science and economics use distinct models for their analyses. Integrated assessment models of climate change
connect modelling approaches from both disciplines to generate a holistic view of the problem and give advice
to decision makers that takes the feedback processes between the economic and the physical systems into
account. While a large body of literature on IAMs has emerged since their appearance2, the very first IAM
was the Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE) developed by William D.Nordhaus,
whose objective was to create “a model that links together in a simplified way the major economic and
scientific elements involved in designing economic policies to slow global warming”.3 First published in the
nineties4, the DICE model has undergone several refinements and improvements.5 Furthermore, it is arguably
still the dominant IAM, which has served as a platform for extensions and has sparked inspiration for seeking
alternative approaches. Probably for this reason Tol (2006) calls it “the prototype of all cost-benefit analyses
of climate change”.6
It is useful to gain a better understanding of this prototype, because the model explained in chapter 3 should
be classified as a stylized integrated assessment model. The treatment of the DICE will enable comparison
and, where appropriate, provide contrast to the approach. Therefore, the next section lays out central
elements of the DICE model structure and highlights some of its essential assumptions. After some of its
extensions are briefly introduced and alternative integrated assessment models touched on in section 1.4, it
is turned to the discussion of some deficiencies in section 1.5 and concluded in section 1.6.
1.3 The DICE model
This section presents the basic model structure of the DICE model, as specified by Nordhaus (2008) in
DICE-2007.7 The focus lies on the composition of the economy module.8
A social planner is assumed to maximize global welfare W over time, depicted by the intertemporal welfare
function
W =
T∑
t=1
Lt
(
c1−σt
1− σ
)
(1 + δ)
−t
. (1.1)
Welfare preferences are represented by the so-called Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function
Ut =
c1−σt
1−σ , which states that individual utility rises with increasing per capita-consumption, ct = Ct/Lt,
implying that U ′t(ct) > 0. Furthermore, marginal utility of consumption decreases (U
′′
t (ct) < 0); this means
that an individual experiencing a certain increment of consumption enjoys a smaller utility gain the richer
2For a comprehensive review of the history of integrated assessment modelling, s. Tol (2006).
3Nordhaus (1994), p. 5.
4S. Nordhaus (1992, 1993) and, most detailed, Nordhaus (1994) for the DICE-94 model.
5For major updates made by Nordhaus s. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) (DICE-99) and Nordhaus (2008) (DICE-2007) as
well as the next section.
6Tol (2006), p. 4.
7Nordhaus offers updated versions, DICE-2010 and RICE-2010 with minor changes to the overall structure, on his homepage,
see http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/RICEmodels.htm, last accessed on 25/05/2012.
8The following descriptions mainly rest on Nordhaus (2008); deviations are reported.
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he or she has been before. The implications of the choice of the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to
consumption, σ ≥ 0, are discussed in detail in sections 1.5.4 and 3.2.2. World population is assumed to equal
labour force Lt, their growth rate is determined exogenously. The social planner discounts future generations’
utility at his or her pure rate of time preference δ.9 The welfare function (1.1) sums up the utilities enjoyed
by the world populations alive from time periods t till T. The periods consist of decades starting with the
decade 2001 - 2010 and terminating with the decade 2240 - 2250.
A single, aggregated good usable for consumption and investment is produced, the process for which is
represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y NETt = Ωt (1− Ξt)PtK̺t L1−̺t , (1.2)
where 0 < ̺ < 1 denotes the elasticity of output with respect to capital Kt, while Pt captures exogenous
Hicks-neutral technical progress10. Population and output11 data are obtained for twelve world regions12,
whereby outputs are gauged in purchasing power parity exchange rates to make production values from the
different regions comparable with each other.13 Equation (1.2) describes net output, Y NETt , because the
gross output Yt is reduced by the costs of CO2 abatement 0 ≤ Ξt ≤ 1, measured in terms of gross output
share, and by climate damages: 0 < Ωt ≤ 1 denotes the fraction of gross output remaining after diminishment
in consequence of global warming14:
Ωt =
1
1 + v1(△Tt) + v2(△Tt)2 . (1.3)
△Tt measures the deviation from the global mean temperature in 1900. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)
acknowledge that global mean temperature increase is not the most important impact variable, but they
regard it as a useful index of climate change, which causes a wider range of adverse impacts.15 The damage
scaling parameters v1 and v2 are estimated from the willingness to pay in the regions to avoid climate change-
induced impacts of a 2.5°C benchmark warming in various categories such as agriculture, sea-level rise, health,
catastrophic changes of the Earth’s geophysics, human settlements and ecosystems, whereby the estimation
draws on existing impact studies, where available. The damage function (1.3) contains a quadratic term in
order to reflect the expectation that damages are non-linearly increasing with rising temperature, whereby
the particular choice of the exponent “2” has no empirical foundation.16 Hence, after the functional form of
the denominator in (1.3) is set in advance, the parameters v1 and v2 are chosen to meet the point estimate
of impacts at a 2.5°C warming. The estimated damage function also incorporates the risk of catastrophic
consequences of climate change such as the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet; the probability of
occurence rises with increases in temperature and is assumed to be 1.2% with a 2.5°C and 6.8% with a 6°C
warming.17 Nordhaus estimates the welfare loss in consequence of a 2.5°C global mean temperature rise at
9For more information on the pure rate of time preference, see section 1.5.4.
10Hicks-neutral technical progress describes general advance that affects all production factors simultaneously and symmetri-
cally.
11Which is also termed income or gross domestic product (GDP).
12These regions are the United States, the European Union, other high-income countries, Russia, Eastern Europe and the
non-Russian former Soviet Union, Japan, China, India, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and other Asia.
13Purchasing power parity exchange rates correct for differences in local income levels and price nivels, s. also Nordhaus
(2007a).
14Cp. the RICE-99 model laid out in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), pp. 17 and 23. Similarly, the DICE-94 model, s. Nordhaus
(1994), pp. 12 and 18f. No changes to the damage function specification were made in the DICE-2007 model update, s. Nordhaus
(2008), pp. 41 and 205.
15Cp. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), p. 64.
16Cp. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), p. 23 and Nordhaus (1994), pp. 18 and 56.
17S. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), pp. 87ff.
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1.5% of projected world GDP in 2100.18 Given that this work relies on the available often limited impact
studies19, Nordhaus admits that the damage function is “extremely conjectural”20.
For zero abatement (Ξt = 0), absolute damages D
DICE
t in monetary terms can congruously be derived as
DDICEt = Yt − Y NETt = (1− Ωt)Yt. (1.4)
This illustrates that Ωt determines the fraction of “surviving” output and that the absolute damages from
climate change scale proportionally with gross output. Abatement costs have the following functional form:
Ξt = χtP
CO2
t
(
ηDICEt
)κ
. (1.5)
0 ≤ ηDICEt ≤ 1 is the control variable to be optimally chosen by the social planner and determines the share
of avoided industrial CO2 emissions. If the share reaches 100%, the economy has completely switched to a
backstop technology through which atmospheric accumulation of industrial CO2 ceases.
21 PCO2t describes
exogenous technical progress in this carbon-saving technology, which makes abatement gradually cheaper
over time. The empirically estimated κ > 1 constitutes a convex abatement cost curve. In DICE-2007,
Nordhaus (2008) adds a parameter χt, which raises abatement costs if only a subset of world regions has
agreed on a CO2 reduction regime, as it for instance was the case in the Kyoto Protocol. The idea behind
this is that if certain regions or sectors are excluded from such a reduction regime, some potentials for
inexpensive abatement are not tapped and marginal abatement costs must rise even faster. Their integration
into equation (1.2) implies that, like damages, also abatement costs are proportional to output, and that
they are modelled as irrecoverable one-time expenses.
Industrial CO2 emissions Et arise from production:
Et = γt
(
1− ηDICEt
)
PtK
̺
t L
1−̺
t , (1.6)
with γt as the carbon-intensity. The aggregated world carbon-intensity is expected to decline by only 0.6%
per year, since the share of emerging economies with high CO2/GDP ratios, such as China, in world income
is rising. The baseline world emissions projection with no abatement
(
Ξt = η
DICE
t = 0
)
, which results from
regional output and carbon intensity projections, ranges between the lower and the middle end of the IPCC
emissions scenarios designed in the year 2000.22 This projection may be regarded as conservative in view of
the fact that observed global CO2 emissions in the first decade of the new century track the IPCC’s highest
emissions scenario A1F1.23
In DICE-2007, only industrial CO2 emissions evolve endogenously, whereas CO2 emissions resulting from
land-use change24 and other GHGs follow exogenous trends derived from separate studies.
18The basic methodology of damage estimation has not changed from the RICE/DICE-99 to the DICE-2007 model, therefore
its description is contained in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), pp. 69ff. Nordhaus emphasizes that only damage to human beings
is taken into account, cp. Nordhaus (2008), pp. 68f.
19For a brief discussion of the quality of these data, see section 1.5.3.
20Nordhaus (2008), p. 42
21The term “backstop technology” was also framed by Nordhaus, who first used it in the context of resource economics to
describe a technology which solves all problems of resource scarcity or energy supply at least for a very long time, cp. Nordhaus
(1973), pp. 547ff. In the DICE model context, Nordhaus refers to a technology which either removes carbon from the atmosphere
or generates energy while causing zero CO2 emissions, s. Nordhaus (2008), p. 42.
22S. Nakicenovic et al. (2000), chapter 4 and Nordhaus (2008), p. 49.
23Cp. Raupach et al. (2007), p. 10289, with global CO2 emissions reaching a new all-time high in 2011, s. International
Energy Agency (2012).
24This refers primarily to conversion of forest into agricultural land.
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The “nature-scientific” part of the model contains a set of equations characterizing the carbon cycle. They
describe in a deliberately simplistic way the dynamics of the carbon sinks in atmosphere, upper oceans and
biosphere and in the deeper oceans. Furthermore, the climate module links atmospheric GHG accumulation
to global mean temperature increase.25 A detailed discussion of that model section is not included, as this
review is mainly used to relate the economy module of the model introduced in chapter 3 to IAM economy
modules, and that model also operates with a further simplified representation of the climate system.
The model operates in a deterministic framework, assuming perfect foresight. It balances current abatement
costs against future damages from climate change, whereby marginal costs of emissions reductions are at all
times equal to their marginal benefits in terms of reduced damages. Nordhaus (2008) points out that all
model results are formed under the heroic assumption that abatement policies are implemented efficiently
everywhere and adds that inefficiencies or incomplete participation of countries and sectors reduce, and may
even reverse, the benefit-cost ratio of every mitigation programme. He emphasizes that the model outcomes
“convey a spurious precision that does not accurately reflect the modeling, behavioral, and measurement
errors and uncertainties”26, but that its function as an integrated assessment model is to provide a consistent
framework that allows a comparison of different policies.
After calibration of the model parameters, the model is numerically solved for sixteen different scenarios, by
use of the General Modelling Algebraic Software (GAMS). The DICE model contrasts the baseline scenario
that assumes zero abatement action with an economically optimal “best-case” scenario. Moreover, it investi-
gates the effect of additional constraints on the concentration of atmospheric CO2 or on maximally tolerable
temperature increase and examines the costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol under varying participation
scenarios. Most interestingly, it also performs two runs that replicate assumptions of the Stern Review27
(Stern (2007)) on the one hand and a (rejected) proposal of the former US Vice President Gore (2007) to
cut “global warming pollution by 90 percent in developed countries and by more than half worldwide in time
for the next generation to inherit a healthy Earth“28.
In the baseline scenario with no abatement the global mean temperature is forecasted to rise by 3.1°C by the
end of the century; from the calibrated damage curve in Figure 1.229 Nordhaus concludes that “[...] the best
guess [...] is that the economic damages from climate change with no interventions will be on the order of 2.5
percent of world output per year by the end of the twenty-first century“30. In comparison to the no-emissions
control scenario, optimal abatement increases global intertemporal welfare as computed by (1.1) by 3.4 trillion
USD (base year 2005). The estimated optimal abatement strategy diminishes temperature rise from 3.1 to
2.6°C in 2100 and from 5.3 to 3.5°C in 2200. These optimal temperature increases exceed the globally agreed
2°C target set in the hope to avoid dangerous consequences of climate change.31 However, when the 2°C
target is imposed as an additional constraint on the economy, according to DICE-2007, mitigation policy
causes losses of one and a half trillion USD compared to the baseline scenario. Nordhaus also concludes that
the Kyoto Protocol is highly cost-ineffective even at a hypothetically high rate of participation, as it leads
25For atmospheric and ocean circulation modellers used to complex simulation models it should be added that, for the sake
of simplicity and computability, the carbon cycle and the climate system together are approximated by six equations only.
26Nordhaus (2008), p. 80.
27See a brief discussion of the Stern Review in sections 1.4.2 and 1.5.4.
28Gore (2007), p. 2. In the simulation, Nordhaus assumes a 90% reduction of world CO2 emissions to take place by 2050 to
represent Gore’s plea in the model, s. Nordhaus (2008), p. 77, which in fact is more than demanded by Al Gore.
29In the figure, the arrow labelled “IPCC estimates” refers to a statement by the IPCC (2007b) Summary of Policymakers
that “global mean losses could be 1-5% GDP for 4°C of warming”, IPCC (2007b), p. 17. It should be emphasized though that
this range reported by the IPCC is informed by five IAM estimates, with the DICE-99 estimate marking the upper end of the
damage estimates range, s. Yohe et al. (2007), p. 822.
30Nordhaus (2008), p. 6.
31S. introductory Motivation chapter of this work.
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Figure 1.2: The DICE-2007 and RICE-1999 global damage curves. Source: Nordhaus (2008), p. 51.
to only marginally lower temperatures in comparison with the no-controls scenario. Furthermore, Nordhaus
estimates that adopting the proposals of the Stern Review or of Al Gore, which both call for sharp emission
reductions in the near future, would lead to welfare losses of around 20 trillion USD (!) compared to the
baseline scenario or approximately one third of world GDP, implying that no abatement is a superior strategy.
Nordhaus therefore rejects these latter two proposals as utterly inefficient, because they require the economy
to adopt carbon-saving technology on a large scale too early, causing huge and immediate abatement costs.
Instead, Nordhaus advocates following a “climate-policy ramp”32: In the near future the economy should
invest in production and human capital, on which returns were currently highest; it should also push research
on low-carbon solutions. In contrast, abatement action should start at low levels and be intensified in the
future when more efficient and inexpensive carbon-saving technologies are available.
In his closing statement, Nordhaus summarizes: “The best approach is one that gradually introduces re-
straints on carbon emissions. [...] A sure and steady increase in harmonized carbon taxes may not have the
swashbuckling romance of a crash program, but it is also less likely to be smashed on the rocks of political
opposition and compromise. Slow, steady, universal, predictable, and boring - these are probably the secrets
for successful policies to combat global warming”33.
1.4 Further approaches to integrated assessment modelling
1.4.1 Extensions of the DICE model
The DICE model was extended to the Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE)
(Nordhaus and Yang (1996); Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)), in which instead of one social planner
32Nordhaus (2008), p. 166.
33Nordhaus (2008), p. 204.
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maximizing aggregated global welfare, the welfare of eight regions is optimized separately and then added
up to compare the outcomes of different policy scenarios.34 Furthermore, regional production functions are
calibrated, subject to regional projections of technical progress. Due to its disaggregation, the RICE model
allows a more detailed analysis of non-cooperative outcomes; even so the main conclusions of the RICE-99
model are similar to those of the DICE-2007 model.35
In his ENTICE-BR36 model, Popp (2004, 2006a,b) endogenizes technological change within the DICE model
framework. He augments it by two knowledge capital stocks; one stock increases energy efficiency, the second
one reduces the price of the backstop technology. Energy is modelled as a further input to production. Popp
concludes that most of the investments in research and development (R&D) take place in absence of any
mitigation policy. Moreover, welfare gains from R&D arise mainly from more inexpensive abatement, but
not from less climate damages, because the optimal temperature increase chosen by the social planner is little
affected by his or her research policy.
Bosetti et al. (2006a) add learning-by-doing as a further mechanism of endogenous technical progress. In
their FEEM-RICE model, learning-by-doing occurs as a result of cumulative past abatement actions and,
together with energy research investments, feeds into an Energy Technical Change Index. As a first effect,
an improvement in this index leads to higher energy efficiency in production. Second, a rising index lowers
the amount of CO2 emissions per unit energy used, i.e. it reduces the carbon intensity. In contrast to the
ENTICE-BR model, the optimal level of research investment is highly dependent on the CO2 stabilization
scenario aimed for.
The WITCH (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid) model (Bosetti et al. (2006b, 2007, 2009)) adopts
the mechanisms of technological change of the FEEM-RICE model and keeps the RICE model framework,
establishing regional social planners who maximize welfare in each of twelve world regions, but WITCH
includes a richer specification of the energy sector. The model distinguishes between electric and non-electric
vectors of energy to acknowledge the fact that reducing CO2 emissions usually is more difficult when satisfying
demand for non-electric energy, e.g. for heat needed in industry. Non-electric energy is generated from coal,
biomass and an aggregate comprising oil, gas and biofuels, including an advanced generation of more carbon-
efficient biofuels, whereby overall use of biofuels is limited to prevent food scarcity. Electricity is generated by
nuclear power, hydroelectric power, from renewable sources and fossil resources, whereby the option for coal-
fired power plants to capture and sequester CO2 is accounted for. The installed power generation capacity,
operation and maintenance costs and fuel consumption together endogenously determine the electricity price.
The model initially favours technologies driven by fossil fuels. It is assumed that the marginal return on capital
investments in plant capacity, and hence also capital costs, are decreasing, so that in the long term when
capital accumulation has progressed, electricity generation shifts to more capital-intensive technologies such
as nuclear and renewable power.
In the WITCH model, regions interact with each other in various ways. First, prices for fossil fuels and
uranium are determined on the world market; their dynamics underly fluctuations in regional demand and
investment decisions. Second, enlarging the capacity of a certain technology in a particular region entails
positive learning-by-doing effects for all users. Third, international spillovers from R&D investments are
assumed. Fourth, regional emissions naturally affect the global emission balance. Finally, if a global emissions
trading system is implemented, it leads to equal marginal abatement costs in all regions, which feeds back
34All welfare functions have the same structure as the welfare function in (1.1).
35Cp. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), pp. 174ff. An update of the RICE model is in progress, s. fn. 7 for Nordhaus’ homepage.
A description and first results of RICE-2010 can be found in Nordhaus (2010).
36Which stands for “Endogenous Technology Integrated model for Climate and the Economy - Backstop R&D”.
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to capital and R&D investment decisions. Bosetti et al. (2009) find that in a non-cooperative setting with
no climate change mitigation agreement in place, no regional leader has sufficient incentive to protect the
climate, given the non-cooperative behaviour of his or her competitors. Furthermore, in such a scenario
CO2 abatement technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and power generation from advanced
biofuels are not adopted. Bosetti et al. reason that only a cooperative solution can induce a transition to
low-carbon technologies.
1.4.2 The PAGE model
The model for Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE) (Plambeck et al. (1997); Hope (2006))
takes an independent approach and exhibits some fundamental differences in comparison to the DICE/RICE
model family. No welfare maximization takes place, as the model operates with exogenous economic scenarios.
In the baseline scenario without any mitigative or adaptive policy, GHG emissions evolve as in the scenario
A2 of the IPCC Third Assessment Report.37 The reduced economy module allows a much more complex
specification of the climate module, which captures the dynamics of three GHGs, namely besides CO2 also
methane (CH4) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). Eight world regions suffer from economic and non-economic
climate damages, which are still defined as a percentage of GDP. Economic damages comprise e.g. capital and
land losses as a consequence of sea level rise, adverse impacts on agriculture or tourism. Damages categorized
as non-economic include loss of biodiversity, human conflicts as a result of more severe water scarcity and
heat stress on human health. Damages only occur if the temperature increase in a region exceeds a tolerable
plateau, or if the temperature rises at a speed faster than the maximum tolerable rate. Adaptation can both
raise the tolerable plateau and rate.38 Parameters in the regional damage functions are calibrated to replicate
damages triggered by a 2.5°C rise above the tolerable plateau. The exponent of the convex damage function,
which is structurally similar to the one defined in (1.3), takes a random value between 1 and 3. GHGs can be
abated to mitigate climate change and further adaptation measures that decrease the net damage of global
warming can be implemented. All mitigation and adaptation policies are determined exogenously.
Besides the more comprehensive climate module and innovations in the damage function, a further distinctive
feature of the PAGE model is its treatment of uncertainty. For about 80 parameters39, whose true value
cannot be estimated with certainty, parameters follow probability distributions; their form is set in accordance
with existing literature. For each of several hundred model runs the parameter values are drawn randomly
from their distributions. Hence, the model generates no point estimates of temperature increase, climate
damage, abatement and adaptation costs, but means and ranges. The model also incorporates uncertainty
regarding large-scale discontinuities of the damage function, the probability of which to appear is initially
low, but assumed to increase once the temperature has risen by 2°C above pre-industrial levels.
This setup allows the PAGE model to perform a powerful sensitivity analysis, where the contribution of
the parameters to overall uncertainty can be estimated. Among the six most influential parameters are
both three climate-related and three economic parameters; this leads Hope (2006) to the conclusion that
performing an integrated assessment is potentially valuable. Among the most decisive parameters are the
climate sensitivity, which is calibrated to match the global mean temperature increase in consequence of a
doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentration
40, and the exponent of the damage function.
37For a description of scenario A2 see Cubasch et al. (2001), pp. 531f.
38The adaptation module of PAGE is analyzed in detail in section 8.3.1.
39The exact number depends on the regions and sectors included in a model run.
40S. Ramaswamy et al. (2001), pp. 353ff. and Denman et al. (2007), pp. 533ff.
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The PAGE2002 model was used in the Stern Review to calculate welfare losses owing to climate change
in a Business as Usual scenario without any mitigation or adaptation efforts. Stern assumes that 80% of
annual income are consumed and calculates aggregate global welfare over time by applying a welfare function
like in (1.1).41 Even though Nordhaus (2008) and the Stern Review use different metrics, it is clear that
Nordhaus’ finding on damages in a no emissions-control scenario42 starkly contrasts with the Stern Review’s
key message: “Our estimate of the total cost of ‘Business as Usual’ (BAU) climate change over the next
two centuries equates to an average welfare loss equivalent to at least 5% of the value of global per-capita
consumption, now and forever. That is a minimum in the context of this model, and there are a number of
omitted features that would add substantially to this estimate. [...] Putting all these together, the cost could
be equivalent to up to around 20%, now and forever”43. The main reason for the discrepancy in results,
namely different approaches to discounting, is explored in section 1.5.4.
1.4.3 The FUND model
Another IAM that adopts exogenous economic scenarios and refrains from welfare optimization is the Cli-
mate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) model, created by Tol (2002a,b,
1999, 1997, 1996). In the model, output and population growth of nine world regions are impacted by climate
change. Climate-induced changes in migration patterns, heat and cold stress affect regional population devel-
opment, while climate damages diminish output and, as a consequence, welfare. Simplyfying the description
of the economic dynamics allows Tol to create a very rich damage module. The functional form of the
damage functions varies and depends on the particular impact category a function describes. Damages are a
consequence of both temperature rise and a high rate of temperature change. Impact categories comprise of
agriculture, forestry, ecosystems, sea level rise, health, water resources and energy consumption44. Tol allows
varying levels of vulnerability to climate change, for instance resistance to vector-borne diseases is strongly
correlated with per-capita income. A further distinct feature of the FUND model is that damages reduce
output not only in the period they occur, but also in subsequent years; damages decline geometrically. For
instance, Tol assumes that agriculture can react to climate change comparatively quickly (damages fade out
after ten years), whereas biodiversity losses are irreversible (impact lasts for a hundred years). CO2 emissions
resulting from land-use change and the GHGs methane and nitrous oxide (N2O) follow exogenous trends and
cannot be controlled. While energy efficiency and carbon intensity improve autonomously over time, two
options exist to further reduce the flow of CO2 into the atmosphere, namely abatement of industrial CO2
emissions and afforestration; afforestration enlarges terrestrial carbon sinks.
Again, abatement action turns out to be neglible in a non-cooperative scenario. In a cooperative scenario,
regions still need to be compensated for the implementation of certain mitigation measures that increase
global welfare, if the cost-benefit-ratio for these particular regions is negative; otherwise they are assumed
to leave the global coalition. This arises from planners maximizing regional rather than global welfare and
poses a problem for poor regions, which gain most from aggressive mitigation. As Tol explains, welfare is not
transferable, whereas money is. However, welfare is concave in terms of income. If poor beneficiaries transfer
a given amount of money to rich countries to compensate them for abatement efforts, the former suffer a
lot more than the latter gain in terms of welfare. Nevertheless, in the cooperative scenario North America
becomes a net recipient of money transfers for compensation. With the almost exclusive responsibility of
41Cp. Stern (2007), pp. 143ff. and pp. 161f.
42S. third-ultimate paragraph of section 1.3.
43Stern (2007), p. 144.
44Considering here that global warming changes the demand for heating and cooling.
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industrial nations for past, committed emissions, this is a curious result, at least in terms of justice. Like
Nordhaus, Tol advocates modest mitigation policies to combat climate change, but adds a word of caution
due to the large uncertainties that the model captures only imperfectly. Moreover, he points out the large
sensitivity of optimal abatement to exogenous emission-driving output growth, autonomous carbon-saving
technical progress and the discount rate. Forestry measures turn out to be far too expensive in every scenario
to be undertaken.45
1.5 Problems and criticism of integrated assessment modelling
1.5.1 Introduction
Tol (2008) notes that most IAMs predict an annual welfare loss of up to 2.5% of world GDP for an increase of
global mean temperature by 2.5°C, which is not overly severe.46 In their critical review of integrated assment
literature on the climate problem, Ackerman et al. (2009) describe the paradox that while scientists call
for an immediate step change in mitigation action to fight climate change, most economists who draw on the
results of IAMs conclude that only moderate abatement starting from low levels and gradually increasing
over time is the most appropriate strategy.47 IAMs have been criticized for a wide range of issues, including
the treatment of technical progress, their damage modules and how they deal with equity. The following
sections review these debates.
1.5.2 Technology and technical progress
Much criticism has been directed against the modelling of (abatement) technology and associated technical
progress in IAMs. Stanton et al. (2009) complain that in order to avoid explosive behaviour leading away
from a unique, stable equilibrium, most economy modules assume constant returns to scale of production,
as in the DICE production function (1.2), in which the sum of output elasticities adds up to one. With this
specification, a doubling of all input factors effects a doubling of output, but because in any model with more
than one production factor the output elasticity of a single production factor must congruously be smaller
than one, each production factor on its own exhibits decreasing marginal returns. Stanton et al. argue that
this does not do justice at least to many new, knowledge-driven technologies48. Furthermore, carbon-saving
technologies suffer from low market penetration; they become more profitable the larger the network within
they operate is, exhibiting increasing returns to scale. Restricting the productivity of such technologies in
economic models not only underestimates their potential, but also disables the analysis of path dependence
and technological “lock-in”s, where past decisions and developments cement the status quo. For instance if a
technology only survives at the market because it is implemented economy-wide and has become a standard
so that market-entry is hard for any challenger. This issue is examined in more detail in section 3.2.4.
Stanton et al. also criticize that expenses for abatement in IAMs often cause a pure loss of income. In the
DICE model this can be seen from (1.2), where abatement costs Ξt simply diminishes the net output without
material compensation. Abatement is modelled as a flow variable and has a one-time effect, and money spent
45Ortiz and Markandya (2009) motivated the selection of models discussed in this section 1.4.
46S. Tol (2008), p. 30.
47Cp. Ackerman et al. (2009), pp. 298f.
48In endogenous growth theory, knowledge as a production factor is often associated with constant or increasing marginal
returns, drives technical progress and thereby allows the prediction of continuous economic growth. See for the origins of this
idea Romer (1986).
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is irreversibly lost. This not only neglects second-order effects such as job creation49, but also falls short of
capturing the nature of abatement expenses. Rather than causing a one-time loss, these investments may at
least in part serve to accumulate a new type of capital, which reenters the economy as a production factor.50
This approach is taken in chapter 3, where a model with clean capital accumulation is introduced.
Without doubt, projections of long-term mitigation costs must entail assumptions on technical progress.
However, its dynamics are poorly described if it is modelled as a purely exogenous process, as it happens
in the DICE model without extensions, where technical progress is described by the two parameters Pt
and PCO2t in (1.2) and (1.5) respectively. Technical progress is enjoyed without any R&D investment,
which is infeasible to be taken in the DICE model51, but usually a requirement for technological advance.
Furthermore, improvements in the performance of existing technologies like an enhanced energy efficiency
arise from learning-by-doing experience as touched on in section 1.4.1. Put into this perspective, early
practice is the key to future discovery. Exogenous technical progress is one reason why IAMs such as
the DICE model often advocate moderate abatement in the present and gradual increments; autonomous
technology enhancements make postponing abatement a cost-efficient option. Ackerman et al. (2009) bring
their criticism to the point as following: “Waiting for the deus ex machina of technical change, the misleading
option suggested by IAMs, will ensure that we have fewer options at significantly higher costs”52. The debate
on endogenous versus exogenous technological change is resumed in section 2.3.1.
1.5.3 Damages from climate change, discontinuities and uncertainty
While uncertainty is attached to every projection and to many scientific and economic parameters applied in
IAMs, all authors admit that the largest uncertainty surrounds the damage module53, which links expected
global warming to damages. This is a tragedy, since avoided damages determine the benefits of mitigation.
The limited availability of robust impact studies present a serious problem for integrated assessment modellers.
The calibration of the damage functions relies on figures from few impact studies, if available, otherwise on
the modeller’s conjectures. Tol (2002a) points out that many IAMs draw on old, possibly outdated impact
studies. Indeed, Nordhaus (2008) does not report that he has updated impact figures when creating the
DICE-2007 model, but refers to the damage module description of RICE-99, which makes clear that they still
stem from the chapter on social costs of climate change of the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report (Pearce
et al. (1996)) that Tol mentions as the main source for IAM modellers.54 Furthermore, Tol criticizes that IAM
authors do not explain in sufficient detail “the myriad assumptions”55 they embrace to construct damage
funtions from impact studies. This lack of transparency makes it impossible for another person than the
author to integrate an update of the impact figures into the model. Even more problematic, Nordhaus and
49Which may matter if full employment is not assumed.
50Cp. Stanton et al. (2009), pp. 176f. Note that mitigation capital accumulation is conceptually different from knowledge
accumulation that leads to technical progress e.g. increasing energy efficiency, as occurring in ENTICE-BR and FEEM-RICE,
reviewed in section 1.4.1.
51Nordhaus acknowledges the deficiencies of exclusively relying on exogenous technological change, since e.g. rising carbon
prices can lead to more research on carbon-saving technology that in turn triggers improvements in carbon efficiency, but
states: “[...] Robust modeling of induced technological change has proven extremely difficult, and to date no reliable modeling
specification for a DICE type model has been developed”, Nordhaus (2008), pp. 34f. This is a surprising conclusion against
the background of extensions in this field presented in section 1.4.1 and the discussion of approaches to implement endogenous
technological change in IAMs by Vollebergh and Kemfert (2005), pp. 140ff.
52Ackerman et al. (2009), p. 308.
53The “thorniest issue in climate-change economics”, Nordhaus (2008), p. 36.
54Cp. Tol (2002a), p. 48 and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), pp. 74ff. The limited impact data still pose a problem, see e.g.
Fankhauser (2009).
55Tol (2002a), p. 48.
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Boyer (2000) explain that while more data is available for some impact sectors such as agriculture and sea
level rise, they are generally very limited for others such as immobile human settlements and biodiversity.
In addition, as Ackerman et al. (2009) point out, assigning monetary values to incidences not evaluated on
markets is not straightforward. Asking for the willingness to pay to prevent heat death entails well-known
shortcomings like varying figures for the value of a human life, which depend on the prosperity of the region
in which they have been surveyed.56
The functional form of damage functions has also come under fire. A large body of literature criticizes
the choice of the exponent in the damage function as often arbitrary, but highly consequential. In the
DICE model, the damage function (1.3) is assumed to be quadratic, due to what “appears to be purely a
mathematical convenience”57. Dietz et al. (2007a) show that fixing the exponent at 3 instead of drawing it
from its distribution with mode 1.3 boosts consumption losses in the PAGE2002 model by a further 23%.58
Heal (2009) criticizes the common habit of expressing climate damages as a percentage value of national
income; in Nordhaus’ damage function this percentage value is given by (1−Ωt) in (1.4). Heal points out that
this practice raises a major question, namely how climate damages react in response to a rise in output. A
doubling of undisturbed gross output leads not only to a doubling of net output in (1.2), but also a doubling
of damages from climate change, as can be seen from (1.4). Heal stresses that this mechanism is “not
self-evident” and poses the reasonable question of whether with a doubling of output, the values of coastal
area and biodiversity lost owing to global warming also double.59 The same mechanism and criticism both
apply to abatement costs as modelled in (1.2).60 Subsequent and related work by Weitzman (2009a, 2010)
well illustrates the large sensitivity of conclusions for mitigation policy to the precise modelling of climate
damages. Specifications with multiplicative damages, which are assumed in DICE, PAGE as well as most
other IAMs, appear to optimally support dramatically lower levels of mitigation action than specifications
with additive climate damages, which diminish income and capital base by substraction.61 The wedge
between damage figures is increasing in the consumption growth rate. Weitzman does not want to express a
preference of one formulation over the other, but concludes: “In this spirit it might be argued that, relative
to the multiplicative form, the additive formulation does not trivialize the welfare impacts of large future
temperature changes. One lesson to be drawn from this simple numerical example is that a seemingly arcane
distinction between an additive and a multiplicative interaction of temperature change with consumption
might have big consequences. If so, then it becomes another example of structural uncertainty exerting a
decisive influence on climate-change policy”.62
From (1.3) and (1.4) it can be derived that climate damage is restricted as well as bounded to the current
period’s output, DDICEt < Yt, hence the economy’s capital base is generally assumed to be unaffected by
climate change. This specification must exhibit serious drawbacks e.g. when considering small island states,
where damages from climate change cannot be coped with by some gradual reductions in output, but where
sea level rise threatens the existence of the islands themselves. Stanton et al. (2009) note that many
impacts from climate change affect the capital stock rather than income, for instance when they threat
56Cp. Ackerman et al. (2009), pp. 305f.
57Ackerman et al. (2008), p. 9. Exactly this single sentence has been omitted in the final version of the paper though, cp.
Ackerman et al. (2010), p. 1660.
58Cp. Dietz et al. (2007a), p. 144.
59Maybe the value of coastal areas does - as with higher output probably also the capital base is larger and “more value at
stake” - but this needs careful argumentation.
60Cp. Heal (2009), p. 15.
61For a mathematical specification of additive damages, s. equation (3.22) in section 3.2.7. Chapter 5 further illustrates the
different approaches and also comes to the conclusion that multiplicative and additive damage specifications may lead to distinct
results.
62Cp. Weitzman (2009a), pp. 2ff., quote on p. 4, and Weitzman (2010), pp. 57ff.
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coastal property or trigger migration. Other impacts may compromise capital and labour productivity, when
droughts reduce harvests and diseases harm health. Stanton et al. acknowledge the mechanism built in the
FUND model to replicate damages with consequences lasting for more than one model period.63
Another major problem exists in reflecting the risk of catastrophic events adequately, since science cannot
estimate with certainty when rising temperature will reach levels at which so-called “tipping points” of
the Earth system are trespassed, triggering major and potentially irreversible changes to it, such as the
possible collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet leading to significant sea level rise.64 Abrupt disastrous
events should be reflected as discontinuities in the damage functions.65 Stanton et al. (2009) acknowledge
the attempt of the DICE model to take the increasing probability of catastrophic events into account, but
object to the deterministic, expected-value based damage point estimates.66 In fact, Weitzman (2009b)
warns that standard cost-benefit analysis based on expected utility theory fails to represent the unknown-low
probability, high-impact aspect of disastrous climate damage adequately, as such extreme disasters would
lead to the “devastation of the planet in a science-fiction dystopia”67. The bare possibility of occurrence
is unacceptable and therefore the unprecedented welfare loss associated with these disasters may not be
averaged.68
Furthermore, Hall and Behl (2006) point out the role of climate instability around a mean level, reporting
that rapid large magnitude climatic transitions in the past tended to reinforce climate fluctuations around
mean levels. If such climate instability led to capital destruction, this should alter the expected return on
capital investments. Also, it can make adaptation measures to a particular state of nature worthless. IAMs
like FUND and PAGE in which damages also depend on the rate of temperature change try to account
for this at least in part. More severely, Hall and Behl come to the conclusion that climate instability
is not compatible with the DICE climate module, which operates with single long-run equilibria for CO2
concentration and temperature, because the adequate incorporation of climate instabilities would introduce
non-convexities to the convex world of economists, hence destroy the notion of a unique, stable equilibrium.
Hall and Behl suggest: “There is a fundamental problem with economic optimization models like DICE for
economic analysis of climate instability: a solution does not exist”.69
1.5.4 Intra- and intertemporal equity
Economists make choices on how to deal with equity, as consumption, investment and damage streams
accrue at different places and at different times. Since a utilitarian welfare function is adopted, which sums
up utilities of generations living in different places and at different times, these assumptions about how those
utility streams are evaluated are decisive. If, for instance, the utility of a certain region or generation is for
any reason underweighed, this will have the consequence that in the optimal, welfare-maximizing solution this
group will receive less resources available for consumption and have to cope with more damages from climate
change, since that group’s utility contributes less than the other groups’ utilities to intra- and intertemporal
welfare.
63Cp. Stanton et al. (2009), p. 173.
64For a discussion of tipping elements and a survey of their possible tipping points, s. Lenton et al. (2008).
65Whereby the exact location of these discontinuities is unknown; for this reason the DICE and the PAGE model assume that
the probability of catastrophic incidents rises once global mean temperature has exceeded a certain threshold.
66Cp. Stanton et al. (2009), p. 172f.
67Ackerman et al. (2009), p. 311.
68S. Weitzman (2009b), pp. 2ff.
69Cp. Hall and Behl (2006), pp. 458ff., quote on p. 460.
27
CHAPTER 1. INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT MODELLING OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Stanton (2009) and Stanton et al. (2009) criticize the way current, in this sense intratemporal inequity is
dealt with in IAMs where several social planners maximize regional welfare and utilities of these regions add
up to global welfare, as it occurs in the RICE and the WITCH models. Indeed, since common utility functions
as embedded in (1.1) imply declining marginal utilities with rising consumption levels, in a world characterized
by a highly unequal distribution of wealth direct income transfers would be the most powerful means to raise
global welfare.70 Entailing the same logic, due to decreasing marginal returns, capital investment is most
profitable in capital-poor regions.
In order to maintain the current income distribution and to prevent IAMs from suggesting a global equal-
ization of wealth, modellers fall back on a technical fix. In a baseline run, they disable trade and income
transfers. Regional differences in marginal capital productivity, which in theory determine the real interest
rates and thereby the direction of international capital flows, are first recorded and then eliminated by ap-
pending so-called Negishi weights.71 In order to equalize the marginal product of capital across all regions,
higher weights, which are just the inverse of each region’s marginal product of capital, have to be assigned to
industrialized countries that are capital-rich, because in these countries the marginal productivity of physical
capital is comparatively low. When transfers are allowed in the IAM standard mode, regional utilities are
multiplied by their Negishi weights, so that the marginal utility of an additional unit of income is the same
across regions. This procedure establishes a world where “natural” interest rates are equal, before global
warming impacts and regional climate policies may introduce opportunities for arbitrage. Nordhaus (2008)
defends: “The analysis does not make any case for the social desirability of the distribution of incomes over
space or time of existing conditions, any more than a marine biologist makes a moral judgment on the equity
of the eating habits of marine organisms. [...] we must limit the scope to what is already a sufficiently
complex area”.72 However, as Stanton (2009) points out, applying Negishi weighing effectively leads to
the consequence that utility gains in rich countries add more to global welfare, or equivalently, that welfare
generated in poor regions is less valuable. This method raises the question of whether “climate change and
greenhouse gas abatement policy” are “essentially” to be regarded as “a problem of justice”.73 Stanton
et al. (2009) further complain that this procedure and its implications are rarely well-explained, with the
consequence that they are even not understood by most non-specialized economists.74
This is certainly not true for probably the most contentious issue within climate economics, the treatment
of intertemporal equity. The common underlying algorithm to perform welfare optimization has been under
continuous debate for almost a century, and the fact that the discussion is ongoing and lively provides a
challenge to put the controversy in a nutshell.75
IAM modellers usually adopt the Ramsey growth model framework, where a welfare function equal or very
similar to (1.1) is maximized over time.76 From optimization, the Ramsey rule for the discount rate ρ, which
is an endogenous variable in the original model, is obtained:
70Following this reasoning thoroughly, the egalitarian society with equal per-capita consumption would, at least from a static
point of view, be optimal.
71This method traces back to Negishi (1972), pp. 16ff.
72Nordhaus (2008), p. 40.
73Tol (2002b), p. 157.
74The problem description largely follows Stanton (2009), pp. 5ff. and Stanton et al. (2009), pp. 175ff. The procedure how
Negishi weights are built into the RICE model is described in Yang and Nordhaus (2006), p. 733.
75To follow up only parts of the recent debate of intertemporal equity in the context of climate economics, see Ackerman
and Finlayson (2006); Ackerman et al. (2009); Dasgupta (2008, 2007); Dietz and Asheim (2011); Dietz et al. (2007a,b);
Nordhaus (2008, 2007b); Stern (2008, 2007); Stanton et al. (2009); Sterner and Persson (2008); Sunstein and Weisbach
(2008); Weitzman (2007).
76For an overview of alternative intertemporal welfare concepts in economics, which could in most cases not assert themselves
in literature, s. Heal (2005).
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ρ = δ +
c˙
c
σ (1.7)
δ > 0 is the pure rate of time preference and in the long term represents discrimination of future generations or
“parental selfishness”77 with respect to their children.78 c˙c is the per-capita consumption growth rate, and σ ≥
0 denotes the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, which describes the percental decline
of marginal utility in response to a one-percent increase of consumption. The higher σ, the less additional
utility is gained from a given increment in consumption. In an intertemporal setting, the interpretation of
σ extends to a measure of aversion against inequality. The lower the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
σ−1, the less willing the social planner is to accept differences in intergenerational consumption patterns. In
this context, if c˙c > 0, less concerns towards future generations exist, as they are richer than us anyway.
79
Since all IAMs under inspection project positive output and consumption growth, the discount rate ρ is
always positive, leading to a devaluation of future consumption, but also damage streams.
In the original Ramsey model, the Ramsey rule (1.7) determines the decision on optimal consumption/saving,
and ρ equals the return on investment or savings. For this reason, Nordhaus (1994, 2008) calibrates the
parameters in (1.7) in accordance with observed market returns to δ = 3% and σ = 1 in the DICE-94 model
and, in response to criticism of a too high pure rate of time preference, to δ = 1.5% and σ = 2 in DICE-2007.
For DICE-2007, he projects an annual global per-capita consumption growth of c˙c = 1.3% for the period 2000-
2100, due to population growth and non-constant consumption growth the discount rate equals ρ = 5.5%.80
Nordhaus justifies his approach as follows: “The approach in the DICE model is to use the estimated market
return on capital as the discount rate. The estimated discount rate in the model averages 4 percent per year
over the next century. This means that $1,000 worth of climate damages in a century is valued at $20 today.
Although $20 may seem like a very small amount, it reflects the observation that capital is productive. Put
differently, the discount rate is high to reflect the fact that investments in reducing future climate damages to
corn and trees should compete with investments in better seeds, improved equipment, and other high-yield
investments”81.
On the contrary, while Stern (2007) combines a lower σ = 1 with a global per-capita consumption growth
rate of c˙c = 1.3% in the Stern-Review
82, he also sets a considerably lower pure rate of time preference,
δ = 0.1%, reflecting the opinion that “the only sound ethical basis for placing less value on the utility [...] of
future generations [is] the uncertainty over whether or not the world will exist, or whether those generations
will all be present”83. This leads to a discount rate of ρ = 1.4%, considerably lower than Nordhaus’ discount
77Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), p. 87.
78In the short and mid-term, δ describes individual impatience; present consumption is preferred to consumption in the future.
In an intergenerational framework the interpretation of δ changes as delineated, but it experienced early criticism: ”[. . . ] we do
not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from
the weakness of the imagination”, Ramsey (1928), p. 543. Also Ackerman et al. (2009), p. 301, point out that discounting
has found its way into intergenerational welfare economics at least partially due to a mathematical necessity, since without
discounting the optimization problem may lack a solution. See for a useful illustration of this paradox Heal (1993), pp. 858ff.
and 869f.
79The properties of σ are more formally explored in section 3.2.2. The parameters of the Ramsey rule (1.7) are exhaustively
explained in all publications listed in fn. 75. For a thorough introduction into the standard Ramsey growth model and the
derivation of the Ramsey rule see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004); see Dasgupta (2008) for this matter in the context of
climate economics.
80Cp. Nordhaus (1994), p. 11 and Nordhaus (2008), pp. 9ff., p. 50, p. 108 and p. 178. For the period 2000-2100 only, the
discount rate of the DICE-2007 would equal ρ = 4.1%.
81Nordhaus (2008), pp. 10f.
82While Dasgupta (2007), pp. 5ff., contests σ = 1 as too low, Sterner and Persson (2008), pp. 65f., argue that this value
is too high; s. also section 4.5.
83Stern (2007), p. 51. For the parameter values see Stern (2007), pp. 46f. and p. 161, fn. 35 and 36.
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rate. Stern interprets the factor (1 + δ)
−t 84 in (1.1) as the probability that human race does not become
extinct due to a devastating meteorite, nuclear wars or diseases and ascertains that for a higher value such
as δ = 1.5% this probability of human race surviving 100 years is only 22%.85 Dietz et al. (2007a) state
that it is not appropriate to adopt market returns to derive the value of the discount rate ρ, since market
returns contain much information about the short run, but too little about the long run, which is relevant
for discounting climate damages occurring in the far future. Furthermore, market returns are distorted
and neglect environmental externalities.86 Nordhaus (2008) and Dasgupta (2008) retort that dissolving
the discount rate away from observable market returns produces major inconsistencies; adopting Stern’s
parameter values would lead to unrealistically high saving rates.87
The debate has heated up88, and a consensus on the appropriate value of the discount rate is out of sight.89
This would not be an overly significant problem if the sensitivity of the overall results to the discount rate
was low. Unfortunately, it seems that the discount rate is one of the determining factors in climate policy.
When Nordhaus (2007b, 2008) plugs Stern’s value for the pure rate of time preference, δ = 0.1%, into his
DICE-2007 model, the socially optimal carbon price to be charged in 2015 for releasing one ton of carbon
bound in CO2 skyrockets from 42 USD in the DICE’s optimal scenario to 348 USD, see Figure 1.3, triggering
the immediate step change in abatement efforts called for by Stern.90 Nordhaus comments: “Having analyzed
the Stern Review, I find that the difference [in its findings and the results of the DICE model] stems almost
entirely from its technique for calculating discount rates and only marginally on new science or economics“91.
Looked at this from a different perspective, despite the structural differences in the models with respect to
other aspects of climate change, solely adopting Stern’s assumptions with respect to discounting in the DICE
model overturns its entire conclusions. The discount rate dominates the science.
While all previously discussed models operate with a single, aggregated consumption (and production) good,
Sterner and Persson (2008) stress the importance of relative good prices. If consumption is disaggregated
into consumption of material goods and environmental services and limited substitutability between the two
is assumed, it must be expected that future climate damages increase scarcity and price of environmental
services. Applying Nordhaus’ discount rate and introducing relative prices into the DICE-2007 model, they
find that the optimal emission path comes close to that of the Stern Review.92 Their general idea could be
84Or e−δt in continuous time.
85Justifying a positive δ by referring to the risk of human extinction is an old approach, s. e.g. Dasgupta and Heal (1979),
pp. 261f. As Sterner and Persson (2008), p. 65, rightly point out, in this view even a δ = 0.1% appears high, since human
race becomes extinct within the next 1000 years with a probability of 63%. Homo sapiens has been alive for more than 60.000
years.
86Cp. Dietz et al. (2007b), pp. 239ff.
87Cp. Nordhaus (2008), p. 179 and Dasgupta (2007), p. 6. The reasoning behind this view follows from the Ramsey model:
A low interest rate must result from high savings leading to intensified capital accumulation, which diminishes the marginal
productivity of capital and in turn the interest rate.
88Nordhaus (2008), pp. 167f.: “[...] The Stern Review was published without an appraisal of methods and assumptions by
independent outside experts [...]. The British government is not infallible in questions of economic and scientific analysis of
global warming, any more than it was in its assessment of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. [...] The Stern Review was
prepared in record time. One of the unfortunate consequences of this haste is that it is a thicket of vaguely connected analyses
and reports on the many facets of the economics and science of global warming. [...] The Stern Review’s radical view of policy
stems from an extreme assumption about discounting”. Dietz et al. (2007b), p. 250: “Those who deny the importance of strong
and early action should explicitly propose at least one of three arguments: (i) there are no serious risks; (ii) we can adapt
successfully to whatever comes our way, however big the changes; (iii) the future is of little importance. The first is absurd, the
second reckless, and the third unethical”.
89For an honest synopsis of both positions and an attempt to unify them see Sunstein and Weisbach (2008), although
their conclusions seem incomplete, for instance Sunstein and Weisbach largely neglect the issue of limited substitutability
between material goods and environmental services as discussed in the following paragraph. Also Dasgupta (2008) provides an
evenhanded overview of matter and argument.
90Cp. Nordhaus (2008), pp. 184ff. and Nordhaus (2007b), pp. 201f. A similar simulation is performed by Ackerman and
Finlayson (2006).
91Nordhaus (2007b), p. 201.
92S. Sterner and Persson (2008), pp. 68ff.
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Figure 1.3: The optimal carbon tax: original DICE-2007 assumptions on the discount rate versus the Stern
Review’s assumptions plugged into DICE-2007. Source: Nordhaus (2007b), p. 201.
visualized in equation (1.7): If utility was explicitly dependent on environmental services, too, this would
add a third term to the Ramsey rule. With degrading environmental quality, the discount rate ρ could
become negative. In this case, restoring intertemporal equity would require the present generation to transfer
resources to future poorer generations.
Furthermore, Ackerman et al. (2009) elaborate that uncertainty with respect to future consumption streams
should diminish their present value. Therefore, a negative term reflecting this uncertainty should be added
to (1.7), decreasing the discount rate, so that precautionary savings are lifted.93
To summarize, the treatment of intertemporal equity within IAMs is a major driving force of their outcomes,
while the representation of complex ethical issues by a few parameters must be regarded as crude. Dasgupta
(2008) concludes in his closing statement: “Intergenerational welfare economics raises more questions than
it is able to answer satisfactorily”.94
Finally, also the unequal treatment of intra- and of intertemporal equity in some IAMs raises questions.
Stanton et al. (2009) point to a puzzling deficiency embedded in IAMs that combine Negishi weighing and
discounting in the ways described above.95 They criticize rightly that in models like RICE or WITCH on the
one hand projected intergenerational differences in consumption levels strongly impact the optimal decisions
and resource distribution (as long as σ > 0 in (1.7)), whereas on the other hand any influence from current
intragenerational differences in consumption levels is ruled out through Negishi weighing.96 In other words,
while intratemporal welfare differences are neutralized, projected intertemporal welfare differences are major
determinants of the optimal outcome; this manifests an inconsistency that is hard to deny.
1.6 Conclusions
Probably the main contribution of integrated assessment models is that they provide a tool for transdisci-
plinary analysis. The idea to link classic economic models to simplified scientific climate modules must be
called revolutionary. These combined models formalize the interaction between the economy and the climate
93Cp. Ackerman et al. (2009), pp. 303f. See also Weitzman (2007), pp. 9ff.
94Dasgupta (2008), p. 167.
95Hence, this point of criticism does not apply to the DICE model or the PAGE model as used in the Stern Review.
96Cp. Stanton et al. (2009), p. 176. Similarly, Sterner and Persson (2008), p. 66.
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system and triggered a - sometimes controversial - dialogue between scientists and economists. As Tol
(2006) points out, economics and science have different intellectual traditions and their tools were developed
separately.97 Indeed, while many climate scientists aim at developing complex models to replicate reality in
as much detail as possible, economists are used to adopting many simplifying assumptions when dealing with
the chaotic element in economic space, the human being. Consequentially, economists’ efforts to incorporate
“scientific space” into their models raise serious concerns among scientists who worry that simplified models
can lead to wrong or incomplete conclusions.
IAMs must be called highly influential and very powerful in stimulating and governing the debate around
the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation. Without a doubt, the Stern Review with its clear-cut
recommendations based on results of the PAGE2002 model contributed considerably to levering the climate
problem up to the top of politicians’ and business leaders’ agendas. However, there is strong disagreement
about the estimated figures. Heal (2009) states that the climate change damage cost range of only 1 till 2% of
annual world GDP as predicted by most standard IAMs “is almost within the margin of accounting error, and
the IPCC certainly gives the impression that climate change will have a far-reaching impact on many human
activities, which is not consistent with so small a value”. He highlights as a particular example agriculture,
where severe food scarcity could lead to soaring food prices, while current food prices underestimate the
willingness-to-pay for food. Furthermore, he points out areas where even the Stern Review, which calls for
an immediate step change in ramping up mitigation efforts, made conservative assumptions.98
The list of problems coupled to integrated assessment models is long. It is clear that a problem as complex
as climate change must be hard to capture in a model that can still be handled by a small group of people
or a single person, but the sensitivity to that model conclusions depend on certain assumptions and even on
the choice of single parameters is frightening and may make numerical results look dubious, if not arbitrary.
It should be highlighted that all modellers put a tremendous effort in collecting data and calibration of their
models, while they do not tire of emphasizing that figures should be taken with a pinch of salt. However, in
the end it is the numbers produced which are used to inform policy-makers about the scale of the problem
and to compare policy options.
Three different roads can be taken from this:
1. Clearly, numerical figures are demanded and needed by decision-makers. For this reason, existing IAMs
will have to be further refined and extended, which is probably the road taken by most IAM modellers; the
extensions of IAMs by adaptation modules (section 8.3) is a proof of evidence that this is happening. However,
this does not seem enough. The Ramsey growth model is now almost a hundred years old and the problems it
entails are well-known. It is highly unsatisfactory that - crucially important - welfare considerations squeezed
into a few parameters are able to dominate the findings of science. A major step forward might require a
different approach to welfare, none of which have gained wide acceptance in economics so far.99 Furthermore,
incorporating discontinuities and multiple equilibria fed in by nature must trigger a veritable revolution in
economic analysis, which is currently designed to identify a unique, stable equilibrium.
2. Ackerman et al. (2009) compare policies to mitigate climate change with insurance against other low-
probability high-impact events such as residential fires or deaths of healthy young people. Given that indi-
viduals buy insurance against incidents that take place with much lower probability than disastrous climate
change is expected to occur with, they conclude that, despite greater uncertainty around catastrophic im-
pacts of climate change, it must also be rational for society as a whole to take a precautionary approach. In
97S. Tol (2006), pp. 11f.
98Cp. Heal (2009), pp. 16f., quote on p. 16.
99Another welfare concept is applied in the model introduced in chapter 3. See also fn. 76 of this chapter.
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practice, this could mean that science determines a mitigation target in terms of temperature rise or a limit
on the maximum amount of tolerable cumulative carbon emissions100, which aims at ruling out catastrophic
climate change with a probability close to certainty. This way economics would no longer attempt to inves-
tigate an optimal policy by comparing marginal costs and benefits of mitigation strategies, since the desired
level of climate change would not have to be economically estimated, but would be dictated by science.
Economic analysis would be released from relying on the stylized optimizing decision of a hypothetical social
planner and the calculation and monetization of climate damages via highly contentious impact functions,
but reduced to the assessment of least-cost abatement strategy achieving the target.101 In fact, this road
leads to a disaggregation of state-of-the-art IAMs.
3. There seems to be some disagreement even among IAM users on the purpose of IAMs: While Nordhaus
(2008) and Stern (2007) use IAMs to quantify the climate problem, Keller et al. (2004), who adopt
DICE-94 to investigate optimal abatement under catastrophic climate damages, describe the limitations to
their conclusions in a very modest manner: “One cannot take the DICE model’s policy recommendations too
literally, but it has repeatedly provided useful insights into the basic phenomena determining optimal policy
under climate change. [...] Integrated assessment models of climate change are nothing more than thinking
tools to analyze the interactions between the economic and the environmental system in a highly simplified,
but transparent, way. As a result, the resulting policy recommendations should be taken with a grain of salt
and are subject to numerous caveats”102. Put differently, while numerical results may not be robust, IAMs
nevertheless teach important lessons about the interplay of the economy and the climate, different strategies
to cope with climate change and optimal coordination of mitigation efforts. A third approach therefore is to
create new frameworks for research and leave the numerical analysis aside at least for some time. Stylized
models have a long tradition in economics in areas such as growth theory and game theory and have proved
able to provide important insights. Released from the ambition to be a self-contained, data-proven world
model, they are transparent and focused. Furthermore, it may be fruitful to redraft some common IAM
components; it is probable that alternative modelling approaches found and proven useful in a stylized model
can later be adopted also in existing, more complex IAMs. This road is taken by Buckle (2009a,b), whose
stylized climate model (chapter 3) sets the foundation for the work in this thesis.
100Such as the internationally agreed 2°C target.
101Cp. Ackerman et al. (2009), p. 311.
102Keller et al. (2004), p. 725 and 737.
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Chapter 2
Stylized Models of Clean Technology
Adoption
2.1 Introduction
The model that will be introduced in chapter 3 shares with IAMs the general framework that includes a
climate and an economy module. Its most significant distinction is that it is a stylized or conceptual model
not producing numerical estimates. Therefore, it is important to be aware of links to and contributions
from other related stylized models. The literature on stylized mitigation modelling is vast, however. In the
following, I try to identify the main economic strands in this area, but for more detailed reviews, such models
are chosen that have features close to those of the mitigation module developed in the next chapter. As a
consequence, the focus of this review lies within models that make intraindustrial change, by a switch from
a dirty to a cleaner technology, responsible for pollution abatement, so that the underlying mechanisms can
be compared with the mechanism crafted in chapter 3.
Even before the discipline of climate change economics started to gain momentum, economists had developed
models to investigate the interaction between economic growth, pollutants and technology. These models
were initially often motivated by problems caused by more local pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide. Even
though carbon-induced climate change adds an additional dimension of a global externality to the problem
set, modern approaches build on this earlier groundwork.1
A large body of mostly empirical literature deals with the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), which claims
higher levels of pollution for developing economies, but improving environmental qualities once incomes
reach higher regions. Some models that tried to explain the underlying mechanisms of this phenomenon are
reviewed in section 2.2.1. Most of these focus on green technical progress exclusively as an explanation for
the EKC, which however is of little relevance for the model developed in chapter 3. Therefore, the model of
Smulders et al. (2011) is selected for a detailed review in section 2.2.2. The model reproduces the shape of
the EKC by assuming that within a one-sector economy a second, clean technology becomes available, whose
economy-wide adoption reduces pollution.
Another useful strand of literature has emerged from endogenous growth theory. When the literature on
economic growth developed, as one of its main drivers, besides population growth and capital accumulation,
1Furthermore, if a one-world model with a single social planner is specified, inter-country externalities do not occur.
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technical progress was identified. In the beginning, technical progress was assumed as exclusively exogenous2,
before the publications by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1998) triggered the boom of endogenous growth theory.
The main advantage of assuming exogenous technical progress is that it is simpler to model, while models
with endogenous technological change usually are more complex, given the diffuse and dynamic nature of
technological change. However, the choice of exogenous vs. endogenous technical progress may crucially affect
conclusions, which also applies to carbon-saving technological change. Section 2.3.1 retraces the progress of
implementing endogenous technological progress in models of climate change mitigation and elaborates why
this distinction may matter. In section 2.3.2, the model of Acemoglu et al. (2012) is looked at in more
detail. While many approaches focus on such endogenous technical progress that reduces the environmental
footprint of a single technology, in their model endogenous technological change alters the ratio at which a
dirty and a clean input factor are deployed in output production. Discussions on both models’ strengths and
weaknesses are provided, leaving no need for a conclusions section.
2.2 The Environmental Kuznets Curve and Smulders et al. (2011)
2.2.1 The Environmental Kuznets Curve
One of the key questions of environmental economics is whether and by which mechanisms pollution may
ultimately decrease with rising economic wealth. In their chapter for the handbook for economic growth,
Brock and Taylor (2005) state that “any growth model that predicts both rising incomes and falling
pollution levels has to work on lowering pollution emissions via one of three channels [... :] scale, composition
and technique effects”3. The first effect describes a positive correlation between output and pollution, so that
pollution falls in times of economic recession.4 Second, even if total output is constant, pollution may fall
if the structure of an economy changes so that production shifts towards cleaner output goods with a lower
emissions intensity. The technique effect applies, if the emissions intensity of a used technology falls, usually
as the result of technical progress. Stern (2004) mentions as a fourth channel an input effect, namely the
substitution of a comparatively CO2-intense input good such as coal by a less CO2-intense input good such as
natural gas, both employed to produce the same output good.5 Indeed, this categorization of effects provides
a good guideline through this review.
A large body of literature on the interaction between pollution, income and growth emerged from observations
that gave rise to the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), whose name borrows from the hypothesis by
Kuznets (1955) that income equality first increases and eventually decreases with income. Initially coined
by Grossman and Krueger (1991), who found a similar relationship for sulfur dioxide and smoke and
income to hold, the EKC captures the observed phenomenon that at least for such pollutants that can be
locally controlled and have a local impact, pollution levels rise in income for low levels of development, but
fall for high levels. For global pollutants such as CO2, the evidence is at best mixed.
6 Figure 2.2.1 illustrates
the standard shape of the EKC.
Literature on the EKC is vast; some of it is compiled in Stern (2004). A lot of studies have been conducted
to confirm the evidence of an EKC, but have also been criticized for poor use of econometrics. Advanced
2Cp. e.g. Solow (1956), pp. 85ff.
3Brock and Taylor (2005), p. 1757
4However, then most probably also incomes are falling.
5Cp. Stern (2004), p. 1421.
6S. Galeotti et al. (2006) and Saboori et al. (2012).
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Figure 2.1: An Environmental Kuznets Curve, which plots the relationship between sulphur dioxide emissions
per capita and per capita income. For the study, data for the period 1982-1994 were obtained from 30
developed and developing countries. Sources: Stern et al. (1996) and, updated, Panayotou (1997).
econometric methods that rule out spurious regressions between per capita income and pollution have led to
the insight that efforts to reduce pollution intensities take place at all levels of income. However, pollution
increases with income and this scale effect exceeds the technique effect in a poor, fast growing economy.
Richer, “more mature” economies usually exhibit less rapid growth, and the technique effect outweighs the
scale effect. In any case, from its origins the EKC has essentially been an empirically observable stylized
fact without an underlying supporting economic theory.7 Several economists have tried to supplement such
a theoretical foundation, and some of their models are briefly reviewed in the following.
Stokey (1998) investigates whether there are limits to growth, so that growth ultimately ceases because at
some level its marginal benefits fall below its marginal environmental costs. She adopts a stylized framework
using an AK production function. The more of a given technology that is used in production, the propor-
tionally more output is generated, but pollution is convex in technology use. Sustained economic growth
is feasible as long as the capital stock grows fast enough and less and less of the technology needs to be
used. However, it is not optimal: Despite the AK production function, marginal capital returns are not
constant but due to pollution, diminishing. Increasing capital accumulation lowers the use of the technology
and abates pollution, but it also decreases the marginal capital returns so that the accumulation process
ultimately comes to a hold. Exogenous technical progress is necessary to make sustained growth optimal.8
Brock and Taylor (2005, 2004) augment the Solow (1956) model, which is among the very first growth
models and assumes exogenous technical progress, by pollution and an abatement variable to create their
“Green Solow” model. The polluting inflow is assumed proportional to output production, but the pollution
7Cp. Stern (2004), pp. 1419ff.
8Cp. Stokey (1998), pp. 4ff.
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stock has the ability to decrease through natural regeneration. Abatement comes at linear costs, but exhibits
diminishing returns when reducing the inflow of pollutants. Abatement is fixed exogenously, hence like in
the classic Solow model, no optimization occurs. Green exogenous technical progress reduces the pollution
flow per unit of output. Like in the original Solow model, once the economy has reached its balanced
growth path, per-capita output, capital and consumption grow by the exogenous rate of labour-augmenting
technical progress, but in order to be sustainable, the technical progress in abatement must be greater
than the sum of labour-augmenting technical progress and population growth, i.e. the growth of economic
activity. Using a numerical simulation that fulfills this condition, Brock and Taylor discover that regardless
of its initial abatement intensity (abatement by output), pollution flows and stock of an economy first
increase and then decrease, hence mimic the U-shape of the EKC. First, this is due to the property of the
classic Solow model, in which the declining marginal returns to capital lead to initially high, but eventually
decelerating output growth. Since emissions inflows are coupled to output proportionally, the pollution growth
rate also slows down. Second, the authors assume that nature regenerates itself the more it is polluted.9
Third, eventually pollution falls, because once the economy approaches its balanced growth path, the rate of
abatement efficiency improvement exceeds the output growth rate.10
In a model that focuses on the role of learning-by-doing effects rather than pure exogenous technical progress
to drive pollution abatement, Brock and Taylor (2005, 2003) introduce the “Kindergarten Rule of Sus-
tainable Growth”. Brock and Taylor use the same utility function as Stokey (1998) and, following the ideas
of Romer (1986), individual marginal returns on capital are declining, but due to assumed economy-wide
knowledge spillovers an AK production function with constant marginal capital returns is applied to the
economy as a whole. At first, the abatement function on an individual level is specified as in the Green
Solow model, but with Romer’s idea applied to abatement, Brock and Taylor assume that, due to knowledge
spillovers, abatement improves in average abatement intensity. Therefore, while marginal abatement costs at
the firm level are increasing, on a societal level they are constant. When maximizing intertemporal welfare,
the relationship between the hidden costs of pollution and capital determines the intensity of abatement
activity. If a marginal increase in pollution reduces welfare by more than a marginal increase in capital
enhances welfare, it is optimal to pursue maximal abatement i.e. fully clean up any pollution in the period
of emergence, which Brock and Taylor name in reference to early childhood education (“Clean up your own
mess!”) a “kindergarten rule”. In the opposite case, abatement switches to zero. For equal marginal bene-
fits, partial abatement takes place. Brock and Taylor show that close to a balanced growth path identical
economies, despite different initial conditions, converge towards the same level of environmental quality and
that pollution of both an initially capital-rich and a capital-poor economy mimics the shape of the EKC.11
To come back to Brock and Taylor’s of effects that enable pollution to fall while incomes rise, which was
given at the beginning of this section, in all these models there exists only one aggregate output good or only
one business sector, which rules out intersectoral environmental change. Since in all these models output
ultimately follows a balanced growth path, inducing rising pollution through the scale effect, it can only be
technical progress, either completely exogenous or through learning-by-doing effects, that ultimately leads to
reductions of pollution levels. A notable exception is the model by Smulders et al. (2011), which features a
technique effect, an intrasectoral composition effect as well as a scale effect, which altogether give rise to an
9This is a questionable assumption at least for severe pollution that affects the regeneration capacity of nature itself. It is
also unlikely to be fulfilled for the GHG CO2, see fn. 41 in section 3.2.6. In the model of Acemoglu et al. (2012) discussed in
section 2.3.2, it is in contrast assumed that regeneration works better the more intact the environment is.
10Cp. Brock and Taylor (2005), pp. 1772ff. and Brock and Taylor (2004), pp. 9ff.
11Cp. Brock and Taylor (2005), pp. 1799ff. and Brock and Taylor (2003), pp. 6ff. In their review, Brock and Taylor
mention many more models that study the relationship between economic growth and the environment, s. Brock and Taylor
(2005), pp. 1779ff.
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EKC curve. The main driver in this model is the switch from a dirty to a clean technology.
2.2.2 Smulders et al. (2011)
2.2.2.1 The model
Smulders et al. (2011)12 question a strong positive link between income and demand for environmental
regulation, which is necessary in order for the composition and technique effects to ultimately overcompensate
the scale effect. According to Smulders et al., such “green demand” is income-inelastic, environmental
regulation is sluggish and often follows a random pattern. In line with their argumentation, Stern (2004)
and Wagner (2008) find that time as a proxy for technical progress plays a more prominent role than income
in explaining the EKC curve.13 Therefore, Smulders et al. develop a model in which technological change
and regulation instead of income lead to a pollution pattern that exhibits the EKC’s shape.
In their model, the main driver of rising and decreasing pollution by a non-specified pollutant is the gradual
adoption of a more or less polluting general purpose technology (GPT). The term “general purpose tech-
nology” goes back to Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), who define a GPT as a key technology that
causes a technological step change and alters large parts of an economy fundamentally. As examples, they
mention the steam engine, the electric motor and microelectronics.14 In the model, GPTs can both harm the
environment or be eco-friendly; it is the financial incentives that decide which technology is adopted.
In Figure 2.2, the EKC curve as emerging in the model is depicted.
12For the following model description, cp. Smulders et al. (2011), pp. 79ff. This article presents an updated version of the
model in an earlier working paper, Smulders et al. (2005), which provides some richer insights to the model dynamics. For the
reproduction as well as the simplification of this model exclusively, I closely draw on own earlier work in Leib (2007).
13I cannot localize a related statement in Wagner (2008), but it can be found in Stern (2004), pp. 1426 and 1435.
14Cp. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), pp. 85ff.
38
CHAPTER 2. STYLIZED MODELS OF CLEAN TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
Figure 2.2: The EKC and the explanation of its shape in Smulders et al. (2011). Taken from Smulders
et al. (2011), p. 86.
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The chart provides a good overview of the model’s timeline, which consists of four phases. During the first
one, the “green phase”, the GPT deployed does not cause any (unspecified) emissions; this phase might
refer to a time before the industrial revolution. At the beginning of the “confidence phase”, a new GPT
becomes available, which is labour-saving and therefore gradually implemented by all firms. Once all firms
have adopted the new GPT, the firms focus on improving the quality of their products, which stimulates
demand and eventually supply. On the downside, the new GPT creates an external effect, namely pollution,
which adversely affects households’ utilities. Pollution is stirred up via the three known channels: First,
via the technique effect; the new GPT is polluting. Second, via a composition effect; more and more firms
adopt the dirty, but financially advantageous technology. Third, via the scale effect; the new technology
stimulates further economic growth. Eventually, the households’ confidence is depleted; the households urge
the state to react, which in the “alarm phase” and through an exogenous response mechanism is assumed
to introduce an emissions tax. This tax creates the incentive to implement another new GPT, which in the
model is completely emissions-free and becomes available in the “cleaning-up” phase. The new GPT is less
labour-saving than the second GPT, but, due to the emissions tax, in total reduces production costs. Once
it has been adopted by all firms and total pollution has fallen back to zero, another phase of product quality
improvements follows.
During each model subphase, maximally two different groups of firms exist: Those that have upgraded
their production technology or product quality already, and those for which this step is still due. Firms
innovate - or drop out. In this sense, the model adopts the idea of a process of “creative destruction”,
during which innovating enterprises crowd out those companies that are reluctant to keep up with the pace
of technological change.15 Smulders et al. highlight the role of intrasectoral change in their one-sector model
in driving or diminishing pollution, referring to empirical studies showing that it is a more powerful factor
than intersectoral change.
In the following section, the general model setup is presented and the cleaning-up phase singled out for
discussion, which is the phase during which clean technology adoption as well as abatement through creative
destruction take place.
The intertemporal welfare function W of the representative household is given as
W =
∞ˆ
0
Ut(Ct, Dt) · e−δtdt =
∞ˆ
0
[ln(Ct)−Dt] · e−δt dt, (2.1)
with utility Ut being concave in consumption Ct and decreasing in damages Dt.
16 Damages are not explicitly
modelled, but assumed to increase in emissions Et. e
−δt is the discount factor at time t with the pure rate
of time preference δ. Emissions may be created during production as an external effect and are therefore not
a control variable of the household.
In a continuum of sectors indexed by i, consumption goods Yi are produced, which differ in their product
quality Qim with m variations per sector. The number of sectors is normalized to one, so that:
15The term “creative destruction” goes back to Schumpeter; for this reason Smulders et al. categorize their model as a
Schumpetarian growth model, s. Smulders et al. (2011), p. 80. A general introduction to Schumpetarian growth models is given
in Aghion and Howitt (1998), pp. 53ff.
16Whereby the particular utility function looks somewhat counterintuitive, because it is not clear why marginal consumption
benefits are declining, but the marginal disutility from damages linear.
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ln(Ct) =
1ˆ
0
ln
M∑
m=1
QimtYimt di, (2.2)
whereby the household only demands those goods that have the best price-quality ratio. Such a product
variation is marked by a tilde, m˜i. With the household’s budget available for consumption being limited to
Bt, from static utility maximization under the budget restriction
Bt ≥
1ˆ
0
(
M∑
m=1
pimtYimt
)
di, (2.3)
the Marshallian demands for goods Yimt in sector i of m-th product quality with price pimt can be derived
as
Yimt =
 Btpimt for m = m˜i0 for m Ó= m˜i , (2.4)
whereby the budget is completely spent on consumption, i.e. the budget restriction (2.3) holds with equality.17
From dynamic optimization follows the growth rate of consumption expenditures as the positive difference
between the interest rate rt and the discount rate δ
18:
B˙t
Bt
= rt − δ, (2.5)
whereby for all model variables B˙t is defined as B˙t =
∂B
∂t .
19
In the model, demand determines supply, so that
Bt
p
im˜it
= Y
im˜it
≡ Bt
pit
= Yit. (2.6)
The unit costs cjt for the production of an output good, Yt, are equal for all sectors and product qualities
and vary only with the GPT j ǫ {1, 2, 3} in use. They amount to
cjt = aLjωt + aZjτt. (2.7)
aLj denotes the quantity of labour units required for the generation of one output unit and ωt the wage per
unit. aZj quantifies the emissions units generated during the production of a single output good, and τt an
emissions tax optionally charged per emissions unit. At the beginning of the model, there is no environmental
regulation, so that τt = 0. So-called cost leaders, which, due to the more modern GPT they have adopted,
have a cost advantage (while product qualities are equal), i.e. cj < cj−1
20, set the output price pi exactly
17For the derivation of Marshallian demands through static utility maximization, s. Varian (2006), pp. 90ff.
18For basics and solution of this dynamic optimization problem s. Grossman and Helpman (1992), pp. 27f. or, more general,
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp. 86ff.
19For the general CES utility function,
C1−σ
t
1−σ
, it would be B˙t
Bt
= rt−δ
σ
, but the logarithmic utility function (2.1) just emerges
when σ = 1. Equation (2.5) is derived from the Ramsey rule (1.7), section 1.5.4.
20Dropping the time index t for a while, as in the original article.
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at the unit costs of their backward competitors, cj−1. For a given technology level j, quality leadership in
contrast translates in the model to the power to command a higher market price than the suppliers of lower
quality products. The market price charged by a quality leader is λ > 1 higher, which is the parameter that
gauges the quality advantage. In summary,
pi =
cj−1 if technology competition takes placeλcj if quality competition takes place, (2.8)
and for profits Πi in sector i, using (2.6) and (2.8), follows:
Πi = piYi − ciYi =

(
1− cjcj−1
)
B profit of a cost leader(
1− 1λ
)
B profit of a quality leader.
(2.9)
At the beginning of the cleaning-up phase21, the following starting point is reached: The GPT j = 1, which
had been used during the green phase and caused zero emissions, aE1 = 0, but induced a labour input
requirement aL1 = 1, had during the confidence phase completely been replaced by the GPT j = 2. This
technology enabled cheaper production, as it reduces necessary labour input per output unit to aL2 = η < 1,
even though per unit of output now aE2 = 1 units of the pollutant are emitted. Eventually however, the
household, which has been suffering from pollution, called for environmental regulation to curb emissions,
which was put in place in the alarm phase. At the beginning of the cleaning-up phase, when all firms have
deployed the same GPT j = 2 and offer products of the same quality, a new GPT j = 3 becomes available.
It leads to labour input requirements aL2 = γ > η, so that without environmental regulation still the GPT
j = 2 would be used. However, taking into account the emissions tax, using the GPT j = 3 is more profitable,
since it is a zero-emissions technology, aE3 = 0. Now, another competition for cost leadership begins. From
(2.7) and (2.8) follows that new cost leaders set as the market price
pi = c2 = aL2ωt + aE2τt = ηω + τ. (2.10)
With (2.9), for their profits follows
Πi =
(
1− cj
cj−1
)
B =
(
1− aL3ωt + aE3τt
aL2ωt + aE2τt
)
B =
(
1− γω
ηω + τ
)
B. (2.11)
During the cleaning-up phase, there exist two different company types k ǫ {2, 3}: A decreasing number Nk =
N2 of firms, labelled in Figure 2.2 as “regulated quality leaders”, still operate with the outdated GPT j = 2,
while a growing number of firms, N3, called the “first movers”, switches to the new GPT j = 3. With
normalization of the total number of firms to one, during the cleaning-up phase
1 = N3 +N2 (2.12)
is valid.
The number of workers that during the cleaning-up phase are demanded to engage in production, LY , amounts
to
21For the detailed descriptions of the other phases, see Smulders et al. (2011), pp. 87f.
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LY = N3YiaL3 +N2YiaL2 = N3
B
pik=3
γ +N2
B
pik=2
η = N3
B
ηω + τ
γ + (1−N3) B
λ(ηω + τ)
η, (2.13)
whereby firms of type k = 2 still set the price according to quality leadership competition pricing, see equation
(2.8).
At the same time, emissions E amount to
E = N3YiaE3 +N2YiaE2 = N3
B
pik=3
· 0 +N2 B
pik=2
· 1 = N2 B
λ(ηω + τ)
. (2.14)
In each phase, firms do research, either to enhance the quality of their products or to implement a new GPT.
During the cleaning-up phase, all backward firms concentrate their efforts on the latter, and all researchers
LRt work on a blueprint necessary for clean technology implementation. For the successful development of
such a blueprint, aR labour units are required, which is assumed to be constant and independent of the GPT.
Researchers are paid the same wage rate ωt as the workers. The number of blueprints developed during a
period, or the research intensity, Rt, is then defined as
Rt =
LRt
aR
. (2.15)
Furthermore, it is assumed that the value of a blueprint equals its development costs aRωt as well as the
stock market value Vt of a company:
Vt = aRωt. (2.16)
The enterprise value is determined by an arbitrage condition, according to which at any time the sum of firm
profits Πt, change in enterprise value V˙t = ∂Vt/t and losses Xt, triggered by shocks, have to equal the return
on shareholders’ equity.
Πt + V˙t −Xt = rtVt, (2.17)
whereby, as a reminder, rt denotes the economy’s interest rate. Losses Xt may be created through quality
competition only; during the cleaning-up phase it is assumed that Xt = 0.
22
The labour markets clear, so that under optimization total labour supply L equals demand:
L = LY + LR. (2.18)
With this information at hand, it is now feasible to describe the dynamics of the “cleaning-up phase”. For an
incentive to adopt the new GPT j = 3, it must provide a cost advantage over the old GPT j = 2, hence the
profit of a new cost leader (equation (2.11)) must exceed the profit of a backward, regulated quality leader
(second line of equation (2.9)), which is the case when
Π3 > Π2 ⇐⇒ γ < η + τt/ωt
λ
. (2.19)
22S. Smulders et al. (2011), p. 84 for details on how this loss affects the solutions during a phase with quality competition.
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Thus if the emission tax τt was too low, it would not be profitable for a firm to adopt the new GPT. Only
if (2.19) is fulfilled, adoption research takes place, Rt > 0. The growth of firms that retrofits and becomes a
cost leader during a period, N˙3t, is higher, the higher the research intensity and thereby the number of new
blueprints, Rt, are during that period:
N˙3t = Rt =
L− LY t
aR
≥ 0. (2.20)
By substituting LY t by the expression given in (2.13), the equation of motion for the number of new cost
leaders can be obtained23:
N˙3t =
1
aR
(
L−N3t Bt
ηωt + τt
γ − (1−N3t) Bt
λ(ηωt + τt)
η
)
≥ 0 (2.21)
or N˙3t =
L
aR
− bt
aR
η
η + τt/ωt
[(
γ
η
− 1
λ
)
N3t +
1
λ
]
≥ 0. (2.22)
Equation (2.21) shows that a rising emissions tax, τt, or a lower number of required labour units for produc-
tion, aY 3 = γ, enhances the incentive to increase clean technology adoption research efforts, which in turn
accelerates the growth of cost leaders. From (2.12) immediately follows
N˙2t = −N˙3t. (2.23)
The equations (2.21) and (2.23) describe the process of Schumpetarian “creative destruction”, which occurs
intrasectorally: The backward firms are forced to innovate - or, alternatively, are crowded out, so that
gradually the new GPT prevails. Since the number of firms using the dirty GPT j = 2 decreases during
the cleaning-up phase, emissions also fall (see equation (2.14)). Again, a technique effect and a intrasectoral
composition effect apply here, while the countervailing scale effect does not matter, since growth is created
from a zero-emissions technology.
The economy grows in the clean-up phase: After plugging (2.11) and (2.16) into the arbitrage condition
(2.17), it can be shown that the interest rate is determined as follows:
rt =
(
1− γ
η + τt/ωt
)
Bt
aRωt
+
ω˙t
ωt
. (2.24)
Smulders et al. (2005) define bt = Bt/ωt as the consumption expenditures per unit of labour income.
24 After
elimination of the interest rate in (2.24) by using (2.5), the growth rate of consumption expenditures per
unit of labour income is derived:
b˙t
bt
=
(
1− γ
η + τt/ωt
)
bt
aR
− δ.
This growth rate is positive for a sufficiently small pure rate of time preference δ.25 The new GPT leads to
23Equation (2.21) can be transformed to derive (2.22), which equals the equation of motion given in Smulders et al. (2005),
p. 15, equation (35), whereby bt = Bt/ωt.
24Therefore, for its growth rate follows b˙t
bt
= B˙t
Bt
− ω˙t
ωt
.
25Equation (2.11) is recalled here: γ
η+τt/ωt
=
cj
cj−1
= c3
c2
< 1.
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rising profits and incomes. Once all firms have implemented the new GPT, another competition for quality
leadership begins.
Smulders et al. also consider how alterations of some model assumptions might impact the results. For
instance, if the GPT j = 3 is not completely clean, thus aE3 > 0, but still profitable to be adopted, at the
beginning of the cleaning-up phase emissions would still fall. However, in the following subphase of quality
competition, due to the scale effect with increased economic activity emissions would rise again; emissions
would follow an N-shaped pattern. Furthermore, they also see the possibilty that at the end of a clean-up
phase another GPT arrives, even though it is polluting. It may succeed either because it saves so much
labour cost that it is still superior despite of the environmental regulation in place, or because it creates a
type of pollution that is not recognized and regulated yet.
2.2.2.2 Discussion
Smulders et al. present a model which provides an interesting explanation for the shape of the EKC curve.
Pollution is traced back to production with a technology that exerts harmful external effects on the environ-
ment. Nevertheless, firms adopt it because it enables higher profits; in fact, they are forced to adopt it to
maintain parity with the economy’s cost leaders and to avoid being crowded out by their competitors. This
seems a rather realistic scenario. Once pollution becomes sufficiently high, an emissions tax is introduced,
which makes the implementation of a less labour-saving, but emissions-saving technology profitable. The
authors point out that a political regime that can enforce such environmental regulation is more difficult to
gather, if the pollutant has a broader impact, with the extreme example of GHGs. The explanations the
model gives for the rising and the falling arms of the EKC curve are complex but elegant; as elaborated ear-
lier, in this model it is the combination of technique, composition and scale effects that drives environmental
degradation or progress, not just a single one.
Some caveats remain. Certainly the biggest one is that while the model explains well the dynamics within
a phase, it does not provide endogenous explanations for the phase shifts. For instance, regulation is key
in the model to stop pollution; it marks the turning point for emissions. While an endogenous mechanism
that triggers regulation is adumbrated by the inclusion of some damage function in the utility function,
it is not completed.26 However, adding a module that includes a state as an actor that reacts to orders
from its agent, the representative household, might go beyond the scope of the model. Smulders et al.
recognize this shortcoming and suggest further research that explains “how and when information builds up,
disseminates, and affects [environmental] policy”27 and to “include a series of additional control variables
into the regressions, e.g. [...] - with regard to policy implementation - the quality of the institutions and
regulatory capacity”28. However, proposing systematic research on this subject contradicts Smulder et al.’s
initial statement that “empirical evidence [suggests] that institutions and regulatory actions are persistent,
and the history of environmental policy often shows a haphazard response to problems”29. Furthermore,
while the model explains the adoption and dissemination of a GPT very carefully, both the labour-saving
as well as the eventually clean GPT suddenly become available in the form of exogenous events in the first
place. The authors make no statement on whether fundamental technical progress is too erratic to model
26At least such a turning point could be easily modelled by introducing a proportional relationship between emissions Et
and damages Dt; as soon as the marginal damages from production exceed the marginal utility gains from consumption, the
household might commission the state to introduce the carbon tax.
27Smulders et al. (2011), p. 94.
28ibid., pp. 92f.
29ibid., p. 80.
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it or why they refrain from modelling GPT research, whereby research success may be uncertain. Since
the introduction of GPTs mark the turning points in the model, attempts to explain their arrival would be
desirable.
While it is rather straightforward to imagine research that enhances the quality of products, some intuition
for research on GPT implemention would be helpful, too. If a ready technology just needs to be adopted,
then probably little research effort is needed. Maybe the authors thought of research that is needed to adjust
a rather generic GPT to the rather specific technical requirements of a single firm; although all firms in the
model operate in the same sector.
The research module of the model is not its most convincing part; research automatically leads to calcuable
success with no uncertainty, and equations (2.13), (2.20) and (2.21) suggest that the companies first demand
as much labour workforce as needed to satisfy consumption good demand, and then the remainder of total
labour supply goes into research. This might not resemble reality very accurately, since the workforce may
be assumed to be rent-seeking; and salaries might be higher in the assumingly more challenging research
sector; such mechanisms are also ruled out in the model by assuming a uniform wage rate ωt for the whole
workforce regardless of the type of work they carry out.
Finally, there is something else that may be of concern. It is assumed that cost leaders set the price equal
to that charged of their competitors using outdated technology (see descriptions between equations (2.7)
and (2.8)) to reap the full cost-saving return. I do not understand why these technology leaders do not set
the price marginally lower than their backward competitors are able to set it, since the leaders can afford
it and are able to rule the market on their own. Such behaviour would most likely fundamentally change
the dynamics of the model30; very similar doubts apply to the pricing of quality leaders. In any case, if
one accepts the pricing assumption, the equation of motion for the number of new cost leaders (2.21) shows
that the speed of creative destruction is dependent on the properties of the GPTs. Given that all firms are
identical at the beginning of the cleaning-up phase, it is not clear why some firms act as first movers, while
others do not.
2.3 Endogenous technical change and Acemoglu et al. (2012)
2.3.1 On endogenous technical change in models of climate change mitigation
As a second stylized model that is presented in more detail in this literature review, the recent model by
Acemoglu et al. (2012) is selected, in which endogenous technological change decides over the question in
which proportion a clean input good and a dirtier input good are used in production. The model captures
the “input effect”31 enabling pollution-free growth. Acemoglu et al. emphasize that their work is based on a
number of previous articles, some of which are briefly summarized in this section.32
To start, Grübler and Messner (1998) warn that the assumption of exogenous technical progress of carbon-
saving technologies may inevitably lead to the premature conclusion that most mitigation efforts should be
postponed until the future, when abatement options have become cheaper; this was also one conclusion drawn
30I am not sure in which way though. With such a pricing in place, either the total number of firms declines, because the
progressive firms crowd out the ones that did not retrofit in time. Or, all companies immediately switch to the new GPT to
preserve their competitiveness and avoid being crowded out.
31As introduced by Stern (2004) at the beginning of section 2.2.1.
32For further references, see Acemoglu et al. (2012), p. 134, fn. 4.
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by Nordhaus (2008) from DICE-2007 (see also section 1.3). Grübler and Messner were among the first that
stressed the endogeneity of technical progress and that learning-by-doing effects necessitate early adoption
of clean technologies.
In Acemoglu (2002), which explores endogenous technological progress in general and does not touch on
environmental issues in particular, Acemoglu for the first time introduces the concept of two competing
effects, namely a price and a market size effect. The price effect directs research efforts to the sector where
input goods cost more than the input goods supplied in the other sector; usually, the relatively scarcer good is
more expensive than the other one. The market size effect stimulates research in the sector that provides the
relatively more abundant input good, whereby market size is measured by the number of workers engaged in
this sector. It is the elasticity of substitution between the two input factors in final output good production
that determines which effect outweighs the other. If it is low, that is two factors are complements rather than
substitutes, then it is comparatively difficult to change the proportion of input goods in output production
and abandon a factor, and the price of the scarcer input factor rises more heavily; as a result, the price effect
dominates and research efforts concentrate on technological improvements of the scarcer, but more expensive
input good.
Nordhaus (2002) stresses the role of private, profit-seeking innovators in contrast to (public) institutions
that want to maximize the social return of research activities; however, the former do not take into account
knowledge spillovers, i.e. positive externalities of their research activities, which leads to R&D investment that
lies below the socially optimal level. In his extension of DICE-99, research efforts that lead to improvements
of the state of technology have declining marginal returns within a period, but it is assumed that research
efforts shift the “innovation-possibility-frontier”33 out continuously, so past knowledge investments advantage
future ones. This is the “building-on-the-shoulder-of-giants” feature, which is also taken up and highlighted in
Acemoglu et al. (2012). Furthermore, for example carbon taxes trigger research to lower the need for fossil
energy in the carbon-energy sector, but they also make goods in other sectors relatively cheaper, thereby via
the price effect described in the previous paragraph reduce (the appeal of) research in other sectors. Also,
more research in the carbon-energy sector implies that some scientists, whose absolute number is at least in
the short term limited, are pulled away from other sectors. Nordhaus assumes that one more dollar spent on
environmental research crowds out a four dollar equivalent of research efforts in other sectors. In the model,
the accumulation of a single knowledge stock leads to both Hicks-neutral technical progress and reductions of
the economy’s carbon intensity, but the effect just described is assumed to increase research costs by a factor
of four, whereby this particular value is said to have been derived from “the basis of existing studies”34, with
no particular reference mentioned. Nordhaus compares a scenario in which endogenous technological change
is enabled, with a scenario in which the carbon intensity can only be reduced by substituting away from
carbon energy. He finds that the effect of induced technological change is marginal, because if it is enabled,
under optimal climate policy, only after 2230 the carbon-intensity is lower than in the benchmark scenario.
Sue Wing (2003) points to an important limitation of this conclusion. Like in Nordhaus (2002), it is
assumed that environmental regulation stimulates intensified research in the dirty sector. However, as Sue
Wing highlights, higher dirty input good prices also cause marginal production costs to rise and therefore
outputs to fall, so that less resources are available for research, thus an income effect occurs. It determines
the size of the overall stock of knowledge available to the different sectors, while substitution effects influence
the distribution of knowledge across the sectors. According to Sue Wing, it is also well possible that carbon
pricing may increase clean technology innovation, but leads to a reduction of overall research efforts. The
33Nordhaus (2002), p. 261.
34Nordhaus (2002), p. 272.
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capability of knowledge to substitute for physical capital and the elasticities of substitution among the input
factors determine the size of these effects; a clear conclusion on the optimal timing of abatement cannot be
drawn.
Gans (2009) also investigates the general assumption that carbon pricing leads to more research that aims
at improving the fuel efficiency of fossil-fuel based technologies. Similarly to Sue Wing (2003), he argues
that carbon pricing may lead to a negative income effect, i.e. lower output, and reduce the resources available
to (carbon-saving) research. Further to that, any political instrument that makes the use of fossil fuels more
expensive is also likely to reduce its use overall; in the spirit of Acemoglu (2002)’s market size effect, this
may also reduce research in that sector. Gans sets up a model of a similar structure as the one by Acemoglu
et al. (2012), which is explored in more detail in the next section, but keeps all other input factors fixed apart
from two energy input goods, one of them based on carbon energy, the other one based on a renewable
technology. Since they both serve as energy inputs, Gans assumes that they are substitutes. If regulation
increases the price of carbon energy, he shows then that the income effect outweighs the substitution effect,
and the returns to innovation as well as innovations fall.
This survey on environment, economic growth and technological change could go on indefinitely. Besides
the aforementioned review article by Brock and Taylor (2005) in the Handbook of Economic Growth,
the chapter by Xepapadeas (2005) in the Handbook of Environmental Economics also offers many further
references on economic modelling of the interaction between economic growth and pollution. At present, there
is no technological change module included in the model presented in chapter 3, and so no more detailed
literature review on this matter is presented. The articles of Baker et al. (2008) and Gillingham et al.
(2008) focus on the role and character of technological change in the context of climate change and provide
broad surveys of the related literature. Vollebergh and Kemfert (2005) provide a summary of attempts
to model technical progress in IAMs.
2.3.2 Acemoglu et al. (2012)
2.3.2.1 The model
Acemoglu et al. state that their work is motivated by a lack of computable general equilibrium models with
endogenous technical progress, referring to the early DICE models by Nordhaus (1994) and Nordhaus
and Boyer (2000).35 The model is set up as follows:
W =
∞∑
t=0
1
(1 + δ)t
U(Ct, Et). (2.25)
Welfare W is computed from the sum of discounted utilities Ut over time t, δ denotes the pure rate of time
preference. Utility is gained from both consumption Ct and environmental quality Et, with
lim
Ct→0
∂Ut(Ct, Et)
∂Ct
= lim
Et→0
∂Ut(Ct, Et)
∂Et
−→∞ and lim
Et→0
Ut(Ct, Et) −→ −∞ and ∂Ut(Ct,E0)∂Et ≡ 0. (2.26)
35Cp. Acemoglu et al. (2012), p. 131. This is similar to the criticism expressed by Nordhaus, see fn. 51 in section 1.5.2,
but as was noted in section 1.4.1, approaches have actually been taken to integrate endogenous (green) technical change into
IAMs; Acemoglu et al. (2012), p. 134, also acknowledge the work of Popp (2004) on this. For further work on endogenous
technological change in IAMs, s. Vollebergh and Kemfert (2005), pp. 140ff.
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Et is limited to its value set [0, E0], whereby E0 describes the state of maximal environmental health, e.g.
referring to a pristine climate. The last condition implies that there is no benefit in utility terms from raising
Et beyond E0.
A final output good Yt is manufactured within two sectors j ǫ [K,M ], from a dirty input good Kt and a
clean input good Mt. The production process is approximated by the CES production function
Yt =
(
K
ε−1
ε
t +M
ε−1
ε
t
) ε
ε−1
, (2.27)
whereby ε denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two input factors. For ε > 1, the two input factors
are substitutes, whereby corner solutions in which Yt is produced by only one input factor are feasible. For
ε ≤ 1, corner solutions are impossible, and at ε = 0 they are perfect complements.36 In the following analyses,
Acemoglu et. al mainly focus on the case in which the dirty and the clean input goods are good substitutes,
hence ε > 1, which describes the case they regard “as the more empirically relevant benchmark”37. They give
the example of renewable energy that, once it can be stored and transmitted in an efficient manner, provides
a very good substitute for fossil energy. They demand research on this crucial parameter ε, whose value is
not well-known: “Estimating the economy-wide elasticity of substitution is beyond the scope of the current
paper. We simply note that since fossil and non-fossil fuels should be close substitutes [...], reasonable values
of ε should be quite high”38.
Only usage of the dirty input factor leads to a detoriating environmental quality, whose equation of motion
is described by
Et+1 = −γKt + (1 + ι)Et. (2.28)
Each dirty input good used in output good production degrades the environmental quality by γ > 0 units,
while the environmental quality regenerates each period by ι > 0.39 Acemoglu et al. point out the feature that
regeneration follows an exponential process, implying that it is dependent on the state of the environment40
and comes to an irreversible hold once the environmental quality has fully degraded, i.e. Et = 0. This
is labelled an “environmental disaster” by the authors, and they emphasize that Et = 0 can never be
the outcome of a welfare-maximizing allocation due to the second property of the utility function given in
(2.26). An environmental disaster occurs when dirty input supply for the output good production reaches
the following threshold value (Et+1 = 0 in (2.28)):
Kt =
1 + ι
γ
E0. (2.29)
Each of the two input goods needed for final output generation (described in (2.27)) is supplied by monopo-
listically competitive firms and produced from labour Ltj and continua of N machines used for manufacture
36The parameter ε is conceptually equivalent to the intertemporal substitution of consumption, in the model introduced in
the next chapter denoted by σ−1. The properties of that parameter are discussed in detail in section 3.2.2; in figure 3.1, at the
axes, the arguments Ct and Ct+1 could be replaced by Kt and Mt, and the same analysis applies.
37Acemoglu et al. (2012), p. 135.
38Acemoglu et al. (2012), p. 155. Quote adjusted to parameter nomenclature of this summary. In their numerical simulation,
they experiment with ε = 3 and ε = 10, with both values characterizing the two input factors as rather good substitutes.
39Hence, in contrast to the Green Solow model by Brock and Taylor (2005, 2004) discussed in section 2.3, in which more
regeneration takes place, the more the environment has been polluted.
40Given that Acemoglu et al. highlight this feature prominently and link it to the example of climate change, they should also
add that the parameter ι itself is very likely to be dependent on the state of the environment, s. also fn. 41 in section 3.2.6.
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of the dirty and the clean input goods with quantities Ftnj and qualities Atnj . These productivities Atnj are
determined endogenously, as elaborated below. In dirty input production, there may also be an exhaustible
resource with flow Rt involved:
Kt = L
1−α
Kt ·Rα2t ·
1ˆ
0
A1−α1tnK · Fα1tnK dn (2.30)
Mt = L
1−α
Mt ·
1ˆ
0
A1−αtnM · FαtnM dn, (2.31)
with 0 < α < 1 as the elasticity of the marginal products with respect to the final input goods and α = α1+α2.
The exhaustible resource stock Zt evolves simply as
Zt+1 = Zt −Rt. (2.32)
For the labour markets to clear, it is necessary that labour demand does not exceed labour supply, the latter
of which is normalized to 1:
LtK + LtM ≤ 1. (2.33)
Markets are assumed to clear, so that all output goods not spent on costs are consumed:
Ct = Yt − ̺
 1ˆ
0
FtnK dn+
1ˆ
0
FtnM dn
− Extr(Zt) ·Rt, (2.34)
whereby Extr(St) is the resource extraction cost function not increasing in Zt, as it is assumed that resource
extraction becomes more laborious the more of the resource has been consumed. Each machine used for final
output production costs ̺ units of the final good Y . ̺ is defined as ̺ ≡ α2.
Driving the endogenous technical progress in the model, scientists decide at the beginning of each period
whether they want to devote their research efforts to improving the dirty technology or the clean technology.
StK scientists work on machines used for dirty input good production and StM scientists work on machines
used for clean input good production, whereby also
StK + StM ≤ 1. (2.35)
After their decisions are made, each scientist is randomly allocated to exactly one machine in sector j ǫ
[K,M ]. The innovation of a scientist succeeds with sector-specific probabilities λj , boosting the quality of a
particular machine n from At−1nj to (1+ τ)Atnj , with ι > 0. If successful, a scientist is granted a one-period
patent on his or her invention and earns profits from machine sales, otherwise an entrepreneur with monopoly
rights is allocated to the machine, who sells the old machine.
The average productivity of technologies in a certain sector over all types of machines at time t amounts to
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Atj ≡
1ˆ
0
Atnj . (2.36)
It marks the state of technology in a sector. With the previous descriptions, it follows that technical progress
in the two sectors evolves according to
Atj = (1 + τ)λjStjAt−1j , (2.37)
hence technical progress is dependent on the probability of a technical advance to occur, λj , when pushed for,
productivity gain τ , the number of scientists Stj working in that sector as well as the technology state of the
art, At−1j . The latter property is labelled by Acemoglu et al. the “building on the shoulder of giants” feature,
introduced with the discussion of the Nordhaus (2002) article, which emphasizes the path dependency of
technical progress and implies that an innovation’s effect increases in the initial technology state. Knowledge
spillovers between the two sectors are ruled out.
In the following discussion, it is focused on the model results for the case without an exhaustible resource,
hence α2 = 0 and α1 = 1 in (2.30) and (2.31), as the model introduced in the next chapter does not include
an exhaustible resource.
The decentralized equilibrium, i.e. the market equilibrium without public intervention, is characterized by
sequences of labour wagesWt, prices for the two input factors Ptj , machine prices Ptnj , demands for machines
Ftnj , demands for dirty technology input Kt and clean technology input Mt, labour demands Ltj , scientist
allocations Stj such that a.) (Ptnj , Ftnj) maximizes the earnings of the scientist or entrepreneur selling the
machine b.) labour demands Ltj maximize the profits of producers of the two input factors c.) choices for Kt
and Mt are optimal from the output good producers’ point of view d.) Stj maximizes the expected earnings
in science e.) labour and input factor markets are cleared by the wage Wt and prices Ptj , respectively.
Condition a.) implies that, with perfectly competitive output good production, the price of each input factor
equals its respective marginal product in output production (2.27), which for the dirty input factor is
∂Yt
∂Kt
=
(
K
ε−1
ε
t +M
ε−1
ε
t
) ε
ε−1 ·K
ε−1
ε −1
t
!
= PtK (2.38)
and equivalent for the clean input factor withMt = Kt in (2.38), so that for the marginal rate of substitution
and the relative price
∂Yt/∂Mt
∂Yt/∂Kt
=
(
Mt
Kt
)− 1ε
=
PtM
PtK
(2.39)
holds.41 Hence, for an increasing relative supply of clean input goods, their relative price falls; this induces the
price effect introduced by Acemoglu (2002). The elasticity of the relative price with respect to a marginal
change in relative supplies is determined by the elasticity of substitution between the two input factors, ε.
In their appendix, Acemoglu et al. show that in the two research sectors, i.e. the clean and the dirty input
sector, an entrepreneur gains the following equilibrium profit Πtnj from selling the n-th machine in sector j
with state of the art technology Atnj
42:
41For ε →∞, the marginal rate of substitution is continuously one, which describes perfect substitutability.
42S. Acemoglu et al. (2012), p. 160.
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Πtnj = (1− α)αP
1
1−α
jt LtjAtnj (2.40)
Using (2.36) and (2.37), scientists choosing sector j to create innovations anticipate the following expected
profit:
Πtnj = (1 + τ)λj(1− α)αP
1
1−α
jt LtjAt−1j . (2.41)
After dividing the expected profits in the clean input good sector by the expected profits in the dirty input
goods sector, the relative attractiveness of clean input research over dirty input research to a scientist is
described by
ΠtM
ΠtK
=
λM
λK︸︷︷︸
relative success probability
×
(
PtM
PtK
) 1
1−α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
price effect
× LtM
LtK︸ ︷︷ ︸
market size effect
× At−1M
At−1K︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
productivity effect
(2.42)
This central equation determines not only the primary direction technical change takes, but, as the produc-
tivities Atj have a direct impact on input good supplies (see (2.30) and (2.31)), also the proportion of the
input goods used in output production. The larger the ratio ΠtMΠtK , the more research efforts are directed to
clean technology research, which ultimately leads to more clean technology adoption. Scientists decide to
favour one sector over another owing to four drivers:
1. The relative probability of research success, which is given exogenously in the model.
2. The price effect, which promotes research in the sector in which input goods yield a higher sales price.
From (2.39), it is clear that this is the sector that contributes less to output production.
3. The market size effect, attracting research in the sector with more employment as the proxy variable
for the market size.43
4. The productivity effect, which advantages the advanced technology in terms of its stage of development.
In short, the more productive a technology is compared to the competing technology, the more likely
it is to be further improved.
Throughout the article it is assumed that the clean technology’s state of the art, i.e. its productivity, lies so
far behind the state of the art of dirty technology that, without public intervention, research always starts
in the dirty input sector.
As a consequence of this and with the clean and dirty technology being substitutes, in the laissez-faire
scenario without public intervention, the technological gap between the dirty and the clean technology further
increases. All scientists focus on dirty technology innovation, so that AtK as well as dirty input production
Kt (see (2.30)) grow at the rate (1 + τ)λj , whereas the productivity of the clean technology remains at its
initial state A0M . Eventually, Kt reaches the threshold value that triggers an environmental disaster, marked
by (2.29).
43The terms “price effect” and “market size effect” in this context were for the time introduced in Acemoglu (2002), s. the
previous section.
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To avoid it, a public intervention is needed. Acemoglu et al. discuss the option of introducing a proportional
profit subsidy zt (with funds raised from a lump-sum transfer from the representative household), so that
expected profits of clean input innovation rise to
ΠtnM = (1 + zt)(1 + τ)λj(1− α)αP
1
1−α
Mt LtMAt−1M . (2.43)
zt has to be chosen high enough, so that research efforts are directed to the underdeveloped clean technology
and it can make up lost ground. Once the ratio At−1MAt−1K is high enough, the subsidy can be removed and
all research focuses on the more profitable clean technology sector exclusively. As Acemoglu et al. show, if
dirty and clean input goods are good substitutes, a temporary subsidy is sufficient to avoid an environmental
disaster. However, it still occurs if the elasticity of substitution is rather low, because while the subsidy
stimulates the productivity effect in favour of the clean technology and also increases the market size for
clean technology machines, once the clean technology dominates the market, the price effect encourages dirty
input good growth. The elasticity of substitution, ε, via (2.39), determines which effect(s) overweigh.
In any case, the intervention is costly, because the economy needs to wait for the clean technology to catch
up and forgo the opportunity to grow faster immediately by building on the shoulder of the “dirty giant”.
The more the intervention is postponed, the more costly it becomes due to the larger gap between the two
technologies with respect to their states of technical progress and due to advanced environmental degradation.
Acemoglu et al. therefore conclude that the recommendation by Nordhaus (2008) (section 1.3) to pursue a
slow, gradual switch towards mitigation technologies leads to increasing, considerable costs.
Acemoglu et al. briefly discuss the hypothetical scenario of the two input goods being complements, i.e.
ε < 1, when the price effect is strong enough to boost research in the clean technology sector that initially
lies behind; eventually dirty and clean input good supplies grow at the same rate, ultimately leading to an
environmental disaster.
To achieve the socially optimal allocation, the authors use the following three instruments:
1. A subsidy for machine provision to counteract underprovision of machines due to monopolistic compe-
tition.
2. A tax on dirty input use to reflect its environmental externality.
3. The research subsidy zt to lead scientists to the sector that yields higher returns to innovation for the
society.
2.3.2.2 Discussion
The model offers an interesting approach to understand the dynamics of dirty and clean technology innovation
as well as their adoption. It is their levels of productivity, Atj that crucially determine the proportion of
dirty and clean input factors. In contrast to Nordhaus’ DICE-2007 model, here technical progress takes place
endogenously, not exogenously. Plausibly, the model assumes that innovators are attracted by some expected
rent in the research sector they decide to operate in. The higher the price of an input factor, the larger its
market and the more productive a sector’s technology, the more likely a sector is to attract scientists. In
the model, if the mix of these factors makes one sector more attractive than the other and the two input
factors are substitutes, this sector will attract all available researchers. Hence, technical progress and growth
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occur in only one sector, ultimately leading to an environmental disaster, if the dirty technology sector is
the initially more advanced one. Only a public intervention that redirects research efforts towards clean
technology innovation can stop this process.
Beyond this core piece of their analysis, the authors come up with some further (suggestions for) extensions
that were not covered in the summary, such as the case of an exhaustible resource needed for dirty input good
production, or an adverse impact from detoriating environmental quality on productivity. One interesting
modification that was not discussed in the paper could be the scenario of an imperfect clean technology that
exerts a non-zero detoriating impact on environmental quality, which would make it even more challenging
to avoid an environmental disaster.
In contrast to the model by Smulders et al. (2011) reviewed in section 2.2.2, Acemoglu et al. acknowledge
the uncertainty of research success by considering research success probabilities λj , and they explicitly as-
sume that scientists exhibit rent-seeking behaviour and do not automatically recruit from the remainder of
unemployed workers.
However, the model also raises some questions. For instance, given the either-or dichotomy in research
activities when the input factors are substitutes, one wonders how the technology that is at the beginning
of the model less attractive to scientists has actually emerged in the first place. The model does not give an
explanation as to why research may take place in more than one sector at a time.
It also does not seem consistent with research in reality that scientists are randomly allocated to some
machine in some sector that they choose each period anew. As Acemoglu et. al repeatedly emphasize, the
path dependency of research is a crucial driver in determining its direction. This should also be true on an
individual level; scientists may become experts over time in a certain field and want to remain with a machine
they have been previously working on. This lack of a learning-by-doing feature is also apparent from the
fact that the probabilities to innovate successfully are assumed constant and independent of past efforts. An
increasing number of failures may make future success more likely, too, since failures also increase the pool
of knowledge.
While the “building on the shoulder of giants” feature emphasizes the path dependency of technical progress,
its particular formulation in (2.37) implies a further effect that should be pointed out: Since the marginal
productivity rise triggered by a successful innovation, (1 + τ), is coupled in a multiplicative manner to the
existing productivity, At−1j , an innovation’s leverage effect also rises in At−1j . To embed a “building on the
shoulder of giants” feature, already an additive specification such as
Atj = (1 + τ)λjStj +At−1j (2.44)
would be sufficient. In this, the productivity enhancement of innovations would be constant, but still technical
progress builds on the existing state of the art. This is not to say that one specification is superior to the
other, but their implications should be carefully elaborated. For instance, one could even consider that the
positive effect of an innovation is decreasing in productivity, At−1j , because it becomes ultimately more
difficult to improve a machine further, when thermodynamical limits are reached.
Apart from these issues, it is also not clear which pool the entrepreneurs come from that overtake the
distribution of a machine if a scientist has failed to innovate it. Furthermore, the authors do not explain
what happens to the machines once they have been used once for input good production; apparently they are
completely unusable or scrapped after one period, which would imply that the whole machine capital stock
is completely renewed each period.
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Chapter 3
The Transition to Clean Technologies
in a Stylized Integrated Assessment
Model of Climate Change
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the structure of the conceptual1 model created by Buckle (2009a,b) is laid out. It transpires
that Buckle’s model shares many characteristics with IAMs, but it is conceptual or stylized in the sense that
it is a “model without data”. Therefore, for the rest of this thesis, I call it a StyLized Integrated assessment
model of Climate and the Economy (SLICE). This chapter aims at providing an in-depth discussion of the
model’s assumptions, and a first extension by a clean capital stock is developed. Furthermore, links and
contrasts to the other models reviewed in the previous two chapters are highlighted throughout this chapter.
In this version of SLICE, a benevolent social planner maximizes world welfare over three periods. He or
she can choose to accumulate two types of capital. Traditional or “dirty” capital investment is cheaper,
but production that runs on dirty capital is more CO2-intense, triggering more climate damages in the long
term. Clean capital causes less pollution, but it is more expensive. It has to compete with the incumbent
technology and also incurs additional, so-called adjustment costs for the economy. Sections 3.2.1 - 3.2.4 set out
the economy module, whilst sections 3.2.5 - 3.2.5 constitute the climate module of the model. In section 3.2.8,
climate damages are mapped back into the economy, and a simple representation of catastrophic damages is
elaborated in section 3.2.9. Section 3.2.10 introduces the alternative welfare criterion adopted in this model.
Section 3.3 examines the optimal solutions to the model under a number of scenarios: the Business-as-Usual
scenario; a dirty-technology-only scenario; partial adoption of a clean technology; the complete transition; a
resource-constrained scenario; and a binding carbon constraint.
The approach to introduce a clean technology to the model is inspired by Buckle (2009a). Unfortunately,
there the model was unable to produce analytical solutions. I altered the approach so that the model can
now be solved analytically, increasing the scope for analysis, and in section 3.4 it is shown that the two
approaches are mathematically equivalent.
1Referring to the distinction between a “conceptual model” and a “descriptive model” in the climate context, elaborated by
DeCanio (2005), p. 418f.
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In accordance with IAMs, SLICE has an economy module, a climate module and a damage function; but
in contrast to most IAMs, SLICE is inspired by the sustainable preferences approach to welfare optimiza-
tion, adopts an additive damage function, models abatement expenses as an investment into accumulable
mitigation capital, includes adjustment costs that handicap clean technology propagation, and considers the
possible existence of cumulative carbon thresholds beyond which catastrophic climate damages may occur.
In section 3.5, it is considered how the novel SLICE features, if implemented in the mainstream IAMs, might
influence them and their results. In section 3.6, the robustness of SLICE’s results against the two strongest
model assumptions is checked, namely the linear utility function and the linear production function. Finally,
conclusions are offered.
3.2 Model structure
3.2.1 Time, population and decision-making
The model comprises of three time periods, with period t referring to the present, period t + 1 to the near
future, and the long term T describing the far future as well as representing the terminal model period.2
Their length is not explicitly defined, but each of them probably lasts for several decades. Production and
consumption take place in periods t and t+1, while the disutility of climate damages arising from this earlier
economic activity is accounted for in period T .
No explicit assumption is made on whether population is alive for all times or renews itself; but population
size and labour supply are assumed to be constant. Therefore, it makes no relevant difference whether the
model variables are defined in per-capita terms or whether they are defined in absolute terms. I select the
second option. As a consequence, instead of a representative agent maximizing his or her individual welfare,
a social planner is contemplated who, equipped with perfect foresight of the consequences of his action, takes
optimal decisions to the best of his knowledge and belief3 to maximize over intertemporal world welfare.4
To enhance the accessability of the model, in this thesis both exogenous and endogenous model variables
of SLICE are assigned capital letters, while all constant model parameters are introduced either as Greek
letters or lower case Latin letters.
3.2.2 Utility and consumption
The social planner intends to maximize the population’s utility Ut over time; only consumption Ct enters the
utility function.5 The linear utility function is adopted from the earlier model versions:
Ut(Ct) = Ct. (3.1)
2The model originally operates in t = 0, 1 and 2. Note that the first period is referred to as period t, but the index t is also
sometimes used as a general index for the time periods. This is mathematically imprecise: strictly speaking, an index with a
different letter, e.g. i = {t, t+ 1, T}, would have to be introduced. Whether t refers to all periods or to the first period value is
always obvious from the context, therefore I refrain from using two different indices.
3Of course, the social planner could also be referred to as female in gender; for the sake of simplicity, it will be referred to
her or him as a “he”.
4In the IAMs seen so far, the social planner(s) maximize(s) regional/global per-capita consumption.
5This is the standard case in most IAMs. For a brief discussion of the implications of a scenario in which consumption is
disaggregated into material goods consumption and environmental services, see section 1.5.4. In the model of Acemoglu et al.
(2012) (section 2.3.2), both consumption and the environmental quality enter the utility function.
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The linear utility function is a prerequisite for the model to produce analytical solutions, especially once the
mitigation and adaptation modules are added. In order to rule out solutions in which consumption equals to
zero, I introduce the minimum consumption level f to ensure that in periods t and t+ 1 there are sufficient
resources left for this purpose:
Ct ≥ f. (3.2)
Likewise drawing upon a linear utility function to generate analytical solutions, Lecocq and Shalizi 2007
stress that “the national climate bill (the costs of mitigation, proactive adaptation, reactive adaptation and
remaining ultimate damages combined) must remain limited relative to national income - say less than 10% -
so that utility can be considered linear in expenditures”6; Ingham et al. (2005) adopt an approach in which
the marginal benefits from climate cost minimization are linear, and also Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003)
and de Bruin et al. (2010) embed linear utilities into their respective IAMs.
Nevertheless, specifying a linear utility function breaks with common conventions; economic analysis usually
operates with utilities that are increasing in consumption (U ′t(Ct) > 0), but where marginal utility is decreas-
ing (U ′′t (Ct) < 0). A standard utility function that fulfills these properties is the CES (Constant Elasticity
of Substitution) utility function7:
Ut(Ct) =
C1−σt
1− σ , (3.3)
with usually σ ≥ 1.8 The CES utility function is not only common in economic growth theory9, but, as seen
before, also dominant in IAMs such as DICE10 or PAGE. It has the convenient property that its elasticity
of marginal utility with respect to consumption, ξU ′t (Ct),Ct
, equals a constant, namely
ξU ′t (Ct),Ct
= −
dU ′t(Ct)
U ′t(Ct)
dCt
Ct
= σ. (3.4)
σ describes the percental decline of marginal utility in response to a one percent increase of consumption.
Furthermore, in an intertemporal setting, its constant reciprocal value matches the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution with respect to consumption,
ξ
Ct
Ct+1
,
U′
t+1
(Ct+1)
U′
t
(Ct)
= −
d(Ct/Ct+1)
(Ct/Ct+1)
d[U′t+1(Ct+1)/U′t(Ct)]
U′
t+1
(Ct+1)/U′
t
(Ct)
= σ−1. (3.5)
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution determines by how much a social planner would shift consump-
tion from period t to period t + 1 in response to a marginal increase in the marginal rate of substitution
MRS =
U ′t+1(Ct+1)
U ′t(Ct)
, which denotes the ratio of marginal utilities in two subsequent periods. The smaller
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ−1, the less willing the social planner is to accept differences in
utility levels and, consequently, consumption levels; alternatively, the less willing he is to accept abandoning
6Cp. Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), p. 15.
7The CES utility function is often also referred to as CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility function, with σ
denoting the constant relative risk aversion, but since SLICE operates exclusively in a deterministic context and risk aversion
plays no role, the recommendation by Wälde to refer to it as CES utility function is followed, cp. Wälde (2010), p. 182.
8This excludes the quasi-linear case where 0 < σ < 1, see fn. 12 in this chapter. For σ = 1, equation (3.3) converges to
U(Ct) = lnCt, s. e.g. Pemberton and Rau (2007), p. 290.
9Cp. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), p. 91.
10S. e.g. equation (1.1) in section 1.3.
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Figure 3.1: Intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Source: adapted from Perman et al. (2003), p. 475.
a consumption unit in period t in return for more consumption in period t + 1. It is probably easiest to
understand the functioning of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution from a diagram, see Figure 3.1.
All three curves in Figure 3.1 represent indifference curves, along which a constant welfare W = U(Ct, Ct+1)
is gained from consumption in both periods. The slopes of the indifference curves depend on their respective
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In order to keep W fixed in the middle case, in which a particular
indifference curve with a 0 < σ−1 ≤ 1 is depicted, the social planner has to be compensated with more and
more consumption units in period t in order to be convinced to forgo one consumption unit in period t+ 1,
the higher initial consumption in period t is (thus the further we go downwards along the indifference curve).
However, it is important to note that the social planner would never accept a corner solution, i.e. an allocation
in which consumption in one period is zero however high the level of consumption is in the other period.
In other words, he perceives certain limits to intertemporal substitution of consumption, which prevent him
from choosing a corner solution, since W = U(Ct, 0) = U(0, Ct+1) = 0 < W. The closer σ
−1 gets to zero, the
less willing the social planner is to trade off consumption between the two periods - the curvature of the curve
becomes larger. For σ−1 → 0, the limiting case of perfect complements is reached11, in which the prudent
social planner sets Ct = Ct+1 = C, since any other allocation, in which Ct < C and Ct+1 > C (or vice
versa), lowers welfare W , because intertemporal compensation is unfeasible. If we consider two generations
living in two different time periods t and t+ 1, perfect complementarity of intertemporal consumption leads
to building an egalitarian society, in which all generations are assigned the same consumption level, but
where even investments by generation t to allow generation t + 1 a higher consumption level are ethically
indefensable.
If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ−1 goes to infinity, the indifference curve forms a straight
line, and its slope does not depend on the ratio of Ct to Ct+1. This property is remarkable, because it
holds even at the borders. In fact, under these particular circumstances the social planner is willing without
hesitation to decide in favour of a zero period t consumption as long as the corresponding welfare loss is
(over-)compensated by welfare gains through an increased period t+ 1 consumption (and vice versa).12
11Where the welfare function takes the form W (Ct, Ct+1) = min [Ct, Ct+1] .
12Actually,for any σ−1 > 1 the social planner is already willing to accept a corner solution; in this case of “quasi-linear”
preferences, the indifference curve crosses the axes, but still preserves a curvature, cp. Varian (1992), pp. 164f.
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The linear utility function (3.1) applied in the model arises from (3.3) when σ = 0.13 In this case, σ−1 →∞,
and no limits to intertemporal substitution of consumption exist, so that extreme solutions can occur. To
summarize, the linear utility function is used to produce an analytical solution. However, with its embedded
property of a constant marginal utility, the results it generates close to corners or for large changes in
consumption levels should be handled with care. The implications of this assumption are further analyzed
in depth in section 3.6.3 and, from another perspective, in section 4.
3.2.3 Production
A single aggregated output good Yt is created through the use of two capital stocks, a traditional
14, “dirty”
capital stock, Kt, and a clean(er) mitigation capital stock, Mt; the latter stock presents an extension to the
original model (Buckle (2009a,b)) and augments it with a second control variable. These capital stocks
are assumed to exhibit the same constant productivity, p > 0, but differ in their investment costs and their
environmental effects. They could either reflect differences in fabrication methods (e.g. with respect to their
energy efficiency) or alternative power generation technologies, which are not modelled explicitly. As an
example, Kt could stand for an economy’s coal-fired power plants and Mt for its gas-fired power plants;
both are completely interchangeable in terms of their output goods, such as electricity and heat.15 The
argumentations by Gans (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) are followed, whose models were (briefly)
reviewed in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, respectively, and who both explicitly assume two even more different
input goods. Gans writes: “As ‘fossil fuel’ and ‘alternative’ (non-fossil or clean) energy (e.g. solar) are
competing sources of energy, it is also natural to assume they are substitutes, ε ≥ 1”16. Acemoglu et al.:
“We simply note that since fossil and non-fossil fuels should be close substitutes (at the very least, once
nonfossil fuels can be transported efficiently), reasonable values of ε should be quite high”17. Building on
the CES production function used in these models, with ε ≥ 0 gauging the substitutability of the two
input factors, see e.g. equation (2.27), SLICE assumes that dirty and clean capital are perfect substitutes in
production.18 This scenario is reflected by ε → ∞, when the CES production function collapses to a linear
production function. SLICE operates with
Yt = p(Kt +Mt)
α ≡ pV αt , (3.6)
where Vt is the total capital stock deployed in production at t. The constant labour force is normalized to
one. Through most of the analysis, constant returns to scale are assumed, hence α = 1, so that the AK shape
See for an alternative description of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with respect to consumption Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004), p. 91. For a broader analysis, in which the concept of elasticity of substitution is discussed in terms of
the input relation of two production factors, see e.g. Dasgupta and Heal (1979), pp. 197ff. or Perman et al. (2003), pp. 475ff.
13Dasgupta (2007), pp. 5ff, contests σ = 1 as too low, while Sterner and Persson (2008), pp. 65ff, argue that this value
already has quite radical implications and cost-benefit analyses are often practically conducted as if it was zero, see section 4.5.
14Actually, very advanced technologies are needed to drill for oil in the Arctic sea or to extract oil from oil sands, but the
fossil-fuel-processing production technology is labelled “traditional” to reflect that it relies on classic, carbon-intense energy
carriers.
15Neglecting spatial and fuel dimensions and avoiding, in this one-good framework, the discussion of the exact composition
of those output goods. It is just assumed that with either capital stock the same generic output good can be produced.
16Gans (2009), pp. 6f. Two sentences have been merged to produce this quote, without changing their original meaning.
17Acemoglu et al. (2012), p. 155. In their numerical simulation, they experiment with ε = 3 and ε = 10, with both values
characterizing the two input factors as rather good substitutes. Aghion and Howitt (2009) assume clean and dirty input factors
as perfect substitutes, cp. Aghion and Howitt (2009), pp. 381f. and 388.
18If one considered fossil-fuel-driven vs. renewable technologies for electricity generation, one could still argue in favour of a
very high substitutabiliy despite the problem of intermittency, assuming that energy storage systems are installed to balance
out fluctuations in renewable electricity generation. This measure would raise the price differential between the clean and the
dirty technology, ζ, but would not necessarily affect their degree of substitutability.
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of the production function in the original model still persists.19 Owing to constant capital returns20, the
AK production function usually generates continuous endogenous long-term growth driven solely by capital
accumulation, whereas neoclassical growth models in which the marginal product of capital is declining
require exogenous technical progress to produce long-run growth. Constant capital returns are commonly
justified by a broad definition of capital, which includes not only man-made capital, but also immaterial
production factors such as human capital and knowledge.21 In section 3.2.8, climate damages are introduced,
which are assumed to rise in capital deployment - as in Stokey (1998) (s. section 2.2.1), who also adopts an
AK production function, in total the marginal benefits of capital accumulation are declining and can even
become negative.
Production occurs in the present and near future only. All capital is consumed at the end of period t+ 1, as
neither production nor consumption take place in period T .
3.2.4 Investment and adjustment costs
Dirty capital accumulation takes place in the standard way, i.e. investments raise the dirty capital stock of the
next period by the size of the investment. For simplicity, capital depreciation is not included.22 With respect
to clean capital accumulation, ideas presented in Buckle (2009a) are further developed. Buckle considers
the possibility that accumulating a clean capital unit may not only be more expensive than adopting a unit
of a more mature high-carbon technology on the basis of standard cost considerations, but that the clean
technology may incur qualitatively new types of costs, arising from economic and political barriers existent at
least at the infancy state of clean technology propagation. Buckle points out that every large-scale investment
project leading to structural change results in costs which go beyond the primary per-unit investment costs.
For example, such additional costs can emerge if the reengineering of the electricity grid is required to
make the economy-wide diffusion of a new general purpose technology feasible.23 Moreover, lobbying groups
defending the status quo from which they benefit can give rise to further, political costs. Buckle labels these
additional costs of a technical or political nature “adjustment costs”. The idea behind this term is closely
related to the problem of a technical or political “lock-in”, as already briefly touched on in section 1.5.2.
Foxon and Pearson (2008) point out the path dependency of technological development on past decisions
and events. If a certain technology leads to an increasing marginal productivity of a production factor due
to economies of scale, network externalities and learning-by-doing effects, it can gain a cost-advantage that
is so large that it prevents the market-entry and diffusion of any other technology that is otherwise superior,
but lacks the technical and economic infrastructure that is at the old technology’s disposal. Furthermore,
the incumbent technology’s beneficiaries are able to work towards building up additional barriers.24 Kemp
reports as an example that vehicles could often be powered more cheaply by biofuel than by petrol, but notes
that conventional combustion motors have a large headstart due to the improvements already experienced
19Which usually takes the form Y = AK, see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp. 63ff. and 205ff. The letter A, which
commonly denotes the capital productivity instead of p, is reserved for the adaptation capital stock, which is introduced in
chapter 10. In section 3.6.2, the implications from using a concave production function with 0 < α < 1 are investigated.
20This stands in contrast to most IAMs, in which the marginal product of capital is generally assumed to be declining, which
was criticized in section 1.5.2.
21See also fn. 48 in section 1.5.2.
22Which could be easily introduced, with no major consequences for the model conclusions.
23The term “General Purpose Technology” refers to a crucial innovation potentially revolutionizing production processes in
the whole economy and was introduced in section 2.2.2. Renewable energy technologies may be regarded as one such general
purpose technology. Their dissemination is dependent on upgrades and extensions of electricity grids, s. e.g. Painuly (2001),
pp. 81 and 84. Other projects that entail similar problems include the construction of electrical vehicle charging networks or
the installation of pipelines to transport CO2 to sequestration sites.
24Cp. Foxon and Pearson (2008), pp. 149f. and 157.
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in reliability, durability, performance and efficiency. Car manufacturers have accumulated a lot of knowledge
in producing conventional combustion motors as have garages in repairing them. Moreover, the petrol
distribution system is mature, while patience is required from customers searching for a petrol station offering
biofuel. Finally, enterprises that have invested in oil exploration and conventional refinery technology have a
strong incentive to block the development of petrol substitutes.25 Going beyond the comparison of pure per-
unit costs, adjustment costs capture the (additional) cost spread between the challenging and the incumbent
technology due to the competitive advantage the latter has accumulated over time. In other words, the
economy has to bear these additional adjustment costs in order to overcome its current lock-in.26
This approach to model adjustment costs may be viewed as complementary to work by Schwoon and
Tol (2006). They conclude from the summary by Sathaye et al. (2001) on barriers to GHG mitigation
technologies that “missing markets, distorted prices, financial market imperfections, tariffs on imported
equipment preventing international diffusion, transaction costs, distorted incentives, public goods nature of
information, but also social, cultural, and behavioral norms and aspirations [are] the main barriers”, but that
“these barriers are difficult to quantify and modeling them would overload the analytic framework of the
[Goulder and Mathai (2000)] model”27, which model Schwoon and Tol augment. However, they take into
account that an immediate replacement of current capital by clean(er) capital incurs substantial premature
capital turnover costs, because the current capital is demounted (far) before the end of its life time. Therefore,
Schwoon and Tol include a cost penalty in the abatement cost function, which penalty rises in the change of
abatement levels, i.e. the speed of the transition. Similar to the SLICE approach to modelling adjustment
costs, Schwoon and Tol specify that abatement costs increase quadratically in the difference of abatement
levels.28 Therefore, while the modelling approaches exhibit similarities, their motivation is quite different.
In summary, clean capital accumulation in SLICE is assumed more expensive than dirty capital accumulation
for two reasons. First, per-capital unit investment costs diverge by a price differential, ζ > 0, reflecting the
fact that low-carbon generation is usually more expensive than fossil-fuel generation. This is the standard
narrative and is acknowledged in mainstream IAMs. The second factor is adjustment costs, which are
assumed to be quadratically increasing in clean capital investment. Adjustment costs scale with Ψ > 0 for
any investment in the mitigation capital stock, but do not apply to disinvestments. Capital investment costs
Icostt incurred in period t, to build up the next period’s capital stocks, Kt+1 and Mt+1, are therefore:
Icostt = (Kt+1 −Kt) + (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt) +
Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt) ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0) . (3.7)
It should be pointed out that this approach represents an attempt to address two of the points of criticism
made by Stanton et al. (2009), summarized in section 1.5.2. Firstly, it highlights the path dependency of
technology adoption and dissemination, since the marginal costs for new clean capital are decreasing in clean
capital already accumulated in the past. This also allows the occurance of a lock-in effect discussed earlier, if
otherwise superior clean technology use is prevented only by too low initial clean capital dissemination and
thereby prohibitively high adjustment costs. Secondly, in contrast to the approaches taken in most IAMs,
expenses for abatement in IAMs do not cause a pure loss of income, but serve the accumulation of a clean
capital stock.29
25Cp. Kemp (1996), pp. 155ff.
26Of course, certain groups of society benefit from “paying” these adjustment costs, however, on an aggregated, economy-wide
scale, they present a social cost.
27Schwoon and Tol (2006), p. 26. Cp. Sathaye et al. (2001), pp. 353ff.
28Cp. Schwoon and Tol (2006), pp. 26f. and 29ff., especially equation (7).
29In many models the accumulation of a knowledge capital stock is considered, which e.g. raises the energy efficiency of
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However, the adjustment costs as specified in (3.7) are most probably able to describe only a part of the
transition to clean technologies, namely its initial phase. This limitation exists for the purpose of producing
a single, analytical solution. In Figure 3.2, a possible shape of a curve that depicts adjustment costs over
the whole transition in dependence of period t + 1 clean capital stock accumulation is given, whereby it is
assumed that M = 0. In the diagram, from M = 0 to M = M˜ , clean technology dissemination is low,
costsAdjustment
M
M
~
M
⌣
M
Region covered
by SLICE
Figure 3.2: A possible adjustment costs curve
and technical and political barriers to clean technology become stronger as soon as it leaves its niche, so
that the marginal adjustment costs are increasing. This is the region represented in this version of SLICE.
When the adjustment costs curve reaches its inflexion point at M˜ , the marginal adjustment costs become
decreasing and, beyond M˘ , even negative. These regions reflect scenarios in which the clean technology
has already gained a significant market share. It still faces strong barriers, but, owing to its increasing
competitiveness, resistance is dwindling. When the clean technology has become the new dominant market
leader and replaced the current incumbent, it enjoys its former competitor’s advantages in the form of a
mature technological infrastructure and the powerful support of lobbying beneficiaries, so that the former
incumbent technology incurs adjustment costs and clean technology adjustment costs may possibly even
become negative in absolute terms, beyond M. Therefore, the region to the right of M˜ might relate to the
case of a technology that exhibits increasing marginal returns since it is knowledge-driven and/or benefits
from network externalities, as described by Stanton et al. (2009) at the beginning of section 1.5.2. Only
once marginal adjustment costs have fallen to zero has the economy’s lock-in by the predecessor-technology
been overcome, and standard prize competition rules.
Of course, the adjustment costs curve may well exhibit discontinuties, for instance once a critical market
concentration is reached or the current incumbent is completely driven out of the market so that adjustment
costs suddenly drop. However, already embedding an adjustment costs curve as drawn in Figure 3.2 poses
production (see for instance some of the models outlined in section 1.4.1). This however is conceptually quite different from a
tangible clean machine capital stock. Also in the two conceptual models by Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Gans (2009) mentioned
earlier in this section, such a clean machine capital accumulation does not take place.
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an intricate challenge to the modeller that is significantly greater than the one arising from implementing its
first arm only, as it may lead to multiple optimal solutions. As already pointed out by Hall and Behl (2006)
in section 1.5.3, economics is currently not well-prepared to deal with such problems. For the competition
amongst alternative energy carriers against fossil fuels, on a world-wide scale and in most parts of the world30,
the situation illustrated by the region left to M˜t+1 most certainly applies - hence SLICE may well approximate
this competition. If particular reference is made to the competition between coal-fired power plants and gas-
fired power plants, the degree of infancy of the latter is certainly region- and economy-specific. Some remarks
on how SLICE might react, once the whole adjustment curve in Figure 3.2 is integrated into the model, are
given in section 3.5.6.
As a further caveat, it may be questionable to assume that the clean technology adjustment costs are assumed
independent of the dirty technology. For instance, in the extreme and theoretical case of zero dirty technology
adoption, the economy’s penetration with clean technology will not face resistance from lobbying groups
defending an incumbent. Therefore, one might like to specify the adjustment costs in (3.7) rather in terms
of clean capital shares, for example
Adjustment costs =
Ψ
2
(
Mt+1
Kt+1
− Mt
Kt
)
·max
(
Mt+1
Kt+1
− Mt
Kt
; 0
)
. (3.8)
The main problem with this specification is that the interweaving of the two control variables in equation (3.8)
inhibits an analytical solution to the model. A simple fix would be to relate the clean capital stock in both
periods to the initial dirty capital stock, Kt, exclusively, to perform an approximation of the clean capital
share in period t+ 1. This could be done immediately without any problem, since Kt is given exogenously.
However, this is only a plausible approximation if either the dirty capital stock barely changes or its change
is marginal compared to clean capital growth. Therefore, in the current model version adjustments are
exclusively related to the previously installed clean capital stock.
3.2.5 CO2: flows and stocks
Economic activity generates different types of greenhouse gases (GHGs), which comprise, among others,
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrious oxide. These GHGs differ in their origin, their photochemical properties,
atmospheric concentration, life time in the atmosphere and consequently their global warming potential. Due
to the world’s large dependency on fossil fuels31 and, to a lesser extent, land-use change32, economic growth
has required increasing emissions of CO2.
33 Once CO2 is in the atmosphere, large fractions stay there for
thousands of years.34 Since approximately 75% of realized and potential global warming is ascribed to CO2
35,
the model focuses on the analysis of CO2; other GHGs lie outside of the scope of this model version.
36
Every production process that involves conversion of materials requires energy. Given that capital accu-
mulation is one of the major drivers of economic growth, and machine capital is needed to process material
conversions, the two capital stocks, Kt andMt, determine the amount of CO2 emissions, Et, generated during
30At present, more than 80% of global energy demand is met by fossil fuels like oil, natural gas and coal, cp. International
Energy Agency (2009), p. 74, figure from 2007.
31S. previous footnote.
32More than 20% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions are caused by land-use change, in particular deforestration, cp. Denman
et al. (2007), p. 512, which are not represented in the model.
33Cp. International Energy Agency (2009), pp. 171f.
34Cp. Archer and Brovkin (2008), pp. 287f. See also fn. 41 in section 3.2.6..
35S. Rogner et al. (2007), p. 101.
36For a comparative treatment of other, shorter-lived GHGs s. Smith et al. (2012).
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production and energy generation. In the model, production – but not consumption - inevitably produces
CO2 emissions:
Et = γKt + µMt. (3.9)
CO2 emissions Et arising from production are assumed to proportionally increase with capital employment.
37
The emission coefficients, or proportionality factors, γ > µ > 0, capture the emission intensities of the dirty
and the clean production technology, respectively. A high emissions coefficient describes a rather “dirty”, i.e.
emissions-intense, technology. Mitigation capital has an environmental advantage. While a clean capital unit
produces the same amount of output as a dirty capital unit, it creates less CO2 emissions as a side product.
38
Equation (3.9) represents abatement in SLICE. In contrast to the abatement function (1.6) of DICE-2007,
which function seems to imply a “cleaning-up” of CO2 possibly in form of an end-of-pipe solution that is
flexibly adjusted in each period, in SLICE abatement takes place through a substitution from dirty to clean
capital. Like the model by Smulders et al. (2005), presented in section 2.2.2, in which the clean technology
became available in the form of a sudden appearance of a stationary general purpose technology, SLICE does
not address the creation of the technologies, and the processes of technological improvement, e.g. triggered
by learning-by-doing, are neglected. In both models, the foci lie on analyzing the investment and adoption
decisions.
3.2.6 Atmospheric greenhouse gas accumulation
CO2 accumulates in the atmosphere. If the model starts in period t, St marks the level of cumulative
CO2 emissions in the atmosphere that have accumulated due to fossil fuel combustion since the start of the
industrial revolution39, raising total cumulative atmospheric CO2 emissions, S
TOT
t , above their pre-industrial
level, denoted by SPI (PI = pre-industrial): SPI denotes the natural amount of atmospheric CO2 before the
beginning of the industrial revolution (PI = pre-industrial)40:
STOTt = SPI + St. (3.10)
Due to the thermal inertia of the climate system, there is a delay between the release of CO2 and its impact on
the global temperatures, which is accounted for in the model. In any period, St comprises only the emissions
generated from production during past periods; hence, period t emissions cause climate damages not earlier
than in period t+ 1, and period t+ 1 emissions contribute to global warming only in the long term.
Large parts of atmospheric CO2 are absorbed by land and, to a larger extent, oceans. Buckle (2009b)
introduces a constant atmospheric carbon retention parameter to reflect the fact that only a fraction of CO2
is not taken up by the carbon sinks on Earth and reaches and remains in the atmosphere. I drop it (set it
37The AK production function is originally motivated by a broad definition of capital, which includes knowledge capital. The
link between capital and emissions as introduced in equation (3.9) suggests that in this model no knowledge capital is considered,
as knowledge capital itself does not produce emissions.
38The emissions coefficients are conceptually related to the carbon intensity γt in the DICE model, see equation (1.6), with
the difference that here it is linked to capital and is a constant parameter, whereas Nordhaus (2008) links it to output and
assumes exogenous carbon-saving technical progress that reduces γt over time.
39The industrial revolution is the cradle of anthropogenic CO2 accumulation. MacKay marks 1769 as the key year of the
industrial revolution, when James Watt patented an efficient steam engine. This invention was driven by coal and allowed to
tap further coal resources, which both stoked demand for coal, cp. MacKay (2009), pp. 6ff.
40This nomenclature slightly deviates from Buckle (2009a,b) in order to save notation.
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equal to one), as such a constant parameter cannot describe the complex carbon cycle41 adequately and is
in this model version dispensable without affecting the conclusions.
The CO2 accumulation function then reads:
St+1 = St + Et (3.11)
Using (3.9), the stock of atmospheric CO2 evolves as follows:
St+1 = St + γKt + µMt (3.12)
ST = St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1. (3.13)
3.2.7 Global warming
Global warming is caused by the so-called greenhouse effect. Sun energy approaches the Earth in the form
of shortwave radiation. While about 30% of this energy is immediately reflected at the same wavelength
back to space, the remaining influx is initially absorbed by the Earth and afterwards reemitted in the form
of longwave, infrared radiation. Atmospheric GHGs like water vapour and CO2 let pass through shortwave
radiation with an only minor rate of retention, but absorb most of the energy transmitted in form of longwave
radiation. These gases in turn release the energy in the form of longwave radiation in all directions; the energy
emitted downwards is trapped by the Earth’s atmosphere and warms the Earth’s surface. Without the natural
greenhouse effect, the global mean surface temperature would come to -19°C instead of the observed +14°C.
The accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere - owing to extensions of and changes in energy production,
industrial activities, agriculture and land use, in short the growth of modern economic activity - is intensifying
the trapping of longwave radiation and results in global warming.42
Radiative forcing measures the change in the energy balance of the Earth-atmosphere system in response to
an alteration of its determining factors. The word “radiative” refers to the fact that these factors impact the
balance of the solar radiation inflow and infrared radiation outflow within the atmosphere, while the term
“forcing” indicates that the Earth’s radiative balance is moved from its original state.43
41Not only does the capacity of terrestrial and marine sinks to absorb CO2 decline with absorption levels, but Bohn et al.
(2007) and Zhuang et al. (2006) for instance report that global warming leads to a thawing of permafrost in Northern wetlands,
likely triggering the release of large amounts of methane (CH4), which has a global warming potential (GWP) per century that
is 27-28 times as large as that of CO2, cp. Boucher et al. (2009), p. 4. Such complex feedback mechanisms can hardly be
adequately represented by a constant retention parameter.
To provide some information on atmospheric carbon retention, Canadell et al. (2007), p. 18867, estimate the annual average
airborne-fraction, defined by Forster et al. (2007), p. 139, as denoting the share of CO2 from anthropogenic sources remaining
in the atmosphere, at 45% from 2000 to 2006. Solomon et al. (2009), pp. 1704f., and Archer and Brovkin (2008), pp. 286ff.,
report that in the long-term quasi-equilibrium partitioning of CO2 between atmosphere and oceans 20-30% of total released
1000-2000 gigatons of carbon would remain in the atmosphere for the next 1000 years, with the rest largely uptaken by the
oceans. The decay of CO2 takes thousands of years. Combining the two figures for short-term and long-term retention, Solomon
et al. estimate that at the end of the millenium atmospheric CO2 concentration will amount to 40% of its peak concentration
enhancement over the pre-industrial value.
However, Solomon et al. (2009), pp. 1705f., also explain that even if at some point CO2 emissions cease, the global mean
temperature will keep its reached higher level until the end of the millenium. This is because any gradual reduction of atmospheric
CO2 that decreases radiative forcing is largely offset by simultaneous ocean heat losses.
To conclude, in order to approximate the carbon cycle adequately, a more complex climate module seems necessary.
42Cp. Treut et al. (2007), pp. 96f. and Moffatt (2004), pp. 12ff.
43Cp. Forster et al. (2007), p. 136.
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The radiative forcing Ft, relative to the neutral level giving rise to global warming within a period t, is
approximated by Myhre et al. (1998)44:
△Ft = 5.35 ln
(
STOTt
SPI
)
. (3.14)
The related global average temperature anomaly45 is given by:
△Tt = Λ△Ft. (3.15)
While there exists an agreement on an approximately linear relationship between temperature rise △Tt and
radiative forcing, the true value of the climate sensitivity Λ, which depends on climate feedback processes, is
uncertain (Forster et al. (2007); Ramaswamy et al. (2001)).46
Plugging (3.14) into (3.15) and conducting a Maclaurin expansion of the logarithm47, Buckle obtains the
following linear approximation for the temperature response, which is valid for a certain range of cumulative
CO2 emissions exceeding the pre-industrial amount:
△Tt = 5.35Λ ln
(
STOTt
SPI
)
≈ 5.35Λ
(
STOTt
SPI
− 1
)
= 5.35Λ
(
STOTt − SPI
SPI
)
. (3.16)
Using (3.10), equation (3.16) can be simplified to
△Tt ≈ 5.35Λ
(
St
SPI
)
. (3.17)
3.2.8 Non-catastrophic climate damages
Rapid, human-induced global warming48, as a consequence of accumulation anthropogenic CO2 emissions in
the atmosphere and as described by (3.17), is anticipated to trigger a wide range of adverse impacts.49 In
line with the IAMs presented in sections 1.3 and 1.4, climate damages are assumed in this model to increase
non-linearly with temperature rise50; climate damage costs Dt are approximated by the following damage
function:
Dt = v(△Tt)ψ (3.18)
where v > 0 captures the exposure and vulnerability to climate change and translates physical damage into
monetary costs, diminishing the resources available for consumption and investment. The damage function
44S. Myhre et al. (1998), p. 2718. Ramaswamy et al. (2001), p. 358, compile additional, more exact estimators. Equation
(3.14) originally described the relationship between radiative forcing and atmospheric CO2 concentration; since the latter appears
both in numerator and denominator, the fact that this model operates with cumulative CO2 emissions makes no difference to
the value of the constant.
45Temperatures in Africa are predicted to rise 1.5 as much as the global average; the factor is reckoned to be even higher for
the polar regions, cp. Christensen et al. (2007), pp. 867 and 902ff.
46The climate sensitivity takes different values in distinct climate models. Besides, regional temperature responses are expected
to vary considerably. Cp. Ramaswamy et al. (2001), pp. 353ff., Forster et al. (2007), pp. 133ff. and Denman et al. (2007), pp.
533ff. See also the description of the PAGE model in section 1.4.2.
47For this common linear approximation, s. Pemberton and Rau (2007), pp. 177f.
48In opposition to natural fluctuations taking place over millions of years.
49Damage categories were touched on in sections 1.3 and are further elaborated in section 6.3.
50Initial benefits arising from carbon fertilization in some regions as a consequence of an incipiently moderate temperature
increase are neglected. They are likely to disappear already above a low threshold, cp. e.g. Cruz et al. (2007), pp. 479f.
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exponent ψ > 1 implements the non-linearity of climate damages in response to temperature increase. For
the moment, for simplicity, like in Nordhaus (2008), a quadratic damage function is chosen (i.e. ψ = 2)
to produce a convex damage function.51 As learnt in section 1.5.3, together with the shape of the damage
function(s) the derivation and value of such a global damage function exponent are also under debate.
However, such a numerical conjecture is much less problematic in a stylized model, which does not require
complete knowledge of the global damage curve to produce numerical damage estimates. Plugging (3.17)
into (3.18) produces
Dt = v
[
5.35Λ
(
St
SPI
)]2
= b(St)
2, (3.19)
and with (3.12) and (3.13), also
Dt+1 = b(St + γKt + µMt)
2 (3.20)
DT = b(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
2, (3.21)
where b = v
(
5.35Λ
SP I
)2
still describes the vulnerability to climate change.
As was sketched in section 1.5.3, climate damages may cause detrimental impacts in different ways. In
principle, they could directly enter the utility function52, they could reduce workers’ capability to produce,
i.e. the productivity of labour, or, as assumed in most IAMs, they could diminish the period output by
a certain percentage rate.53 In SLICE, climate damages of any kind reduce period t resources otherwise
available for consumption Ct and investment expenditures I
cost
t in absolute terms:
Ct = Yt − Icostt −Dt. (3.22)
In contrast to most IAMs, including PAGE and models of the DICE/RICE family, in which climate damages
are multiplicative in the sense that they rise and fall with the level of output, here damages are modelled as
additive. As elucidated in section 1.5.3, the multiplicative approach entails some questionable features, and
some related points of the criticism expressed by Heal (2009) and Stanton et al. (2009) are, at least in
principle, addressed by this approach.
First, climate damages Dt are neither necessarily tied nor related to output in a given period. Instead, in this
additive specification, climate damages could generally be regarded as the sum of lost present consumption
and the present value of future consumption flows; the latter of which diminish when global warming reduces
resources available for capital investment, or when it damages the capital stock itself. In this notion, the
cost of land loss due to sea level rise is then not only determined by lost output produced in the affected
region, but it additionally comprises the potential future welfare that could have been created in that area by
the destroyed capital stock. Secondly, at least conceptually it is straightforward to include in these damages
damages to natural capital, which traditionally are not accounted for in computations of GDP, so that these
damages should not be assumed to correlate with output. However, this novel additive approach raises
51In section 10.6, it is shown how a more complex version of SLICE can be solved analytically for a wide range of exponents,
among them the damage function exponent.
52As they do in Acemoglu et al. (2012), see section 2.3.2.
53For instance, in DICE-2007, s. section 1.3, equations (1.2) and (1.4).
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the well-known and considerable philosophical and practical problems of monetizing the (present) value of
ecosystem goods and services.54 Third and finally, in contrast to the approach in Nordhaus (2008), here
damages from climate change are not bound by output levels. Although the model makes no statement about
whether the damages affect the capital base, output or both, the scenario Dt > Yt, where it can be inferred
from (3.22) that the capital stock must be affected, is clearly feasible.
It should be noted that an empirical calibration of the model might pose problems, because in this additive
approach damages are independent of GDP. However, damages are usually regarded to rise with output,
as more economic value is at stake, supporting a multiplicative damage specification such as in (1.2). This
poses a problem however if a country is currently underdeveloped, as such a damage specification may
underestimate its potential to generate income, as illustrated in section 7.3.6. The present-value approach
to motivate additive damages, as described above, may again possibly apply best to some certain damages,
so that in an empirical model a combination of multiplicative and additive approaches would perhaps have
to be considered. For instance, Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) also first introduce an additive damage
specification, similar to that in (3.22), but their damage function itself is again dependent on output, so that
a hybrid modelling approach emerges.55 This issue is not taken up further, since for this stylized model it
seems sufficient and reasonable to assume that climate damages are on average increasing in global warming,
as established in (3.19).
3.2.9 Catastrophic climate damage, discontinuities and limits to substitution
In an attempt to extend the model by a straightforward catastrophic damage module, which accommodates
the risk of disastrous, non-marginal climate change, it is assumed that the vulnerability to climate change, b, is
highly non-linear above a certain threshold level of cumulative CO2 emissions, Ω. Motivated by the existence
of Earth system’s “tipping points” touched on in section 1.5.3, once this cumulative carbon emissions threshold
level is trespassed upon, it is possible, in the model, that the economy loses its entire resource endowment.
For such a setup, b can be approximated as follows:
b(Si) =

b if Si ǫ [0; Ω] with pr = 1
b if Si ǫ ]Ω;∞[ with pr = ΩSi
∞ if Si ǫ ]Ω;∞[ with pr = 1− ΩSi ,
for i = t, t+ 1, T (3.23)
where pr denotes the probability. The assumption that climate damages may be “unlimited” is most certainly
an exaggeration despite the statement of Ackerman et al. (2009) that catastrophic climate damages would
lead to the “devastation of the planet in a science-fiction dystopia”56. It helps sidestepping here the question
raised by Weitzman (2009b) concerning how to deal adequately with low-probabilty, extremely-high-, but
still limited-impact events, whose associated disutility may arguably not be weighted and averaged in the
standard way.57 Here, even a social planner that adopts a standard cost-benefit analysis will aspire to reject
any risk of catastrophic climate change that triggers infinite damages, and the planner will avoid reaching an
area of the damage function where large discontinuities are possible. Therefore, he will always ensure that
54For an attempt to evaluate biodiversity (loss) in monetary terms s. Sukhdev (2008).
55Cp. Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003), pp. 302 and 326. Their approach actually exhibits similarities to the approach that is
considered in section 5.5.
56Ackerman et al. (2009), p. 311.
57See also section 1.5.3.
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the cumulative carbon emissions do not exceed that threshold58, i.e. he will take a precautionary approach
in the spirit of Ackerman et al. (2009)59 and limit cumulative emissions to a maximum tolerable level60:
Si ≤ Ω for i = t, t+ 1, T. (3.24)
Considered from a different perspective, Ω denotes the amount of cumulative carbon emissions above which
damages cannot (anymore safely) be compensated by marginal income gains in the form of additional man-
made goods, or, alternatively, a point at which the limits to substitution between man-made goods and
environmental goods, here affected by changes to the climate, are reached. The approach is motivated by
the recent debate in science on fixed, cumulative carbon targets that aim at reducing the risk of catastrophic
climate change.61 Among the cumulative carbon targets under discussion, there are the one trillion tonnes of
cumulative carbon in the atmosphere (3.67 trillion tonnes of CO2) that could limit global temperature rise to
no more than 2°C (with a one-standard-error uncertainty range of 1.6 to 2.6°C) by 2100, proposed by Allen
et al. (2009b).62, or the suggestion by Meinshausen et al. (2009) to restrict cumulative CO2 emissions by
2050 to one trillion tonnes of CO2 to stay below the 2°C target with a probability of 75%
63. Of course,
nobody can define up to what level global warming can be expected to be “safe”.
3.2.10 Sustainable preferences and welfare
As elaborated in section 1.5.4, discounting usually leads to the discrimination of future generations against
present ones. To rule out such a dictatorship of the present, which takes place when future utilities are
discounted, Buckle adopts and develops, in the climate context, an alternative welfare criterion introduced
by Chichilnisky (1996). Chichilnisky characterized the nature of sustainable preferences as exhibiting
sensitivity to both the present and the long-run future and specifying trade-offs between them. She provided
a decomposition of a sustainable criterion of welfare into two components. The first is the usual discounted
utility stream over time, while the second includes a finite and purely additive measure providing weight to
the very long run utility. Welfare W according to sustainable preferences is defined as:
W =
∞∑
t=0
βtUt + φ, (3.25)
where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor. In a nutshell, Chichilnisky’s idea is to add to the discounted utility
58This approach therefore differs somewhat from the one taken by Keller et al. (2004). They experiment with different
values of the parameter that gauges the magnitude of uncertain catastrophic climate damages in DICE-94 and find that possibly
larger damages may result in postponing, but not necessarily avoiding, the occurence of such a catastrophic event, cp. Keller
et al. (2004), p. 726.
59S. the conclusions of chapter 1, second bullet point.
60In the following, to avoid trivial solutions I always assume that exogenous period t and t + 1 carbon stocks are below Ω:
thus St < Ω and St+1 < Ω are fulfilled.
61Cumulative emissions targets have recently been discussed in science as an alternative to targets for atmospheric CO2
concentrations. Because of the large uncertainties in the carbon cycle, the emission target corresponding to an atmospheric CO2
concentration target at a certain point in time is hard to identify, not to mention that even if the concentration target is met,
the temperature response aimed for may not ensue, given the incomplete understanding of the climate system. Uncertainties
can be reduced by considering the amount of cumulative CO2 emissions that may be tolerated in order not to exceed a certain
temperature target over a certain period. Scientific models show that this amount is insensitive to particular emission paths
due to the slow decay of CO2 and propose certain cumulative CO2 emissions targets. In contrast to time-focused stabilization
scenarios entailing a higher degree of uncertainty, cumulative CO2 emissions targets relate more directly to mitigation policy.
Cp. Allen et al. (2009a), Allen et al. (2009b), Meinshausen et al. (2009) and Zickfeld et al. (2009).
62S. Allen et al. (2009b), p. 813.
63S. Meinshausen et al. (2009), p. 1158.
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stream a purely finitely additive measure φ = lim
t→∞
Ut, in order to more adequately take into account the
needs of future generations.64
Inspired by Chichilnisky’s ideas, SLICE adopts a modified approach. In this model, φ > 065 is a parameter
that assigns weight to the disutility of damage occurring in the very long run to adequately include future
generations’ claims to their share of intergenerational welfare. The short-term future in period t + 1 is
discounted by a discount factor 0 < β < 1. This does not reflect discrimination, but impatience of economic
agents alive in both periods t and t+ 1.66 The discount factor is related to the pure rate of time preference,
δ, in the common way67:
β =
1
1 + δ
. (3.26)
Furthermore, it is assumed that always
β(1 + p) > 1 ⇐⇒ p > δ (3.27)
holds, otherwise the capital productivity would be too low to motivate sacrificing period t consumption, and
no investment would take place even in the absence of any climate damages.
To summarize, in SLICE, the social planner maximizes welfare W as follows:
max
Ct, Ct+1
W = Ut(Ct) + β · Ut+1(Ct+1) + φ · UT (−DT ). (3.28)
The negative argument of the last term limits the choice of suitable utility functions. Measuring long-term
damages in disutility units may cause problems when a more general CES utility function is used68, but for
a linear utility function, such problems do not exist.
3.3 Scenarios and optimal solutions
3.3.1 Overview
Section 3.3.2 presents the general optimization problem. Afterwards, the optimal solutions to six different
scenarios are derived. At first, the case of a myopic planner is considered, who does not take long-term
damages into account. This represents SLICE’s Business as Usual scenario, in which no emissions abatement
effort is taken. In the second scenario, only dirty capital is employed by the economy. Scenario 3 considers
the optimal outcome of a mixed scenario with partial adoption of the clean technology, and in scenario 4 a
complete transition to clean technologies takes place. In scenarios 5 and 6 I scrutinize the consequences of
binding constraints on resources available for investment and on cumulative carbon emissions, respectively,
the latter leading over to a note on technical progress in SLICE.
64Cp. Chichilnisky (1996), pp. 244ff. This welfare criterion is far from having established itself in economics, but it is
praised by Heal for its “implications that may be much more future-oriented than the standard approach”, cp. Heal (1997), pp.
337ff. Beltratti et al. (1998) applied this welfare criterion in their analysis of optimal harvesting of exhaustible environmental
resources.
65Thereby in contrast to standard discounting explicitly including values φ > 1.
66This was briefly described in fn. 78 in section 1.5.4.
67Recalling the Ramsey rule (1.7) from section 1.5.4, the rate of time preference, δ, coincides with the discount rate, as with
the linear utility function σ = 0: ρ = δ +
Ct+1−Ct
Ct
σ = δ +
Ct+1−Ct
Ct
· 0 = δ.
68see section 3.6.3.
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3.3.2 The general optimization problem
I formulate the complete, general optimization problem:
max
Ct, Ct+1
W = Ut(Ct) + β · Ut+1(Ct+1) + φ · UT (−DT ),
subject to
Yt = p(Kt +Mt)
Icostt = (Kt+1 −Kt) + (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt) +
Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt) ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0)
Dt+1 = b(St + γKt + µMt)
2
DT = b(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
2
Ct = Yt − Icostt −Dt
Ut(Ct) = Ct
Ct, t+1 ≥ f
ST ≤ Ω.
The production function, investment costs and the damage functions are plugged into the resource restriction.
The utility function is applied to consumption, and then consumption replaced in the welfare function by
the terms on the RHS of the resource restriction. Embedding the minimum consumption constraints and the
carbon constraint, the Lagrangian function Z can be set up, which is maximized over Kt+1 and Mt+1:
max
Kt+1,Mt+1
Z = p(Kt +Mt)− (Kt+1 −Kt)− (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)
− Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt) ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0)− b(St)2
+ β
[
(1 + p)(Kt+1 +Mt+1)− b(St + γKt + µMt)2
]
− φb [(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)2]+ λ1(Ct − f)
+ λ2(Ct+1 − f) + λ3[Ω− St − γKt − µMt − γKt+1 − µMt+1], (3.29)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions
∂Z
∂Kt+1
≤ 0; Kt+1 ≥ 0; Kt+1 · ∂Z
∂Kt+1
= 0 (3.30)
∂Z
∂Mt+1
≤ 0; Mt+1 ≥ 0; Mt+1 · ∂Z
∂Mt+1
= 0 (3.31)
∂Z
∂λi
≥ 0; λi ≥ 0; λi · ∂Z
∂λi
= 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. (3.32)
The terms associated with the Lagrange multipliers λ1 and λ2 demand that at least the minimum consumption
level is reached in both periods. The last term in brackets in (3.29) associated with λ3 embeds the carbon
72
CHAPTER 3. THE TRANSITION TO CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES IN A STYLIZED INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT MODEL OF CLIMATE CHANGE
constraint into the optimization problem. Relevant first order conditions69 (FOCs) are
∂Z
∂Kt+1
= −1 + β(1 + p)− 2φbγ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
− λ1 − λ3γ ≤ 0 (3.33)
∂Z
∂Mt+1
= −(1 + ζ)−Ψ ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0) + β(1 + p)− 2φbµ(St + γKt + µMt
+ γKt+1 + µMt+1)− λ1 [(1 + ζ) + Ψ ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0)]− λ3µ ≤ 0 (3.34)
∂Z
∂λ1
= p(Kt +Mt) +Kt −Kt+1 − (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)
− Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt) ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0)− b(St)2 − f ≥ 0 (3.35)
∂Z
∂λ3
= Ω− St − γKt − µMt − γKt+1 − µMt+1 ≥ 0. (3.36)
In the following, a number of scenarios are analyzed. In each of them, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are fulfilled
differently. However, all scenarios apart from the first one refer back to these FOCs.
3.3.3 Scenario 1: Business as Usual or the myopic social planner
If the social planner is myopic, i.e. φ = 0, he only cares about welfare in the short and mid term, but does
not take into account the climate damages that occur in the long term. This describes the SLICE Business
as Usual (BAU) scenario, in which no emissions control takes place. It implies zero clean capital investment,
Mt+1 = 0
70, furthermore dirty capital investment is not limited owing to concerns about long-term damages.
If φ = 0, the marginal benefit of investment always exceeds its marginal cost due to assumption (3.27), or
dW
dCt
= 1 < β(1 + p) =
dW
dKt+1
. (3.37)
Therefore, the social planner invests as much as possible in period t to maximize the intertemporal consump-
tion sum by boosting period t+1 consumption, but he needs to pay attention to the minimum consumption
restriction (3.2). From (3.29) follow the optimal solutions for dirty capital, cumulative long term carbon
emissions and consumption71:
K`t+1 = (1 + p)(Kt +Mt)− b (St)2 − f (3.38)
S`T =
(
St + γKt + µMt + γ
(
(1 + p)(Kt +Mt)− b (St)2 − f
))
(3.39)
C`t = f (3.40)
C`t+1 = (1 + p)
(
(1 + p)(Kt +Mt)− b (St)2 − f
)
− b(St + γKt + µMt)2 (3.41)
69In the following it is always assumed that λ2 = 0, so that Ct+1 ≥ f .
70Whereby it is allowed that the economy starts with a non-zero clean capital stock, that is Mt ≥ 0.
71Due to the depreciation of its environmental advantage, any initial clean capital Mt > 0 is completely substituted by dirty
capital. Probably an economy described by φ = 0 would never have accumulated clean capital in the first place, in which case
simply Mt = 0. It is assumed that the initial resources are large enough to allow fulfilling the minimum consumption restriction
for period t, while still leaving resources for investment.
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In the BAU scenario, no abatement efforts are taken, and dirty capital investment and cumulative period T
emissions are at their maxima.
3.3.4 Scenario 2: no adoption of clean technology
In this baseline case, clean technology is either not available or its adoption too expensive, hence Mt =
Mt+1 = 0. For an interior solution
72 to emerge in absence of clean technologies, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
are to be fulfilled as λ1,2,3,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
= 0, ∂Z∂Mt+1 < 0, so that Ct, t+1 ≥ f, Kt+1 ≥ 0 and the carbon constraint
does not bite. For the rest of this work, I refer to the case in which, in all periods, not only consumption
is greater than f , but also the optimal capital stock levels are greater than zero, as the “standard interior
solution” of a model scenario.
The FOC for dirty capital stock, (3.33), shows that, on the one hand, a marginal increment in period t + 1
capital stock augments the resources available for consumption in period t+ 1 by (1 + p); this is the benefit
of investment. On the other hand, investment comes not only at the cost of an abandoned unit of period
t consumption as in the case without climate damages, but it also produces a marginal climate damage
cost in the long term. Since these environmental costs are assumed to rise quadratically in production,
the marginal benefit of investment is decreasing. The climate externality deters the social planner from
complete investment in period t, occurring in the BAU scenario. Hence, although a linear utility and a linear
production function are combined, due to the climate externality, for certain values of the initial Kt and St
endowments a non-corner solution becomes feasible. If past emissions have been high and grown an already
very large cumulative emissions stock, it may even be rational to choose a Kt+1 < Kt, hence to disinvest.
73
From the FOC for dirty capital stock, (3.33), the optimal period t + 1 capital stock, K̂t+1, can be derived
and, from (3.13), optimal long-term cumulative carbon emissions, ŜT :
K̂t+1 = V̂t+1 =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ2
− St
γ
−Kt (3.42)
ŜT =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ
. (3.43)
Effectively, the social planner chooses investment or disinvestment levels to attain this optimal emissions
target, so that the short-term marginal economic benefit of emitting an extra unit of CO2 from production
at t + 1 is equal to the marginal long-term damage caused. Optimal cumulative emissions are independent
of initial capital and CO2 endowments; the higher the initial level of cumulative CO2 due to endowments
of CO2 and capital, the accordingly lower will be production and associated emissions in period t + 1. The
higher the capital productivity, p, the larger the patience gauged by β, the lower the vulnerability to climate
change, b, and the lower the long-term damage weighting factor φ - the larger are the optimal period t + 1
capital stock as well as cumulative emissions in period T . Counterintuitive may be the fact that ŜT falls in
γ, i.e. the less emissions-intense production is, the more cumulative emissions are optimal. To reach a better
understanding of this phenomenon, it is worth looking at the comparative statics for different values of the
emissions coefficient. The FOC (3.33) is rearranged to
72Referring to Ct,t+1 ≥ f .
73There are regions in the endowment parameter space (Kt, St) where economic activity is just not feasible since climate
damages overwhelm economic resources in one or both of the initial periods. There is also a large region where economic activity
is feasible and the social planner will either invest or disinvest, depending on initial endowments. For a detailed analysis of these
different scenarios in absence of clean technologies see Buckle (2009b).
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1
γ
(β(1 + p)− 1) = 2φb(St + γKt + γKt+1), (3.44)
and parallely a graphical analysis is offered in Figure 3.3. Equation (3.44) shows the marginal net benefits
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Figure 3.3: Scenario 2: Comparative statics with respect to the emissions coefficient
of an additional CO2 emissions unit in terms of the present value of consumption on the left hand side and
the marginal long-term damage costs of that emissions unit on the right hand side. In the diagram, the
marginal benefits of dirty capital emissions, MBK1 , are represented by a straight line, as one emissions unit
always allows the same marginal benefit from consumption in period t + 1. The particular shape of the
marginal clean capital emissions costs curve, MBM , is explained in the following section, but for now it is
noted that in this scenario it continuously lies below theMBK1 curve; for this reason no clean capital stock is
accumulated, and the crucial MBK curves are drawn with bold lines. The marginal dirty capital emissions
costs are increasing in emissions, Et+1 = γKt+1, therefore the describing MC
K
1 curve has a positive slope.
The intersection of the MBK1 curve and the MB
K
1 curve identifies the optimal period t+ 1 emissions.
For a lower value of γ, as the left hand side of equation (3.44) exhibits, the marginal benefit of an addi-
tional emissions unit rises, because more production (and consumption) per emissions unit can take place.
Furthermore, the cumulative emissions level drops, so that the marginal cost of an additional emissions unit
falls. As a consequence, the social planner would optimally increase period t + 1 capital and accept higher
cumulative period T emissions as well as larger absolute long-term climate damages. In the diagram, when
γ1 drops down to γ2, the MB
K
1 curve shifts upwards, resulting in the higher MB
K
2 curve. At the same time,
the marginal dirty capital emissions costs curve, MCK2 , falls. The two new curves intersect with each other
at a higher level; the optimal level of period t + 1 emissions rises. Further additions to period t + 1 capital
in reaction to further reductions in the emissions intensity could continue until either investment resource
constraints bite, or at ST = Ω the limits to substitution between man-made goods and changes to the climate
75
CHAPTER 3. THE TRANSITION TO CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES IN A STYLIZED INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT MODEL OF CLIMATE CHANGE
are reached.
The fall of γ describes emissions-saving technical progress in the model. The important and probably sur-
prising conclusion from this analysis is that, in SLICE, emissions-saving technical progress leads to larger
optimal amounts of cumulative emissions. This puzzling result is further addressed in the next chapter.74
Proposition 1. In the dirty-technology-only scenario, the optimal level of long-term cumulative emissions
is independent of past, committed emissions, but increases if production becomes less emissions-intense.
3.3.5 Scenario 3: partial adoption of clean technology
In the case in which the dirty and clean technologies are both employed in production, the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions must hold with λ1,2,3,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
, ∂Z∂Mt+1 = 0, so that Ct, t+1 ≥ f, Kt+1, Mt+1 ≥ 0. Focusing on the
most interesting case of positive investment into clean capital (i.e. Mt+1 > Mt), from (3.33) and (3.34) are
obtained
Kt+1 =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ2
− St
γ
−Kt − µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
Mt+1 (3.45)
Mt+1 =
β(1 + p)− (1 + ζ)−Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt)
2φbµ2
− St
µ
− γ
µ
Kt −Mt − γ
µ
Kt+1, (3.46)
which in combination provide
M∗t+1 = Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
. (3.47)
Equation (3.47) illustrates the path dependency of clean technology investment. The more intense the
penetration of the economy clean technologies in period t, the higher the level of mitigation capital in period
t + 1. This closely relates to the “building on the shoulder of giants” feature in the model of Acemoglu
et al. (2012), as seen in section 2.3.2, equation (2.37), stating that any innovation builds on the existing state
of a technology.75 Here, adjustment costs give rise to such a feature; clean technology investment benefits
from previous clean technology investment.
Returning to equation (3.47), the size of the price differential, ζ, relative to the first term within the bracket
determines whether or not mitigation capital is augmented. M∗t+1 > Mt holds for a sufficiently small price
differential:
(γ − µ) β(1 + p)− 1
γ
> ζ. (3.48)
The smaller the price premium and the greater the environmental advantage of the clean technology, the
more is adopted. The scale of clean technology adoption is determined by the adjustment cost parameter ψ.
74There may be an interesting analogy to this: If the discount rate in standard IAMs falls, this makes mitigation more
desirable. However, at the same time saving and capital accumulation become more attractive, too, increasing pollution and
(partially) offsetting the result of more abatement.
75Referring to the discussion of the implementation of the “building on the shoulder of giants” feature in section 2.3.2.2, in
contrast to the approach taken in Acemoglu et al. (2012), where previous research has a positive, multiplicative effect on future
research, here M∗t+1 rises only by Mt in an additive fashion. Such an additive link was considered as an alternative in (2.44).
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The level of clean-technology investment is extremely sensitive to the price differential if adjustment costs
are small, and unresponsive if adjustment costs are high, as apparent from
∂M∗t+1
∂ζ
= − 1
Ψ
. (3.49)
Plugging (3.47) into (3.45) provides
K∗t+1 =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ2
− St
γ
−Kt − 2µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
. (3.50)
Comparing K∗t+1 with the optimal level of capital at t+1 in the case of no adoption of clean technologies from
equation (3.42), K̂t+1, we realize that K
∗
t+1 < K̂t+1, thus with clean technology adoption a crowding out of
traditional capital investments takes place. The greater the difference between emissions coefficients and the
more widespread the clean technology at the outset, the more dirty capital is substituted by clean capital.
M∗t+1 is not affected by changes to the initial endowments of dirty capital and CO2, Kt and St, because any
increase in exogenous committed carbon emissions is compensated by reductions in K∗t+1 exclusively.
This behaviour is best understood from a diagram. From (3.33) and (3.34), the marginal benefitsMBK , MBM
and marginal long-term costs MCK , MCM of emitting an additional unit CO2 in period t+ 1 are isolated:
MBK ≡ 1
γ
(β(1 + p)− 1) (3.51)
MBM ≡ 1
µ
[β(1 + p)− (1 + ζ)−Ψ ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0)] (3.52)
MCK =MCM ≡ 2φb(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1). (3.53)
I display the associated curves in dependence of period t+1 CO2 emissions in Figure 3.4. The joint marginal
cost curve is increasing in CO2 emissions. The marginal benefits of dirty capital emissions are constant.
For disinvestment in clean capital, Mt+1 < Mt, no adjustment costs apply and the marginal benefits curve
for clean capital emissions is flat, too. For Mt+1 > Mt, due to the increasing adjustment costs it exhibits
a negative slope. The bold line marks the joint, best-choice marginal benefit curve. The social planner
accumulates clean capital until increasing adjustment costs cause the marginal benefits of clean technology
emissions to fall below those of the dirty technology emissions. If the exogenous initial cumulative CO2
emissions increase, a scenario depicted by S1t < S
2
t , the joint marginal cost curve shifts upwards, reducing
the optimal level of dirty capital (emissions) at t+ 1, but leaving clean capital (emissions) unaffected.
Adding up (3.50) and (3.47) leads to the total period t+ 1 capital stock, V ∗t+1:
V ∗t+1 =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ2
− St
γ
−Kt +
(
1− 2µ
γ
)
Mt +
(
1− µ
γ
)
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
. (3.54)
For Mt = 0 or µ < 0.5γ, it can be concluded that the partial adoption of clean technology will always
increase the capital stock, compared to the dirty-technology-only scenario, thus V ∗t+1 > V̂t+1.
76 Clean
technology adoption enhances the discounted consumption stream, even though the resources available for
76For µ > 0.5γ, i.e. a large initial endowment of mitigation capital and when | (1 − 2µ
γ
)Mt |> (1 −
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Figure 3.4: Investment response to an increase in exogenous, initial cumulative CO2 emissions
period t consumption are reduced in proportion to the mitigation capital investment. This feature I name
the “growth envelope of mitigation”. The growth envelope is graphically represented by the shaded area in
Figure 3.4, and mathematically by the difference V ∗t+1 − V̂t+1.
Proposition 2. Clean capital investment crowds out dirty capital investment. By shifting consumption from
period t to period t+1, but altogether increasing the discounted consumption stream, clean technology adoption
gives rise to a “growth envelope of mitigation”.
The solutions for optimal dirty and clean capital stock, (3.50) and (3.47) respectively, plugged into (3.13),
deliver the same optimal carbon budget as in the case in which only the dirty technology is used:
S∗T =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ
= ŜT . (3.55)
Possibly to some surprise, the employment of clean capital does not reduce cumulative emissions relative
to scenario 2. Instead, the technology mix allows the planner to exploit the carbon budget more efficiently,
and the expansion of total capital, compared to the dirty-capital-only scenario, comes at no additional
environmental cost. The puzzle behind this model behaviour is solved in section 4.3. It is worth noting
though that the optimal carbon budgets in scenarios 2 and 3 are already significant departures from the
Business as Usual trajectory.
Proposition 3. Partial clean technology adoption leaves the optimal level of long-term cumulative emissions
unchanged.
µ
γ
) 1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
, the growth in clean capital does not compensate for reductions of the dirty capital stock.
The intuition for this is as follows: From (3.47) it is apparent that M∗t+1 will always be chosen larger than Mt, regardless of
how high the initial endowment of Mt has been. However, high values of Mt imply that large shares of the cumulative emission
budget (3.55) have already been consumed in periods t and t+ 1. In this case, the enhancements in mitigation capital stock do
not compensate the disinvestments in the dirty capital stock necessary to attain the optimal carbon budget.
78
CHAPTER 3. THE TRANSITION TO CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES IN A STYLIZED INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT MODEL OF CLIMATE CHANGE
This qualitative result exhibits some similarity with the findings of Popp (2004, 2006b), whose ENTICE-
(BR) model(s) were sketched on in section 1.4.1. In Popp (2004), Popp compares the optimal policies
under an exogenous technological change and an endogenous technological change scenario. He finds that if
endogenous technological change is enabled, so that investments can be taken to improve energy efficiency
or lower the operational costs of a backstop technology, endogenous technological change boosts welfare by
9.4%, but leaves emissions trajectories and temperature levels virtually unchanged. Popp writes: “There
is almost no variation in global mean temperature between the endogenous and exogenous R&D case. In
fact, after 100 years the temperature is just 0.04% lower when the role of endogenous technological change is
included. One reason for the small change in atmospheric temperature is that much of the welfare gains from
induced technological change come from cost savings that make meeting environmental goals cheaper”77, and
he confirms this result in a later study78. A similar interpretation needs to be adopted for understanding
this SLICE result: The availability of a clean technology does not change the optimal emissions level, but
makes its achievement cheaper. Unfortunately, the explanation of the mechanism behind his result is not
well explained by Popp. He concludes that “Achieving significant reductions in future warming will not be
possible without restrictive climate change policies”79, hence endogenous technological change on its own is
not enough to bring significant reductions.
In the model by Acemoglu et al. (2012), section 2.3.2, it was the market size, productivity and price effects
that attracted scientists to engage in the dirty or the clean input sector, and these effects ultimately decided
which of two technology was further developed and adopted. As seen above in (3.47), a sort of market size
effect also applies in SLICE to the clean technology; the more has been adopted in the past, the higher is
the optimal clean capital stock. A higher productivity in environmental terms (lower µ) also leads to higher
adoption levels. A price effect though cannot be observed in the model, since no research takes place in
SLICE, and a high factor price does not encourage research, but discourages the use of this factor. Apart
from performing comparative statics analysis, the process of endogenous or exogenous technological change
is not explicitly modelled in this version of SLICE, so that these comparisons must be lopsided.
The models of Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Smulders et al. (2011), sections 2.3.2 and 2.2.2, respectively,
have in common that they do not consider adjustment costs of clean technology adoption. In Smulders
et al. (2011), once the third, zero-emissions and (due to the emissions tax) more profitable GPT arrives,
it is adopted gradually by all firms, hence eventually a complete transition always takes place. This result
might change if adjustment costs are implemented in their model. Then, even though the new GPT may be
initially superior, after a number of market participants have adopted it, its competitive advantage would
dwindle due to the adjustment costs. It seems possible that in this case clean technology adoption comes to a
halt, before a complete transition has taken place, if the economy is not helped out of its predecessor-GPT’s
lock-in. However, their model is a multi-period model. Adjustment costs as established in (3.7) and the
solution for optimal clean capital stock in (3.47) imply that the optimal level of clean capital rises over time
due to the “building on the shoulder of giants” feature or path dependency. Further analysis is required.
3.3.6 Scenario 4: full switch to clean technology
A complete transition to the clean technology can take place, when the joint long-term marginal cost curve
crosses the marginal benefits curve for the clean technology above the horizontal dirty technology marginal
77Popp (2004), p. 756.
78S. Popp (2006b), p. 21.
79Popp (2004), p. 765.
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benefits curve, s. Figure 3.5. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are in this case fulfilled with λ1,2,3,
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Figure 3.5: The complete transition
0, ∂Z∂Kt+1 < 0, so that Ct, t+1 ≥ f, Mt+1 ≥ 0 and K∗t+1 = 0. Assuming an expansion of clean capital,
Mt+1 > Mt, from (3.34) we derive
M¨t+1 =
β(1 + p)− (1 + ζ) + (Ψ− 2φbµ2)Mt − 2φbµ (St + γKt)
Ψ + 2φbµ2
. (3.56)
With the complete switch away from dirty capital, M¨t+1 is now dependent on past emissions. Long-term
cumulative emissions are described by
S¨t+1 =
µ [β(1 + p)− (1 + ζ) + 2ΨMt] + Ψ (St + γKt)
Ψ + 2φbµ2
. (3.57)
In this model, M¨t+1 and S¨t+1 are arguably understated, first because effects from learning-by-doing are not
modelled, which probably lowers the price differential ζ, and second because adjustments costs for clean
capital accumulation should fall once the clean capital stock has become large, as it was explained in section
3.2.4. In the limit of small adjustment costs80, i.e. Ψ ≈ 0,
...
M t+1 =
β(1 + p)− (1 + ζ)
2φbµ2
−Mt − St
µ
+
γ
µ
Kt (3.58)
80Or if committed emissions due to initial endowments of capital and initial CO2 levels are so high that there is no scope for
additional investment, so that Mt+1 < Mt and no adjustment costs accrue.
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...
St+1 =
β(1 + p)− (1 + ζ)
2φbµ
(3.59)
apply. Hypothetically assuming that adjustment costs never become negative in the case of a full switch
to clean technologies, the long-term cumulative CO2 emissions should lie within the range
[...
St+1; S¨t+1
]
.
Substracting from
...
St+1 the long-term cumulative emissions of the dirty-technology-only scenario 1, given in
(3.43), leads to
...
St+1 − S∗t+1 = (γ − µ)
β(1 + p)− 1
γ
− ζ > 0. (3.60)
Hence, a full switch to clean technologies in absence of adjustment costs in the optimum leads to higher
emissions levels than their complete avoidance. The mechanism behind this was already explained in section
3.3.4.
3.3.7 Scenario 5: resource-constrained economy
In the resource-constrained case, the planner has insufficient resources available to ensure minimum con-
sumption in period t as well as reach the investment level that is optimal under no resource restriction.
As a consequence, he invests as much as possible, until period t consumption falls to its lower bound f . I
analyze the case in which both the dirty and the clean technology are still adopted, which ensues when the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are fulfilled with λ2,3,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
, ∂Z∂Mt+1 = 0 and λ1 > 0, so that Ct+1, Kt+1, Mt+1 ≥ 0
and Ct = f , and I also assume Mt+1 > Mt. From (3.33) and (3.34) follow:
M˘t+1 = Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)(
β(1 + p)
1 + λ1
− 1
)
− ζ
)
(3.61)
K˘t+1 =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ2
− St
γ
−Kt − 2µ
γ
Mt
− µ
γ
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)(
β(1 + p)
1 + λ1
− 1
)
− ζ
)
− λ1
2φbγ2
. (3.62)
From a comparison of (3.47) and (3.61) it is clear that M˘t+1 < M
∗
t+1; the resource-constrained economy
cuts down its clean technology investment. No similarly clear-cut conclusion can be drawn on dirty capital
investment, and we do not know whether K˘t+1 < K
∗
t+1 or K˘t+1 > K
∗
t+1, as is elucidated by a comparison of
(3.50) and (3.62). In order to solve the model for this scenario completely, λ˘1 must be derived by plugging
(3.61) and (3.62) into (3.35), but then it cannot be solved for λ˘1 analytically.
Nevertheless, some important conclusions can be derived. λ1 denotes the marginal utility gain for the case
that the investment budget constraint is slackened by one unit of initial resource endowment (lowering f
or enhancing Yt); that unit flowing into investment. Since capital investments exhibit constant production
returns, but lead to rising climate damages, their total returns are declining. Hence, the marginal utility
gains from relaxing the budget constraint are declining, too. Therefore, a high λ1 is associated with a small
investment budget, whereas a low λ1 corresponds to a comparatively high level of investment.
Equations (3.63) and (3.64) describe the marginal investment responses in reaction to an investment budget
cut that leads to a loss of a marginal utility unit:
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∂M˘t+1
∂λ1
= − 1
Ψ
β(1 + p)
(1 + λ1)2
(1− µ
γ
) (3.63)
∂K˘t+1
∂λ1
=
µ
γ
1
Ψ
β(1 + p)
(1 + λ1)2
(1− µ
γ
)− 1
2φbγ2
. (3.64)
From the sign of (3.63) it is apparent that (tightening) resource constraints always reduce the level of M˘t+1
and that the tighter the budget becomes (the higher λ1), the less cut are clean technology investments. This
investment behaviour is simply necessary to maintain a M˘t+1 > 0 in this scenario. The lower the adjustment
costs Ψ, the more units of clean capital investment are abandoned relative to a scenario with a larger or
unconstrained budget, as for low adjustment costs one unit of budget buys more clean capital. Turning now
to the dirty technology, as the first term in (3.64) is positive, but declining in λ1, it is feasible that for certain
parameter constellations and a gentle budget constraint (λ1 close to zero) the social planner accumulates
more dirty capital than in the optimized unconstrained case. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
When the budget becomes tighter, λ11 < λ
2
1, the marginal benefit curve of the clean technology falls more
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Figure 3.6: Investment response to a tightening budget
rapidly than that of the dirty technology, as is apparent from a comparison of the first order conditions (3.33)
and (3.34). In the scenario depicted, mitigation capital investments are cut, while dirty capital investments
slightly increase.
Proposition 4. If the economy is resource-constrained, clean technology investments are reduced, and for
certain parameter constellations dirty capital investments may even overshoot the optimal level of the con-
strained scenario.
In this scenario, the world is so poor that while it is never able to fully exploit the atmospheric carbon
sinks, it uses its scarce investment resources to stimulate economic growth as much as possible. Even
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though the model works within the framework of a one-world-model, this may possibly shed light on the
question why developing countries often choose unsustainable development paths - namely since benefits
from environmental investments seem low compared to the rents gained from immediate and possibly more
urgent economic growth.
The social planner will clearly need to curtail both capital stocks if he or she faces a very limited budget.
Dirty capital investments will fall as well, once the absolute value of the second term in (3.64) becomes larger
than the first, which happens for sufficiently large values of λ1, or severe resource constraints. It makes perfect
sense to economize on clean capital first: with a binding budget constraint cost considerations become more
significant, and the competitive advantage of the clean technology is reduced. However, while maintaining or
even extending the dirty capital stock at the cost of the clean one may be the optimal strategy under resource
constraints, this could lay the foundation of a dirty-technology-lock-in in some (not-considered) future, when
path dependency hinders clean technology investment.
With investment levels lower than desired, the total capital stock V˘t+1 must be smaller than V
∗
t+1. Similarly,
optimal cumulative emissions in the long-term are lower:
S˘T =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ
− λ1
2φbγ2
, (3.65)
even if dirty capital investments grow compared to the unconstrained scenario.
3.3.8 Scenario 6: binding carbon constraint
In this scenario, the economy must limit its cumulative carbon emissions in order to avoid catastrophic
climate damage, i.e. SˇT = Ω. With dirty technology only,Mt =Mt+1 = 0, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions fulfill
λ1,2,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
= 0, ∂Z∂Mt+1 < 0, λ3 > 0, so that Ct, t+1 ≥ f, Kt+1 ≥ 0, and from (3.33) and (3.36) follow
Kˇt+1 =
Ω
γ
− St
γ
−Kt (3.66)
λˇ3 =
β(1 + p)− 1
γ
− 2φbΩ. (3.67)
The shadow value λˇ3 reflects the welfare gain from a marginal slackening of the carbon constraint, perhaps
reflecting new scientific findings that a higher amount of cumulative carbon emissions still avoids the risk
of disastrous climate change with certainty. λˇ3 is decreasing in Ω, since the marginal benefits of capital
investment are declining due to increasing climate damages.
When it is optimal to deploy both technologies, i.e. ∂Z∂Mt+1 = 0 and both Kt+1, Mt+1 ≥ 0, combining (3.33),
(3.34) and (3.36) results in
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K˜t+1 =
Ω
γ
− St
γ
−Kt − 2µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
(3.68)
M˜t+1 = Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
(3.69)
V˜t+1 =
Ω
γ
− St
γ
−Kt +
(
1− 2µ
γ
)
Mt +
(
1− µ
γ
)
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
. (3.70)
λ˜3 =
β(1 + p)− 1
γ
− 2φbΩ. (3.71)
Comparing (3.69) and (3.47) shows that M˜t+1 =M
∗
t+1; furthermore λˇ3 = λ˜3. Hence, the fact that there is a
hard limit to cumulative carbon emissions does not affect the clean capital investment plan, and the shadow
value λ˜3 remains independent of any parameter defining the clean technology’s properties (Ψ, ζ and µ).
Comparing the differences between the optimal capital stocks in the mixed and in the dirty-technology-only
scenarios with each other, we see that K∗t+1 − K˜t+1 = K̂t+1 − Kˇt+1 = β(1+p)−12φbγ2 − Ωγ > 0 always holds.
Whether or not a clean technology is used, the burden of meeting the carbon constraint is borne by the dirty
capital stock only, as illustrated in Figure 3.7. A non-binding carbon constraint Ω1 poses no problem to the
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Figure 3.7: Investment response to a tightening carbon constraint
economy, which invests as described in scenario 2. When the carbon constraint bites, Ω2 < Ω1, the economy
reduces its dirty capital investments to limit long-term cumulative emissions to Ω2. With a biting carbon
constraint, investment in clean capital investment will only be curtailed, if the period t+1 dirty capital stock
has already been set to zero.
Proposition 5. If the carbon constraint bites, dirty capital investments and emissions are reduced accordingly
to meet it.
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3.3.9 A note on technical progress in SLICE
As said before, this version of SLICE does not include an endogenous technological change module, and even
exogenous technical progress is absent.81 Nevertheless, the carbon-constrained case reveals some insights on
the properties of desirable technical progress.
From a comparison of the optimal capital stocks of the two dirty-technology-only scenarios, under no carbon
constraint, (3.42), and under a biting carbon constraint, (3.66), it is evident that while emission-saving
technical progress (i.e. reductions in γ) increases optimal capital investment in the carbon-constrained case,
an increase in p does not.
A weaker, but similar property can also be derived when a clean technology is available, by differentiating
with respect to p the optimal solutions for total period t + 1 capital investment with (V˜t+1) and without
(V ∗t+1) a carbon constraint, given in (3.70) and (3.54) respectively, and a comparison:
∂V˜t+1
∂p
=
β
Ψ
(
1− µ
γ
)2
<
∂V ∗t+1
∂p
=
β
2φbγ2
+
β
Ψ
(
1− µ
γ
)2
(3.72)
Under a binding carbon constraint, a higher capital productivity still allows some substitution from dirty
to clean capital and thereby an overall higher level of investment, but the overall growth-enhancing effect is
lower than in the unconstrained case, since even though a rising p enhances the marginal benefits of both
technologies, no carbon budget may be attained that exceeds Ω.
The reason for these limitations to productivity-enhancing technical progress to produce growth lies in the
limits to substitution between man-made capital and the climate, or, put differently, the end of marginal
cost-benefit-analysis, which are reached at Ω. Then, in the dirty-technology-only case, such technological
progress is no longer helpful, because production can no longer be scaled up. When a clean technology is
available, it still makes a higher level of clean technology use optimal (the MBM curve in Figure 3.7 shifts
upwards), but additional clean capital emissions must now crowd out dirty capital emissions at equal scale,
and cumulative long-term emissions may not rise beyond Ω. The analysis indicates that close to the carbon
constraint, emissions-saving technical progress is superior to productivity-enhancing progress in enabling
output growth. Addressing this issue in a model framework that explicitly embeds technological change
seems appropriate.
3.4 Equivalence of clean technology modelling approaches
In sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, a clean capital stock was introduced, whose adoption causes adjustment costs.
These ideas first appeared in Buckle (2009a), who makes a first attempt to analyze the transition to clean
technologies. His model operates with a single capital stock, but the share of clean technology is introduced as
a second control variable. Increasing the share of clean technology causes adjustment costs. Unfortunately,
the model could not be analytically solved, so that its properties were originally illustrated by numerical
simulations. For this work, I reengineered the model setup so that the model now produces analytical
solutions, which facilitates the further analysis. I prove that both approaches are mathematically equivalent.
The original approach as well as the proof are presented in appendix A.
81Whereby it would of course be straightforward to extend the model by exogenous technical progress. However, this might
only blow it up by some more parameters without offering further insights.
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3.5 Potential implications from SLICE modelling assumptions for
standard IAMs and vice versa
3.5.1 Introduction
In section 3.2, the SLICE innovations that stand in contrast to the IAM standard approaches were laid out
step by step. In this section, five distinct features of SLICE are singled out again in order to discuss the effects
they might trigger if they were embedded into standard IAMs. Conversely, in this section the manner in
which SLICE results might change if SLICE operated with the standard approaches is also elucidated. In the
following, sustainable preferences are contrasted with the utilitarian discounting approach, multiplicative with
additive damages, clean capital accumulation with flow abatement, cost-benefit analysis with the adoption
of a limit to maximum carbon emissions, and finally the consequences of the absence and the presence of
adjustment costs for the models are debated.
3.5.2 Modified sustainable preferences vs. utilitarian discounting
Virtually all IAMs operate with a pure utilitarian discounting approach, which favours the interests of the
present over the interests of future generations, as seen in section 1.5.4, since only very marginal weights are
assigned to mid- to long-term utilities. Naturally, with a problem such as climate change that involves large
time lags until heavy damages are likely to occur, the utilitarian approach built on the paradigm of consumer
impatience may be dangerously misleading. The modified sustainable preference approach, introduced in
section 3.2.10, might serve here as a remedy, since it assigns weight to utility enjoyed in the very long term
and may thereby avoid (large) climate damages being set aside. However, the long-term weighting factor
φ is undoubtedly an ethical parameter and can probably hardly be calibrated from market interest rates,
which Nordhaus (1994, 2008) uses to derive the disount rate. Therefore, once it comes to the calibration
of models adopting sustainable preferences, a new argument on the appropriate value must inevitably break
out. In any case, the adoption of sustainable preferences in standard IAMs is likely to lead to more ambitious
levels of optimal abatement, as this approach ensures that damages occurring in the very long term are also
assigned a non-marginal value.
What happens to SLICE if a pure discounting approach is adopted has already been seen in section 3.3.3.
There, a perfectly myopic social planner was imagined who makes his decision exclusively on the basis of
discounted utilities exclusively and therefore happens to neglect the long term consequences of his investment
decisions, namely climate change; φ = 0. This led to maximal investment in dirty capital only, to maximize
consumption in the first two periods.
3.5.3 Multiplicative vs. additive damages
All IAMs reviewed derive and express climate damages in proportion to GDP. The motivation to choose
this multiplicative approach is not self-evident, as discussed in section 1.5.3. Embedding additive damages
into the standard IAMs would probably pose some challenges to the authors. It would not only require a
reformulation of some model equations, but also create the need to differentiate between damages that may
be assumed to increase with GDP (e.g. power shortages caused by heat waves) and others that should not
(e.g. biodiversity loss). I want to be careful with a definite forecast specifying which changes to models
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and results should be expected from such a reengineering, but the work of Weitzman (2009a, 2010), which
is briefly summarized in section 1.5.3, suggests that the classic multiplicative approach might reduce the
optimal abatement levels, compared to an additive approach. Hence, it could be that IAMs that adopt
additive damages call for more ambitious mitigation action than their current counterparts.
Further research in this area seems fruitful. In section 5.3, it is shown how additive damages once introduced to
the stylized IAM created by Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan (2011), which originally operates with
multiplicative damages, changes its most fundamental result. In section 5.4, it is elucidated how multiplicative
damages alter SLICE.
3.5.4 Mitigation capital vs. flow abatement
In section 1.5.2, the complaints by Stanton et al. (2009) were recorded that in most IAMs, abatement is
treated as a one-time expense and does not, more realistically, serve the accumulation of a distinguishable,
clean capital stock. In SLICE, the consequences of modelling abatement as a one-time expense that helps
saving period t + 1 emissions only once, are straightforward. In this case, no mitigation capital could be
accumulated that increases production and can be consumed in period t + 1, and as the only benefit of
abatement the damages reduction in the long term would remain .82
If an algorithm to reflect clean capital accumulation is introduced into abatement functions such as DICE-2007
one’s (equation (1.6), section 1.3), it may lead to increasing production and a crowding-out of dirtier capital.
Model setups with a second, accumulable knowledge capital stock that, as a proxy for the technological
state of the art, directly enhances production, have a long tradition in economics. In Popp (2004, 2006a,b),
knowledge capital does not enter the production function directly, but helps to increase energy efficiency and
reduces the price of a carbon-free backstop technology. Against this background, it is actually surprising
that abatement is still not usually modelled to lead to some form of machine capital accumulation, which is
different from immaterial knowledge capital accumulation. Maybe one reason for avoiding such a specification
of a clean capital stock is that then explicit assumptions on the economic properties of such clean capital
would have to be made. As Stanton et al. (2009) and Hall and Behl (2006) point out (see sections 1.5.2
and 1.5.3), clean capital may be wrongly described by assuming decreasing marginal returns, but anything
else may not be straightforward to fit into the convex world of economics and make standard optimization
with the identification of a single equilibrium challenging.
While explicit modelling work needs to be done to explore the consequences of clean capital accumulation
for standard IAMs, similar consequences as experienced when switching from exogenous to endogenous tech-
nological change may arise (sections 1.3, 1.5.2 and 2.3.1). The specification of clean capital could lead to a
ramping up of early abatement efforts in the models, because clean capital can be reused for a number of
periods, until it needs to be replaced.
3.5.5 Cost-benefit analysis vs. a limit on maximum cumulative carbon emissions
Scenario 6 in section 3.3 of this chapter has already shown the consequences of introducing an upper limit
on cumulative emissions for SLICE. If optimal cumulative atmospheric carbon exceeded the threshold value
82Currently, abatement in SLICE takes place by switching from dirty to clean capital, which are both used in production.
If mitigation investment does no longer serve the accumulation of some production capital, the model’s original abatement
mechanism of input substitution is deactivated; hence abatement expenditure would have to effect a direct reduction of dirty
capital emissions.
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in absence of such a limit, emissions once adopted would need to be curbed accordingly, repealing standard
cost-benefit analysis.
Emissions targets have been considered in IAMs. For instance, Nordhaus (2008) estimates that preventing
global temperature rise from reaching its optimal levels in DICE-2007, 2.6°C in 2100 and 3.5°C in 2200, and
instead limiting it to 2°C, would cause intertemporal welfare losses of 1.6 trillion 2005 USD compared to the
zero-abatement baseline scenario; that is to say that according to these results the international community
has got it wrong and the 2°C target stipulated in the Copenhagen Accord (2009) (see Motivation at the
beginning of this thesis) should rather be given up in favour of Business as Usual.83
3.5.6 Smooth transition to clean technologies vs. adjustment costs
The role of the adjustment costs in SLICE is crucial. If they were set to zero, the only differences between
the dirty and the clean technology would be presented by their per-unit investment costs price differential,
ζ, and the emissions coefficients, γ and µ. As the then last remaining non-linearity, embedded in the climate
damage function, applies to both dirty and clean capital in the same way, the model would produce bang-bang
solutions only84: Only one type of capital would be accumulated, apart from the peculiar case in which the
marginal benefits of both types are equal. Such a bang-bang solution also appears in the model of Acemoglu
et al. (2012), section 2.3.2, in which research takes place exclusively either in the dirty or in the clean input
sector.
Considering the role of adjustment costs for existing IAMs seems a useful task for future research. Convex
abatement cost functions, such as in (1.5) in section 1.3, are fairly standard in IAMs. Hence, their shape is
similar to the clean capital investment costs in SLICE that include adjustment costs. However, the motivation
behind assuming increasing marginal abatement costs are different. In the mainstream IAMs, it stems from
the standard assumption in economics that the marginal returns to a production factor decline in its use, an
assumption that we saw being criticized by Stanton et al. (2009), section 1.5.2, as possibly not applicable
to many clean technologies. Adding adjustment costs during the initial phase of a transition raises the slopes
of convex abatement curves and lowers optimal levels of abatement.
However, the picture would be more different if the full shape of an adjustment cost curve, as depicted in
Figure 3.2, section 3.2.4, was considered. Multiple equilibria would be possible, if not likely, to occur. For
instance, it can be seen in Figure 3.2 that between Mt = 0 and M˜t and between M˜t and M t there always
exist two curve segments that share the same slope. At these points, the marginal adjustment costs are
equal, hence two equilibria seem possible, and it is not immediately clear whether the one occurring matches
the preferable one. Modellers would need to take into account the role of path dependency of (clean capital)
investments. Furthermore, it is interesting to consider what happens once it is optimal for the economy to
choose a clean capital stock that lies above M˜t. The only inflexion point of the adjustment cost curve lies
at M˜t. This is where marginal adjustment costs are at their maximum. Therefore, if the marginal benefits
of adopting the clean technology are so high that they justify a clean capital accumulation amounting to
M˜t, then for otherwise constant marginal investment costs and benefits, and sufficient available resources, it
becomes suddenly optimal to switch entirely to the clean technology and completely abandon the dirty one.
This is the picture in SLICE, but in other IAMs the standard convex abatement costs are likely to prevent
such a sudden, complete switch towards full abatement. However, with such adjustment costs embedded into
83Cp. Nordhaus (2008), p. 82.
84In Figure 3.4, section 3.3.5, the absence of adjustment costs would be reflected by a completely straight MBM curve, which
runs parallel to the MBK curve.
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these IAMs, probably beyond certain threshold levels a step change in abatement suddenly becomes optimal.
There is no doubt that such behaviours would augment the complexity of IAMs considerably; but it would
also allow them to come a step closer to reality.
3.6 Robustness checks
3.6.1 Overview
Probably the two strongest assumptions in this version of SLICE are those of constant marginal returns to
consumption on the one hand and constant marginal returns to capital on the other hand. Therefore, in
section 3.6.2 the consequences of a production function with diminishing returns to scale are investigated.
It turns out that in this case SLICE is no longer able to offer an analytical solution, so that a numerical
simulation is performed.
Once declining marginal utilities are introduced, consumption is no longer perfectly substitutable intertem-
porally, and a smoothing of consumption over time should be expected. In section 3.6.3, this hypothesis is
checked. Again, with a non-linear utility function no analytical solution can be derived, and the consequences
of declining marginal returns to consumption to SLICE’s results as well as to investment decisions influenced
by a rise in initial cumulative emissions St are investigated by numerical simulations. Section 3.6.4 briefly
concludes.
For the sake of ease, during both robustness checks it is assumed that cumulative emissions do not reach the
threshold level Ω, beyond which potentially catastrophic damages may occur.
3.6.2 Decreasing returns to scale
3.6.2.1 Introduction
The model operates with the strong assumption of constant returns to capital investment; in the production
function (3.6), the output elasticity with respect to capital was set to one, α = 1. This enables the derivation
of an analytical solution, but it needs to be seen whether or not fundamental results of the model are an
artifact of a linear production function. For this reason, in the following the model properties for an α < 1
are investigated.
3.6.2.2 Methodology
It is still assumed that clean and dirty capital are perfectly substitutable, but that they jointly exhibit
decreasing returns to scale. Hence, the production function (3.6) keeps its more general form, that is
Yt = p(Kt +Mt)
α,
in which α < 1. In the dirty-technology-only scenario, Mt+1 =Mt = 0 applies. In the following optimization
problem, an interior solution can no longer be obtained with standard methods:
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max
Kt+1
Z = pKαt − (Kt+1 −Kt)− b(St)2 + β
[
pKαt+1 +Kt+1 − b(St + γKt)2
]
(3.73)
− φb(St + γKt + γKt+1)2 (3.74)
∂Z
∂Kt+1
= −1 + β(αpKα−1t + 1)− 2φbγ(St + γKt + γKt+1) = 0 (3.75)
⇐⇒ β(αpKα−1t + 1) = 1 + 2φbγ(St + γKt + γKt+1) (3.76)
For the partial adoption case with Mt+1 > 0, and assuming a standard interior solution, the optimization
problem in (3.29) changes to
max
Kt+1,Mt+1
Z = p(Kt +Mt)
α − (Kt+1 −Kt)− (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)
− Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt) ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0)− b(St)2
+ β
[
p(Kt+1 +Mt+1)
α +Kt+1 +Mt+1 − b(St + γKt + µMt)2
]
− φb(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)2 (3.77)
∂Z
∂Kt+1
= −1 + β(pα(Kt+1 +Mt+1)α−1 + 1)− 2φbγ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1) = 0(3.78)
∂Z
∂Mt+1
= −(1 + ζ)−Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt) + β(pα(Kt+1 +Mt+1)α−1 + 1)
− 2φbµ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1) = 0 (3.79)
⇐⇒ β(pα(Kt+1+Mt+1)α−1+1) = (1+ζ)+Ψ(Mt+1−Mt)+2φbµ(St+γKt+µMt+γKt+1+µMt+1). (3.80)
Plugging (3.80) into (3.78) leads to the rule
Kt+1 =
ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt)
(γ − µ)2φbγ −
St
γ
−Kt − µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
Mt+1. (3.81)
This equation is plugged into (3.78) to eliminate Kt+1, obtaining
β
[
pα
(
ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt)
(γ − µ)2φbγ −
St
γ
−Kt − µ
γ
Mt +
(
1− µ
γ
)
Mt+1
)α−1
+ 1
]
= γ
ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt)
(γ − µ) + 1
(3.82)
An arbitrary choice of parameter values is made, which are specified as: p = 2; ζ = 0.12; Ψ = 0.0001; γ = 1;
µ = 0.9; b = 0.0006; β = 0.95; φ = 0.9; f = 0; St = 2; Kt = 750; Mt = 0. The optimal values for K̂t+1, K
∗
t+1
and M∗t+1, when α = 1, are calculated from (3.42), (3.50) and (3.47). For the scenario in which no clean
technology is available, but α = 0.98, the period t+1 dirty capital stock that equates the LHS and the RHS
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1 2 3 4
α = 1 α = 0,98 α = 1 α = 0,98
Dirty capital (t+1) 961 712 376 369
Clean capital (t+1) 0 0 650 381
Total capital (t+1) 961 712 1026 750
Clean capital share (t+1) 0,00 0,00 0,63 0,51
Cumulative emissions (T) 1713 1464 1713 1464
Consumption (t) 1289 1352 1125 1261
Consumption (t+1) 2544 1621 2739 1725
Damages (T) 1761 1286 1761 1286
Welfare 2121 1735 2142 1742
Clean technology unavailable Clean technology available
Table 3.1: Decreasing returns to scale: simulation results
of (3.76) is the optimal one. In the same manner, the optimal period t + 1 clean capital stock is identified
from (3.82), if Mt+1 > 0 and α = 0.98, and plugged into (3.81) to obtain the associated optimal period t+1
dirty capital stock.
3.6.2.3 Results
Results of the numerical simulations are given in table 3.1.
The table starts by comparing columns one and two, which report the case with no clean technology. If
α < 1, the capital productivity is lower, and so are investments and cumulative emissions. Consumption in
the first period goes up, because less resources are spent on investment, but these consumption gains are
overcompensated from consumption losses in period t + 2, when less productive and less capital is installed
than in the linear benchmark case.
More significantly, from a comparison of columns two and four, it is evident that the decisive properties
derived earlier still hold: Once a clean technology is available, the total period t+ 1 capital stock increases,
but clean capital investments crowd out dirty capital investments. As a consequence, intertemporal welfare
increases, with a shift of consumption from period t to period t+1. Strikingly, optimal cumulative period T
emissions remain unaffected, when a partial transition takes place.
From columns three and four it is apparent that when decreasing returns to capital are introduced, both
clean and dirty capital investments are reduced, but clean capital investments are much more sensitive to
reductions in α.
Proposition 6. The central results that clean capital accumulation spans a growth envelope, leads to a
crowding out of dirty capital investment, but leaves the optimal emissions level unchanged, are not exclusive
to the assumption of a linear production function.
3.6.3 Declining marginal utilities
3.6.3.1 Introduction
In the following, the linear utility function is replaced by the CES utility function Ut(Ct) =
C1−σt
1−σ with
σ > 0, so that marginal utilities are declining, i.e. U ′t(Ct) > 0 and U
′′
t (Ct) < 0, and corner solutions with
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respect to consumption are ruled out. The properties of the CES utility function with respect to variations
in σ have already been discussed in depth in section 3.2.2, including the mathematical definition for σ.
Briefly summarized, σ describes the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption; its reciprocal
value marks the intertemporal substitutability of consumption. The larger σ, the more the social planner
desires to smooth the consumption path, and an intertemporal “trading off” of consumption that moves the
consumption bundles away from their average becomes increasingly costly in terms of intertemporal welfare.
Since with a σ > 0 consumption is no longer perfectly intertemporally substitutable, a smoothed consumption
pattern over time should be observed, which is confirmed by the following analysis.
3.6.3.2 Methodology
In applying the CES utility function in its general form, the need to adjust the welfare function established in
(10.9) emerges. In (10.9), damages were accounted as “negative consumption”, but the CES utility function
is not defined for negative arguments. Therefore, the long-term damages are taken “under the roof” of period
t + 1 consumption, and period t + 1 consumption, in the following referred to as “adjusted period t + 1
consumption”, is redefined as follows:
Ct+1 = Ct+1 − φ ·DT . (3.83)
To guarantee positive net consumption at any time, which is necessary to obtain a solution from the model
with the CES utility function, for period t+1 the minimum consumption constraint (3.2) has to be extended,
so that
Ct+1 ≥ f + φ ·DT (3.84)
is fulfilled. I label condition (3.84) as “sustainability constraint”; it ensures that in period t + 1 there are
enough resources accumulated to compensate for later damages weighted by the long-term weighting factor
φ. With the renewed definition for period t+ 1 consumption the welfare function (10.9) changes to:
max
Ct, Ct+1
W = Ut(Ct) + βUt+1(Ct+1 − φ ·DT ). (3.85)
If utility was linear in consumption, compared to the model used in the main text, the only change would
now be that long-term damages are also discounted by β, with no impact on qualitative conclusions. Hence,
modifying the welfare function in this manner seems to pave a viable way of performing this robustness check.
The associated optimal solutions for period t + 1 dirty and clean capital in the linear-utility case can be
retrieved easily by replacing ”φ” by ”β ·φ” in (3.42), (3.50) and (3.47). Thus the following equations give the
linear utility case (i.e. σ = 0) benchmark values:
K̂t+1 =
β(1 + p)− 1
2βφbγ2
− St
γ
−Kt (3.86)
K∗t+1 =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbβγ2
− St
γ
−Kt − 2µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
(3.87)
M∗t+1 = Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
, (3.88)
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whereby equation (3.86) describes the adjusted optimal capital stock for the dirty-technology-only scenario.
If σ > 0 and if no clean technology is available, so thatMt+1 =Mt = 0, and assuming that all side consitions
are fulfilled, the optimization problem looks as follows85:
max
Kt+1
Z =
(
pKt − (Kt+1 −Kt)− b(St)2
)1−σ
1− σ
+ β ·
[(
(1 + p)Kt+1 − b(St + γKt)2
)− φb(St + γKt + γKt+1)2]1−σ
1− σ (3.89)
∂Z
∂Kt+1
= −C−σt + (β(1 + p)− 2βφbγ(St + γKt + γKt+1) · C
−σ
t+1 = 0
⇐⇒ (pKt − (Kt+1 −Kt)− b(St)2)−σ = [((1 + p)Kt+1 − b(St + γKt)2)− φb(St + γKt + γKt+1)2]−σ
· (β(1 + p)− 2βφbγ(St + γKt + γKt+1) . (3.90)
Note that for σ = 0, equation (3.90) collapses and leads to the result given in (3.86).
If σ > 0 and a clean technology is available, so that Mt+1 > 0, the following optimization problem is posed:
max
Kt+1,Mt+1
Z
=
[
p(Kt +Mt)− (Kt+1 −Kt)− (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)− Ψ2 (Mt+1 −Mt) ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0)− b(St)2
]1−σ
1− σ
+ β ·
[(
(1 + p)(Kt+1 +Mt+1)− b(St + γKt + µMt)2
)− φb(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)2]
1− σ
1−σ
(3.91)
∂Z
∂Kt+1
= −C−σt
+ (β(1 + p)− 2βφbγ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)) · C−σt+1 = 0 (3.92)
⇐⇒
(
Ct+1
Ct
)σ
= β(1 + p)− 2βφbγ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1) (3.93)
∂Z
∂Mt+1
= −C−σt ((1 + ζ)−Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))
+ (β(1 + p)− 2βφbµ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)) · C−σt+1 = 0 (3.94)
⇐⇒
(
Ct+1
Ct
)σ
=
β(1 + p)− 2βφbµ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
(1 + ζ)−Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt) (3.95)
Equations (3.93) and (3.95) are equated to get temporarily rid of the ugly consumption terms and solve for
Kt+1:
β(1 + p)− 2βφbγ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1) = β(1 + p)− 2βφbµ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
(1 + ζ)−Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt)
85In the following, it is refrained from restating the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, but made sure that in the simulations Ct+1 ≥
f + φ ·DT and assumed that the carbon constraint is always non-binding.
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⇐⇒ Kt+1 = (1 + p) · (ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))
2φbγ2((1 + ζ) + Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))− 2φbγµ −
St
γ
−Kt − µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
Mt+1 (3.96)
After plugging (3.96) back into (3.92), the following expression is obtained, in whichMt+1 is the only variable
left:
[
p(Kt +Mt)−
(
(1 + p) · (ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))
2φbγ2((1 + ζ) + Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))− 2φbγµ −
St
γ
− 2Kt − µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
Mt+1
)
(3.97)
− (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)− Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt) ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0)− b(St)2
]−σ
=
[
(1 + p)
(
(1 + p) · (ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))
2φbγ2((1 + ζ) + Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))− 2φbγµ −
St
γ
−Kt − µ
γ
Mt +
(
1− µ
γ
)
Mt+1
)
− b(St + γKt + µMt)2
− φb
(
(1 + p) · (ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))
2φbγ((1 + ζ) + Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))− 2φbµ
)2]−σ
·
(
β(1 + p)− βγ
(
(1 + p) · (ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))
γ((1 + ζ) + Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt))− µ
))
For σ = 0, equation (3.97) delivers M∗t+1 as given in (3.88).
The same parameters as in section 3.6.2.2 are adopted, i.e.: p = 2; ζ = 0.12; Ψ = 0.0001; γ = 1; µ = 0.9;
b = 0.0006; β = 0.95; φ = 0.9; f = 0; St = 2; Mt = 0. These values are plugged into (3.86) and into (3.87)
and (3.88) to obtain K̂t+1, K
∗
t+1 andM
∗
t+1. If σ > 0 and the clean technology is not available, the period t+1
dirty capital stock that equates the LHS and RHS of equation (3.90) is the optimal one. When Mt+1 > 0,
the optimal Mt+1 equals the Mt+1 that equates the LHS and RHS of (3.97). Afterwards, it is plugged into
(3.96) to identify the optimal Kt+1, too.
3.6.3.3 Results
The simulation results are given in table 3.2. In the two top tables, the results stem from simulations with
an initial capital stock Kt = 800; in the lower two they are generated from Kt = 700. The respective upper
boxes describe the dirty-technology-only scenario, the respective lower ones refer to the scenarios in which
the clean technology is partially adopted. Results are reported for σ = 0, σ = 0, 2, σ = 0, 5, σ = 1 and σ = 2.
As described in section 3.2.2, above σ ≥ 1 corner solutions are no longer feasible. σ = 1 and σ = 2 were the
values used in DICE-2007 and in the Stern review.86 Note that the values in columns 1 and 6 in table 3.2
only differ from those reported in columns 1 and 3 in table 3.1, respectively, because of the change made to
the welfare function to enable this simulation.
As apparent from all tables, the higher σ, i.e. “the less perfect” the intertemporal substitutability of con-
sumption, the less extreme the distribution of consumption over time. A stronger consumption smoothing
directly follows from a rise of σ.
If we compare the results in columns 1 and 6, 2 and 7, 3 and 8, 4 and 9 and 5 and 10 with each other, we
notice that for σ > 0 clean technology adoption no longer leaves cumulative period T emissions unaffected,
but actually leads to a reduction, i.e. abatement of CO2 emissions takes place. With higher values of σ, also
the differences of period t consumption levels between the dirty-technology-only and the clean-technology-
adoption scenarios shrink in all cases. A glance at the lower two tables reveals that these results hold also
86See section 1.5.4.
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1 2 3 4 5
σ = 0  σ = 0,2  σ = 0,5  σ = 1  σ  = 2
Dirty capital (t+1) 1001 1069 1122 1168 1209
Clean capital (t+1) 0 0 0 0 0
Total capital (t+1) 1001 1069 1122 1168 1209
Clean capital share (t+1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Cumulative emissions (T) 1803 1871 1924 1970 2011
Consumption (t) 1399 1331 1278 1232 1191
Consumption* (t+1) 862 931 981 1022 1057
Welfare 2217,6 2215,2 2210,1 2203,3 2195,4
6 7 8 9 10
σ = 0  σ = 0,2  σ = 0,5  σ = 1  σ  = 2
Dirty capital (t+1) 416 385 367 355 346
Clean capital (t+1) 650 705 736 758 772
Total capital (t+1) 1066 1090 1103 1113 1118
Clean capital share (t+1) 0,61 0,65 0,67 0,68 0,69
Cumulative emissions (T) 1803 1822 1831 1839 1843
Consumption (t) 1235 1201 1182 1167 1160
Consumption* (t+1) 1057 1092 1112 1126 1134
Welfare 2238,7 2238,4 2237,9 2237,4 2237,1
11 12 13 14 15
σ = 0  σ = 0,2  σ = 0,5  σ = 1  σ  = 2
Dirty capital (t+1) 1101 1068 1043 1022 1006
Clean capital (t+1) 0 0 0 0 0
Total capital (t+1) 1101 1068 1043 1022 1006
Clean capital share (t+1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Cumulative emissions (T) 1803 1770 1745 1724 1708
Consumption (t) 999 1032 1057 1078 1094
Consumption* (t+1) 1252 1217 1189 1165 1147
Welfare 2188,3 2187,7 2186,6 2185,1 2183,6
16 17 18 19 20
σ = 0  σ = 0,2  σ = 0,5  σ = 1  σ  = 2
Dirty capital (t+1) 516 613 661 689 708
Clean capital (t+1) 650 469 372 312 271
Total capital (t+1) 1166 1082 1033 1001 979
Clean capital share (t+1) 0,56 0,43 0,36 0,31 0,28
Cumulative emissions (T) 1803 1737 1698 1672 1654
Consumption (t) 835 951 1015 1057 1085
Consumption* (t+1) 1447 1321 1247 1198 1164
Welfare 2209,4 2205,5 2199,9 2194,9 2190,8
*) = includes damages (T)
Clean technology unavailable, K(t) = 700
Clean technology available, K(t) = 700
Clean technology unavailable, K(t) = 800
Clean technology available, K(t) = 800
Table 3.2: Declining marginal utilities: simulation results
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for the scenario in which a growing σ triggers disinvestment in clean capital. For σ = 0, clean technology
adoption leads to an extension of the total capital stock, whereas in all scenarios in which σ ≥ 0, 5 clean
technology adoption results in a reduction of capital investment. However, for σ = 0, 2 and both Kt = 800
and Kt = 700, clean capital adoption still leads to an extension of overall capital investment. Hence, for the
parameters chosen, above some value 0, 2 < σ < 0, 5 clean technology adoption leads no longer to a capital
extension, but to a shrinking of the capital stock. With growing σ, beyond that value the wedge between the
total capital stock with and without clean technology is increasing in σ.
Looking at the top two tables where Kt = 800, we notice that in response to increments in σ, the optimal
total capital stock in period t + 1 as well as cumulative period T emissions grow. When clean technology
is available, the clean capital share is increasing in σ, whereby clean capital increasingly crowds out dirty
capital. It is important to point out though that this behaviour occurs in a situation in which for σ = 0
period t consumption exceeds adjusted period t+ 1 consumption, so that consumption smoothing requires a
consumption shift from period t to period t+ 1. Without clean technology, the only way to accomplish this
is to boost investments, as confirmed by the results of the upper table.
In order to check whether the direction of the investment responses are dependent on the benchmark distri-
bution of consumption, simulations were run for a smaller initial traditional capital stock, Kt = 700. As the
simulation results in columns 11 and 16 reveal, in the benchmark case period t consumption is now lower than
period t+1 consumption. As a consequence, the investment responses to a rising σ are reversed, as shown by
the results in the two lower tables in table 3.2. Without clean technology, dirty capital now shrinks when σ
is increasing. When a clean technology is available, the total capital stock still shrinks, too, but with growing
σ traditional capital investment increasingly crowds out mitigation capital investment. Cumulative period
T emissions are still decreasing in σ, because clean capital emissions fall more than dirty capital emissions
grow. This means that not only the question of whether overall investment is increased or downsized with
increasing σ, but also the question of whether traditional or mitigation capital is crowded out by the other
capital type depends on the initial temporal distribution of the benchmark consumption at σ = 0.
In fact, in all scenarios cumulative CO2 emissions in the long term follow the direction of the investment
response to a rise in σ; this means that the factor substitution does not completely offset the environmental
consequences of total capital accumulation / reduction. However, with clean technology adoption cumulative
period T emissions increase at a slower rate, when capital investment goes up as a consequence to a rise in
σ (upper two tables), and they fall faster, when capital investment decreases (lower two tables).
Interestingly, although with a σ > 0 (so that consumption needs to be somewhat smoothed over time)
some degree of freedom is lost, for a given technology scenario - at least for the parameter values chosen -
the intertemporal welfare sum is rather insensitive to changes in σ. However, with increasing σ the wedge
between the welfare sums of a dirty-technology-only and a clean-technology-adoption scenario is increasing.
A compilation of these results reflects what should be expected. A lower intertemporal substitutability of
consumption (a higher σ) makes the social planner smooth consumption over time. If there is no clean
technology available, the only way to do this is to adjust investments. Yet it is in the inherent nature
of an investment that it initally causes costs, and that its potential benefits accrue at a later point in
time. In this sense, clean capital investment is more extreme, because it has larger upfront costs than dirty
capital investment; but its payoff is also larger, or, to put it differently, mitigation investment takes more
consumption away from period t and leads to more adjusted consumption in period t+ 1 than dirty capital
investment does. Therefore, when an upscaling of investments is necessary to shift consumption to the latter
period, clean capital investment is also boosted, because it provides a more powerful leverage to accomplish
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the consumption smoothing. Likewise, when consumption in the earlier period is to be increased at cost
of consumption in the latter period, clean capital investment is axed due to its stronger leverage on the
intertemporal distribution of consumption.
The results also showed that only up to some 0, 2 < σ < 0, 5 a growth envelope of mitigation exists, i.e. clean
technology adoption leads to a larger period t+1 capital stock than in the scenarios without clean technology.
However, once σ has exceeded this threshold value, clean technology adoption leads to reductions of the total
capital stock in period t + 1. The growth envelope of mitigation disappears; clean technology adoption no
longer stimulates investment. Instead, the optimal cumulative emissions level falls in σ. The reasons for this
behaviour are explained in chapter 4.
With σ = 0, the social planner’s freedom of choice concerning how to maximize intertemporal welfare is
comparatively unconstrained, but the greater σ, the more he has to move away from maximizing the welfare
sum generated from the two consumption bundles in order to limit intertemporal inequality. This costs
welfare and explains why welfare is always decreasing in σ.
Proposition 7. With a CES utility function, the optimal emissions level is sensitive to clean technology
adoption, and the growth envelope of mitigation may disappear.
3.6.4 Conclusions from robustness checks
The assumption of linear utilities is more crucial for SLICE than the assumption of a linear production
function. With declining returns to scale, many of the previous results still hold. We continue to observe
the growth envelope of mitigation, i.e. clean technology adoption stirs up capital investments, whereby clean
capital still crowds out dirty capital, but leaves cumulative period T emissions unchanged.
With a CES utility function, the key result around the growth envelope of mitigation only holds for “small”
values of the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption; the particular threshold value is very
likely to be dependent on the values specified for the other parameters. As learnt in section 1.5.4 and further
discussed in section 4.5, there is no consensus in the literature on the value of σ.
3.7 Conclusions
The stylized integrated assessment model created by Buckle (2009a,b) and further developed here con-
stitutes an innovative approach to analyzing the economics of climate change within a simple framework.
The model does not aim at producing numerical results as IAMs usually do; instead it stands within the
tradition of conceptual economic models that are constructed to find general insights into a problem. The
model introduces some new features and investigates the adoption of clean technology and the determination
of the optimal carbon budget in a framework where the social welfare function reflects both a concern for
discounted short-term utility determined by the consumption level on the one hand, and long-term climate
damages on the other. In contrast to many IAMs of climate change, damages are assumed to be additive
rather than multiplicative and the introduction of clean technology is treated as an investment rather than
as an irreversible loss of income.87 As long as clean technology propagation is in its infancy, adjustment costs
that arise from technical and political barriers may impede the transition to clean technology. The impacts
87Technology cost reduction measures such as R&D or learning-by-doing are however not considered.
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of both resource constraints and precautionary limits on cumulative carbon emissions are also considered. I
have shown that the two approaches to model the second, clean capital stock as presented in Buckle (2009a)
and here, respectively, are mathematically equivalent, but the approach introduced in this chapter enables
the model to produce analytical solutions, which can be derived by standard methods.
As well as offering analytical tractability, the model provides interesting insights. Even though it operates with
an AK production function, the presence of increasing climate damages limits capital investment and leads
to significant mitigation action relative to a BAU path along which long-term damages are fully discounted.
The optimal carbon budget is determined by the equality of the marginal benefits of emitting an additional
unit of CO2 from production in period t + 1 and the long-term marginal damages caused by that CO2. In
the reference model that assumes linear utility and production, the optimal level of long-term cumulative
emissions is independent of past, committed emissions, and is higher the less emissions-intense production
is. The partial adoption of a clean technology does not reduce that optimal cumulative emissions level,
which remains unchanged. However, it gives rise to a growth envelope of mitigation: clean capital crowds
out dirty capital; investments and the total capital stock in period t + 1, as well as welfare, increase. Due
to rising adjustment costs, the economy’s optimal technology mix is path-dependent on past investments in
clean capital. In the case of a complete transition, cumulative emissions actually rise beyond the levels of the
no/partial clean technology adoption scenarios; the superior environmental efficiency of the clean technology
makes a higher level of investment and emissions economically optimal. This suggests that the adoption
of a clean technology may not make a more stringent mitigation target optimal, but rather lead to a more
efficient exploitation of the carbon budget; clean technology adoption increases the growth envelope of the
economy. Hence in this reference model, mitigation is a pro-growth strategy rather than a means of reducing
environmental impacts; it makes higher levels of economic growth and capital accumulation feasible.
Of course, the additional costs of investing in clean rather than dirty technology fall on the present generation
exclusively, whereas the mitigation benefits are enjoyed only in the long term. While this model does not
include intergenerational transfers to finance clean technologies, an obvious extension would be to address
these in the context of an overlapping generations model where mitigation investments by an early generation
are financed through long-term government debt that is repaid by later generation, when the benefits of the
earlier clean investments accrue. While the deeper related ethical issues deserve a sophisticated analysis, this
could be a mechanism that enforces intergenerational compensation and distributes the fruits and burdens
of the optimal policy more equitably on the shoulders of the different generations.
In economies that face binding resource constraints, the desired, higher level of cumulative CO2 emissions
cannot be attained. Investments in the more expensive clean technology are curtailed relative to the optimal
case when both clean and dirty technologies are deployed. Dirty capital investments may even overshoot
their optimal level in the case of partial adoption with no binding resource constraint. Due to the path
dependency of clean capital investments, this practice might cement the competitive advantage of the dirty
technology for the future - though sequential investment decisions were not explicitly analyzed.
The model also examines the possibility that cumulative carbon levels can trigger catastrophic climate dam-
ages that cannot be compensated for by output growth, and that the planner takes this risk seriously. In
the spirit of Ackerman et al. (2009), the social planner takes a precautionary approach and commits to a
fixed cumulative carbon target. He or she leaves standard marginal cost-benefit analysis aside and chooses
the least-cost development path to meet it. Close to the limits of substitution between man-made goods and
changes to the climate, technical progress in capital productivity loses much of its growth-enhancing power.
Emissions-reducing technical progress is then potentially more effective in boosting economic welfare and
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should therefore have a greater priority in policy design.
On the downside, some of these results turn out to be sensitive to the assumptions of a linear production and a
linear utility function, which were adopted from the earlier model versions to preserve SLICE’s transparency,
its adaptability to further extensions, and the generation of analytical solutions that make profound analyses
of the model’s comparative statics possible. In order to check the sensitivity of SLICE to these assumptions,
numerical analysis has to be fallen back on. I, however, would see no sense in a stylized model that operates
without data, but can only be dealt with through methods that compromise its elegance. Instead, an
alternative existing fully-fledged IAM could be used and adjusted as appropriate, though with the caveat in
mind that it is built on a set of particular, but more elusive assumptions and disgorges questionable empirical
results. Therefore, while the aim of creating a stylized, well-tractable model is kept, it is important to keep
highlighting the sensitivity of the model results to certain assumptions.88
The assumption of a linear production function appears less critical than the assumption of a linear utility
function. Even if the production function is concave, the reference model’s conclusions seem to hold. More
fundamental to the model results is the assumption of an infinite intertemporal elasticity of consumption
substitution, or alternatively a zero elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption. A rising σ
leads to stronger consumption smoothing over time. The sensitivity of clean capital investment to changes
in σ is always larger than that for dirty capital investment, for the simple reason that clean capital with
its higher upfront costs and larger benefits exerts a larger leverage effect on the intertemporal distribution
of consumption, facilitating the smoothing of consumption. However, the growth envelope of mitigation
is gradually disappearing in σ until at some threshold value the growth envelope completely vanishes, and
optimal cumulative emissions actually sink as a consequence of clean capital accumulation, which behaviour
is not yet fully understood. The next chapter tackles and solves exactly this puzzle.
Feeding back some of the SLICE features into standard IAMs should influence their conclusions. The adoption
of sustainable preferences, additive damages and a cumulative carbon target all seem likely to raise optimal
mitigation levels in those models, and modelling abatement as a stock variable might lead to earlier abatement.
Adjustment costs might diminish clean technology adoption levels, but also introduce discontinuities into the
models.
88Whereby this statement is valid for almost every econonic model.
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SLICE and the Rebound Effect
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter raised a number of puzzles. It turned out that the optimal level of long-term cumulative
emissions is not only sensitive to emissions-saving technical progress, but in fact rises with it, whereas one
would intuitively expect it to fall. Furthermore, in the standard version of SLICE with a linear utility
function, the cumulative emissions level does not change, when a second, cleaner capital stock is added to
the production factor portfolio. Instead, investments and production increase, spanning a growth envelope
of mitigation. In the robustness checks section, it was elaborated that these results are sensitive to the size
of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption substitution, σ−1, and turn over for higher values of σ. In the
previous chapter, these features could be explained partially, for instance by arguing that emissions-saving
technical progress enhances the marginal product of capital (emissions), making higher levels of investment
and cumulative emissions optimal.
However, it turns out that so far only parts of the underlying processes have been understood. The investment
responses to new, or better technologies that could potentially help bringing emissions down imply that SLICE
exhibits a so-called rebound effect, in fact backfire: A marginal improvement of a technology’s emissions
intensity ultimately results in even more emissions. The following section 4.2 elaborates the conception of
the rebound effect and reasons for its occurrence. In section 4.3, a mathematical definition of the rebound
effect is given, and the rebound effects SLICE predicts are calculated. Afterwards, the puzzles mentioned
in this introduction are resolved. Since the SLICE results suggest very strong rebound effects, section 4.4
performs a reality check by looking at empirical evidence for so-called economy-wide rebound effects, in
order to enable a judgement whether the qualitative predictions of SLICE may hold. Since the intertemporal
elasticity of consumption substitution is the key parameterthat drives the strong rebound effects in SLICE,
section 4.5 investigates whether and for what arguments a σ = 0 can be justified, before conclusions are
drawn.
4.2 The rebound effect
Birol and Keppler (2000) do an excellent job in not only disentangling the concept of a rebound effect, but
in their illuminating article they also elaborate how the rebound effect is usually viewed by representatives
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of different academic disciplines. This section draws largely on Birol and Keppler’s work. They stress the
distinction between energy efficiency and energy intensity. Energy efficiency is computed from the quantity of
output goods or service streams that can be generated from a single energy unit. It characterizes a technical
property, usually of a particular machine, and is crucially determined by the state of its technology. In con-
trast, energy intensity is an aggregating variable that describes the actually observed amount of energy units
used to produce a single unit of output. Naturally, energy efficiencies strongly influence the energy inten-
sity, but so also do other variables such as consumer behaviour and geography. Therefore, the link between
energy efficiency and energy intensity also becomes increasingly blurry the higher the level of aggregation.
It is stronger when the energy intensity of a company site is under inspection, but weaker when the energy
intensity of an economy is under consideration.
In a static world with fixed demand, an increase in the energy efficiency of a machine that provides an
energy service (i.e. output generated from energy) would automatically carry over to reductions in energy
consumption, just because the same service is provided with less energy units. However, if the price of energy
is assumed constant, the price of an energy service unit falls, as through the energy efficiency improvement
providing it becomes cheaper. This is likely to stimulate some rise in demand for the energy service, which is
satisfied once its marginal product has fallen down to its new, lower price. The rising demand for the service
stimulates energy consumption, which constitutes the rebound effect, which partially offsets the reduction
made possible by the energy efficiency improvement. If the rebound effect more than offsets the energy-
consumption-reducing effect from the energy efficiency improvement, this is called “backfire”1.
The size of the rebound effect is crucially determined by the elasticities of substitution between the energy
service and the other input factors on the one hand, as well as the income elasticities of demand on the other
hand. The former determines the size of a substitution effect, the latter the size of an income effect. The
higher the substitution and the income effects, the larger the rebound effect. I start with illustrating the
impact the elasticity of input factor substitution has on the rebound effect. Again, if an energy efficiency
increase leads to a decrease of the energy service price, more energy service is used until its marginal product
matches the new, lower price. However, with more energy service units deployed, the marginal productivities
of the other production factors rise2, so their deployment is now reduced to approach their unchanged factor
prices. Hence, if energy services and the other production factors are substitutes to at least some extent, the
share of energy services in production grows at cost of the other factors. On an economy-wide level, a rise of
energy efficiency results in a substitution from less to more energy-service intense sectors.
To consider the extremes, if an energy service and another intermediate input factor are perfect complements
in the production of a given number of final output goods, hence are needed in a fixed, invariable proportion,
energy-saving technical progress that lowers the cost of the energy service cannot change this factor input
ratio. Therefore, the same number of energy service units as before is used, and the energy intensity of the
production process decreases by the same percentage rate as the the energy efficiency has improved.3 Both
the substitution and the rebound effect are zero. In contrast to this scenario, if the two input factors are
perfect substitutes and the substitution effect is at its maximum, the rebound effect is strongest. Let us
assume for illustration of the perfect substitutes case that in the initial state, five final good output units
can be created from four input units, either energy service or labour, whereby each single input unit costs
the same fixed numéraire price. Hence, it does not matter whether energy services or labour are used for the
1In the terminology of Sorrell (2009), p. 1457.
2As can be easily verified from differentiating a Cobb-Douglas production function with respect to a production factor, which
function reflects limited substitutability between production factors.
3Assuming that the income effects explained below are zero and that the second intermediate input factor does not require
any energy.
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manufacture of the output good, but it is assumed that currently one unit of energy services and three units
of labour are used to produce five output goods, whose aggregated price then amounts to four output goods.
Now the adoption of a new technology doubles the energy efficiency, so that for a given use of energy the
productivity of the energy service doubles, too. As a consequence, for fixed input prices energy services will
completely crowd out labour in production. Assuming that the output of five units remains constant, only
two energy service units need to be used. However, for the given scenario, while at the beginning one energy
service unit consumed an initial benchmark amount of energy, now two energy service units consume twice
50% of that benchmark, so that in total the energy demand remains unchanged. In the example, while no
energy has been saved through the clean technology adoption, it nevertheless leads to a potential increase
in welfare: Two numéraire units are saved (the costs have fallen from four to two), increasing the available
resources.
Potential income effects may intensify the rebound effect: If the income elasticity of demand of that final
output good is infinite, then all savings made possible by the energy efficiency improvement are invested in
more production of that output good, increasing energy consumption. This is a direct income effect. However,
abstracting from a single sector, the income gain may also be spent on manufacture and consumption of other,
more or less energy-service-intense output goods, depending on their income elasticities of demand. Such
responses constitute indirect income effects.
Fact. In summary, the higher the elasticity of substitution of energy service with respect to other input
factors and the higher the income elasticity of demand of the output sector under inspection, thus the larger
the substitution and the direct income effect, the greater the direct rebound effect, which (partially) offsets a
reduction of energy consumption triggered by an improved energy efficiency. Further, indirect income effects
may lead to an economy-wide rebound effect.
In quantitative terms, the rebound effect is measured by the ratio of energy consumed additionally due to
the substitution and the income effects divided by the energy that could technically have been saved through
the energy efficiency improvement under a constant production batch: “[A rebound effect of] 10% means that
10% of the energy efficiency improvement initiated by the technological improvement is offset by increased
consumption”4. Since single-family households spend about 50% of their electricity and natural gas consump-
tion on residential space heating, any significant rebound effect following energy efficiency improvements in
this area would have a significant impact. Older empirical estimates show that the direct rebound effect lies
in the range of 10-30%, so that an energy efficiency improvement that may potentially lead to the saving of
100 energy units in residential space heating in total results in a saving of 70-90 energy units. For residential
cooling through air-conditioning, the direct rebound effect may lie in the range of 0-50%, and about 20-
50% of energy efficiency improvements in personal transportation services are offset by the rebound effect.5
Providing newer estimates, Sorrell et al. (2009) concludes “that the mean long-run direct rebound effect
for personal automotive transport, household heating and household cooling in OECD countries is likely to
be 30% or less and may be expected to decline in the future as demand structures and income increases”.
Estimates of economy-wide rebound effects are viewed at in section 4.5.
Birol and Keppler (2000) point out a further characteristic of the rebound effect: It is time-dependent,
too. As a rule of thumb, in the short term, elasticities of substitution are low, because the production process
is optimally calibrated to a certain state of technology. Reallocating the production factors in consequence
4Berkhout et al. (2000), p. 426. I provide a mathematical definition in section 4.3.
5These figures are taken from Greening et al. (2000), pp. 394ff. However, their database stems from the eighties and nineties,
so these estimates might be somewhat outdated.
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of a technological change requires some time of adjustment, which naturally is available in the long term,
when elasticities of substitution are higher.
This time-dependence of the rebound effect leads to different views of it among representatives of different
academic disciplines. As Birol and Keppler elaborate, an engineer tends to generally neglect it, because in
the engineer’s perception the technological and demand structures are fixed, and the increase in productivity
of one factor does not affect the others. The economist is more likely to exaggerate the significance of the
rebound effect, since the economist is not aware of technical problems on the micro-level, but regards the
production and consumption structure as rather flexible and able to smoothly react to new price signals.
This general discrepancy of perspectives also carries over to modelling preferences. Engineers particularly
like to build up bottom-up models, in which the properties of each technology is evaluated independently from
others and endogenous demand feedbacks are neglected, while economists favour top-down models in which
both supply and demand are comparatively flexible and both affected by changes in marginal productivities
and prices. Birol and Keppler express optimism over joint modelling efforts to integrate insights from both
disciplines.
As the authors conclude, if an economy is growing, it is very difficult to limit or even reduce absolute energy
consumption, since rising incomes stimulate demand for all kind of (energy-fueled) goods. Furthermore, one
important driver of growth is technical progress, and technical progress often comes in form of energy effi-
ciency improvements, with all the benefits and caevats discussed in this section. Only if technical progress
undoubtedly led to a true backstop technology that solves all energy scarcity and pollution problems indef-
initely, concerns about a rebound effect would become irrelevant. Therefore, if a government wants energy
efficiency improvements - for whatever reasons - to carry over into reductions of the economy’s energy inten-
sity, it must accompany policies to promote research with other policies such as raising the price of energy to
prevent a rebound effect. However, as the authors note, policy instruments have their own “rebound effects”,
leading to market distortions and limiting economic growth. If only the energy price is raised, but attempts
to innovate fail, economic growth is thwarted, so that policy mixes need to be balanced: “Multiple objectives
such as maintaining economic growth while decreasing energy intensities require multiple instruments. [...]
For truly significant results price signals and efforts to increase the capacity for technological improvements
have to complement each other. Neither can deliver economic and environmental least-cost solutions on its
own. Together they might”6. However, Birol and Keppler also stress that the rebound effect is not neces-
sarily undesirable. If it is an optimal reaction, it just implies that the economy maximes its welfare best
by enhancing output rather than cutting energy consumption, or, as they bring it to the point, that “it is
the rebound effect that translates technological efficiency improvements into economic growth”7. Ultimately,
rising incomes may also lead to an increase in demand for programmes that reduce energy consumption, for
example because it causes pollution; then this scenario links back to the discussion of the Environmental
Kuznets curve in section 2.3.
4.3 The rebound effect in SLICE
Equipped with this knowledge, some of SLICE’s puzzles can be reconsidered and resolved.
The rebound effect in relative terms, RB, can be defined mathematically as
6Birol and Keppler (2000), p. 468.
7Birol and Keppler (2000), p. 462.
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RB =
RBA
EEA
=
EEA+NECCA
EEA
. (4.1)
The “rebound effect in absolute terms”, i.e. additional energy units consumed in consequence to the energy
efficiency improvement, amounts to RBA. EEA is a positive number and stands for “energy efficiency
improvement in absolute terms”, measuring how many energy units could potentially be saved technically.
NECCA abbreviates the actually realized “net energy consumption change in absolute terms”. NECCA
is negative for a small rebound effect (0 < RB < 1). It is positive, if the rebound effect outweighs the
energy savings made possible by the technical progress, i.e. when backfire occurs (RB ≥ 1). The net energy
consumption cannot fall by more than is saved through technical change8, so that EEA
!≥ −NECCA and
RB
!≥ 0. For a brief demonstration, the example of Berkhout et al. (2000) given in the previous section is
taken up again, who said that a rebound effect of 10% means that 10% of the energy efficiency improvement
initiated by the technological improvement is offset by increased energy consumption. Let us assume that
100 energy units could be saved through the technical improvement. Then, with(4.1):
10% =
100 +NECCA
100
NECCA = −90, (4.2)
which makes perfect sense: Since the rebound effect amounts to 10%, the energy consumption decreases only
by 90, not the full 100 energy units.9
In section 3.3.4, the optimal solutions for dirty capital investment and cumulative long-term emissions, when
a clean technology is not available, were derived. It was shown that if the emissions intensity, γ, falls, it is
optimal for the social planner to target a higher level of cumulative emissions than originally. This intuitively
unexpected behaviour is caused by a rebound effect.
Optimal cumulative emissions in period T are:
S∗T = St + γKt + γK
∗
t+1, (4.3)
so if γ marginally decreases, in a static world in which emissions-saving technical progress does not trigger
any economic feedbacks, it should be expected that cumulative period T emissions fall by
EEA =
∂S∗T
∂γ
| ∂K∗
t+1
∂γ =0
= Kt +K
∗
t+1 =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ2
− St
γ
, (4.4)
whereby K∗t+1 was given in (3.42) and it was assumed that ∂K
∗
t+1/∂γ = 0.
However, γ impacts the optimal decisions; as was already seen in section (3.3.4), a fall in γ raises the marginal
benefits of capital and thereby investment and cumulative emissions. Cumulative emissions S∗T as derived in
(3.43) rise by
NECCA = −∂S
∗
T
∂γ
=
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ2
. (4.5)
8Provided that the energy efficiency improvement does not lead to falling demand, for which case there is no rationale.
9Sorrell and Dimitropoulos (2008), pp. 638ff., offer a number of other definitions of the rebound effect, with differing
levels of complexity. The definition given seems sufficient for this work.
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Using (4.1), the rebound effect can then be computed, occurring in the base scenario of SLICE for a marginal
decrease of γ:
RB =
EEA+NECCA
EEA
=
∂S∗T
∂γ | ∂K∗t+1
∂γ =0
+
(
−∂S∗T∂γ
)
∂S∗
T
∂γ | ∂K∗t+1
∂γ =0
⇐⇒ RB =
β(1+p)−1
2φbγ2 − Stγ + β(1+p)−12φbγ2
β(1+p)−1
2φbγ2 − Stγ
=
β(1+p)−1
φbγ2 − Stγ
β(1+p)−1
2φbγ2 − Stγ
= 2 · β(1 + p)− 1− φbγSt
β(1 + p)− 1− 2φbγSt . (4.6)
If SLICE started at pre-industrial times when St = 0, the rebound effect in SLICE amounts to 200%, which
presents the lower bound. Even though SLICE considers optimal cumulative emissions in the long term,
when time for adjustments and rebound effects are largest, this seems a rather high value, given the previous
empirical estimates for direct rebound effects. However, it was to be expected that RB > 100%, because
otherwise S∗T would not rise in the model, when γ falls.
Why is the rebound effect in SLICE so strong?
The substitution and income effects determine the size of the rebound effect. With respect to the substitution
effect, it can be quickly concluded that it is zero. In the dirty-technology-only scenario, there is no other
production factor which could be substituted away from, when the dirty technology becomes more emissions-
efficient. However, the income effect is at its maximum. In SLICE, demand is not modelled explicitly (so
that an income elasticity of demand cannot be discussed as such). It is recalled though that σ = 0 marks
the special case in which the CES function’s
(
Ut =
C1−σ
1−σ
)
elasticity of utility with respect to marginal
consumption is zero, and marginal utilities are not declining in consumption levels. Therefore, all “income”
becomes available through a technical advance in γ is spent on additional investment, since it will always
increase the discounted period t+1 consumption by more than it reduces period t consumption, see assumption
(3.27). However, it should be noted that a a higher initial income, coming in a “manna-from-heaven” form so
that it does not affect the optimal emissions level, would not lead to more investment, but just be consumed
in the first model period. It is important to understand that a fall in γ makes dirty capital more productive
and therefore a higher level of cumulative emissions tolerable, i.e. optimal, which level overall determines
investment decisions. It should be mentioned that also the shape of the production function influences the
scale of the rebound effect significantly; if the marginal returns to production were declining, accumulating
further capital becomes less profitable.
Now, a second surprising feature of SLICE is turned to. In section 3.3.5, it was shown that as long as clean
capital investment remains more profitable than dirty capital investment, it perfectly crowds out dirty capital
up to the point where adjustment costs have risen so much that clean capital is no longer competitive. A
partial adoption of clean technology does not change the optimal level of cumulative emissions. However, it
boosts economic growth between period t and period t+ 1. Why does this happen?
It is continuously assumed that dirty and clean capital are perfect substitutes, as established in the production
function (3.6). Hence the substitution effect is at its maximum, and the rebound effect amounts to 100%:
Inspite of clean capital adoption, cumulative period T emissions do not fall. Also the income effect is
significant here, as it ensures that the gains from the growth envelope of mitigation are entirely spent on
clean capital investment, but not on period t consumption.10
10It is recalled that that it is the properties of the dirty technology only that determine the intersection of the dirty capital
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This leads over to a further SLICE puzzle. In section 3.6.3, the impact of an elasticity of marginal utility
with respect to consumption greater than zero was investigated. A σ > 0 led to consumption smoothing:
Regardless of whether in the σ = 0 scenario consumption in period t or period t+1 was larger, for σ > 0 the
two consumption levels always approached each other. Moreover, it was discovered that the growth envelope
of mitigation as well as the optimal long-term cumulative emissions level decrease in σ. With increasing σ,
marginal utilities decrease more rapidly in consumption, the income effect weakens and the rebound effect falls
below 100%. With rising σ, not only period t+ 1 consumption is boosted, but also period t consumption.11
4.4 Does an economy-wide rebound effect exist?
In the scenarios revisited, SLICE exhibits rebound effects that constitute backfire. On the base of pure direct
rebound effects, rebound effects that exceed 100% are unlikely. However, SLICE is a strongly simplifying
macro-economic model with a single good that aggregates over many goods. It is still possible that economy-
wide rebound effects, caused by indirect income effects, are so strong that energy efficiency increases or
emissions-saving technical progress eventually lead to rising CO2 emissions.
Probably the most prominent example of backfire is Jevons’ paradox, a well-known puzzle in environmental
economics. Jevons (1865/1965) made the argument that technical progress that improves the efficiency
of coal extraction and use, would without regulation ultimately lead to a rise in demand for coal, because
the service flow per unit of coal was increasing; see also Alcott (2005) for a discussion of Jevons’ theses.
Polimeni and Polimeni (2006) list a number of studies that identify a Jevon’s paradox in a wider sense.
First, according to these studies food production efficiency enhancements have eventually resulted in more
famines, because they simultaneously enabled tremendous population growth. Second, extensions of the road
infrastructure have not reduced the number and intensity of congestions, because they encouraged increased
car use. Third, the size of refrigerators has grown with their efficiency. In their own study, Polimeni and
Polimeni present empirical evidence that Jevons’ paradox may hold on a national, macro-economic level for
aggregated energy consumption in response to aggregated energy intensity improvements in six major world
regions.12
However, Sorrell (2009) explains that testing the Jevons’ Paradox empirically is extremely difficult (and
therefore not popular). Even though there is a strong correlation between GDP and energy consumption,
it remains unclear by how much economic growth stirs up energy consumption. Sorrell supposes that there
is some mutual causality and concludes that other approaches should be taken to investigate the Jevon’s
Paradox. Neoclassical economists and endogenous growth theory generally tend to downplay the significance
of the rebound effect, since energy contributes only very little to factor costs, while economic growth is
mainly fueled by enhancements in capital and labour, and technical progress that raises the total factor
productivity. This view however is heavily contested by ecological economists, who find that once it is
distinguished between different qualities of energy carriers, historical improvements in energy efficiency turn
out to be much smaller than commonly assumed and most evidence for decoupling energy consumption
from output vanishes. Furthermore, ecological economists emphasize that also man-made capital goods are
ultimately created from energy and the rises of labour productivity stem largely from equipping workers with
emissions marginal cost- and benefit curves and thereby optimal cumulative emissions, and since those properties do not change
when a clean technology becomes available, also the optimal level of cumulative emissions does not change (section 3.3.5).
11This also explains why in table 3.2 with increasing σ for all scenarios the differences in period t consumption with and
without clean technology adoption shrink.
12Cp. Polimeni and Polimeni (2006), pp. 345ff.
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energy-fueled devices rather than through abstract technical progress. According to some studies Sorrell cites,
the productivity of energy inputs is ten times larger than their share in total costs commonly acknowledged.
The theoretical and empirical approaches of both economic schools have not yet been reconciled, so that no
clear conclusion on this matter can be drawn. In any case, as Sorrell infers, if it is true that energy efficiency
improvements do not just reduce energy costs, but also enhance the total factor productivity overall, backfire
can no longer be ruled out by arguing that the share of energy in total factor costs was small. He adds that
incidents of backfire are more likely to occur with the invention of General Purpose Technologies13, such as
the steam engine or the electric motor, rather than with gradual improvements in energy efficiency, since
GPTs open up fundamentally new possibilities to boost innovation, productivity and economic growth, often
stirring up energy consumption.14
Sorrell (2007) compiles the results from eight economic studies that try to estimate economy-wide rebound
effects following energy efficiency improvements. These studies use rather different Computable General Equi-
librium models. Due to their caveats and strong assumptions, Sorrell warns about taking their quantitative
results for granted. However, while four of the studies find economy-wide rebound effects of around 50%,
the other four studies report backfire. Therefore, Sorrell concludes that no general conclusion on the size of
the economy-wide rebound can be drawn yet at this stage, and that its size may be dependent on particular
circumstances.15 Sorrell (2009) closes with: “A prerequisite for all the above is a recognition that rebound
effects matter and need to be taken seriously. Something is surely amiss when such in-depth and comprehen-
sive studies as the Stern (2007) review overlook this topic altogether. While rebound effects are difficult to
study, they are not necessarily anymore difficult than well-researched issues such as price-induced technical
change. Their continued neglect may result as much from their uncomfortable implications as from a lack of
methodological tools. Too much is at stake for this to continue”.16
From this review on economic-wide rebound effects it is apparent that incidents of backfire are in the range
of what is to be considered possible. The rebound effect and its determinants are far too complex to be
adequately reflected by SLICE due to its simplicity, but this seems to imply that the SLICE predictions
cannot be considered unreasonable. While the rebound effect to an improvement in γ is most certainly
exaggerated in SLICE in quantitive terms, what matters for this stylized model is that SLICE’s qualitative
response, i.e. the incident of backfire after an improvement in the emissions intensity, may hold. However,
SLICE with its linear utility function cannot reflect rebound effects of different scales, which in the model
always reach backfire levels.
4.5 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution with respect to
consumption revisited
The simplifying utility and production function condition the strong rebound effects in SLICE. As the work
by Saunders (2008) suggests, predetermining the size of the rebound effect by functional choice does not
seem an exclusive feature of SLICE though. In a purely theoretical study, Saunders analyzes how a series of
common economic production (cost) functions that involve capital, labour and energy as production factors
respond to a rise in energy efficiency. He shows that the Leontief production function always leads to zero
13For a definition s. section 2.2.2.
14Cp. Sorrell (2009), pp. 1460ff.
15Cp. Sorrell (2007), section 4.5.
16Sorrell (2009), p. 1468.
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rebounds, which comes as no surprise: It presents the special case of the CES production function in which
the elasticity of substitution17 between the production factors is zero. The Cobb-Douglas function, in which
the elasticity amounts to one, continuously leads to backfire. The Translog cost function regularly used in
empirical energy economics studies only does not automatically lead to backfire, if it is not globally concave
- violating a standard axiom of economic study. Out of the common production functions, only a particular,
but unfortunately rather arbitrary form of the CES production does not produce backfire, hence seems flexible
enough to account for varieties of rebounds. If a CES production function has to be fallen back on, Saunders
asks modellers to not arbitrarily choose ε, but carefully estimate it.18 In summary, this analysis makes clear
that the rigidity of SLICE regarding the rebound effect due to functional specification does not constitute
an exception in economics.
However, besides the high elasticity of substitution when two capital stocks are considered, the strong rebound
effects are triggered in particular by the assumption of an intertemporal elasticity of substitution with respect
to consumption, σ−1, that goes to to infinity or, equivalently, a zero elasticity of marginal utility with respect
to consumption, σ = 0. How plausible is this particular value?
Empirical estimates of σ vary, but usually lie above σ = 0. Obtained in very different modelling and spatial
contexts, empirically derived values for σ cover a wide range: 4 (Issler and Piqueira (2000)); 2-5 (Skinner
(2011)); ≈ 1, 25 (Favero (2005)); 0,45 (Kapoor and Ravi (2010)). These values assume, as the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function does, that σ is constant over time, which assumption however
is rejected by Crossley and Low (2006).
With respect to integrated assessment modelling, even though this key parameter is crucial in determining
the all-decisive discount rate (see section 1.5.4, equation (1.7)), arguably not too much effort has been spent
on setting the “right” value of σ. A piece of evidence for this is included in section 1.5.4, where it was reported
that Nordhaus (2008) revised it upwards from σ = 1 in the DICE-94 model to σ = 2 in DICE-2007, only
in order to be able to lower the previously rather high pure rate of time preference, without altering the
discount rate too much. This makes the parameter choice look somewhat arbitrary. Sterner and Persson
(2008) illustrate the implications of these values nicely: For σ = 1, the CES utility function converges to
the logarithmic utility function, which implies that an increase from 100.000 to 1.000.000 consumption units
raises utility by bare 20%. For σ = 2, if a person was transferred to one consumption unit by somebody who
is a hundred times richer, his or her utility would explode 10.000 times as much as the donour loses. While
Sterner and Persson refrain from explicitly claiming σ = 0 in integrated assessment modelling, they point to
the fact that in most benefit-cost-analyses, the costs and benefits in monetary terms are related to each other,
regardless of who the benefactors and beneficiaries are. In the consequence, if intratemporal equity issues
are thus effectively blinded out, it could be justifiable to also ignore intertemporal equity by setting σ = 0.
Similar to how poor populations are discriminated by Negishi-weighting (section 1.5.4) today, by assuming
indefinite consumption growth and σ > 0, future generations are discriminated. Sterner and Persson write:
“Is it reasonable to use welfare weights only when we want to argue that we should do nothing today and
leave the costs to future generations? This happens to be a case when the use of the curved utility function is
in our interest. In all other cases - educational or nutritional programs for the poor, development assistance,
or progressive taxation - we choose to disregard the curvature of the utility function. Real business is often
conducted as if σ were zero, and most economists use zero in all other contexts. Thus, it is ironic that Stern
(2007) has been accused of using too low a value for σ when he has used a value of one. If we use the discount
rate to lower the estimates of the costs from climate change that our descendents will face, based on the
17In section 2.3.2 referred to as ε.
18Cp. Saunders (2008), pp. 2197ff.
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argument that they will be so much richer and the utility function is so curved, then we should logically
give extra weight to any low-income people affected - such as the coastal dwellers of Bangladesh who appear
doomed to become environmental refugees as their lands are inundated”19.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter started off by introducing the rebound effect in its different facets, which is caused by substitution
and direct and indirect income effects. The rebound effect holds the key for understanding the behaviour
of SLICE observed in the previous chapter, where clean technology adoption or emissions-saving technical
progress led to zero emissions reductions or even higher levels of optimal cumulative carbon, respectively. The
functional forms embedded in the standard version of SLICE cause strong rebound effects, indeed backfire,
and the further analysis has made clear that these are caused by large elasticities of production factor and
intertemporal consumption substitution.
Since direct rebound effects are usually likely to be far below 100%, the rebound effect in SLICE must reflect
economy-wide rebound effects. There is some evidence for economy-wide backfire to occur, but it is not easy
to estimate its robustness. The relationship between technical progress, energy consumption and economic
growth is notoriously difficult to disentangle. However, as long as the debate continues, a decision on whether
SLICE can reflect responses to emissions-saving technical progress adequately in terms of their qualitative
directions must remain pending.
Not only in SLICE, also in other economic models the particular forms of the involved functions crucially
determine the occurrence and size of potential rebound effects. In SLICE, it is eventually the elasticity of
marginal utility with respect to consumption that drives backfire. σ = 0 contradicts most empirical studies
that all find positive values, even though estimates vary quite considerably and it might be time-variant.
However, Sterner and Persson (2008) find good reasons why σ should be assumed very low in IAMs.
It seems to me that another time the conflict between Nordhaus and Stern could break out, who argue
whether climate policy parameters that affect the discount rate should be calibrated in accordance with
market interest rates, or a prescriptive approach should be taken to adequately tackle the unique challenge of
climate change. It seems though that even Nordhaus, who always claimed that the parameters are carefully
adopted from empirical studies, varies σ quite arbitrarily.
The original purpose of this chapter had been to explain the counterintuitive behaviour of SLICE with the
help of the rebound effect, and afterwards to investigate whether the orginal approach in Buckle (2009a,b)
to specify a linear utility function is justifiable. Eventually, this led to debating whether or not economy-
wide rebound effects occur as well as discussing the correct value for σ. While both the pure rate of time
preference and the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption (and the consumption growth
rate) crucially determine the all-dominating discount rate in IAMs, it appears to me that, in the climate
context, the elasticity has received much less attention than the pure rate of time preference. Both the
economy-wide rebound effect and the correct determination of σ unambiguously require future research. It is
always surprising to see how many important questions SLICE touches on, but the complexity of these issues
might exceed its functionality. My impression though is that this chapter has brought not enough evidence
to either generally support or completely reject SLICE in its basic version. Of course, the chapter reminds
us to be aware of possible caveats and limiting assumptions - as is true for most economic models.
19Sterner and Persson (2008), p. 66. Original notation adjusted to nomenclature of this work.
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Chapter 5
A Discussion of Müller-Fürstenberger
and Stephan (2011) and Additive
versus Multiplicative Damages
Revisited
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the model of Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan (2011) is presented and its result
scrutinized with the help of SLICE. Also Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan develop a “stylized integrated
assessment model”1 of climate change; thereby it shares some of SLICE’s ambitions, although it does not
operate with two distinct technologies. Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan study the interaction between
optimal GHG emissions, the discount rate and technological change. They derive as the key result that the
level of the optimal cumulative long-term stock of atmospheric CO2, for which a flow equilibrium between
additional emissions inflows and natural decay outflows exists, is independent of technological change. This
result also holds after the introduction of a discount rate and a carbon retention parameter that is dependent
on the level of atmospheric carbon. In the following, I refer to this phenomenon as the “independence
property” of their model. This key result, however, contrasts with a result from SLICE. In sections 3.3.4 and
3.3.6, and particular equations (3.43) and (3.57), it was found that the level of long-term cumulative emissions
are sensitive to the technology parameters of the model, capital productivity p and emission intensities γ
and µ. Improvements in these parameters enhance the marginal productivity of capital and therefore make
it optimal to cope with a higher level of long-term cumulative emissions.2
The main purpose of this chapter is to check the robustness of Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s indepen-
dence property. In section 5.2, their model is presented. In the original model, output is modelled as inversely
proportional to climate damages, leading to multiplicative damages. In section 5.3, I transform the damage
module so that damages are substracted from output (additive damages), to show that the independence
property is an artifact of the multiplicative damages assumption.
1Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan (2011), p. 986.
2In section 4.3, the coherence of this phenomenon with the rebound effect was elucidated.
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By embedding multiplicative damages into SLICE, in section 5.4 I show that the SLICE results on the
interplay between the optimal long-term emissions target and technology are not dependent on whether
climate damages are assumed multiplicative or additive to output. In section 5.5, I experiment with a further
modelling approach. Finally, conclusions from these analyses are drawn.
This chapter is self-contained insofar as the discussion in this chapter is not referred back to in later chapters
and thus is not a prerequisite for understanding the other chapters of this thesis.
5.2 The model
Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan specify the following production function:
Yt = H
β
t K
α
t E
1−α
t , (5.1)
with 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1. Use of conventional machine capital Kt is not coupled to emissions generation; instead
CO2 emissions Et feed as a separate production factor into the creation of gross output Yt in period t. Ht
represents accumulable technological knowledge, and if β > 0, the production function exhibits increasing
returns to scale.
Emissions Et augment, with a one-period time lag, the stock of atmospheric CO2, St, of which in each period
a fraction 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 remains3:
St+1 = θSt + Et. (5.2)
The model’s resource restriction is
Ωt(St) · Yt = IHt + IKt + Ct
⇐⇒ Ωt(St) · Yt = Ht+1 − εHHt +Kt+1 − εKKt + Ct. (5.3)
IHt and I
K
t describe investments in machine and knowledge capital, respectively, and εH ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ εK ≤ 1
denote respective “capital survival factors”4. The authors emphasize that εH may also be greater than
one, if knowledge capital increases over time without investment, e.g. through exogenous technical progress,
knowledge spillovers or learning-by doing effects. All income not spent on investment can be consumed, Ct.
However, only a fraction Ωt(St) of output is available, because the fraction (1−Ωt(St)) is destroyed through
climate change. This assumes multiplicative damages, equal to the Nordhaus (2008) approach taken in
DICE-2007. In some contrast to DICE, damages do not increase with temperature rise, but with stocks
of atmospheric CO2: This is in line with the SLICE approach, whereby Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan
refrain from explicitly deriving the link between damages and carbon stocks for the sake of simplicity. Also
in their model, damages5 are convex, or ∂Ωt(St)∂St < 0 and
∂2Ωt(St)
∂S2t
< 0:
3For an explanation of this parameter, see fn. 41, section 3.2.6.
4Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan (2011), p. 980.
5Whereby actual damages Dt are computed as (1-Ωt(St))Yt.
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Ωt(St) = 1−
(
St
Λ
)2
. (5.4)
Λ “marks a hypothetical stock, at which climate damage would consume all of conventional wealth”6. The
authors state that Λ should generally depend on the economy’s exposure to climate change and its adaptation
capacity.
Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan refrain from using the “classic”, but problematic utilitarian discounted
utility approach, but instead apply a welfare concept developed by Chichilnisky et al. (1995), called the
“Green Golden Rule”. The Green Golden Rule defines the consumption path that leads to the “highest
indefinitely maintainable level of instantaneous utility, in a framework where environmental goods are valued
in their own rights”7. As an implication, impatience of a household reflected by some consumption discount
factor is ruled out in this framework.
Applied to this model, the Green Golden Rule identifies an infinite consumption path, which maximizes
welfare W according to
max
Ct
W =
(
lim
t→∞
Ut(Ct)
)
, (5.5)
so that a constant consumption level C exists that maximizes U . The problem reduces to
max
C
W = U(C). (5.6)
By solving the resource restriction (5.3) for C, it can be replaced in (5.6) (somewhat similar to the solution
strategy used for solving SLICE); also the production function (5.1) is used and emissions eliminated from
the problem by plugging in (5.2), so that utility is maximized over long-term levels of the production inputs,
H,K and S:
max
H,K,S
W = U
[
Ω(S) ·HβKα((1− θ)S)1−α − (1− εH)H − (1− εK)K
]
. (5.7)
Since utility “is a concave, strictly increasing function of consumption, [...] solving the optimality problem
requires to find indefinitely maintainable values of H,K,E which grant maximal consumption”8; the utility
function can be dropped and with the FOCs follows
∂W
∂H
= βΩ(S) ·Hβ−1Kα((1− θ)S)1−α − (1− εH) = 0 (5.8)
∂W
∂K
= αΩ(S) ·HβKα−1((1− θ)S)1−α − (1− εK) = 0 (5.9)
∂W
∂S
=
∂Ω(S)
∂S
HβKα((1− θ)S)1−α + (1− α)(1− θ)Ω(S) ·HβKα((1− θ)S)−α = 0
⇐⇒ 0 = HβKα((1− θ)S)−α
[
∂Ω(S)
∂S
((1− θ)S) + (1− α)(1− θ)Ω(S)
]
, (5.10)
6Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan (2011), p. 980. It would be more accurate to say that once Λ is reached, the whole
period output is destroyed - but, with a multiplicative approach, further wealth in form of the economy’s capital base remains
untouched.
7Chichilnisky et al. (1995), p. 176.
8Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan (2011), p. 980.
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whereby it is assumed that 0 ≤ εH , εK < 1. Let H∗,K∗ and S∗ mark the optimizing values. Then, from
(5.10), it follows that the optimal sustainable carbon stock, S∗, is independent of machine capital, K∗, and
technological knowledge, H∗. S∗ is determined only from
∂Ω(S∗)
∂S∗
S∗ + (1− α)Ω (S∗) = 0. (5.11)
For the explicit damage function (5.4), the solution is
S∗ =
√
1− α
3− αΛ. (5.12)
Equation (5.11) conveys Müller-Fürstenberg and Stephan’s key result: that the “sustainable climate, which
yields maximal per capita consumption over the long-run, is independent of the stock of technological knowl-
edge”9.
In the following, Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan reintroduce a discount factor into their model and show
that this key result still holds. They make the common observation that for low discount rates, which lead to
assigning comparatively more weight to future generations, investments into research and GHG abatement
are high. Eventually, they perform numerical simulations, while adopting the utilitarian welfare approach.
Still, atmospheric CO2 converges to a constant stock, the level of which is positively correlated with the
discount rate. An increase of technological knowledge productivity (β rises) stimulates knowledge capital
investments, but still does not affect the level of the long-term carbon stock; it marginally influences the path
towards that level. Finally, for similar considerations as discussed in section 3.2.6, Müller-Fürstenberger and
Stephan reiterate their simulations, now assuming a carbon retention parameter θ(St) that increases in levels
of St, but the invariance result still holds.
Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan conclude: “By means of a highly stylized integrated assessment model we
have shown both theoretically and numerically that the stock of technological knowledge has no impact on
the optimal carbon stock over the long run. This has an impact on long term policy-making, since makers
need not to agree on expectations about future technological change. It simply does not matter for a global
long run emission target. We are aware that our results do not hold for a more detailed modeling of the
energy sector. At the very bottom line there is an invariance result”10. However, in the following it is shown
that even in this simple top-down framework the independence property is not robust against changes in the
damage module; in fact it is the assumption of multiplicative damages that produces this result.
5.3 Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan (2011) and multiplicative
vs. additive damages
While both Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s model as well as SLICE represent approaches to develop a
stylized IAM, it must be ensured that their results may be compared with each other. First, even though
SLICE does not explicitly consider technological change, insights gained from comparative statics analysis
with respect to its technology parameters may be related to the Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s conclu-
sions, whose model operates with accumulable technological knowledge. Even though the representation of
9ibid., p. 980.
10ibid., p. 986, whereby they neither reason why nor describe which case they refer to as the “very bottom line”
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technical progress is different in both models, the links between technology and optimal carbon stocks can be
compared. Furthermore, Müller-Fürstenberger either work with the Green Golden Rule or adopt a utilitarian
discounted utility framework, whereas the SLICE welfare framework is inspired by sustainable preferences.
However, all approaches have in common that they lead or converge to a single, optimal carbon stock in the
long term, whose levels are independent of the particular emissions trajectories11. Therefore, I conclude that
the optimal long-term carbon stock S∗ in Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s model, given in (5.11), section
5.2, correspondends to optimal long-term cumulative emissions ŜT in SLICE, section 3.3.4, equation (3.42),
and the effects of changes in (assumptions to) technology may be compared.
Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s independence property result is strong and poses the question whether
it is caused by some specific modelling assumptions. In accordance with the standard approach taken in
DICE-2007 and most other IAMs, damages reduce output by a proportionality factor, Ωt, in a multiplicative
manner; in Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s model, this multiplicative link is established in (5.7) and in
DICE-2007 in (1.2) in section (1.3). As was discussed in section 1.5.3, there is no clear economic rationale
behind a multiplicative link between damages and output. In fact, if damages in Müller-Fürstenberger and
Stephan’s model are modelled as additive, rather than multiplicative, it can be shown that the independence
property no longer holds. I replace equation (5.7) by
max
H,K,S
W = U
[
HβKα((1− θ)S)1−α − (1− εH)H − (1− εK)K − Ω(S)
]
, (5.13)
It is still assumed that the damage function itself, Ω(S), is independent of H and K, but it is now detached
from the production function on the left hand side. Instead, damages are modelled as another factor that
diminishes resources available for consumption in a way similar to investment.12 In order to apply the Green
Golden Rule, which identifies the consumption level that enables the highest indefinitely maintainable level
of consumption, I derive only the FOC with respect to St:
∂W
∂S
= (1− α)(1− θ)HβKα((1− θ)S)−α − ∂Ω(S)
∂S
= 0
⇐⇒ HβKα = S
α
(1− α)(1− θ)1−α ·
∂Ω(S)
∂S
. (5.14)
Equation (5.14) makes evident that now the long-term optimal carbon stock is dependent on the long-term
levels of H andK, i.e. also the state of technology. Hence, the independence property of Müller-Fürstenberger
and Stephan does no longer holds once additive damages are specified and is an artifact of a multiplicative
damage specification.13
5.4 SLICE and additive vs. multiplicative damages
Nevertheless, the question of whether or not the long-term level of carbon emissions is independent of tech-
nology is not settled yet. As the previous section showed, Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s model does
11Provided that resources are sufficient to allow the achievement of those optimal levels and current cumulative emissions
levels do initially not already exceed the optimal ones.
12Of course, using the particular functional form for Ω(S) that was introduced in (5.4) then does not make sense anymore.
13And possibly also sensitive to other model assumptions.
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not provide clear guidance on this. However, the conclusion derived from SLICE that technology crucially
determines the optimal level of cumulative emissions may also be sensitive to the specification of the link
between output and damages. In (3.22) in section 3.2.7, additive damages in SLICE were established. There-
fore, as another robustness check, in the following SLICE is run with multiplicative damages. I orientate this
approach towards Nordhaus’ DICE-2007 setup, see equations (1.2) and (1.3) in section 1.3, in which only a
fraction Ωt of output “survives” climate change. Deviating moderately from Nordhaus’ approach, but in line
with Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s approach, in this modified version of SLICE Ωt does not decrease
in temperature rise △Tt, but cumulative emissions St:
Ωt =
1
1 +Dt
=
1
1 + b(St)2
. (5.15)
In SLICE, no production takes place in the long term, period T , so that there is also no output that can
be reduced by climate change. Therefore, only for the purpose of this robustness check, it is assumed that
benefits and costs of production investment accrue during the same, second period. This means that the
additional carbon-cycle-induced time lag between emissions and climate damages is ignored. Factually, SLICE
is reduced to a two-period model. For the sake of comparability with Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s
model, the basic model with a single technology only is used. Its welfare function is now
max
Kt+1
W = U(Ct) + U(Ct+1)
= [ΩtYt − (Kt+1 −Kt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t
+ [φ (Ωt+1Yt+1 +Kt+1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
period t+ 1
=
[
pKt
1 + b(St)2
− (Kt+1 −Kt)
]
+
[
φ
(
pKt+1
1 + b(St + γKt+1)2
+Kt+1
)]
. (5.16)
Solving this leads to14
∂W
∂Kt+1
= 0
0 = −1 + φ
[
p
(
1 + b(St + γKt+1)
2
)−1 − pKt+1 (1 + b(St + γKt+1)2)−2 2bγ(St + γKt+1)]+ φ
⇐⇒ 1− φ
φ
(
1 + b(St + γKt+1)
2
)2
= p
(
1 + b(St + γKt+1)
2
)− pKt+12bγ(St + γKt+1)
0 =
(
1 + b(St + γKt+1)
2
) [1− φ
φ
(
1 + b(St + γKt+1)
2
)− p]+ pKt+12bγ(St + γKt+1)
0 =
(
1 + b
(
S∗t+1
)2)[1− φ
φ
(
1 + b
(
S∗t+1
)2)− p]+ pKt+12bγ (b (S∗t+1)2) . (5.17)
In this two-period framework, S∗t+1 represents the “long term” cumulative emissions. With multiplicative
damages, the model can no longer be explicitly solved for S∗t+1 by using standard methods. However, it is
evident that, firstly, the level of S∗t+1 still depends on the emissions intensity γ. Secondly, in response to a
decrease in γ, S∗t+1 must rise to keep equation (5.17) balanced. A rebound effect (chapter 4) that is greater
than 100% hence persists also for multiplicative damages, that is emissions-saving technical progress leads to
14It is noted that for the derivation of equation (5.17) both the product rule as well as the double chain rule had to be used.
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an increase of optimal long-term cumulative emissions level. To conclude, the qualitative result remains the
same in SLICE, whether damages are assumed additive or multiplicative.
5.5 A further damage modelling approach in SLICE
In the following, the same exercise is performed for a third damage-output link specification worth considering.
While the welfare function (5.16) is kept, it is experimented with the following, alternative damage factor:
Ωt = 1−Dt = 1− b(St)2. (5.18)
Plugging this into (5.16) delivers
max
Kt+1
W = (1−Dt)Yt − (Kt+1 −Kt) + φ ((1−Dt+1)Yt+1 +Kt+1)
=
(
1− b(St)2
)
pKt − (Kt+1 −Kt) + φ
[(
1− b(St + γKt+1)2
)
pKt+1 +Kt+1
]
. (5.19)
A condition Dt < 1, valid in both periods, might be demanded to ensure that net output remains greater
than zero, although, as was already elaborated in section 3.2.8, e.g. in a small island state climate damages
might be able to exceed output and impair its capital base. Differentiating with respect to capital leads to
∂W
∂Kt+1
= −1 + φ [(1 + p)− pb(St + γKt+1)2 − pKt+12bγ(St + γKt+1)] = 0. (5.20)
This time, replacing the terms St+ γKt+1 by St+1 does not bring progress here, since then still one variable,
Kt+1, is left in the equation. Fortunately, it can be solved here for K
∗
t+1 and S
∗
t+1 explicitly:
0 = −1 + φ [(1 + p)− pb(St + γKt+1)2 − pKt+12bγ(St + γKt+1)]
1
φ
= (1 + p)− pb (S2t + 2StγKt+1 + γ2K2t+1)− 2pbγStKt+1 − 2pbγ2K2t+1
1− 1
φ
+ p
(
1− bS2t
)
= 3pbγ2K2t+1 + 4pbγStKt+1
0 = K2t+1 +
4St
3γ
Kt+1 −
1− 1φ + p
(
1− bS2t
)
3pbγ2
+
4S2t
9γ2
− 4S
2
t
9γ2
0 =
(
Kt+1 +
2St
3γ
)2
−
1− 1φ + p
(
1− bS2t
)
3pbγ2
− 4S
2
t
9γ2
Kt+1 = ±
√
1− 1φ + p (1− bS2t )
3pbγ2
+
4S2t
9γ2
− 2St
3γ
, (5.21)
whereby the solving process with the quadratic complement was laid out in all explicitness. If the first term
under the root was large, but negative, the root would not have a solution. If the first term had a low
negative value, for both a positive and a negative root a negative solution for K∗t+1 outside of its definition
116
CHAPTER 5. A DISCUSSION OF MÜLLER-FÜRSTENBERGER AND STEPHAN (2011) AND
ADDITIVE VERSUS MULTIPLICATIVE DAMAGES REVISITED
space would be reached. Hence, the root must be positive, and the following unique solutions for K∗t+1 and
S∗t+1 are obtained:
K∗t+1 =
√√√√ 1p (1− 1φ)+ (1− bS2t )
3bγ2
+
4S2t
9γ2
− 2St
3γ
(5.22)
S∗t+1 = St + γK
∗
t+1 =
√√√√ 1p (1− 1φ)+ (1− bS2t )
3b
+
4S2t
9
+
1
3
St (5.23)
This solution set holds some surprises. First, with this damages specification, the “long term” cumulative
emissions are no longer dependent on the emissions coefficient, γ. Second, they possibly even rise with initial
committed emissions, St, which contrasts with the behaviour observed in sections 3.3.4 and 5.4.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, it was shown that Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s (2011) result that the level of the
optimal stock of atmospheric CO2 is independent of technological knowledge is not definite. In fact, it was
proven that this result does not hold, when an additive instead of a multiplicative link between output
and climate damages is assumed. The research question raised by Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan was
investigated by experimenting with different damage-output-link modelling approaches in SLICE. It turned
out that whether damages are modelled as additive or multiplicative, in both cases the level of optimal
cumulative long-term emissions depends on SLICE’s technology parameters and increases with emissions-
saving technical progress.
Finally, a third modelling approach was tried out. It led to a solution in which the optimal amount of
accumulated carbon in the long term does not vary with the emissions technology. However, such a modelling
approach has not been discussed yet in the literature and may entail some caveats that have not yet been
paid sufficient attention, therefore results from this premature analysis need to be taken with a pinch of salt.
Beyond the discussion Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan’s independence result, this analysis shows how
sensitive even qualitative IAM results to particular model assumptions are, not to mention quantitative
results. This particular debate on additive versus multiplicative damages underlines the point made by
Weitzman (2010), who does not see yet a compelling reason to strictly prefer one approach over the other.15
Results may significantly vary with damage modelling specifications, and further research on ways to model
damages is required.
On further notes, Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan claim that the fact that, despite improvements in the
carbon intensities of production, world CO2 emissions still grow, arose “largely due to the so-called rebound
effect. The rate at which de-carbonization has taken place through the innovation of more energy-efficient
technogies is significantly smaller than the growth rate of the demand for carbon energy and hence of carbon
dioxide emissions”16. Such a statement needs an empirical validation; given the estimates of likely ranges of
rebound effects, reported in section 4.2, it seems unlikely that the rebound effect on its own has led to this
15S. section 1.5.3.
16Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan (2011), p. 978. Energy efficiency improvements, as a side effect, make energy services
cheaper and therefore also stir up demand, a phenomenon described in chapter 4 as the “rebound effect”.
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development. It is very possible that the continuous or sudden economic growth of many world regions was
caused by a large variety of factors such as improving education levels, population growth and deregulation
as well as rebound effects, and that these developments altogether offset the energy efficiency improvements.
In any case, their conclusion, quoted in the last paragraph of section 5.2, that the independence property
(even if it was robust) releases policy-makers from the need to agree on common expectations with respect to
future technological change, seems ill-founded. Even if technical progress did not affect the optimal level of the
long-term carbon stock, it determines the technological mitigation and adaptation possibilities. Expectations
over these matter, because decision makers and investors promote policies and bet on technologies according
to them.
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Chapter 6
Dimensions of Adaptation
6.1 Introduction
Mitigation aims at slowing down or avoiding climate change. It always does so by either reducing GHGs
emissions or enhance the GHG storage capacity on Earth to prevent them from reaching the atmosphere.
According to Smit et al., “adaptation refers to adjustments in ecological-social-economic systems in response
to actual or expected climatic stimuli, their effects or impacts”1. Given that these effects or impacts are
various and hit many different areas and sectors, adapation responses vary considerably and have different
objectives.
As research on adaptation is an emerging discipline, no general consensus on the terminology has been
reached yet. In section 6.2, a classification system of adaptation measures is introduced, which is then built
on in the following chapters. Section 6.3 outlines adaptation measures in eight sectors affected by climate
change. This review of specific adaptation measures can hardly be considered as complete, but it sheds light
on the kinds and range of adaptation measures. The sectors looked at, namely agriculture, forestry, fisheries,
water management, human health, coastal protection, infrastructure and natural ecosystems, are the sectors
usually considered in current adaptation cost studies, which are the topic of chapter 7.2
6.2 Categories of adaptation measures
6.2.1 Reactive vs. anticipatory adaptation
In the terminology of Fankhauser et al. (1999), adaptation is reactive, if human beings, other creatures
and institutions adjust themselves to climate change after it has occured. It is anticipatory, if actions are
taken beforehand in order to better cope with the expected impacts of future climate change. Mendelsohn
(2000) alternatively terms the former ex-post and the latter ex-ante adaptation. Fankhauser et al. emphasize
that the distinction between reactive and anticipatory climate change is less clear-cut in practice, because
1Smit et al. (2000), p. 225. More definitions of adaptation are given in Smit and Wandel (2006), p. 282.
2An more detailed description of the likely consequences of climate change and possible damages to human beings and
ecosystems in all their facets exceeds the scope of this work; it is provided in IPCC (2007a).
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anticipatory adaptation planning may be informed by and adjusted to current, observable events. World
Bank (2010a) labels anticipatory adaptation as “proactive adaptation”.3
Anticipatory adaptation planning is handicapped by the uncertainty of future climate change. Furthermore,
some anticipatory adaptation measures cannot be implemented quickly, but require careful preparation and
have long lead times. In contrast, reactive adaptation has the advantage that affected subjects can first
observe the challenge and then adjust accordingly. However, because reactive adaptation measures are not
always able to provide a satisfactory level of protection (e.g. resettlement from an area that has been destroyed
by a flood), adaptation projects with a very long lead time are in some cases necessary.4
6.2.2 Autonomous vs. interdependent adaptation
Autonomous adaptation is accomplished by affected subjects, including human beings and other creatures,
individually and does not require any intervention or additional incentivisation to make it happen; enjoyed
by the actor exclusively, expected benefits are large enough to stimulate efficient adaptation. Interdependent
adaptation possibly needs to be coordinated though if the beneficiary does not match the actor, or if more
than one actor has to take efforts to generate an effective adaptation response. In those scenarios, there is
the potential for external effects, which may prevent adaptation from reaching its optimal level.
This categorization is motivated by the suggestion of Mendelsohn (2000) to differentiate between private
adaptation, where an actor takes a particular measure because it lies in his or her self-interest, and joint
adaptation with many beneficiaries, which may give rise to external effects and lead to underprovision. He
supposes that joint adaptation can ultimatively only reach its optimal level through coordination efforts, for
instance facilitated by the government. In this context, Fankhauser et al. (1999) introduce as a contrast pair
“autonomous vs. planned adaptation”, with a similar idea. They emphasize though that it may also depend
on the viewpoint in which category an adaptation measure falls: The government may regard the switch
to a new crop type as a measure with sufficient benefits to be carried out autonomously by the agriculture
sector, so that no public intervention is required, but farmers in a particular region still might find it useful
to jointly establish the supply chain of the new crop type, optimize land use and form buying syndicates to
maximize their common yields. I avoid the term “planned adaptation” here to obviate any confusion with
“anticipatory adaptation” and rather speak of “interdependent adaptation”; according to Fankhauser et al.’s
definition planned adaptation is not characterized by the time dimension, but the requirement of conscious
intervention.5
Table 6.1 provides some examples to illustrate the categorizations introduced so far. Activating air-conditioning
to lower or raise indoor temperature can clearly be done by a single individual; migration from a region that
has been hit by a disaster may take place largely autonomously. Disaster management requires the coordina-
tion of several public actors though, and drought compensation payments to help farmers over crop failures
need to be collected from the taxpayer or insurer. In anticipation of a changing climate, farmers may cul-
tivate a different crop type, and citizens have themselves vaccinated against new diseases that are likely to
spread. Finally, coastal management involves public authorities across the regions to prevent consequences
from floods and sea-level rise, and early-warning systems are installed so that affected parties are informed
can prepare against predicted extreme weather events.
3Cp. Fankhauser et al. (1999), p. 69, Mendelsohn (2000), p. 586 and World Bank (2010a) p. 6.
4Currently, plans are made to manage flood risk within the Thames estuary, United Kingdom, for the next 100 years. It took
30 years from the North Sea flood of 1953 to complete the Thames Barrier, the centre element of current flood risk management
system, s. Reeder et al. (2009), pp. 54ff.
5Cp. Fankhauser et al. (1999), pp. 69f. and Mendelsohn (2000), pp. 585ff.
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Autonomous Interdependent
Reactive
Air-conditioning
Migration
Disaster management
Drought compensation payments to farmers
Anticipatory
Sowing seeds of different crop type
Requesting vaccination against likely new disease
Coastal management
Installation of early-warning systems
Table 6.1: Categorization of adaptation measures
6.2.3 Substitutable vs. complementary adaptation
Fankhauser et al. (1999) introduce a further nomenclature to describe the interaction between different
adaptation measures. Adaptation measures are complementary to each other, if they increase each oth-
ers’ marginal benefits6, and they are substitutes, if one measure makes another measure redundant or less
worthy. If a government, in anticipation of the climate-change-induced propagation of a new vector-borne
disease in its territory, starts an educational campaign promoting preventive and curative countermeasures,
the government aims at improving the effectiveness of autonomous, reactive adaptation to this threat. In
contrast, evacuation and migration away from coastlines provide an (imperfect) substitute for successful
coastal protection measures that prevent land and property losses.7
6.2.4 Soft vs. hard adaptation
In World Bank (2010b), it is differentiated between soft and hard adaptation measures. In this context,
hard adaptation measures are usually capital-intense, and costs and benefits are comparatively easy to fore-
cast. Typical examples are coastal protection measures, the reinforcement of infrastructure against extreme
weather events and the improvement of water irrigation measures. Soft adaptation measures on the contrary
involve behavioural and institutional changes and regulatory policies; their costs and effects are more difficult
to measure and to predict. According to this classification system, for instance the introduction of water
markets to establish private property rights, land use planning and education programmes are soft adaptation
measures.8
6.3 Sector-specific characteristics of adaptation
6.3.1 Agriculture
Agricultural yields are strongly influenced by weather conditions. Apart from raising mean temperatures,
climate change is expected to increase the interannual climate variability and precipitation patterns and
thereby the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as heat waves, droughts, heavy rainfall
and possibly storms. As a consequence, traditional efforts to prepare against weather variations may have to
be scaled up, or may be inappropriate to the new conditions. Furthermore, some crop types can prosper only
within a narrow climate envelope. Adaptation strategies to prepare the agricultural sector against changing
weather patterns include
6They may even enable each other, for instance if early-warning systems provide the information necessary for an adequate
response.
7Cp. Fankhauser et al. (1999), p. 70.
8Cp. World Bank (2010b), pp. 8ff.
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– Developing and cultivating new crop types that are more resilient to expected regional climate changes.
– Avoiding monoculture to increase plant resilience.
– Adjusting crop disease treatment and fertilization.
– Improving water management: Raising efficiency of irrigation systems and conserving soil moisture; see
also section 6.3.4.
– Preventing soil erosion in consequence of heavy rainfalls.
– Enhancing availability of information on more efficient agricultural practices and climate risks.
– Stopping subsidization that cements status-quo practices and creates perverse incentives preventing
adjustment to new climatic conditions.
Adaptation of livestock management includes measures such as ensuring availability of fodder and alleviating
heat-stress.9
6.3.2 Forestry
Spittlehouse and Stewart (2003) note that forests are curently managed under the assumption of a
relatively stable climate throughout a forest’s life, which can endure for centuries. However, climate change
is likely to adversely affect the tree growth rates, increase the fire risk, impact the yield and the quality of
wood and extend the range of diseases and harmful insects threatening forests. Adaptation measures include
– Determining the resilience of species to climate change and, based on this assessment, flexibly adjusting
seed zones to new climatic conditions.
– Altering forest composition and tree spacing and performing salvage logging to minimize the wildfire
and disease propagation risks.
– Facilitating the migration of tree species by providing favourable soil conditions in a new environment.
– Restraining undesirable plant species that gain competitiveness under new climatic conditions.10
Protecting forests has the additional benefit of maintaining their capacity as terrestial carbon sink and as
such constitutes a mitigation measure.
6.3.3 Fisheries
Hydrological regimes already suffer from human-induced stressors such as overfishing, pollution, water diver-
sion and invasive species, and global warming adds a further burden. Globally increasing temperatures on
average reduce the range of cooler microhabitats in proximity, especially in shallow waters, and changes in
precipitation patterns will alter streams and thereby habitats, while some habitats such as lakes are likely
to dry up entirely. Freshwater fishes cannot regulate their body temperature physiologically, instead it is
determined by the environment in which they stay. Since all biochemical reactions that determine fishes’
9Cp. Howden et al. (2007), p. 19693, Smith and Lenhart (1996), p. 199 and Wheeler and Tiffin (2009), p. 32.
10Cp. Spittlehouse and Stewart (2003), pp. 2ff.
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physiology, metabolism and reproduction are directly dependent on the body temperature, global warming
may lead to both increments and decrements of certain fish populations. Moreover, with rising water tem-
perature the oxygen demand of most cold-blooded aquatic organisms goes up, but the oxygen solutability
detoriates, limiting its supply. Higher temperatures raise the toxicity of many common pollutants such as
organophosphates and heavy metals and exacerbate the effects of eutrophication. Given the complexity and
numerous interdependencies of marine ecosystems, adaptation to climate change is difficult:
– Where possible, fish adapt autonomously and migrate to other, less affected zones. Fish that are trapped
by man-made barriers or in lakes can be relocated by human intervention with unclear prospects of
success.
– Avoiding catch quota allocations that are based exclusively on historical data and fail to incorporate
the impacts of climate change on fish populations.
– Implementing sustainable fishery management ro reduce general stress.
– Extending aquaculture that reduces uncertainty with respect to yields is contentious due to a mixed
eco-balance.11
6.3.4 Water management
Global warming is expected to trigger more (extreme) droughts in certain regions, glaciers to melt, precipi-
tation patterns to shift, so that the quantity, the spatial and the temporal distribution of water supply and
traditional means of water provision change. Since water is needed for a wide range of human activities, also
the consequences of this process are manifold. Challenges include the provison of drinking water, cooling
water for industry and water for irrigation12, the satisfaction of sanitation needs, waste water disposal, tempo-
rary inundation, maintaining recreational areas and waterways and generation of energy from hydropower.13
Adaptation measures that alleviate the stress on water supplies include
– Improving water reservoir storage and efficiency of groundwater pumping.
– Facilitating and forcing water reuse.
– Rainwater harvesting.
– Desalination of sea water.14
Demand-targeted adaptation measures comprise
– Enhancing efficiency of irrigation systems and reducing leakage rates in urban systems.
– Encouraging water-saving.
– Introducing local water markets to incentivize a more careful water service management.15
11Cp. Ficke et al. (2007), pp. 583ff. and Brander (2007), pp. 19710ff.
12In fact, approximately 70% of global water demand stems from agriculture, s. Pedrero et al. (2010), p. 1233.
13Cp. Arnell (2009), p. 41.
14Desalination is a very expensive means of fresh water generation, so that it is only attractive in highly populated coastal
regions, in which no sufficient alternatives for water provision from ground and surface water resources exist, s. Kirshen (2007),
p. 8.
15Cp. Kirshen (2007), p. 1.
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– Improvement of general resource management and governance.
– Cross-border water trade.
There may not always be a straightforward and inexpensive substitute for traditional means of water catch-
ment available, for instance in regions where the main water resource is declining due to climate change and
in which population growth or urbanization increase water demand.16
6.3.5 Human health
Climate change also poses a number of potential threats to human health. Climate change is expected to
increase the number of extreme weather events such as heat and cold waves.17 Extreme events such as
floods and storms do not only directly endanger human lives, but also compromise general living conditions
in the aftermath of such events, for instance by detoriating the water quality (due to contamination) and
means of sanitation, so that diseases induced by poor hygiene such as cholera, typhoid fever and diarrhea can
spread. Global warming also creates advantageous living conditions for transmitters of vector-borne diseases
such as dengue and malaria in previously unaffected regions, thereby promoting the spread of these diseases.
Food scarcity triggered by developments summarized in sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.3 results in malnutrion and,
ultimately, death.18
As Ebi et al. (2006) point out, many adaptation measures against the impacts from climate change do not
primarily target the health sector, but rather support agriculture, water management and other sectors that
provide significant services to human health.19 Adaptation measures that are carried out in the health sector
specifically comprise
– Extending the health service, i.e. enhancing staff education, availability of drugs and number of prac-
tices.
– Introducing and monitoring of (new) environmental and health regulatory standards.
– Disease prevention measures, e.g. breastfeeding promotion, immunization programmes and information
campaigns on new diseases.
– Occupational health and safety measures to maintain productivity of workers affected by climate change.
– Installation of vector surveillance systems.
– Provision of bednets and indoor insecticides to inhibit vector-borne diseases.20
16The riparian states of the Andes expect to face serious water shortages already in ten till twenty years, because the glaciers
supplying them with large amount of freshwater are melting. Adaptation will require to divert water streams from a wider area,
which is costly and will derogate the ecosystems the water is taken from, cp. Vergara et al. (2007), pp. 261ff.
17“Preliminary estimates [of the consequences of the 2010 heat wave] for Russia referred a death toll of 55,000, an annual crop
failure of ~25%, more than 1 million ha of burned areas, and ~US$15 billion (~1% gross domestic product) of total economic
loss”, Barriopedro et al. (2011), p. 220.
18Cp. Confalonieri et al. (2007), pp. 396ff.
19Cp. Ebi et al. (2006), p. 1933.
20Cp. Kovats (2009), pp. 53f. and Ebi (2008), p. 5.
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6.3.6 Coastal protection
Melting glaciers and ice sheets as well as the thermal expansion of seawater, triggered by global warming,
lead to sea-level rise.21 As a consequence, both dry and wetland of densely populated coastal areas goes per-
manently lost. Furthermore, sea-level rise increases the number of coastal storm surges and river inundations,
entailing saltwater intrusion and erosion.22 Adaptation strategies involve
– Hard protection in form of dykes to prevent floods, whereby strengthening dykes usually comes at cost
of reducing wetland. Wetland restoration itself is a flood prevention measure, as well as maintaining
natural flood protection in form of e.g. mangrove forests.
– Nourishing sediments and beaches against erosion.
– Reducing the vulnerability of accommodation by e.g. raising homes on pilings, making insurance avail-
able and installing hazard warning systems.
– Control and redirection of urban growth in coastal areas and planned retreat with migration away from
areas at flood risk.
– Installing saltwater entry barriers and changing water abstraction to combat saltwater intrusion.23
6.3.7 Infrastructure
Infrastructure facilitates economic activity and provides the necessary logistics for the exchange of goods and
provision of services (water, sewerage, electricity). It is constituted by roads and bridges, railways, airports,
ports, electricity grids, telecommunications and water management systems. The term “social infrastructure”
subsumes services such as public transport, health care, education and emergency services. An “institutional
infrastructure” is needed to build up and maintain the other types of infrastructure. The boundaries of
these definitions are not clear and may vary from case to case, or from study to study. For instance,
Satterthwaite and Dodman (2009) raise the issues whether or not private or community-managed wells
that serve as a substitute for unavailable piped supplies or road maintenance service should be labelled as
parts of infrastructure, too. Furthermore, also housing, which is managed mostly privately, may be included
in a broad definition of infrastructure.
Adapting the infrastructure to climate change means especially improving its resilience against extreme
weather events such as storms, floods and droughts.24
6.3.8 Natural ecosystems
Natural ecosystems25 provide numerous services to the human being. They create the climate that makes
human life possible in most parts of the world and provide fresh air, food and other natural resources. Their
sinks can take up a considerable amount of waste products caused by human activity, including GHGs, and
natural ecosystems protect against extreme weather events such as floods. Their proper functioning is vital
21See e.g. Rahmstorf (2007), pp. 368f. and Meehl et al. (2005), p. 1769.
22Cp. Nicholls and Tol (2006), pp. 1074f.
23Cp. Nicholls (2009), pp. 65ff., Nicholls et al. (2007), p. 342 and Smith and Lenhart (1996), p. 197.
24Cp. Satterthwaite and Dodman (2009), pp. 75f.
25In contrast to well-controlled, managed ecosystems such as national parks.
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for the conservation of biodiversity, and they entail an amenity value for many people that appreciate their
beauty and use them for recreational purposes.26
Mean temperature rise and increased climate variability force ecosystems to adjust themselves to new climatic
conditions, increasing the population of those species whose survival chances rise under the new climatic
regimes. If those species that cannot cope well with with them cannot find or migrate to any new refuge,
they must become extinct. Also the lives of those species that do naturally migrate are impacted by climate
change, for instance when the species, in consequence of global warming, alter their migration time schedule,
but the life cycle of their preferred prey animal remains unchanged, or vice versa. Extreme weather events
also threaten ecosystems in many ways, for instance while droughts are likely to occur more often, they are
also likely to be accompanied by a higher number of wildfires. Ecosystems have continuously been adjusting
to changing climates, but the rapidness of anthropogenic climate change poses an unprecedented challenge to
them. It adds to other human-induced stress such as land-use change that already leads to habitat reduction
and defragmentation, over-fertilization and eutrophication.
Where autonomous adaptation of ecosystems and of the species they accommodate reaches its limits, the
following measures can be considered:
– Active natural resource management, reducing (stress from) other anthropogenic interventions, in order
to increase ecosystems’ resilience against climate change.
– Preserving or recreating habitats or creating new habitats, although the limited understanding of the
complexity of ecosystems constricts limits this option.
– Replacing eco-system services where feasible, e.g. by manual seed dispersal and use of artificial pesti-
cides.27
The degree of interaction with other adaptation measures impacting this sector varies. For instance, erecting
a dam as a coastal protection measure runs counter to biodiversity conservation efforts, while preserving
wetlands as flood areas benefits coastal ecosystems.28
6.3.9 Cross-sectoral adaptation
A number of adaptation measures can be applied in different sectors or aim at enhancing preparedness and
resilience across several sectors simultaneously.
– Information-sharing, for instance transferring existing know-how on agriculture in dry regions to regions
that are likely to become more arid in the future.
– Providing private disaster insurance and creating/strengthening public disaster (compensation) funds.
– Conducting education campaigns, for instance teaching of water-saving methods or promotion of vac-
cinations.
– Installing early-warning systems to predict extreme weather events.29
26For an introduction to the concept of Ecosystem Services, e.g. see Wallace (2007).
27Cp. Fischlin et al. (2007), pp. 215ff.
28S. Paterson et al. (2008), pp. 1352ff. and Berry (2009), p. 92. For a brief discussion of impacts on two particular ecosystems,
forests and marine ecosystems, see sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.
29Cp. Smith and Lenhart (1996), pp. 195f. For a brief discussion of private and public insurance mechanisms, see Lecocq
and Shalizi (2007), pp. 29f.
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– Cross-sectoral land-use planning e.g. to optimize mangrove forest stand over needs for flood protection
and spatial requirements for aquaculture.30
30S. Eric L. Gilman (2008), p. 243.
130
Chapter 7
Estimates of Adaptation Costs
7.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews studies that estimate global costs of adaptation and discusses the methodology of these
studies.
In theory, the costs of mitigation, adaptation and residual damage should be minimized jointly due to their
interaction. Adaptation aims at (partially) avoiding expected damages from climate change, whose size is
largely determined by mitigation. Adaptation often cannot protect against all consequences from climate
change though, and such damages that are not absorbed by adaptation, either because adaptation against
some events is unfeasible or too expensive, are termed “residual damages”1.
As long as marginal cost-benefit analysis applies2, in the optimum the marginal costs of action should equal
the marginal costs of inaction. Once adaptation is added as a second option apart from mitigation to combat
climate change, this implies that in the optimum the marginal mitigation costs, the marginal adaptation costs
and the marginal residual costs should be equal. Fankhauser (2009) points out that mitigation reduces the
need for adaptation costs over many decades, given the nature of GHGs, which are stock pollutants.3 Put
in a nutshell, any adaptation cost studies need to take mitigation (scenarios) into account, since mitigation
determines the need for adaptation, albeit the exact link is fraught with uncertainty.4
The overlap between development and adaptation measures poses a significant problem for estimating adap-
tation costs in developing countries. Many adaptation measures potentially foster both development and
increase resilience against climate change. McGray et al. (2007) frame this issue by distinguishing a contin-
uum of adaptation measures. Some measures are clearly aimed at alleviating the impact of climate change
exclusively, such as relocation measures in anticipation of significant sea level rise. At the other extreme,
adaptation aims to reduce vulnerability to climate change, e.g. by fighting poverty, improving education and
enhancing the efficiency of decision-making structures, measures that also align with classic development
policy. It is commonly held that development strengthens the resilience to climate change. The less adapta-
tion measures target specific problems and rather focus on improving general resilience, the harder it is to
1Examples are productivity losses in agriculture despite some adaptation to climate change or species lost despite actions to
preserve biodiversity. For more examples of residual costs after adaptation, s. Arnell (2009), p. 43.
2Which may be misleading when e.g. marginal inaction leads to nonmarginal, catastrophic damages.
3S. Fankhauser (2009), p. 20.
4See section 8.2 for a further discussion on the relationship between mitigation and adaptation.
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disentangle adaptation costs from expenses for development.5
With these caveats in mind, in the following I review a number of studies that report global estimates of
adaptation costs. The first studies, with their results presented in section 7.2, derive them through pure
top-down approaches without differentiating between impact sectors. The UNFCCC (2007) study presents
the first attempt that combines sectoral estimates to provide estimates of global adaptation costs. Its results
and in particular its methodology are discussed in detail in section 7.3. A more recent study of the World
Bank (2010b) also surveys global adaptation costs sector-wise, and it tries to verify them by adding bottom-
up country case studies to verify its global adaptation cost estimates. The study is discussed in section 7.4.
As a plausibility check, in section 7.5 estimates of adaptation costs are compared with predicted mitigation
costs. I provide an overall appraisal of these studies in section 7.6.
7.2 Top-down estimates of adaptation costs
Despite the complexity of the challenge, recently a few studies have been published that provide estimates
for aggregated adaptation costs in the developing world, which are not broken down into contributing sectors
or regions.
At first glance, the wide range of estimates, which are reported in Table 7.1, raises questions about their
trustworthiness. The estimated annual costs of adaptation in developing countries range from four to 109
billion USD, even though the methodologies used in the compilation of these studies do not differ that much
from and indeed seek to build on each other.
Table 7.1: Estimates for annual aggregated adaptation cost arising in the developing world, adopted from
Agrawala et al. (2008), p. 69.
5Cp. McGray et al. (2007), pp. 27ff. This classification does not only impact the estimation of adaptation costs, but also
bears consequences for funding negotiations. According to the UNFCCC, in contrast to paying development assistance, providing
adaptation funding to compensate for climate damages, which are largely caused by the industrialized countries, is an obligation
(See Motivation at the beginning of this thesis). Therefore, claiming adaptation funding from the developed countries may be
acknowledged as more legitimate than claims for development aid. Moreover, given the conceptual overlappings, developing
countries fear that already approved development assistance is relabelled as adaptation funding, hence that the latter is not
additional, cp. Ribot (2010), p. 32.
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The studies listed in Table 7.1 adopt an almost purely top-down approach. The authors of World Bank
(2006) compile figures for current annual overseas development assistance flows, foreign direct investments
and gross domestic investments. A share of these financial flows is then assessed to be “climate-sensitive”
and the need to protect these investments against adverse influences from climate change is assumed to add
10 to 20% to the required sums. However, the authors admit that these ratios are “purely an estimate”. The
figures and calculation are given in Table 7.2. The authors call them “ball-park figures”.6
Table 7.2: Top-down estimates for annual aggregated adaptation cost arising in the developing world from
World Bank (2006), p. 144.
The Stern (2007) Review states that these figures were produced using “very rough estimates” for reported
multipliers and points to the general problems of adaptation cost estimation, but nevertheless presents only
a slightly different set of figures that have been “updated through discussions with the World Bank”. The
differences between the estimates of the World Bank study and the Stern Review stem from different ratios for
a few climate-sensitive investments and adaptation cost ranges. For instance, the lower end of the adaptation
cost range generally starts at 5 instead of 10%, but still finishes at 20%.7
The authors of Oxfam (2007) acknowledge that “the method used [by the World Bank] provides a very useful
starting point for understanding the scale of costs”8, but complain that the World Bank study neglects new
investment flows that add to current ones, with some entirely new investment projects becoming necessary
as a result of climate change. Furthermore, they criticize that the World Bank focuses on the adaptation
costs of macro-actors only, but neglects adaptation costs that have to be borne by community-level actors
such as households, local administrations and non-governmental organisations on location. Therefore the
Oxfam (2007) authors extrapolate costs from a small set of community-level adaptation projects that have
been initiated by non-governmental organisations as well as from figures of immediate adaptation costs that
were identified by thirteen developing countries that had submitted National Adaptation Plans of Action
(NAPAs). Finally, they further add so far unidentified costs, such as costs of ecosystem protection, costs
of building organisational capacity and costs of preventing additional stress imposed on women carrying
out unpaid caring work. As a result, they appraise the annual adaptation costs for developing countries at
more than 50 billion USD9, though in the report the contributions of the so far unidentified costs are not
6Cp. World Bank (2006), pp. 33 and 144.
7Cp. Stern (2007), p. 442.
8Oxfam (2007), p. 18.
9Cp. Oxfam (2007), pp. 17ff.
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broken down explicitly. In their critical review, Agrawala et al. (2008) point to the problems of scaling up
from a small sample of case studies and note that the Oxfam study probably double-counts some costs, for
instance when a community-level project managed by a non-governmental organisation has been funded by
macro-actors, e.g. from overseas development assistance.10
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) offers further figures in its Human Development
Report 2007/2008. It adopts the same methodology as the other studies to estimate the annual costs of
“climate-proofing” investment and overseas development aid flows in 2015, and applies most of the ratios
set in the Stern Review. Because it includes a wider range of current annual investment flows (3 billion
USD investments in developing countries in the UNDP (2007) report versus 1.7 billion USD in the World
Bank (2006) study), the upper range of estimates for “climate-proofing” these money flows is higher than
those given in the previous studies. On top of these costs, the UNDP suggests that at least 40 billion USD
annually should be added to poverty reduction programmes to cope with climate change in 2015 and two
billion USD for upgrading disaster response systems in expectation of a higher number of climate-change-
induced emergencies. Altogether, this explains why the UNDP’s adaptation cost estimates are the highest,
as apparent from Table 7.1.11
7.3 The UNFCCC (2007) study
7.3.1 Overview
The UNFCCC (2007) report moves away from a pure top-down approach. It attempts to bundle sectoral
impact studies in order to provide global estimates of adaptation costs in developing and developed countries
in the year 2030. The report groups impacts into the six sectors discussed in section 6.3, namely agriculture,
forestry and fishery; water supply; human health; coastal zones; infrastructure; and ecosystems. Different
IPCC mitigation scenarios were considered, acknowledging an interaction between mitigation and adapta-
tion.12 The report addresses the general question of choosing the right benchmark - which standard of living
should be maintained by adaptation? The vulnerability to climate change of developing countries is critically
exacerbated by underdevelopment, which in fact already at present causes an adaptation deficit. Is it ethi-
cally defensible to project adaptation against a welfare level that must be regarded as too low?13 Usually,
for a given vulnerability level tolerable adaptation costs will be higher, if a higher standard of living should
be protected or is assumed, as this raises the value at stake.
Fankhauser (2009) compiles an overview of the UNFCCC’s estimates, which are reported in Table 7.3. The
UNFCCC’s range of estimates for adaptation costs in the developing world lies within the range of estimates
predicted by the studies discussed in the previous section. The UNFCCC study also provides a range of
estimates for adaptation costs in the developed world, whereby the higher end of the adaptation cost range
in developed countries is expected to be almost twice as high as the upper end of costs in the developing
world.
In the following, the different sector-specific adaptation cost estimation methods are briefly summarized and
some criticism reported.
10S. Agrawala et al. (2008), pp. 72f.
11Cp. UNDP (2007), pp. 192ff. This section has drawn on the selection of studies made by Fankhauser (2009), pp. 20ff. and
Agrawala et al. (2008), pp. 29ff.
12Cp. UNFCCC (2007), p. 23. See for more details on this interaction particularly section 8.2.
13This issue can be related to the problems of Negishi weighting (see section 1.5.4), with which method IAM modellers overall
preserve the status quo of the present world distribution of welfare.
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Table 7.3: Estimates of world annual adaptation cost per sector from UNFCCC (2007) - table from
Fankhauser (2009), p. 25.
7.3.2 Agriculture, forestry and fisheries
Projected population and economic growth is anticipated to stimulate demand for services from agriculture,
forestry and fisheries, leading to an extension of these sectors as well as intensification of associated research
activities. Climate change is expected to increase these expenses for extension and research by 10% in 2030
and, further to this, costs for new capital investments by 2% in 2030.14
Wheeler and Tiffin (2009) criticize the lack of a bottom-up verification of estimates and argue that this
top-down approach is unlikely to capture adequately the adaptation costs of the micro-actors and that it does
not take into account possible benefits of climate change for agriculture.15 They suggest the consideration of
bottom-up approaches to establish a link to the specific means of adaptation in this sector.16
7.3.3 Water supply
The UNFCCC report estimates adaptation costs in 2030 for fixing expected mis-matches between national
water demands, which are boosted by population and economic growth, and national water supplies, as
forecasted by six general circulation models. The cost structure of adaptation measures was assumed to be
uniform over all nations, with a differentiation between costs in developing countries and costs in developed
ones. Such demand that cannot be satisfied despite adaptation leads to residual damage costs in the study.
The costs of adapting water management to climate change given in Table 7.3 only add to costs for the
achievement of the Millenium Development Goal of reducing the number of people without access to safe
drinking water and basic sanitation in 2015 by 50%, for which alone cost estimates range from 9 to 100
billion USD per year. The authors of the study emphasize that costs for maintaining water quality and flood
control are not captured in their survey, as also costs for intra-country distribution systems that are needed
to balance national water supply and demand were not considered. The study focuses on capital investments
only and neglects operation and maintenance costs.17
14S. UNFCCC (2007), pp. 101f.
15In Northern latitudes a moderate warming is likely to potentially raise agricultural yields, but harvesting these also requires
adaptation measures such as switching to cultivation of plants that can flourish better in a warmer climate.
16Cp. Wheeler and Tiffin (2009), pp. 33ff.
17Cp. UNFCCC (2007), pp. 105ff and Kirshen (2007), pp. 2ff.
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Arnell (2009) calls the UNFCCC’s estimation methodology “broadly robust”, but suspects that adaptation
costs in the water sector are currently underestimated in the study due to its limited scope.18
7.3.4 Human Health
The UNFCCC study draws on estimates of additional, climate-change-induced cases of diarrhoeal disease,
malnutrition and malaria and multiplies them with current average treatment costs per child.19
It must be emphasized that these three harmful impacts on human health considered in the UNFCCC study
represent only a subset of the much larger set of impacts, outlined in section 6.3.5. Furthermore, Kovats
(2009) argues that, by operating with treatment costs that are based on existing cure programmes, the
study neglects the infrastructure and personnel costs of extending them to new areas. Furthermore, the
average treatment costs may not remain constant until 2030, because of technical progress or failures e.g.
due to mosquitos developing drug and insecticide resistance. Moreover, cost variations between countries are
disregarded. While Kovats acknowledges that the UNFCCC estimates build on best available information
for developing countries, she suspects an underestimation of total costs “because of all the activities, diseases
and countries that are not included”.20 Also, Agrawala et al. (2011) find that regarding health it is not
clear whether treatment costs that arise in consequence of climate change should be accounted as climate
impact or adaptation costs.21
7.3.5 Coastal zones
The UNFCCC study uses the dynamic interactive vulnerability analysis (DIVA) tool, which processes data
of more than 12.000 coastal segments to evaluate the costs of coastal protection particularly against sea-level
rise. If the costs of protecting a segment by dyke construction or beach nourishment does not exceed the
benefits generated from that segment in terms of economic output, adaptation is suggested and adds to costs.
The study adopts a long-term focus and assumes that a coastal infrastructure is prepared that is ready for
the challenges posed by climate change in 2080, which requires adaptation as soon as 2030.22
Nicholls (2009) notes that DIVA does not take into account present coastal protection deficits especially in
developing countries and rather assumes favourable conditions for an upgrade. Overcoming this adaptation
deficit is expected to substantially increase costs. Residual costs in terms of coastal area degraded as a result
of coastal protection measures are not accounted. The UNFCCC study does not resolve the general lack of
studies investigating coastal protection against possibly heavier and more frequent storms. On the plus side,
long-lasting experience with coastal engineering has led to rather solid coastal protection cost data that were
fed into DIVA.23 Fankhauser ranks this sector as the impact sector in which adaptation costs and benefits
are currently understood best.24
18S. Arnell (2009), p. 49.
19Cp. UNFCCC (2007), pp. 108ff. Children are most heavily affected by these diseases, s. Ebi (2008), p. 1.
20Cp. Kovats (2009), pp. 53ff.
21Cp. Agrawala et al. (2011), p. 261.
22Cp. UNFCCC (2007), pp. 116ff.
23Cp. Nicholls (2009), pp. 64ff.
24Cp. Fankhauser (2009), p. 22.
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7.3.6 Infrastructure
The UNFCCC report investigates adaptation of infrastructure at risk due to climate change-induced extreme
weather events. The estimation approach comes close to that of the studies reviewed in section 7.2. First,
damages to infrastructure in the past that were caused by extreme weather events are derived from insurance
data to estimate the ratio of infrastructure assets potentially affected by climate change.25 Second, this ratio
is then applied to projected 2030 infrastructure investment flows to identify those flows that are vulnerable to
climate change. Finally, the Stern Review’s (2006) 5-20% adaptation mark-up ratio to “climate-proof” these
investments is adopted.26 The estimates close to the upper range in Table 7.3 signal that costs for adapting
the infrastructure to climate change could well constitute by far the largest share of overall adaptation costs.
Unfortunately, estimation methods in this sector are also considered to be the least precise among the sectors
examined in the UNFCCC study. Satterthwaite and Dodman (2009) highlight as the most crucial
deficiency that the UNFCCC first mentions, but then during the estimation disregards the vast infrastructure
(investment) deficit in large parts of the developing world. As an illustration, although most climate change
impacts are expected to hit the developing world, the cost estimates for adapting whole Africa’s adaptation
infrastructure in 2030 vary from 22 to 371 million USD, while in North America the range is predicted 3.7 - 63.7
billion USD.27 In the simple, but sharp words of Satterthwaite and Dodman: “It is not possible to estimate
the cost of adapting infrastructure by adding a percentage to existing investments if there are no existing
investments”28. Additionally, Satterthwaite and Dodman note that adaptation of houses against extreme
weather events is not considered anywhere in the UNFCCC report. They complain that the installation
of early-disaster-warning systems as an effective means of adaptation was not taken into account either.
Satterthwaite and Dodman encourage a paradigm shift away from using the top-down approach towards a
case-study based bottom-up approach.29
7.3.7 Natural ecosystems
Although “it is possible that the additional costs for addressing adaptation to climate change [of natural
ecosystems] would be quite substantial”, the UNFCCC refrains from making an educated guess, as it regards
the evidence base as too limited. The report discusses one approach to calculate the costs of extending and
creating protected areas, but discards it, because this approach singles out one particular type of measure,
and it is unclear how to separate climate-change-induced need for additional protection areas from need
created by other stressors.30
Berry (2009) acknowledges the lack of case studies to extrapolate from, but criticizes the report for only
considering adaptation of ecosystems in protected areas, but not in non-protected areas.31
25Data from Munich Re or the Association of British Insurance indicate that 0.7 or 2.9% of infrastructure investments will
be vulnerable to climate change, much lower values than those suggest by the studies in section 7.2. Both the authors of the
UNFCCC study and Satterthwaite and Dodman (2009) critically note that the damage ratios obtained from insurance data
are likely to be too low, because they only recorded very extreme weather events, s. UNFCCC (2007), p. 121 and Satterthwaite
and Dodman (2009), p. 80.
26Cp. UNFCCC (2007), pp. 121f. The report states that this ratio stems from the World Bank, but we know from Table 7.2
that World Bank (2006) continuously operated with 10-20% as adaptation mark-up ratio.
27Cp. UNFCCC (2007), p. 123.
28Satterthwaite and Dodman (2009), p. 80.
29Cp. Satterthwaite and Dodman (2009), pp. 74ff.
30Cp. UNFCCC (2007), pp. 113f.
31Cp. Berry (2009), pp. 95 and 98.
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7.4 World Bank (2010b)
The World Bank (2010b) study takes a two-track approach that aims at combining top-down adaptation
cost analysis with bottom-up case studies from Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Samoa
and Vietnam. The study scrutinizes the effects of climate change on economies in 2050 and the costs for
adaptation measures that completely offset its adverse impacts. Where such a complete clean-up is not pos-
sible, adaptation is assumed being carried out until its marginal costs exceed its marginal benefits, putting
up with residual damages. According to the authors, due to this ambitious focal point the figures reported
in the survey are likely to represent the upper end of adaptation costs. For the global estimation strand of
the study, impacts on agriculture, forestry, fisheries, infrastructure, water resources, health and ecosystem
services, coastal zones and impacts from extreme weather events were considered.32 For the country-level
studies, economic computable general equilibrium (CGE) models were used to capture cross-sectoral effects
of adaptation; furthermore, evidence from local communities on how the social context determines the pref-
erences over adaptation measures was collected and taken into account in the evaluation of most favourable
adaptation options. The authors state that in the study’s cost minimizations, hard adaptation measures
were in general favoured over soft ones, because the costs of the latter were more difficult to estimate. This
procedure may potentially lead to an upward bias of cost estimates.
While the study assumes that decision makers have complete information about future climate and economic
variables, the problem of uncertainty on four levels is stressed:
– Future climate change
– The rate of economic growth
– The optimal timing of adaptation investments
– Future technical progress
To proceed with the first one, a wettest and a driest climate scenario under a climatic regime with a 2°C
temperature rise were assumed to capture the range of extremes. A single forecast for GDP is formed from
an average of GDP projections of the IAMs FUND, PAGE and RICE33, and optimal investment timing is
neglected. All cost estimates are based on the current state of technical knowledge, probably leading to an
exaggeration of costs.
The estimate of global annual adaptation costs from 2010 to 2050 amounts to 70 to 98 billion USD, which
is narrower, but within the range estimated by the UNFCCC. In the extreme-wetness scenario more costs
accrue than in the extreme-drought one, especially due to a larger need for infrastructure protection and
flood management. The study concludes that adaptation costs in East Asia and Pacific will be ten times
larger than in the Middle East and North Africa, with only 3% of total costs falling onto the latter region.
This discrepance may partially relate to the fact that adaptation in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, health and
against extreme weather events account for only about 20% of adaptation costs, whereas infrastructure, the
protection of coastal zones and water management, prevalent issues in East Asia and Pacific, cause the bulk
of costs. As the authors note, the richer a country, the easier it can adapt itself, but also the larger the assets
32The sectoral estimation methods used in this study are not explained inWorld Bank (2010b), but inWorld Bank (2010c).
Some methods deviate from those applied in the UNFCCC (2007) study, but because the challenges the studies face are similar,
this study’s sector-specific estimation methods are not discussed in more detail here.
33These IAMs were discussed in section 1.4.
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at risk that require protection. The fact that their estimate for coastal protection costs is sixfold higher than
in the UNFCCC (2007) study the authors ascribe to better methods used in their study.
With respect to the country-studies strand, the particular adaptation needs in the countries under examina-
tion vary with their geographic locations. For example, Ethopia heavily relies on agriculture, while countries
such as Vietnam and Bangladesh are especially affected by extreme weather events such as storm surges, and
the island state Samoa is particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise and flooding. Methodological differences
of the study’s two approaches do mostly not allow linking results of the global and the country track of the
study to each other, although some country studies suggest that adaptation costs may exceed those estimated
by the top-down approach.
In their conclusions, the authors highlight the significance of sustainable development and poverty reduction
to enhance the resilience against climate change. Given the uncertainty over central economic and climate
variables, they recommend to delay adaptation measures as long as possible and to start with “low-regret”
actions, i.e. measures that are urgent and necessary already at present and in absence of (further) climate
change and that are beneficial under different climate scenarios.
The authors stress the weaknesses of their survey, pointing out that the mathematical models used do not
optimize over the complete sets of considerable adaptation measures, but compute the benefits of a few
pre-selected ones. Due to the large uncertainty affecting almost all significant variables, the authors suggest,
at least in the short term, to rely on “robust rules of thumb”34 to identify the adaptation measures that
yield the largest benefits for a range of scenarios rather than to focus on refining the models. They add
that the models also struggle with incorporating the costs and benefits of soft adaptation measures and with
complex issues such as migration, which however may not only be triggered by environmental challenges,
but also by poverty and political conflicts. Furthermore, the authors also point to the problem of neglecting
those services from ecosystems that are not valued on economic markets. They finally explain that it was
almost impossible to feed local preferences identified from the community surveys into optimizations, e.g. by
ranking some adaptation measures that were generally preferred by a community over others, largely because
of problems in scaling up these information and in disentangling development and adaptation measures that
were prioritized by local communities.
7.5 Plausibility check: comparison with costs of mitigation
It is informative to relate these adaptation cost figures to estimates of mitigation costs. To recap, the
UNFCCC (2007) predicts that the annual costs in 2030 to satisfy global adaptation needs lie within the
range of 49 - 171 billion USD.
For a mitigation cost figure, a starting point is the DICE-2007 model of Nordhaus (2008). Nordhaus
provides the present value of total mitigation costs until 2250 for a range of scenarios, but indirectly also
a sense of the size of annual mitigation costs in DICE-2007 can be derived. Nordhaus reports that in the
optimal abatement scenario, in which the atmospheric CO2 concentration is stabilized at 658.4 ppm in 2200,
during the decade 2021-2030 18.1 billions tons of carbon should be globally saved compared to the baseline
scenario with no emissions controls. Furthermore, the social cost of a ton of carbon to be charged e.g. in
form of a carbon tax should optimally amount to 53.39 2005 USD during that decade35, but this describes
34World Bank (2010b), p. 15.
35S. Nordhaus (2008), pp. 92 and 100
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the marginal emissions reduction costs; the average abatement costs will lie below 53.39 2005 USD. Hence,
the upper bound of abatement costs, if DICE’s optimal emissions target for 2030 is achieved, lies at 98 billion
2005 USD.
In the Stern (2007) Review, in order to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 550 ppm, which target is reached by
limiting global fossil fuel emissions to about 18 GtCO2 in 2050, in 2025 349 billion USD have to be spent on
mitigation efforts.36
The mitigation part of the UNFCCC (2007) study reviewed in this chapter predicts that in order to re-
strict global emissions to 29.11 GtCO2e (of which 26 Gt is CCO2) in 2030, which presents a reduction of
approximately 50% from the BAU scenario, investment flows in 2030 need to increase by 200 - 210 billion
USD.37
The optimal abatement costs in DICE are comparatively low, but it is recalled from section 1.5.4 that its
mitigation target is less ambitious in comparison, and it is not clear how well the UNFCCC adaptation
costs apply to DICE’s optimal emissions scenario. The latter two figures exceed the UNFCCC’s adaptation
cost estimate by far, and if in the UNFCCC study more ambitious mitigation was assumed such as in
Stern (2007), the predicted values for adaptation costs should be expected to come down even further. If
both these ranges for mitigation and adaptation costs are taken for granted and the latter comparatively
small, this raises the question why one should bother with expensive mitigation at all. Put differently, if
explicitly a zero-abatement-scenario was assumed in the UNFCCC study, would this mean that adaptation
costs would skyrocket beyond 200-400 billion USD, so that costly “optimal” mitigation policies are financially
justifiable? Or does this cost comparison suggest that the adaptation costs are strongly underestimated by
the UNFCCC? None of the adaptation cost studies covered in this review thoroughly scrutinizes the linkage
between mitigation and adaptation costs.
7.6 Overall appraisal
Fankhauser (2009) and Agrawala et al. (2008) point out the deficiencies of the global, pure top-down
studies presented in section 7.2. First, they complain that these studies all adopt a very similar, deficient
methodology. They specify ratios for money flows that might be affected by climate change as well as for
average costs to protect these successfully against harmful impacts from climate change, but these ratios lack
almost any empirical base. The studies’ results are highly sensitive to (uncertain projections of) investment
flows, but nevertheless the common proceeding of the studies has led to a convergence around some possibly
spurious estimates that span very broad adaptation cost ranges. Furthermore, Fankhauser and Agrawala et
al. criticize these estimates for not being linked to any specific adaptation measures, and that they are likely
to fail to include all costs that incur in the different sectors and for different means of adaptation.38 After
these studies were conducted, but apparently before the UNFCCC (2007) report was published, the IPCC
stated: “Comprehensive multi-sectoral estimates of global costs and benefits of adaptation are currently
lacking”39.
Before the World Bank (2010b) study was published, Fankhauser concluded that the UNFCCC study
produces “perhaps the best global adaptation cost estimates available to date”, but that this report suffers
from a number of shortcomings beyond the ones already discussed:
36S. Stern (2007), pp. 232f.
37S. UNFCCC (2007), pp. 92 and 216.
38Cp. Fankhauser (2009), p. 24 and Agrawala et al. (2008), p. 75.
39Adger et al. (2007), p. 719.
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– The scope of the UNFCCC study is limited, as it reports figures on five of six selected impact sectors,
but does not evaluate adaptation costs for e.g, tourism and the energy sector. Also adaptation against
economic impacts resulting from climate-induced structural change was neglected.40
– In the sectors examined, often adaptation only against a subset of expected impacts was under con-
sideration, e.g. coastal protection against sea-level rise, but not storms, and in the health sector only
three diseases entered the analysis, while the effects of heat and cold waves were neglected at all.
– The study does not capture the full range of adapation measures also on another dimension, because
it focuses on such measures that have to be coordinated or financed by public actors. This means that
costs borne by private actors are omitted, and it also implies that maybe some possibly more cost-
effective adaptation strategies, for instance autonomous improvements in water scarcity management,
were left out in the analysis.
– Fankhauser urges a more careful evaluation of adaptation costs. Usually, following the generally ac-
knowledged principles of economic analysis, the present value of project implementation costs with
expenses for planning, construction and maintenance instead of multiples of initial capital expenditures
should provide the starting point for cost analysis.
– The costs of establishing powerful, efficient decision-making structures particularly in developing coun-
tries were not considered at all.
– The report lacks a scrutiny of learning-by-doing effects, which could lead to a reduction of adaptation
costs.
– The UNFCCC study does not aim at estimating second-order effects such as employment-stimulating
effects of adaptation or potential synergies or conflicts between adaptation measures in e.g. agriculture
and water management.
– The significance of uncertainty is underrepresented in the UNFCCC analyses; adapting to mean changes
is easier and less expensive than preparing against a wider range of possible impacts.
Fankhauser concludes that these shortcomings altogether lead to a significant underestimation of adaptation
costs.41 Parry et al. (2009) presume that adaptation costs are likely to be two- till three times larger than
estimated in the UNFCCC study, although it is not clear where this particular order of magnitude is derived
from.42
On a further note, it looks a bit surprising that the UNFCCC only refused to report the rough estimates of
adapting natural ecosystems to climate change. To the uncritical reader, this decision might suggest that
figures derived for the other sectors are significantly more robust. As Satterthwaite and Dodman (2009)
impressively elaborated for infrastructure, this may not necessarily be the case.
The number and seriousness of deficiencies of the UNFCCC study should not come as too big a surprise. One
purpose of describing specific means of adaptation in section 6.3 was to illustrate the variety of adaptation
options that are to be considered, which must pose a problem for identifying and estimating the costs of a
comprehensive adaptation strategy. Beyond that, the complaints made by IAM modellers are recalled that
40For instance, if the international community committed itself to a reduction of oil consumption, this would affect the business
of the OPEC states, whose economies at present largely rely on oil exports.
41Following in most parts Fankhauser (2009), pp. 25ff.
42S. Parry et al. (2009), p. 14.
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impact studies are far too scarce and lack robustness, too, so that the calibration of IAMs is difficult.43
Adaptation responds to projected impacts though, therefore adaptation cost estimations, which must build
on impact studies, lead one step further into the unknown.
The World Bank (2010b) study provides an update on cost figures and methods. It tries to avoid relying
exclusively on (sectoral) top-down analyses and supplements country-case studies that analyze local adapta-
tion needs for the purpose of verification of the study’s global estimates. Unfortunately, the authors come to
the conclusion that the country-case studies can contribute only to a limited extent to the validation of the
global estimates due to a lack of complementarity of the two strands. It is to be welcomed that the number
of uncertainties any adaptation cost study has to deal with were emphasized and the weaknesses of the study
clearly pointed out. To pick out a critical example, the fact that the study’s GDP forecast draws on an
average of GDP projections made by three IAMs, does in my view not necessarily make it more trustworthy
due to the IAMs’ deficits elaborated earlier. The UNFCCC study and, to a lesser extent, the World Bank
study seem to struggle with the adaptation deficit; first of all since most infrastructure capacity is located
in developed countries and adaptation of infrastructure in these studies is predicted to form a large share of
the total resources needed for adaptation, adaptation costs in developed countries are comparatively large.
This is a surprising finding, contrasting strongly with the common view that climate change is likely to hit
developing countries most and exposes the conceptual problems these studies face.
While some of the studies try to take into the account the fact that there should be some feedback from
mitigation levels to adaptation costs, the link between these two climate policy options does not yet seem to
have been explored very thoroughly. Apparently, no sensitivity analysis has been carried out to set e.g. the
UNFCCC’s adaptation cost estimates into context with different scales of mitigation effort, but obviously
only if adaptation costs and residual damages can be significantly reduced through mitigation or if mitigation
exhibits some other benefits such as reducing the risk of catastrophic climate damages, a case for mitigation
can be made. The current estimates for mitigation and adaptation costs rather appear to have been created
and evaluated separately from each other. Since in some studies mitigation appears as the far more expensive
option, with apparently cheap adaptation at hand, if we use these flawed estimates and take a simple cost-
beneft approach and ignore the risk of climate threshold effects, mitigation at the scale discussed ostensibly
lacks a financial justification. Alternatively, under a strict zero-abatement regime the costs of adaptation
may be far higher than estimated here, so in that case mitigation would actually pay off.
As Fankhauser notes, “interest in global adaptation cost estimates increased sharply a few years ago when
international support for adaptation in developing countries emerged as a key aspect in the negotiations for
a successor to the Kyoto Protocol”44. In other words, robust global estimates of adaptation costs are needed
by policy-makers to negotiate issues such as international adaptation funding. However, “the UNFCCC
report was based on a set of commissioned studies [...]. These took place over a short period dictated by the
timescale of the UNFCCC process and the need to report the results to the next Conference of Parties, so
there was no time for independent review of a draft of the report”45. One can only hope that the policy-
makers that demand these estimates are sufficiently aware of their shortcomings and use them with care. In
the Copenhagen Accord (2009), and reconfirmed later at COP16 and 17, it was agreed that “developed
countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs
of developing countries”46.
43As discussed in section 1.5.3.
44Cp. Fankhauser (2009), p. 23.
45Parry et al. (2009), p. 7.
46Copenhagen Accord (2009), p. 3.
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Adaptation in Integrated Assessment
Models and Conceptual Models
8.1 Introduction
The bulk of climate change adaptation modelling work has emerged only recently. Dickinson (2007) pro-
vides a comprehensive list of models from various academic disciplines that explicitly treat (sector-specific)
adaptation.1 In this review chapter, I focus on economic models of climate change that consider aggregated
adaptation; hence I do not include models that simulate adaptation in a particular sector.
Given that adaptation is usually added as a further policy option to models that previously considered
mitigation as the only strategy to combat climate change2, adaptation modelling raises the question of
how these control variables interact. Section 8.2 first sheds light on the reasons for the historical focus on
mitigation and relative neglect of adaptation in both politics and modelling, and then surveys the literature
that debates the fundamental interrelationship between mitigation and adaptation. Recently, Agrawala
et al. (2011) published a survey with brief summaries of existing adaptation models. This review aims to
go into more detail and discuss the specific model assumptions. In section 8.3, the adaptation modules and
results of four integrated assessment models are scrutinized, which include PAGE (Plambeck et al. (1997);
Hope (2006)), AD-DICE (de Bruin et al. (2009a)) and AD-RICE (de Bruin et al. (2009b)), the modified
version of FEEM-RICE (Bosello (2010)) and AD-WITCH (Bosello et al. (2010a,b)). Afterwards, in
section 8.4 three conceptual models of climate change that combine mitigation and adaptation are reviewed,
namely those of Ingham et al. (2005), Lecocq and Shalizi (2007) and Buob and Stephan (2010). Since
to my knowledge apart from the economic adaptation modelling literature review of Agrawala et al. (2011)
no other one has been published to date, besides laying out the models’ structure and results I want to
elaborate the contributions and limitations of each of the models very carefully. In section 8.5, I draw overall
conclusions and explain the implications for my own modelling work.
As adaptation modelling is a recent branch of research, no standard on notation has prevailed so far. In this
review, efforts were made to harmonize notation as much as possible over the presented models. Furthermore,
1The list does not include though any conceptual economic models that treat adaptation, such as the models reviewed in
sections 8.4.1 - 8.4.3.
2Apart from bare disinvestment.
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different authors use different terms to describe the same phenomena; I stick to the terminologies that were
introduced in chapters 6 and 7.
8.2 On the interaction between mitigation and adaptation
For many years, the main focus both in politics and research has almost exclusively been on mitigating
climate change. This is evident from the climate negotiation process, in which only in most recent years has
adaptation started to play a major role. Even though adaptation to climate change was mentioned from early
on in the United Nations (1992) (See the Motivation chapter at the beginning of this work), both scientists
and policy-makers firmly believed that enough time was left to solve the climate problem. For this reason,
mitigation dominated the agenda, while it was thought that adaptation could be dealt with in the far future,
if necessary. Furthermore, addressing the need for adaptation was not well-viewed, because it was regarded as
accepting the avoidable. Adger et al. (2009) write: “Until recently, adaptation has been somewhat sidelined,
or some would say, actually tabooed, in the climate change discourse. Many argue that investing in adapting
to the impacts distracts from the major task of mitigating the causes of anthropogenic climate change by
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Others are convinced that adaptation will automatically happen, once
environmental changes become visible”.3
Füssel (2007) lists additional reasons that make mitigation more appealing and tractable to the decision-
maker as well as the researcher than adaptation. First, mitigation appears as the more powerful policy
option, because abatement of GHG emissions continuously reduces the potential impacts on all climate-
sensitive systems, but the ability to protect them through adaptation is limited. Second, mitigation gets
down to the root of the problem, whereas the success of anticipatory adaptation relies on local, hence more
uncertain, climate and impact predictions. Third, especially poor developing countries are considered in
need of adaptation4, but these countries have contributed comparatively little to climate change. This makes
the sourcing of adaptation funding a contentious issue. Mitigation on the contrary is generally financed
by the polluter. Finally, the success of most mitigation measures can be ascertained comparatively easily;
they either lead to reductions in GHG emissions or their enhanced storage in terrestrial and marine sinks. In
contrast, the indicators of adaptation are much less uniform and vary across sectors. For example, they might
range from the maximum wind speed a construction can withstand, to the duration of drought resistance
of a new crop type. The overlap between adaptation measures and development projects, as touched on
in section 7.1, makes a transparent cost-benefit analysis of adaptation even more challenging.5 A further
incentive to prioritize mitigation (at first) may be that the cost-benefit-cycle of mitigation is considerably
longer than that of most adaptation measures, so that mitigation needs to go first. While the transition to a
low-carbon economy requires large-scale capital investments as well as a fundamental reengineering of current
(energy) infrastructures, the accrual of mitigation investment benefits is further delayed by the carbon cycle.
In contrast, reactive adaptation measures pay off immediately, and anticipatory adaptation measures are
subject to an investment cycle only.6
However, despite these caveats, there is a clear rationale to analyze mitigation and adaptation jointly: “If
emissions that cause local climate change damages are reduced from any source, then local adaptation must
3Adger et al. (2009), p. xiii.
4Although the UNFCCC (2007) predicts that the costs for adaptation of the developed countries will exceed those for
adaptation of the developing countries, see section 7.3.1.
5Cp. Füssel (2007), p. 265 and Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), p. 8. Tol (2007), p. 742, for these reasons casts doubts on the
feasibility of joint analysis of mitigation and adaptation.
6Cp. Tol (2005), p. 573.
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also be reduced in order to maintain local climate change damages at a constant level. Therefore, effectively,
the amount of adaptation that is optimal, by any set of policy objectives, depends on the degree to which
the local impacts of climate change are reversed by mitigation”7. This statement of Callaway (2004)
implies though that mitigation and adaptation are substitutes. Whether or not this is true, is debated.
Are mitigation and adaptation substitutes, as Callaway’s statement suggests, that is mitigation diminishes
the marginal benefits of adaptation and vice versa, reducing each others’ use, or are they complements, i.e.
mitigation increases the marginal benefits of adaptation and vice versa, reinforcing each others’ use?
If there are no measure-specific repercussions from a mitigation onto an adaptation measure and vice versa,
then substitutability implies that, for instance, mitigation that avoids changes in precipitation patterns lowers
the need to adopt crop varieties that are more resilient to altered climatic conditions.8 There are a number
of cases though in which an adaptation measure interferes with mitigation in a way in which it undermines
the aim of the latter and vice versa. An almost classic, as often cited example is that of air-conditioning,
which ensures indoor coolness in spite of (global) warming, but produces further GHG emissions at the same
time9; thereby it increases the need for mitigation. Yohe and Strzepek (2007) give another, more complex
example. In their study on flooding in Southeast Asia, they find that mitigation usually prevents water flow
increases that result from climate change, but it can also delay peak flow years to years in which in absence of
mitigation a decline in flows would be expected; then for these time intervals mitigation actually enhances the
need for adaptation measures, i.e. flood protection.10 Furthermore, as the mitigation measure afforestation
increases the area of a certain biotope, it can make e.g. efforts to protect local biodiversity more effective.11
In both the latter examples, the mitigation measure increases the marginal benefits of adaptation, indicating
complementarity.
Several authors conclude that whether or not the complements property holds in certain cases, is ultimately
an empirical question.12 However, these cases seem limited in their scale and frequency and appear unlikely
to overturn the overall substitutability between mitigation and adaptation on an aggregate level in terms
of both of them reducing (adverse impacts from) global warming. Klein et al. (2007), who reviewed the
relationship between mitigation and adaptation for the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, write: “On the
operational scale of specific projects, there may be trade-offs or synergies between adaptation and mitigation.
However, the majority of projects are unlikely to have strong links, although this remains a key uncertainty.
[...] The emissions generated by most adaptation activities are only small fractions of total emissions, even
if emissions will decline in the future as a result of climate-protection policies”.13
In the next sections, models that analyze mitigation and adaptation on an aggregate level are discussed,
taking into account the evaluation of Klein et al. that at least on this level the substitutability property
holds: “Adaptation and mitigation may be seen as substitutes in a policy framework at a highly aggregated,
international scale: the more mitigation is undertaken, the less adaptation is necessary and vice versa”.14
Against this background, it appears surprising that some of the models reviewed in section 8.4 pay so much
attention to the case in which mitigation and adaptation are considered as complements.
It should be emphasized though that mitigation and adaptation are far from being perfect substitutes. First,
only mitigation has the power to stop or slow down the process of global warming, whereas adaptation merely
7Callaway (2004), pp. 272f.
8S. Wilibanks et al. (2007), p. 714.
9Cp. Tol (2005), p. 575 and Füssel (2007), p. 266.
10Cp. Yohe and Strzepek (2007), p. 732.
11Cp. Ravindranath (2007), pp. 849ff.
12S. Kane and Shogren (2000), pp. 96f. and Yohe and Strzepek (2007), p. 734.
13Klein et al. (2007), pp. 753 and 760.
14Klein et al. (2007), p. 753.
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aims at better coping with its impacts. Second, some impacts from climate change cannot be completely
absorbed by adaptation, but can be avoided only through mitigation in the first place.15 Third, adaptation
provides a more immediate remedy than mitigation does.
8.3 Adaptation modelling in integrated assessment models
8.3.1 PAGE
8.3.1.1 Adaptation module and results
PAGE was already introduced in section 1.4.2. It is not an optimizing model, but it compares the outcomes of
scenarios with each other in which economic and emissions variables are exogenous. Plambeck et al. (1997)
pioneered adaptation modelling by explicitly incorporating adaptation into their PAGE95 model, in the form
of exogenous variables. They differentiated between three different ways in which adaptation could help to
protect against climate change. The modelling approach has not changed from PAGE95 to the PAGE2002
update.16 In PAGE, residual damages, Rjt, in world region j in model period t are computed by
17
Rjt =
(
RTjt
2.5
)ψ
· CD2.5 ·
(
1− Ajt
100
)
· Yjt. (8.1)
Damages in PAGE are calibrated for a 2.5°C residual temperature increase18 RTjt. CD2.5 denotes the
percentage share of output lost for this default increase.19 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 3 is the uncertain exponent of the
damage function drawn from some probability distribution. Damages can be reduced by adaptation, Ajt,
expressed as a proportion of gross damages.
Only if the physically occurring temperature rise Tjt exceeds some tolerable level, ALjt, which is adjusted
by other types of adaptation, damages are triggered, and then the difference between them is fed as residual
temperature rise, RTjt, into the residual damage function (8.1).
RTjt = max(0;Tjt −ALjt). (8.2)
“Residual temperature increase” describes the temperature rise “that matters”, as it still leads to damages
despite the following two types of adaptation: Temperature increase is only considered critical if it rises above
some tolerable plateau Pjt, or if the rate of temperature rise Hjt is too high (climate change is occurring too
quickly). Adaptation measures APjt and A
H
jt can raise the tolerable plateau or the tolerable rate of change,
respectively. The adjusted tolerable plateau, APjt, and the adjusted tolerable rate of temperature rise, AHjt,
are defined as
15Cp. Callaway (2004), pp. 273f. For instance, once a vector-borne disease has spread to a new area as a consequence of a
warmer climate, it may be hardly possible to exterminate the transmitters.
16Cp. for the following Plambeck et al. (1997), pp. 88ff. and Hope (2006), pp. 35ff.
17For the purpose of this review, the term that captures the risk of discontinuities in the damage function is removed here.
Also the index d = 0, 1 is dropped, which distinguishes between the two impact sectors (economic vs. non-economic) in the
orginal publications.
18The term “residual temperature increase” will be explained below.
19As can be easiliy verified, for RTjt = 2.5 and Ajt = 0 equation (8.1) collapses to Rjt = CD2.5 · Yjt.
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APjt = Pj +A
P
jt (8.3)
AHjt = Hj +A
H
jt . (8.4)
For the adjusted tolerable level ALjt, which determines the residual temperature in (8.2), it is assumed that
ALjt = min(APjt;ALjt−1 +AHjt), (8.5)
with ALj0 = 0. Hence, the model assumes that there is a time-invariant threshold of regional temperature
increase beyond which climate damages occur; this threshold needs to be lifted by adaptation APjt in each
period anew. Equation (8.5) seems to suggest that the tolerable rate of change increases every period by
Hj +A
H
jt .
20
The total costs of adaptation K are defined as
K = rAjt ·Ajt + rA
P
jt ·APjt + rA
H
jt A
H
jt (8.6)
where rAjt, r
AP
jt , r
AH
jt > 0 are cost parameters of the different types of adaptation.
8.3.1.2 Discussion
Plambeck et al. (1997) and Hope (2006) make an effort to incorporate adaptation in their model explicitly,
which distinguishes it from other early IAMs. They even include three different types of adaptation, one that
reduces damages from climate change once occurring, one that permits more local warming to occur without
causing damages and one that reduces damages caused by the rate of climate change. The authors do not
provide any examples for adaptation measures they have in mind, but refer to somewhat generic “adaptive
policy”21. All types of adaptation exhibit constant marginal benefits (equations (8.1), (8.2) and (8.3)) as
well as constant marginal costs (equation (8.6)). These are strong assumptions, and an explanation on the
motivation behind them would be helpful.
Furthermore, the costs and benefits of adaptation are assumed to always accrue in the same period. This
is no problem for the specification of Ajt in (8.1), since it indicates the assumption of reactive adaptation,
which by definition takes place right after a disaster has occurred. Certainly some anticipatory adaptation
is needed though to raise the tolerable plateau and rate of climate change. Given that most model periods
are 20 or more years long, the authors may have assumed for those that anticipatory adaptation takes place
at the beginning of a period and pays off at its end. However, the first three periods include only one year,
during which the cost-benefit cycle of adaptation must be regarded as rather short.
All adaptation variables are modelled as flow variables, hence all adaptation measures have to be renewed
every model period to maintain their effect. This property does not appear convincing. For instance, a
measure that raises the tolerable temperature plateau might be the erection of dykes, but this measure raises
20This raises the question why therefore not simply ALjt = min(APjt;AHjt). In contrast to the original specification in
Hope (2006), p. 43, equation (26), it is for simplicity assumed here that the model periods are equidistant from each other.
21E.g. Plambeck et al. (1997), p. 87.
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the protection level against sea-level rise continuously also in the future, which property is probably better
reflected by a stock variable.
The modellers set values between 50% and 90% for reactive adaptation, Ajt, against economic damages in
different world regions from 2010 onwards in their simulations.22 This means that 50-90% of climate damages
can be cleaned up by reactive adaptation - an optimistic assumption that needs grounding. The authors do
not inform about a restriction on Ajt. Certainly Ajt ≤ 100, but I wonder whether also Ajt = 100 is generally
admitted, leading to zero residual damages and a complete “clean-up” of climate damages by adaptation.
There is a further model feature that requires clarification. Adaptation expenses APjt shift the damage curve
upwards, so that the threshold level rises beyond which global warming triggers damages. AHjt raises the
tolerable rate of temperature change.23 Then, equation (8.5) determines that only either the magnitude or
the rate of temperature leads to damages, which however are described by the same damage function (8.1).
Arguably, given the difference in the challenges, it is very unlikely that damages caused by too extreme or too
fast climate change evolve according to exactly the same pattern. Furthermore, if in (8.2) Tjt exceeds both
APjt and (ALjt−1+)AHjt, too much climate change is happening too quickly. However, due to (8.5) only
the more significant impact variable enters the residual damage function (8.1), while the other is completely
ignored. This does not make any sense.
8.3.2 AD-DICE and AD-RICE
8.3.2.1 Adaptation modules and results
Only recently attempts have emerged to incorporate adaptation as a control variable into optimizing inte-
grated assessment models, in which economic and emissions variable are endogenous. de Bruin et al. (2009a)
made the first attempt by extending DICE24 to AD-DICE (Adaptation in the Dynamic Integrated model of
Climate and the Economy). They convert the original DICE damage function to
CCt
Yt
= v1(△Tt) + v2(△Tt)2, (8.7)
and refer to a comment from Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) that in DICE adaptation was implicitly assumed
optimal and has fed into total costs arising from climate change, CCt.
25 De Bruin et al. point out that in this
case it must be possible to split these total costs up into adaptation costs KAt as well as residual damages
Rt:
CCt
Yt
=
Rt
Yt
+
KAt
Yt
. (8.8)
To make the effect of adaptation identifiable, in the following they redefine (8.7) to
Dt
Yt
= v1(△Tt) + v2(△Tt)ψ, (8.9)
22S. Hope (2006), p. 55.
23It does not impact the slope of the damage function though, as the authors’ notation suggests (There, AHjt is labelled as
SLOP Ejt.), but instead works mathematically in the same way as A
P
jt.
24DICE was introduced in section 1.3.
25As before, Yt still denotes gross output, △Tt measures the deviation from the global mean temperature in 1900 and v1, v2 > 0
are scaling parameters.
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where Dt now exclusively comprises damages from climate change before adaptation takes place, and 1 ≤
ψ ≤ 3 describes the exponent of the no longer necessarily quadratic damage function, with the exponent’s
value being determined during calibration. As before, damages can be reduced by mitigation. Furthermore,
they can be damped by adaptation, 0 ≤ At ≤ 1. Residual damages Rt are defined as
Rt = Dt · (1−At). (8.10)
This specification is very similar to that of PAGE, stated in (8.1): At · 100% of the same period’s damages
are cleaned up by reactive adaptation.26 Adaptation is modelled as a flow variable, hence adaptation in a
given period does not benefit from any adaptation measures carried out in the past. One model period lasts
ten years. Plugging (8.9) into (8.10) results in:
Rt = (1−At) · Yt ·
[
v1(△Tt) + v2(△Tt)ψ
]
. (8.11)
De Bruin et al. specify increasing adaptation costs KAt :
KAt
Yt
= rAχt , (8.12)
with r > 0 and χ > 1 being adaptation cost parameters.
Relying on the assumption that, while not explicitly modelled, adaptation has implicitly been optimal in
DICE-99, de Bruin et al. assume optimal adaptation (also) in AD-DICE27 to calibrate AD-DICE in ac-
cordance with the optimal abatement scenario of DICE-99, minimizing the discounted squared difference
between (supposed to be residual) damages CCt of DICE-99 in (8.7) and residual damages Rt of AD-DICE
in (8.11). They estimate the damage function exponent at ψ = 2.32 and the adaptation function exponent at
χ = 3.6 to reproduce optimal (residual) damages of DICE-99. Optimal A∗t varies between 9-45%. However,
while discounted residual damages in the final model period 220028 still amount to little more than 2% of
GDP in 2200, on each discounted mitigation and adaptation is spent less than 0.4% - apparently, more action
is not profitable, so that total climate change costs sum up to 3% of world GDP in 2200. Welfare is greatest
in the scenario in which both mitigation and adaptation are optimally deployed to combat climate change.
Mitigation and adaptation act as substitutes: In the optimal scenario in which both strategies are permit-
ted, mitigation as well as adaptation measures are implemented, but optimal mitigation and adaptation are
both lower than in the respective optimal mitigation- or adaptation-only scenarios. A higher discount rate
shifts efforts from mitigation to adaptation, because in this case the future benefits of mitigation are less
appreciated by the decision-maker in the present.
De Bruin et al. propose an alternative specification in which the marginal benefits to adaptation are not
constant (as they are in (8.10)), but declining:
Rt =
Dt
At
, (8.13)
26As examples for such adaptation, de Bruin et al. name applying sunblock, air-conditioning, changing holiday destinations
and changing crop types. While applying sunblock might be categorized as an adaptation measure that is carried out in order
to protect the skin from ultraviolet rays intensified by the ozone hole, changing crop types should be regarded as an example of
anticipatory adaptation to climate change. Farmers change crop types in anticipation of future climate changes, but changing
crop types cannot save the current harvest against e.g. a heavy drought.
27Hence, they impose the optimality condition ∂Rt
∂At
=
∂KAt
∂At
.
28To be exact, in model period 2190-2200.
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with At > 1. However, in order to be able to leave (8.10) as before, they modify instead the adaptation cost
function to
KAt
Yt
= r ·
(
1
1−At
)χ
. (8.14)
Now the adaptation cost function exponent is estimated at χ = 8.19, adaptation costs are increasing faster
than before. The qualitative results do not deviate from those generated from the previous setting.
De Bruin et al. comment that they neglect uncertainty as well as sectoral and regional differences of adaptation
features. In their opinion, the implications of non-optimal adaptation also warrant research. De Bruin et al.
say that they ignore possible irreversibility of catastrophic climatic events: “Should greenhouse gas emissions
set in motion a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation or a collapse of the Greenland or West-Antarctic
Ice Sheet, adaptation may be the only policy option”.29
In another modelling step, de Bruin et al. (2009b) calibrate AD-DICE in accordance with damage figures of
DICE-2007 and extend RICE by explicitly modelled adaptation, to AD-RICE. Based on figures from RICE-
99, AD-RICE estimates separate damage functions for 10 of the original 13 world regions, indicated by the
subscript j. The authors now also allow for such adaptation that needs to take place in order to be able to
reap benefits of climate change, for instance in currently cold regions that have to extend and adjust their
agricultural infrastructure to a new, warmer climate, and replace the AD-DICE residual damage function
(8.10) by
Rjt = Djt · (1−Ajt) +Djt ·A+jt. (8.15)
If a region faces net benefits from climate change, hence Djt < 0, then Ajt = 0, but adaptation to exploit
them is positive, A+jt > 0. Adaptation cost parameters rj , χj > 0 are calibrated according to
KAjt = rjA
χj
jt + rj
(
A+jt
)χj
. (8.16)
In AD-RICE, only Japan is expected to face 8 billion USD discounted net benefits from climate change over
the next two centuries. It can increase them by appropriate adaptation measures by more than ten times to
91 billion USD. While the US can reduce its present value gross damages from 985 billion USD to 21 billion
USD by adaptation, in Africa only 718 billion USD of the present value gross damages amounting to 2051
billion USD are prevented by adaptation. The US has the highest adaptation cost function exponent with
χUSA = 10.21, the lowest Japan with χJAP = 3.26.
30 AD-RICE is used to investigate a number of issues
such as international cooperation against climate change and transnational provision of adaptation funding31,
which work is revisited in section 11.4.
29For the preceding cp. de Bruin et al. (2009a) pp. 65ff. Regarding to this quote from p. 79, I include it because I disagree
with the authors’ understanding of adaptation: In consequence of such disastrous climate change of course only last-resort
measures such as large-scale migration from the coastlines are feasible. However, I would not label this measure a considerable
policy option, because it is this kind of extreme climate change that reveals the limits to adaptation. Hence, I would rather
argue that not adaptation, but mitigation is the only available viable strategy to combat disastrous climate change - by avoiding
it at all.
30S. de Bruin et al. (2009b), pp. 14ff.
31S. Hof et al. (2009); de Bruin and Dellink (2009); de Bruin et al. (2010).
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8.3.2.2 Discussion
Optimizing integrated assessment models of climate change have lacked adaptation modules, therefore the
efforts of de Bruin et al. should be regarded as a milestone that sets the starting point for further research
in this area.
There are however some deficiencies in their approach, some of which they acknowledge themselves. AD-
DICE only considers reactive adaptation and lacks any proxy for anticipatory adaptation. For this reason,
they suggest for future work the specification of an adaptation capital stock to accommodate anticipatory
adaptation. While the model operates with constant marginal adaptation benefits (8.10), de Bruin et al.
assume increasing adaptation costs ((8.12) and (8.14)), “as cheaper and more effective adaptation options
will be applied first, and more expensive and less effective options will be used after these”. This statement
might support decreasing marginal benefits rather than increasing marginal costs, although this may depend
on the viewpoint; this issue is returned to in section 10.3.2.
Despite the statement by the authors that At = 100% in (8.10) is never reached due to increasing adaptation
costs, the specification of the adaptation function generally suggests that for unlimited resources climate
damages could be fully cleaned up by adaptation, implying that any impacts from climate change are the-
oretically 100% reversible. A specification of adaptation benefits such as in (8.13), where residual damages
Rt > 0 for any level of adaptation, may come closer to reality. This debate will be the topic of chapter 9.
Finally, the calibration of the model poses some serious questions. De Bruin et al. justify the calibration of
AD-DICE in accordance with DICE99 results only on the vague claim by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) that
in DICE99 adaptation had been implicitly assumed optimal. Apparently, de Bruin et al. take this statement
for granted, but it may be questionable to exclusively orient the calibration of the adaptation function at
(results of) a model that does not model adaptation at all, while no efforts for an independent empirical
grounding of the adaptation function were made. This procedure may explain the unusually high adaptation
cost function exponents, leading to a quartic cost function in the first specification ((8.11) and (8.12)) and to
a χ > 8 in the second specification ((8.13) and (8.14)). I further wonder for what reason the damage function
exponent is restricted not to exceed ψ ≤ 3, but the adaptation cost function exponent χ is not restricted.
With respect to AD-RICE, only small changes to the adaptation module have been made. It appears
surprising though that the structural effect of adaptation measures that aim at harnessing climate change
are modelled in virtually the same way as adaptation measures to protect against adverse consequences from
climate change (equations (8.15) and (8.16)), although measures and effects in reality are probably rather
different. Even cost function parameters rj , χj are assumed the same for both types of adaptation. While
the authors give an upgrade of the agricultural infrastructure as the only example of a GDP-enhancing
adaptation measure, it is then very surprising that only Japan is reported as a country that may seek to reap
benefits from climate change: Agriculture, including forestry and fishery, accounts for only 1.2% of Japanese
GDP in 200632, and given its small available land area, it seems unlikely that Japan will extend or modify
its agriculture as a result of climate change in a way that exerts a significant stimulating effect on its GDP.
The authors do not explain why adaptation can help the USA to reduce gross climate damages by a factor
of almost 50, but cannot help Africa even to halve gross damages. Unfortunately, neither the extremely high
adaptation cost function exponents χj nor the large range of estimated values, thus the large variation of
adaptation cost functions across the globe, are commented on.
32S. Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (2008), p. 1.
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8.3.3 Adaptation in FEEM-RICE
8.3.3.1 Adaptation module and results
In order to accommodate anticipatory adaptation in FEEM-RICE33, Bosello (2010) adds an adaptation
capital stock to a version of FEEM-RICE used in Buonanno et al. (2001), which was based on RICE96 by
Nordhaus and Yang (1996); reactive adaptation is not included in the model. A social planner maximizes
consumption-driven world utility, which is calculated as the Negishi-weighted sum of utilities in the six macro
regions USA, Japan, Europe, China, Former Soviet Union and Rest of the World.
In the adaptation module, adaptation capital stock accumulation is described by
Ajt = (1− δ)Ajt−1 + IAjt−1. (8.17)
Ajt denotes the adaptation capital stock of region j in period t, which can be augmented in the preceding
period by adaptation investments IAjt−1. It is diminished by depreciation with the depreciation rate 0 < δ < 1
in each period. Adaptation capital does not enter the production function as a production factor, but lowers
climate damages. Gross output Yjt is reduced to residual output Y
RES
jt via:
Y RESjt = Ω
AD
jt · Yjt, (8.18)
with the share of “surviving output” defined as
ΩADjt =
1− v1jµv2jt
1 + v3 · e−Ajt · (Tt/2.5)v4 . (8.19)
µjt denotes the share of emissions from production that the social planner decides to abate; the abatement
costs decrease residual output, as does a higher global mean temperature Tt.
34 As usual in models of
the DICE/RICE family, resources spent on mitigation in period t have no emissions-reducing effect in any
subsequent period. A larger adaptation capital stock enhances residual output.
Bosello imposes the condition that adaptation costs in 2050 must exceed 0.15% of world output, which figure
is motivated by literature. Acknowledging limits to the potential of adaptation to protect against adverse
impacts of climate change, adaptation in 2100, when CO2 concentration in the Business as Usual scenario
has doubled, is limited to prevent not more than 70% of gross climate damages.
If no adaptation takes place, i.e. Ajt = 0 ∀ j, t, the model reproduces the results of scenarios in Nordhaus
and Yang (1996) and Buonanno et al. (2001); the values of the parameters v1, v2 and v3, v4, which scale
abatement costs and climate damages respectively35, match those calibrated by Nordhaus and Yang (1996)
in RICE96. Bosello states that the RICE96 damage function included some adaptation costs e.g. for coastal
protection36; by explicitly including adaptation “again” in this version of FEEM-RICE, but nevertheless
operating with the old parameter values Bosello deviates from the approach taken by de Bruin et al. (2009a)
in AD-DICE, who tried to disentangle adaptation costs from climate damage costs in DICE99. As Bosello
33Which was briefly discussed in section 1.4.1.
34The benefit of abatement in the model is to bring emissions down, which dampens temperature rise.
35Neither Bosello (2010), ? nor Nordhaus and Yang (1996) provide information about these parameters’ domains of
definition.
36I cannot find a passage in Nordhaus and Yang (1996) that corroborates this statement.
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describes, his specification hence assumes that in RICE96 no anticipatory adaptation costs were implicitly
included, which assumption “does not affect the qualitative nature of the highlighted outcomes”37.
As in Buonanno et al. (2001), besides spending money on mitigation or investing in adaptation, the social
planner may also decide to invest in R&D to stimulate endogenous technical progress, which both increases
output and lowers the emissions-output ratio. Bosello compares scenarios with each other in which no
controls, mitigation only, mitigation with R&D, mitigation and adaptation and mitigation and adaptation
with R&D are the available policy options.
In the simulations, adaptation crowds out expenses for both R&D and mitigation, confirming the view that
these options are substitutes, but they are strategic complements in that sense that a combination of all
three options is optimal. If adaptation is available, emissions and gross damages are higher, but residual
damages lower than in the no-adaptation scenarios. In absence of endogenous technological change, in 2100
it is optimal to avoid 55% of climate damages, but only 3% of damages are avoided by mitigation, whereas
the other 52% are neutralized by adaptation. Bosello explains that this stems from the model specification, in
which abatement costs increase exponentially, whereas adaptation investment costs increase only linearly. On
the optimal timing of adaptation, he writes: “At the same time the exercise shows clearly that, when damages
materialize, adaptation has to start. In the model this happens after 2040, but today’s world is already
experiencing climate-change damages, thus should urge policymakers for the immediate implementation of
adaptation plans”.38
8.3.3.2 Discussion
While reactive adaptation is missing from the model framework, Bosello’s modified version of FEEM-RICE
is the first IAM that includes anticipatory adaptation. However, his quote reported at the end of 8.3.3.1
saying that in the model adaptation optimally starts after 2040, but that in the real world it should better
start already now as well as his quote further above stating that ignoring previously assumed adaptation
in RICE96 does not affect the qualitative nature of the result, are odd. On the one hand, Bosello fires
off a battery of elasticity and sensitivity analyses, reporting the numerical results in great detail, possibly
because he considers them as policy-relevant. On the other hand, the quotes seem to suggest it is not the
numbers that matter, but only the qualitative direction of the results. In the latter case, a carefully-designed
theoretical or stylized model may be the better-suited analysis tool, if the general properties of mitigation
and adaptation in there are represented more adequately. If the numbers generated should not be taken
seriously, it should be clearly stated that this model version of FEEM-RICE performs numerical analysis for
the purpose of illustration, but not to provide robust data to policy-makers.
Using an exponential function for the adaptation function in (8.19) is unusual, and the motivation behind it
lacks elaboration. While marginal adaptation investment costs are assumed constant (8.17), marginal returns
to adaptation turn out to be actually increasing, i.e.
∂Y RESjt
∂Ajt
> 0 and
∂2Y RESjt
∂A2
jt
> 0. This stands in contrast to
all other models reviewed in this chapter, which assume that either marginal adaptation costs are constant
or increasing and that marginal benefits are either constant or decreasing. Therefore, the combination of
linear adaptation costs and increasing marginal benefits raises questions. Bosello does neither mention that
his adaptation function implies increasing marginal returns nor gives an example for an adaptation measure
37Bosello (2010), p. 10.
38Bosello (2010), p. 19.
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whose marginal benefits are increasing.39 Furthermore, he does not mention that not only exponentially
increasing abatement costs, but also these exponentially increasing adaptation benefits might contribute to
his observation that adaptation contributes disproportionately to the reduction of climate change (impacts).
In contrast to de Bruin et al. (2009a) in AD-DICE, Bosello has considered an upper ceiling for the potential
of adaptation to reduce impacts of climate damages, although it was not reached in the simulations performed.
Finally, Bosello’s approach may be regarded as a bit half-hearted. While allowing for an adaptation capital
stock certainly is an innovative contribution, it raises the question why he did not make an effort to also
include a capital stock for mitigation, which accumulates over time by “green investments” that change
production and emissions patterns continuously.40
8.3.4 AD-WITCH
8.3.4.1 Adaptation module and results
To date, AD-WITCH created by Bosello et al. (2010a,b) is to be regarded as the most sophisticated IAM
in terms of how it models adaptation to climate change, since it considers and distinguishes anticipatory
adaptation, reactive adaptation and investment in adaptation research. The welfare setup of WITCH as
described in section 1.4.1 is kept. Gross output Yjt in world region j in period t is modified by the “Nordhaus”
damage function Ωjt, so that residual output Y
RES
jt is given as
Y RESjt =
1
1 + Ωjt
· Yjt (8.20)
with
Ωjt = v1j(△Tt) + v2j(△Tt)ψj , (8.21)
whose parameters v1j , v2j > 0 and ψj > 1 were calibrated to match the output loss expected to occur after a
2.5°C global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels41, which figure had been estimated from
literature surveys. In AD-WITCH, the damage function ΩADjt decomposes into
ΩADjt =
Ω
′
jt
1 +Ajt
, (8.22)
where the functional form of Ω
′
jt is defined as before in (8.21), but calibrated parameters are different. The
authors assume a 2.5°C temperature rise in 2060 as a fixpoint and calculate sectorwise estimates of adaptation
costs, by identifying climate-sensitive investment streams and building on the ratios used in World Bank
2006 (see section 7.2), to recalibrate the parameters of the damage module in (8.21).42 ΩADjt then substitutes
Ωjt in (8.20). As Bosello et al. point out, the specification in (8.22) exhibits the desirable property that even
39One example could be the building a dyke around an island - only if all coastal segments are protected, the island is safe.
However, once the whole island is protected, it may be increasingly difficult to reinforce the dykes to prepare them for the
challenge of rising sea levels, so that marginal adaptation benefits could be considered S-shaped, discontinuously increasing for
low levels of adaptation.
40Which is the approach taken by SLICE in chapter 10.
41As before, △Tt measures the deviation from the global mean temperature in 1900.
42For details, s. Bosello et al. (2010b), pp. 6ff.
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with unlimited resources devoted to adaptation Ajt, residual damages can be brought only close to zero, but
not cancelled completely. Furthermore, the marginal benefits of adaptation are declining.
Residual damages Rjt are still defined as the difference between gross and residual output:
Rjt = Yjt − Y RESjt =
Ω
′
jt
1 +Ajt
· Yjt. (8.23)
Adaptation is decomposed into anticipatory adaptation AAjt and reactive adaptation RAit, and the according
elasticity of substitution is set at ε1 = 0.9, establishing them as to some degree substitutable, but excluding
the possibility of a corner solution.
Ajt = v3
(
α1j ·AA
ε1−1
ε1
jt + α2j ·RA
ε1−1
ε1
jt
) ε1
ε1−1
. (8.24)
v3 > 0 is a scaling parameter and 0 < α1j , α2j < 1 denote the shares of anticipatory and reactive adaptation,
respectively, in total adaptation. Anticipatory adaptation stock is accumulated as follows:
AAjt = (1− δ1)AAjt−1 + IAjt, (8.25)
with the depreciation rate 0 < δ1 < 1 and investments in ex-ante adaptation, IAjt. The definition of (8.25) is
not entirely clear. The authors describe elsewhere43 that investments in anticipatory adaptation take effect
after one model period of delay; one model period lasts five years. For this reason, it is likely that it should
be IAjt−1 instead of IAjt. Note that also in the adaptation capital equation of motion (8.17) of the modified
version of FEEM-RICE, in which a model period comprises ten years, anticipatory adaptation investments
takes effect with a one-period delay.
Reactive adaptation and adaptation knowledge about reactive adaptation, AKjt, are modelled in a structure
similar to that in (8.24) and (8.25):
RAjt = v4
(
α3j ·RE
ε2−1
ε2
jt + α4j ·AK
ε2−1
ε2
jt
) ε2
ε2−1
(8.26)
AKjt = (1− δ2)AKjt−1 + IKjt, (8.27)
where REjt are reactive adaptation expenditures, IKjt denotes investments in reactive adaptation knowledge
and the other parameters have similar interpretations, as in (8.24)-(8.25). Again, like anticipatory adaptation
investments in (8.25), it appears that knowledge investments have an immediate effect. Reactive adaptation
expenditures and knowledge are modelled as good substitutes with ε2 = 1.4.
Cost functions for reactive adaptation expenditure, knowledge accumulation and anticipatory adaptation
investments are all assumed linear.
Bosello et al. assume anticipatory adaptation for the purposes of coastal protection, settlement and ecosystem
protection, and for water protection; sectors in which reactive adaptation takes place are agriculture, health
and space heating and cooling. They restrict knowledge accumulation to reactive adaptation, because they
43S. Bosello et al. (2010a), p. 81.
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argue that innovations are generated mostly in agriculture (development of climate-change-resilient crops)
and health (investigation of new vaccines) and during the development of information technologies for early-
warning systems. Bosello et al. calibrate AD-WITCH in accordance with data from Nordhaus and Boyer
(2000) and Agrawala et al. (2008); the criticism from the latter on the UNFCCC adaptation cost estimates
also fed into the decision of adaptation cost estimates in section 7.3.
Bosello et al. compares scenarios with varying expected climate damages and discount rates, in which a
social planner maximizes global utility, with a BAU scenario, in which no region undertakes any mitigation
or adaptation.44 In their reference scenario, global adaptation expenditure reaches 2 billion USD in 2035 and
3 trillion USD in 2100. As to be expected, the share of mitigation in the optimal policy mix increases with
a decreasing discount rate, because for a lower discount rate future climate damages are assigned a greater
weight. In this context, the authors emphasize that effects from abatement measures are not only delayed due
to the carbon cycle, but also because the investment cycle applying to stemming the transformation of the
energy infrastructure is long, therefore mitigation needs to start much earlier than adaptation. AD-WITCH
confirms the observation of AD-DICE that both optimal mitigation and adaptation are lower than in the
scenarios in which only one of the two options is available. They are substitutes; one reduces the marginal
benefits of the other and vice versa, so that they crowd each other out. The authors find that non-OECD
countries spend about the same as much on anticipatory adaptation as they spend on reactive adaptation,
while most adaptation expenditures of OECD countries flow into reactive adaptation. They reason for this
lies in their differing adaptation needs: While the greatest threat for OECD countries is posed by sea level
rise, non-OECD countries have a particular need for reactive adaptation in agriculture, health and space
heating and cooling. Non-OECD countries’ adaptation expenditure is significantly larger than that of OECD
countries45, and given that resources are scarce in those regions where damages are likely to be highest,
transfers from OECD to non-OECD countries amounting to an annuity of 470 billion USD are optimal,
which the authors set in contrast with the official world development aid in 2007, around 100 billion USD,
to emphasize the challenge.
8.3.4.2 Discussion
AD-WITCH presents the most ambitious attempt to include adaptation explicitly in an IAM. It is the first
IAM that explicitly allows for both ex-ante as well as ex-post adaptation. Given that the model aims at
producing numerical figures potentially fed into the policy-making process, the assumptions under which
AD-WITCH operates should be carefully scrutinized.
For instance, Bosello et al. admit that due to a lack of a catastrophic damage module the benefits of mitigation
may be underestimated, which might explain why a temperature increase by a comparatively large magnitude
of 3-3.4° is appraised optimal. Despite the conceptual and data availability problems that are addressed in
the following, the authors draw the rather strong conclusion that “this [result] does not mean that aggressive
mitigation is not necessary, but that it can only be justified on the basis of precautionary considerations in
the presence of catastrophic uncertainty”46.
44The latter is called by Bosello et al. the “non-cooperative scenario”, assuming that a lack of cooperation leads to zero
mitigation and adaptation. This implies the assumption that adaptation incentives must be ensured through international
cooperation, but, as the authors point out elsewhere, adaptation policies often have a local, site-specific benefit. For this
reason, it is likely that the bulk of optimal adaptation measures will be carried out also without a binding international climate
agreement. Therefore, I rather speak of a BAU scenario than a “non-cooperative scenario”.
45Which stands in contrast to the finding of UNFCCC (2007), s. section 7.3.
46Bosello et al. (2010a), p. 86.
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With respect to the modelling of adaptation, in AD-WITCH the marginal benefits of adaptation are assumed
decreasing, but marginal costs constant. This stands in contrast to the AD-DICE, where it is vice versa.
The adaptation function in (8.22) marks an improvement from the AD-DICE model, because in AD-DICE it
seemed that theoretically all climate damages could be offset by adaptation. However, Bosello et al. implicitly
make a choice that they do not justify. A more general adaptation function than that defined in (8.22) would
be
ΩADjt =
Ω
′
jt
(1 +Ajt)κ
, (8.28)
with an adaptation function exponent κ > 0. Of course, the true functional form of the adaptation function
is unknown, but the authors do not explain why they implicitly make the choice κ = 1, while the parameters
of the damage function (8.21) are calibrated. Furthermore, the specification in (8.22) implies that if damages
in the numerator double, also the denominator with adaptation has to double only to maintain the same ratio
of avoided damages. To provide a numerical example for clarification, I assume that Ωjt = 10 and Ajt = 4,
so that 50% of damages are prevented or successfully dealt with by adaptation. If Ωjt increases by ten units,
adaptation needs to rise by only five units to ensure that still ΩADjt = 2. Whether this is realistic or not needs
to be discussed. A first remedy if one wants to ensure that adaptation needs to increase by a more similar
magnitude as damages do could be to experiment with a 0 < κ < 1 in (8.28), although then still a given
amount of adaptation would always prevent the same share of gross damage, regardless of its absolute level.
The strict separation between anticipatory adaptation in some sectors and reactive adaptation in others is
not obvious to me; for sure both take place in all sectors to varying extents. In AD-WITCH, for agriculture
exclusively reactive adaptation is considered, but recalling the adaptation measures needed for adaptation in
agriculture, briefly summarized in section 6.3.1, installing irrigation systems and avoidance of monoculture
are certainly anticipatory adaptation measures that require ex-ante investments.47 Furthermore, while it is
an achievement of AD-WITCH that it allows for knowledge accumulation, it is unlikely that innovations are
subject to reactive adaptation technology exclusively. Bosello et al. themselves mention innovations created
during the development of information technologies for early-warning systems, which should fall though into
the category of anticipatory adaptation, for which in AD-WITCH no process of knowledge accumulation
takes place.
Potential knowledge spillovers between the regions are not considered in AD-WITCH.
Bosello et al. describe it as a problem that some regions are likely to gain a net benefit from climate change
so that no adaptation should be necessary. Because these regions spend money on adaptation nevertheless,
during calibration the authors see the “need to impose a level of damage consistent with observed adaptation
costs”48. However, even in such sectors in which benefits from climate change may occur e.g. by creating a
more favourable climate for agriculture, the agricultural infrastructure needs to change to reap these benefits.
Therefore, generally also regions that are likely to enjoy a net benefit from climate change will need to adapt.49
We know from the review of adaptation cost estimates, conducted in chapter 7, that available and reliable
adaptation data is sparse, which only exacerbates the known problem of the scarcity of climate change impact
studies, and so the calibration of AD-WITCH must be a difficult process. One particular figure though seems
47A similar point of criticism could be made on the categorization of adaptation in the health sector as reactive adaptation,
but Bosello et al. explain that they chose it because the data they use refers to disease treatment cost, Bosello et al. (2010a),
p. 89, fn. 13.
48Bosello et al. (2010a), p. 77.
49Adaptation to favourable consequences of climate change is explicitly considered in AD-RICE, see section 8.3.2.1.
158
CHAPTER 8. ADAPTATION IN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT MODELS AND CONCEPTUAL
MODELS
particularly questionable. Bosello et al. claim to have calibrated their model in accordance with adaption
estimates from Agrawala et al. (2008), the book that contains their article is edited by Agrawala and
Fankhauser. Agrawala et al. concluded that current global estimates of adaptation costs do “not [provide]
a useful guide to shape international decisions on adaptation financing”50, and Fankhauser assesses in his
follow-up publication that the adaptation cost estimates presented in the UNFCCC (2007) study that range
from 49 to 171 billion USD in 2030 are likely be underestimated.51 In the AD-WITCH reference scenario
however, global adaptation costs in 2035 are estimated at 2 billion USD, after which they rise sharply.
8.4 Adaptation modelling in conceptual models
8.4.1 Ingham et al. (2005)
8.4.1.1 Model and results
Ingham et al. (2005) create a conceptual model of climate change to investigate the question discussed in
section 8.2, namely whether and under which circumstances mitigation and adaptation can be complements.
In the complements case, if the costs of mitigation e.g. fell due to some technical progress, the optimal response
would be not only to reinforce mitigation, but also adaptation. The authors suggest that adaptation should
be less costly if climate change occurs less rapidly. They give as an example the case of a coastal city that
needs to move inland to react to rising sea-levels; the more time is available for this, the less capital that is
still intact has to be given up before the end of its lifetime. If mitigation successfully slows down the speed
of climate change, it thereby also lowers the adaptation costs and, following this logic, stimulates controlled,
long-term migration of citizens to the inland.52
Ingham et al. develop their model step-by-step, starting with defining mitigation and adaptation as substi-
tutes. Climate damage costs in their model are captured by a damage function
b ·D (M, A) ≥ 0, (8.29)
where damages D are reduced by mitigation M and adaptation A, and b > 0 is a scaling parameter. The
following properties are assumed to hold:
∂D
∂M
< 0;
∂2D
∂M2
> 0;
∂D
∂A
< 0;
∂2D
∂A2
> 0 (8.30)
∂2D
∂M · ∂A =
∂2D
∂A · ∂M > 0; min
{
∂2D
∂M2
,
∂2D
∂A2
}
>
∂2D
∂M · ∂A (8.31)
Equation (8.30) reflect declining marginal benefits of mitigation and adaptation. The first part of equation
(8.31) establishes the substitutes property by saying that the marginal benefit of mitigation decreases the
more adaptation is carried out and vice versa; the second part of equation (8.31) adds that the increasing
50Agrawala et al. (2008), p. 75.
51Cp. Fankhauser (2009), pp. 25ff. See also chapter 7.
52However, if mitigation was very successful, then maybe adaptation would not be necessary at all - and mitigation and
adaptation would be predominantly substitutes again.
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use of mitigation (adaptation) lowers its own marginal benefits always more rapidly than those of adaptation
(mitigation).
In the simple one-period model, the social planner minimizes total costs K53:
K = b ·D (M, A) +KM (M) + rKA(A), (8.32)
with KM (M) and KA(A) as strictly convex cost functions of mitigation and adaptation, respectively, and r
as a scaling parameter of adaptation costs. After solving for optimal mitigation M∗ and optimal adaptation
A∗, Ingham et al. analyze the model’s comparative statics in reaction to changes in b > 0 and r > 0. If the
damage costs b rise, both mitigation and adaptation go up. If adaptation costs r rise, adaptation is reduced
and mitigation reinforced, confirming that mitigation and adaptation are substitutes. Also if mitigation is
redefined to reduce the risk of damage occurrence, but adaptation only can avoid damages, mitigation and
adaptation still remain substitutes.
In an extension to a two-period model, climate damages are modelled to occur at the end of the second model
period and to depend on cumulative mitigation M =M1 +M2 and cumulative adaptation A = A1 +A2, so
that the social planner in the two periods minimizes
K2 = b ·D (M, A) +KM (M2) + rKA(A2) (8.33)
K1 = K
∗
2 +K
M (M1) + rK
A(A1), (8.34)
whereby apparently no discounting or weighting of period 2 costs takes place. The two-period model exhibits
similar comparative statics as before. Ingham et al. mention that period 1 adaptation could be understood
as pro-active and period 2 adaptation as reactive, which would not be the case if damages occurred in both
periods. The authors also analyze a one-period multi-country model. Given that one country’s mitigation
efforts exert a postive externality on the other countries, they obtain the standard result that in the non-
cooperative scenario global mitigation falls short of its optimum. The countries’ adaptation efforts are larger
in the non-cooperative than in the cooperative scenario to compensate for suboptimal mitigation.
They then redefine the period 2 adaptation cost function to KA(A2,M2) with
∂KA
∂M2
< 0;
∂2KA
∂M22
> 0;
∂2KA
∂M · ∂A < 0. (8.35)
Referring to the case example described in the introduction, they argue that period 2 mitigation slows down
climate change and hence reduces period 2 adaptation costs, whereby this effect is decreasing in mitigation. If
this effect is strong enough, mitigation and adaptation may behave as complements, that is falling mitigation
costs boost both mitigation and adaptation. The authors conclude that without this specification, the
substitutes property holds in all other scenarios.54
53There is no mention of a utility function, hence implicitly a linear utility function is assumed.
54Cp. Ingham et al. (2005), pp. 1ff.
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8.4.1.2 Discussion
This model of Ingham et al. (2005) presents an early attempt to combine mitigation and adaptation within
a conceptual model. The solutions are not reproduced in greater detail in this review, because the adaptation
module of this early model is still quite generic. No efforts were made to explore or to experiment with a
particular shape of the adaptation function. Worse, both in the one- and in the two-period model, in which
mitigation and adaptation are substitutes, the mitigation cost function as well as the adaptation cost function
exhibit exactly the same properties, and mitigation and adaptation apparently influence damages in the same
way. Hence, any structural differences between mitigation and adaptation such as the carbon-cycle-induced
time-lag, which delays the positive effect of mitigation action to the future, are ignored. To move one step
closer to reality, period 2 mitigation M2 should be entirely dropped from the model so that only period 1
mitigation M1 impacts climate damages occurring at the end of period 2. The mentioned differentiation
between period 1 adaptation as anticipatory and period 2 adaptation as reactive is not substantiated by
any further discussion of any possible difference between the associated adaptation cost functions. The
finding that mitigation and adaptation behave as substitutes as long as they are defined as substitutes is not
surprising.
8.4.2 Lecocq and Shalizi (2007)
8.4.2.1 Model and results
According to Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), the necessity to adapt poses a number of questions, namely how
to deal with the adaptation continuum discussed in section 7.1; to what extent public actors should intervene
on the global, national and local levels; how to optimally mix (expenses for) mitigation and adaptation; on
the optimal balance of reactive and anticipatory adaptation and how uncertainties and budget constraints
affect these conclusions.
Before setting up their model, they debate the rationale for public intervention to facilitate effective adap-
tation. First, on the national and local level there is a need for R&D and education programmes to increase
knowledge, especially on anticipatory adaptation, and disseminate it to households and firms. Second, adap-
tation may suffer from network externalities, if it is interdependent (see section 6.2.2), so that the responsible
authority needs to coordinate these activities. Third, the public actors must also thwart moral hazard of
actors that expect the government to bail them out, once a disaster has occurred, so that they become
careless with their own anticipatory adaptation. An example for a related measure could be forbidding the
construction of houses in areas that are at risk of disappearing as a result of sea-level rise. Due to that risk,
the price of that building land may drop and, without regulation, attract buyers that expect receiving high
compensation payments from the government after a flood. Fourth, financial transfers may be necessary to
endow the poor with sufficient means for adaptation.
Given that adaptation aims at alleviating local problems, it may be considered obvious that it should also be
financed locally. Lecocq and Shalizi give a number of reasons though for adaptation (funding) interventions
by the international community or for some degree of international cooperation on adaptation. First, some
public goods in need of protection extend beyond a single sovereign territory, for instance when a water
reservoir is used by several riparian states. Hence, some adaptation measures may exert positive or negative
spillovers on neighbouring states, which external effects require internalisation. Second, the problem of
moral hazard persists also on the international level; some countries may decide not to sufficiently invest in
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adaptation, because they anticipate international support at occurrence of a disaster. Third, a lot of current
development-aid-based projects will have to be “climate-proven”55, and the international community needs
to analyze the vulnerability of its investments and aid to climate change. Fourth, international adaptation
funding transfers are suggested to reflect the historical responsibility of developed countries with respect to
past CO2 emissions.
56 Finally, some developing countries face strict budget constraints and are reliant on
international assistance for adaptation.
Because Lecocq and Shalizi assume a social planner to take decisions in their model, it cannot address the
question of how adaptation expenses should be split among private and public actors.
In the model, four expense items constitute the climate bill. These are mitigation, anticipatory adaptation,
reactive adaptation and residual damages57. Convex mitigation costsMKijt(Mijt) are assumed to be increasing
in GHG abatement,Mijt, across all sectors i and regions j in period t.
58 RAijt and AAijt denote the amount
of money spent on reactive and anticipatory adaptation, respectively, to protect sector i and region j from
climate change impacts, hence marginal adaptation costs are assumed linear. Since sectors and regions do
not share a straightforward common adaptation success indicator, the money spent on adaptation is used as
such.
Residual damages Rijt′(Mijt, RAijt′ , AAijt) are concave in abatement and both types of adaptation, hence
∂Rijt′
∂Mijt
< 0;
∂2Rijt′
∂M2ijt
> 0;
∂Rijt′
∂RAijt′
< 0;
∂2Rijt′
∂RA2ijt′
> 0;
∂Rijt
∂AAijt
< 0;
∂2Rijt
∂AA2ijt
> 0 (8.36)
are fulfilled, where t
′
> t.59
Lecocq and Shalizi further differentiate between targeted anticipatory adaptation measures on the one hand
that alleviate damages exclusively in sector i and region j and non-targeted measures on the other hand that
may possibly exert some positive spillover effect on another sector or region. The former usually comprise hard
measures involving fixed capital such as dyke construction, insulation of houses or stabilizing infrastructure,
the latter soft, less fixed-capital intensive measures such as creating insurance schemes, upgrading disaster
management or enhancing early-warning systems.
A social planner minimizes the intertemporal world’s climate bill with total costs K over time:
K =
I, J, T∑
i, j, t
[(
1
1 + ρ
)t [
MKijt(Mijt) +AAijt +RAijt +Rijt(M1...Mt−1, AAij1...AAijt−1, RAijt)
]]
. (8.37)
ρ > 0 is a discount rate, and Mt =
I, J∑
i, j=1
Mijt aggregates mitigation over all sectors and regions in period
t; the last summand sums up the residual damages. Lecocq and Shalizi explain that in order for (8.37) to
capture negative world welfare, utility must be approximately linear. They argue that the latter assumption
may hold if the costs of the national climate bills do not exceed 10% of national gross income.
55Motivating a bulk of the adaptation costs as estimated in section 7.2.
56See also section 11.3.
57Lecocq and Shalizi use the less common term “ultimate damages” to refer to residual damages.
58A particular reason for assuming convex mitigation costs such as adjustment costs is not given. Lecocq and Shalizi write
“concave”, but their mathematical description points to convex mitigation costs.
59Lecocq and Shalizi write that
∂Rijt′
∂RA2
ijt
′
< 0 and
∂Rijt′
∂AA2
ijt
′
< 0, but want to assume diminishing returns to adaptation; in
(8.36) the inequality signs are corrected accordingly.
162
CHAPTER 8. ADAPTATION IN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT MODELS AND CONCEPTUAL
MODELS
Assuming an interior solution, the FOCs are then60
∂MKijt(Mijt=f )
∂Mijt=f
= −
I, J, T∑
i, j, f+1
[(
1
1 + ρ
)t
∂Rijt
∂Mt=f
]
(8.38)
−1 = ∂Rijt
∂RAijt
(8.39)
−1 =
T∑
f+1
[(
1
1 + ρ
)t
∂Rijt
∂AAijt=f
]
+
(I, J)′∑
(i, j)′ Ó=(i, j)
T∑
f+1
[(
1
1 + ρ
)t ∂R(ij)′t
∂AAijt=f
]
(8.40)
The first condition describes that under optimality the marginal cost of abatement should equal its discounted
future marginal benefits in terms of avoided damages. The second one demands that the constant marginal
costs of reactive adaptation matches its marginal benefits in terms of alleviated damages, both occurring in
the same period. In the third condition, the left group of summands on the RHS captures the marginal future
benefits of a purely targeted anticipatory anticipation measure on a particular sector in a particular region,
(i, j). The right group of summands sums up the marginal future benefits of a non-targeted adaptation
measure for all other sectors and regions (i, j)
′
. For optimality, the sum of future marginal benefits of
anticipatory adaptation must equal its marginal costs. Lecocq and Shalizi conclude that the more regions
and sectors benefit from an anticipatory adaptation measure, the more it should be promoted.
The authors emphasize that
∂Rijt′
∂Mijt · ∂AAijt =
∂Rijt′
∂Mijt · ∂RAijt′
> 0, (8.41)
in which still t
′
> t, hence that mitigation and adaptation are substitutes. They elaborate once more that this
means that an enhancement of mitigation action reduces the marginal benefits and the need for adaptation
and vice versa and conclude that mitigation and adaptation need to be analyzed jointly. Although Lecocq and
Shalizi make no statement on the explicit functional forms of the adaptation function, their graph61 indicates
that they assume that adaptation shifts the damage curve and does not affect the slope of the damage curve;
this is equivalent to the approach taken in AD-DICE/AD-RICE and different from the approach taken in
AD-WITCH. This issue is revisited in chapter 9.
With respect to the relationship between ex-ante and ex-post adaptation, Lecocq and Shalizi state that in
many cases
∂Rijt′
∂AAijt · ∂RAijt′
> 0, (8.42)
so that they are often substitutes, too. As an example, if anticipatory adaptation has made a region’s irri-
gation system more resilient to climate change, less wheat has to be imported in case of a drought (as an
example of reactive adaptation). However, the authors emphasize that the relationship between anticipatory
and reactive adaptation is more equivocal than that of mitigation and adaptation. Given the wide range
60The time notation system of the original model was altered to save some notation, which does not affect the model conclu-
sions.
61S. Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), p. 20.
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of existent adaptation measures, there also exist cases in which ex-ante and ex-post adaptation are comple-
ments. For instance, improving disaster management in anticipation of a higher number of climate-induced
catastrophes e.g. by acquiring one more fire engine makes the reaction to an event more powerful. Hence,
anticipatory adaptation here enhances the marginal benefit of coupled reactive adaptation, and elevating the
former will also lead to an increment of the latter. In certain cases the two types may not influence each
other at all.
In an extension to integrate uncertainty over future climate change, from now on there exist s possible states
of the world, associated with a different damage function in each sector/region combination. The social
planner expects these states to occur with probabilities prs and minimizes intertemporal costs
62:
K =
I, J, T, S∑
i, j, t, s
prs
(
1
1 + ρ
)t [
MKijt(Mijts) +AAijts +RAijts +Rijts(Mts...Mt−1s, AAij1s...AAijt−1s, RAijt)
]
(8.43)
Before the true state of the world is manifest in period π, all anticipatory decisions on mitigation and ex-ante
adaptation up to period π − 1 are optimized over all possible states of the world. Thus, given there is no
knowledge of the true state of the world until period π, prior to that period all Mijt and AAijt will be set
in the same way regardless of the true state s. From period π onwards, uncertainty vanishes and as in the
model under perfect foresight, the choices can be targeted to the true state of the world.
FOCs for the uncertainty periods t < π are
∂MKijt=f (Mijt=f )
∂Mijt=f
= −
I, J, T, S∑
i, j, f+1, s
prs
[(
1
1 + ρ
)t
∂Rijts
∂Mt=f
]
(8.44)
−1 = ∂Rijts
∂RAijts
(8.45)
−1 =
T, S∑
f+1, s
[
prs
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
∂Rijts
∂AAijt=f
]
+
(I, J)′∑
(i, j)′ Ó=(i, j)
T, S∑
f+1, s
[
prs
(
1
1 + ρ
)t ∂R(ij)′ts
∂AAijt=f
]
(8.46)
Equation (8.44) still demands that in the optimum marginal abatement costs must equal the discounted
marginal benefits of abatement, now weighed by the probabilities of the possible different states of the world.
Reactive adaptation is not affected by uncertainty, because it is chosen once damages have been revealed.
Given that the shape of the damage function is determined by s, formally also reactive adaptation depends
on s. The authors further break down FOC (8.46) for an illustrating two-period model in which sectors are
abstracted from and damages occur in region s ǫ {j = 1, ...J = S} with pr {damages occur in region j} = 1S .
For a targeted anticipatory adaptation measure, the marginal effects on a region j can then be extracted as
−1 = 1
S
1
1 + ρ
∂Rjt+1
∂AAjt
. (8.47)
62This assumes risk-neutrality, but Lecocq and Shalizi assure that also under risk aversion the qualitative results of the
analysis would not change. Furthermore, this specification implies that the probability distribution over the states is known
with certainty, an assumption that is not fulfilled in the climate context.
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If the social planner knew which region s had to be protected in advance, he or she would set there
−1 = 1
1 + ρ
∂Rst+1
∂AAst
. (8.48)
Given that Rj Ó=s, t+1 = 0, in the latter case no anticipatory adaptation investment has to be taken for all
unaffected regions j Ó= s, hence also AAj Ó=s, t = 0.
Equation (8.47) implies that when there is uncertainty over where the damages will occur, anticipatory
adaptation will be distributed evenly over all regions possibly affected. The higher the number of possibly
affected regions S or, alternatively, the larger the uncertainty over the spatial realization of an expected
climate-change-induced event, the less ex-ante anticipation is carried out in a region j.63 Under certainty
(equation (8.48)), all anticipatory investments flow into the region that will be affected by climate change.64
For a non-targeted anticipatory adaptation measure that reduces damages in N > 1 out of the J = S regions,
and assuming identical damage functions in all regions, (8.46) collapses to
−1 = N
S
1
1 + ρ
∂Rjt+1
∂AAjt
. (8.49)
The more regions benefit from that measure (N rising), the more anticipatory adaptation takes place. From
comparing (8.47) and (8.49) it is apparent that a region j will generally be better protected if a non-targeted
adaptation measure is relied on than if a targeted measure is implemented, because the uncertainty with
respect to the latter undermines its benefits and ultimately leads to a lower level of anticipatory adaptation
investment.65
Reactive adaptation is also likely to be affected by uncertainty indirectly. Since uncertainty reduces the
marginal benefit of anticipatory adaptation and if reactive and anticipatory adaptation are substitutes, more
reactive adaptation will be relied on.
From this analysis follows a ranking of adaptation measures: Where damages are expected to occur with
high probability in certain regions such as coastal areas, targeted anticipatory adaptation is likely to be the
best choice. If a country will probably be hit by climate change, but the exact localization of damages within
its territory is unclear, it should engage preferably in non-targeted anticipatory adaptation. If the damage
risk is perceived to be low and the geographical distribution of those unlikely damages unknown, relying on
reactive adaptation is the advisable option.
For a given distribution of targeted and non-targeted measures, the optimal level of mitigation is not affected
by the localization of damages, as long as they occur somewhere with certainty, so that for this two-period
model equation (8.44) simplifies to
∂MKjt (Mjt)
∂Mjt
= −
S=J∑
j=1
(
1
S
1
1 + ρ
∂Rjt+1
∂Mt
)
= − 1
1 + ρ
∂Rjt+1
∂Mt
. (8.50)
Uncertainty about the magnitude affects both mitigation and anticipatory adaptation66, but under uncer-
63With rising S, for equation (8.47) to hold, also the marginal benefit of anticipatory adaptation in region j,
∂Rs, t+1
∂AAs, t
, must
increase. With declining marginal benefits of adaptation, a higher marginal benefit corresponds to lower levels of adaptation.
64If the damage functions were equal for all regions, equations (8.47) and (8.48) imply that aggregated anticipatory adaptation
investments over all regions J = S would be the same, too.
65Not only are damages assumed to respond equally to an additional unit of either targeted or non-targeted anticipatory
adaptation, Lecocq and Shalizi also assume identical cost functions for both targeted and non-targeted adaptation measures.
66Although probably not to the same extent, see the end of the section.
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tainty over the spatial realization of damages the benefits of anticipatory adaptation only are reduced, so
that the global planner probably transfers resources from anticipatory adaptation to mitigation. In a non-
cooperative setting, this is not clear, because then global mitigation is not controlled by a single planner. If
a regional planner wants to protect a region under its control against climate change, boosting anticipatory
or reactive adaptation that is under his or her control exclusively might be the safer, more effective option.67
Lecocq and Shalizi eventually discuss the impact of budget constraints Bqts on the climate-change-related
expenses of a country q, still under uncertainty for all periods t < π. Then, the country faces the budget
constraint
(I, J)ǫq∑
i, j
[
MKijt(Mijts) +AAijts +RAijts
] ≤ Bqts, ∀t (8.51)
Hence, the following Lagrangian function Z, with the Lagrange multipliers λqts, is minimized over all countries
q, whereby no intertemporal or inter-country transfers are allowed:
Z =
I, J, T, S∑
i, j, t, s
[
prs
(
1
1 + ρ
)t [
MKijt(Mijts) +AAijts +RAijts +Rijts(Mts...Mt−1s, AAij1s...AAijt−1s, RAijt)
]]
+
T, S,Q∑
t, s, q
[
prs
(
1
1 + ρ
)t]
λqts
(I, J)ǫq∑
i, j
[
MKijt(Mijts) +AAijts +RAijts
]−Bqts
 (8.52)
The mitigation FOC is obtained as follows:
∂Z
∂Mijt=f
= (1 + λqt)
∂MKijt(Mijt=f )
∂Mijt=f
+
I, J, T, S∑
i, j, f+1, s
[
prs
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
∂Rijts
∂Mt=f
]
= 0
⇐⇒ ∂M
K
ijt=f (Mijt=f )
∂Mijt=f
= −
I, J, T, S∑
i, j, f+1, s
[
prs
(1 + λqt)
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
∂Rijts
∂Mt=f
]
. (8.53)
The FOCs for reactive and anticipatory adaptation are obtained similarly:
−(1 + λqt) = ∂Rijts
∂RAijts
(8.54)
−(1 + λqt) =
T, S∑
f+1, s
[
prs
(
1
1 + ρ
)t
∂Rijts
∂AAijt=f
]
+
(I, J)′∑
(i, j)′ Ó=(i, j)
T, S∑
f+1, s
[
prs
(
1
1 + ρ
)t ∂R(ij)′ts
∂AAijt=f
]
(8.55)
If the budget constraint is binding, λqt > 0, this parameter gauges the shadow value of an additional unit of
resource endowment that can be spent on combatting climate change.
Lecocq and Shalizi differentiate early budget constraints, before uncertainty is resolved, from later budget
constraints, when the true state of the world has been unveiled. The former constraints limit expenses on
67These questions are addressed in chapter 12.
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mitigation and ex-ante adaptation, the latter restrict means for reactive adaptation. The authors then discuss
two scenarios.
If early budget constraints in a country q bite, but due to economic growth later budgets are expected to be
sufficiently high to pay the whole climate bill, this means that in contrast to reactive adaptation mitigation
and anticipatory adaptation will be underfunded. Hence, it is recommendable to invest currently scarce
resources in such anticipatory adaptation that is likely to benefit many sectors and regions and that cannot
be satisfactorily substituted by reactive adaptation. On the international level, in order to raise efficiency of
mitigation and adaptation investments globally, affected countries in need should receive funding transfers
to assist them with mitigation and anticipatory adaptation.
In the second scenario, when early budget constraints give sufficient leeway, but later constraints are expected
to be more restrictive due to economic or climate-change-induced shocks, current resources should be focused
on such anticipatory adaptation that acts as a substitute to reactive adaptation. The international community
should provide help once the damages occur.
Lecocq and Shalizi conclude that if both uncertainty over the localization of future damages and the risk
of future budget constraints prevail, neither anticipatory adaptation, especially targeted one, nor reactive
adaptation provides a satisfying option.
Subsequently, they debate the viability of financial transfers from the present to the future as a means
to improve the situation. As the scope for market-based solutions including insurance schemes is limited
particularly in developing countries, Lecocq and Shalizi suggest the setup of public rainy-day funds, which
essentially means accumulating public savings for worse times. They acknowledge the political challenge
of defending such a fund against forces that prefer increasing fiscal spending at present, especially if their
financial return is lower than the discount rate. The return will probably be low. First because, due to
uncertainty over the temporary pattern of damages, means for reactive adaptation have to be always held
available. Second because the government probably preferably engages in low-risk, low-return investments.
However, also in a scenario in which the return falls short of the discount rate, saving for reactive adaptation
can be advisable, namely if the returns to reactive adaptation are likely to be high. Rainy-day funds set
up by the international community bear the additional appealing feature that they may provide help with
reactive adaptation where needed, whereas a single country is always more at “risk” to save at possibly a low
interest rate, but not to be affected by climate change.68
8.4.2.2 Discussion
The article of Lecocq and Shalizi provides many very useful insights. Especially their careful treatment of
the varying characteristics of adaptation is remarkable. Lecocq and Shalizi do not only distinguish between
anticipatory and reactive adaptation, to which difference adaptation modellers have paid only little attention
so far, but they also analyze the effect that uncertainty over the localization of damages has on adaptation,
explicitly taking the spatial dimension into account. By trading targeted anticipatory adaptation off against
non-targeted one, they introduce a new attribute of adaptation to the debate that to my knowledge has not
been mooted yet. Furthermore, they provide a useful, practice-oriented guide that ranks different adaptation
strategies against each other in the face of uncertainty.
The article elaborates the advantage that mitigation has over anticipatory adaptation, when uncertainty
over the geographical damage distribution is recognized. Since the benefits of mitigation occur globally, such
68Cp. Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), pp. 2ff.
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uncertainty does not diminish them, whereas it reduces the expected benefits of anticipatory adaptation for
a local community, if there is a real chance that the adaptation effort is wasted.
Still, while the authors mention that both mitigation and adaptation also suffer from uncertainty over the
overall magnitude of damages, neither within the model nor in the discussion do they distinguish the impact
this uncertainty has on the different, available options to combat climate change. This becomes most apparent
in equation (8.37), where residual damages are defined as Rijt(M1...Mt−1, AAij1...AAijt−1, RAijt). This
specification suggests that both period t−1 mitigation as well as period t−1 anticipatory adaptation pay off
in the next model period. The authors make no statement on the length of one period, but the cost-benefit
cycle of mitigation measures is certainly longer than that of most anticipatory adaptation measures, so that
probably only mitigation actions M1...Mt−x with x ≫ 1 have a notable effect on damages in period t. Not
only may some mitigation projects that aim at large-scale changes of energy supply take substantial time to
realize, but also the carbon cycle delays the effect of mitigation by decades. In contrast, even such fixed-
capital-intensive anticipatory adaptation as coastal protection may be accomplished within a decade.69 Recall
that in AD-WITCH (Bosello et al. (2010a,b)) the adaptation investment cycle is modelled to take only up
to five years. Hence, anticipatory adaptation (and of course reactive adaptation) has a significant competitive
advantage over mitigation with respect to uncertainty over the magnitude of impacts, as mitigation has to
be carried out comparatively early to reduce future damages. Because the cost-benefit cycle of anticipatory
adaptation is shorter than that of mitigation, anticipatory adaptation can be held off until a much later point
in time, when more information on the magnitude of damages has been gained. This makes adaptation more
adjustable to the challenge.
Furthermore, by not defining particular forms for the mitigation and adaptation functions, the model sidesteps
a statement on the overall potential of these options to tackle climate change. For instance, the model does
not reflect on the likely limits to adaptation in cancelling impacts from climate change, whereas mitigation
can avoid the climate problem in the first place.
Moreover, the differentiation the authors make between targeted and non-targeted anticipatory adaptation
measures appears rather strict. Maybe it would be more realistic to consider the fact that probably most
adaptation measures that are targeted exert both a marginal benefit on their target region, but also positive
spillovers on non-targeted regions. For instance, probably almost all adaptation measures will at least create
knowledge spillovers on neighbour regions, although this accumulated experience must not be relevant, if the
neighbour regions face a very distinct challenge from climate change. The combined targeted and non-targeted
effects could still be captured by equation (8.40) without the need for an amendment.
Regarding the discussion of rainy-day funds on a national level, setting them up may not be the best option,
as long as they are primarily motivated by the scenario that a country faces relative abundance of financial
means in the present, but becomes poorer over time. In that case, it should probably rather foster its economic
growth than build up a rainy-day fund that potentially yields low interests. If a climate-induced shock is
expected to cause the tightness of later budgets, as the authors assume as one scenario70, then anticipatory
measures might be the better choice compared to saving money for reactive adaptation. Small island states
that are at risk of disappearing due to sea level rise will face serious budget constraints, too, given that their
capital base is likely to be destroyed. However, their inhabitants certainly do better to migrate in advance
rather than save for reactive adaptation and wait until the disaster takes place. Therefore, an applicable
case example of a country that does not face serious budget constraints already now, but only in the future,
69This timeframe is the ambition for the underwater dam created to protect Venice from flooding, s. BBC (2005).
70S. Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), p. 36.
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would be helpful. On an international level, such rainy-day funds may certainly have their place, as existing
crisis intervention funds prove.
As the analysis in most cases does not go beyond the discussion of the FOCs, possibly some of the useful
conclusions could have been drawn without the help of the model. While the model introduces a sectoral
differentiation (index i), the model makes very little use of it. Therefore, the index could probably be dropped
to simplify the notation a bit without affecting the model conclusions.
8.4.3 Buob and Stephan (2010)
8.4.3.1 Model and results
Buob and Stephan (2010) aim to analyze a non-cooperative regions’ game scenario “in which mitigation
and adaptation are perfect substitutes in protecting against climate impacts”71. They ask whether in absence
of a binding mitigation treaty a rationally-acting single country would rather rely upon adaptation rather
than engaging in mitigation.
In the model, J (world) regions are governed by regional social planners that aim at maximizing regional
welfare over two periods, t=1,2. Regional period t welfare is determined not only by consumption Cjt, but
also the regional environmental quality, Ejt. The initial environmental quality E1 > 0 is the same in all
regions. In period 2, regional environmental qualities Ej2 are enhanced by the sum of all regions’ mitigation
actions MM =
J∑
j=1
Mj , which take place in period 1 only, and by regional adaptation Aj , which takes place
in period 2 only and whose effect is limited to the country that adapts. Period 2 environmental quality adds
up to
Ej2 = E1 +MM +Aj , (8.56)
establishing mitigation and adaptation as perfect substitutes to raise environmental quality, whereby the
effect of mitigation is delayed by one period to reflect the longer cost-benefit cycle of mitigation. Mitigation
action in one region causes positive spillover effects on the environmental qualities of all other regions.
Utility Ujt is derived from consumption and environmental quality, and a logarithmic Cobb-Douglas utility
function assumed:
Ujt = ε lnCjt + (1− ε) lnEjt, (8.57)
with 0 < ε < 1 being the elasticity of consumption. At the beginning of period 1 each region receives an
identical exogenous world income yj , which it can spend either on consumption, on mitigation Mj or save
for the next period, with savings denoted as Sj .
72 In period 2, savings can either be consumed or used for
adaptation Aj . Hence, the regional planners face the following two budget constraints:
yj = Cj1 +KMj (Mj) + Sj for t = 1 (8.58)
(1 + ρ)Sj = Cj2 +KAj (Aj) for t = 2 (8.59)
71Buob and Stephan (2010), p. 1.
72Production is excluded from the model.
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On savings a return with an exogenous market interest rate ρ > 0 is earned. KM (Mj) and KA(Aj) determine
the costs of mitigation and adaptation measures, respectively. At first, Buob and Stephan assume constant
marginal costs for both, in all regions,
KMj (Mj) = ζMj (8.60)
KAj (Aj) = rAj , (8.61)
with cost parameters ζ, r > 0. The model is then solved by backward induction. In period 2, each region’s
planner maximizes utility (8.57) subject to (8.59), taking into account (8.56). Intermediate solutions A
′
j and
C
′
j2 are obtained, which are still dependent on M
∗
j and S
∗
j . Hence, subject to (8.58), in a second step the
intertemporal welfare function is maximized,
W = Uj1 + βUj2, (8.62)
with a discount factor 0 < β < 1. Given that marginal/average benefits as well as costs of both mitigation
and adaptation are assumed constant, a corner solution with respect to M∗j and A
∗
j is likely. In fact, from
(8.56) it is apparent that the marginal benefits of mitigation and adaptation are identical73; therefore, if the
marginal/average costs of mitigation are lower than the discounted marginal/average costs of adaptation,
hence ζ < r1+ρ , only mitigation takes place and A
∗
j = 0. The higher the number of regions J that mitigate,
the lower is the regional contribution to global mitigation, because the marginal benefits from environmental
quality in utility terms are decreasing. If ζ > r1+ρ , only adaptation takes place and M
∗
J = 0. For ζ =
r
1+ρ ,
there is an infinite set of solutions.74 If the initial environmental quality E1 is very high, due to the declining
marginal benefits from environmental quality in terms of utility, it may happen that both M∗j = A
∗
j = 0.
75
To avoid the either/or solutions, for the rest of the paper Buob and Stephan replace the adaptation cost
function (8.61) by
KAji(Aj) =
rAj
E1 +MM
, (8.63)
thus impose “the more realistic assumption [...] that marginal costs of adaptation depend on initial environ-
mental quality as well as on global mitigation”. To justify this, they refer to the work of Parry et al. (2001)76
and to the argument of Ingham et al. (2005) presented in section 8.4.1 that mitigation reduces the speed of
climate change and thereby the adaptation costs.77 In this context, Buob and Stephan argue: “Adaptation
73From a single region’s perspective. For the world, the marginal/average benefits of mitigation are J times higher than the
marginal/average benefits of adaptation due to the former’s externality.
74The model makes no statement on the relationship between the social planner’s discount factor β and the market interest
rate ρ. However, β does not enter the decision on mitigation vs. and adaptation, because the benefits from both accrue in period
2.
75The solutions for M∗j and A
∗
j in the different scenarios are given explicitly in the article and straightforward to derive. They
are not reproduced here, as they are not needed for the further discussion.
76Who actually do not discuss the complementarity/substitutability issue and must be regarded as misquoted.
77Buob and Stephan (2010), p. 2. In another publication, in which Buob and Stephan again heavily draw on the comple-
mentarity hypothesis, they write: “The just mentioned papers [that support the consideration of mitigation and adaptation as
substitutes] have in common that they focus on the main characteristics of mitigation and adaptation only, and thus, analyze
the interaction of mitigation and adaptation from a general perspective only. However, a review of the impact literature, which
focuses on applied and detailed studies with respect to spatial and sectoral scale, again exhibits diverse views on the interrela-
tionships between mitigation and adaptation”, Buob and Stephan (2009). p. 6. However, Buob and Stephan construct a model
in which mitigation and adaptation are considered in aggregate form, so that in that article also this statement contradicts
rather than supports their complements approach.
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reduces a region’s vulnerability to climate change and variability. Mitigation improves the global environ-
mental quality, which in turn reduces regions’ vulnerability, and hence, the lower can be the investment in
adaptation”78.
8.4.3.2 Discussion
The latter explanation deserves to be discussed. Even though with more mitigation less damages from climate
change can be expected overall, for a given damage level, adaptation costs (and their functional form should)
remain unchanged. It is not clear whether mitigation influences the vulnerability to climate change; first and
foremost mitigation reduces climate change and, as a result, makes less adaptation necessary. This causal link
is what determines them as substitutes and not as complements though. Buob and Stephan also summarize:
“A typical way to adapt to undesirable effects of global warming is to invest in protecting infrastructure,
and typically the investment costs are lower, the lower the expected damages are. Hence, costs of adaptation
depend on the present environmental quality as well as on mitigation”79. Again, with less expected damages,
adaptation investments may be lowered, but the investment cost structure remains the same.
Moreover, the assumption (8.63) that adaptation costs are declining not only in mitigation, but also in the
initial environmental quality is not substantiated. If the world starts with a “healthier climate”, probably
less adaptation is needed, but the reason why this should impact the form of the adaptation cost function is
not obvious.
To avoid the strict either/or solutions of the type described above, the rest and the bulk of the paper
relies on assumption (8.63). Buob and Stephan analyze how different combinations of initial income yj and
environmental quality E1 influence regional adaptation and mitigation decisions. Some of the model results
appear rather dubious. It comes at no surprise and seems plausible that at low levels of initial incomes and
a high level of environmental quality - maybe to be dubbed the “pre-industrial case” - the planners prefer
spending their resources on consumption and set M∗i = A
∗
i = 0. For both low levels of income and highly
detoriated environmental quality though, due to the link between environmental quality and adaptation
established in (8.63) the model predicts that such deprived regions will only engage in mitigation. The
low-income/low-environmental quality scenario probably best refers to a developing country that is already
heavily affected by climate change. Intuitively, one would expect that in such a scenario a region would
prefer to raise its environmental quality rather quickly, hence preferably invest in adaptation with a shorter
cost-benefit cycle than mitigation.80 More striking, in view of the whole chapter 7 that reports on the
billions that need to be spent over the next decades to protect the inhabitants and economies of particularly
developing countries against climate change, the prediction that these countries are willing to abstain from
adaptation entirely, appears not credible. Most work in the article builds on assumption (8.63) and is not
further presented here.
It is a notable feature of the model that the utility function explicitly involves two goods, namely a con-
sumption good and environmental quality. In many economic models of climate change, only consumption
enters the utility function, so that the properties with respect to (the possible limits to) the substitutability
between consumption and a natural climate are often obscure. The utility function (8.57) constitutes con-
sumption and environmental quality as imperfect substitutes, acknowledging an independent amenity value
of the environment and taking into account the increasing difficulty to substitute for a detoriating climate.
78Buob and Stephan (2010), p. 4.
79Buob and Stephan (2010), p. 13.
80In contrast to mitigation, the adaptation measures will furthermore target the own region exclusively. However, in the
model it is assumed that the marginal benefit of mitigation and adaptation on the own region are equal.
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Buob and Stephan also make explicit assumptions on the shape of the mitigation and adaptation cost and
benefit functions, allowing them to derive explicit analytical solutions for the model’s control and state
variables and analyze their comparative statics. Unfortunately, those assumptions appear wrong in most
parts.
To start with, it is said that mitigation and adaptation enhance the environmental quality on the planet,
although it is closer to reality to say that mitigation prevents the detoriation of the environment (the climate),
while adaptation does not influence the environmental framework conditions, but aims at making the best
out of the existing ones. The model specification also raises the question what happens if no mitigation or
adaptation measures are carried out - does it mean that the environmental quality is too low then and it has
to be first built up by these actions, or does it imply that the state of climate is bad already and needs to be
pushed back by mitigation and adaptation, assuming reversibility of climate change? Also it is impossible to
analytically distinguish residual costs of climate change that still accrue despite of mitigation and adaptation.
The model suffers here from the lack of a damage module.
The only general distinction between adaptation and mitigation that is made is that mitigation takes longer to
take an effect, acknowledging the longer cost-benefit cycle of mitigation. However, the authors do not explain
why they specify both linear cost and benefit functions for both mitigation and adaptation.81 Furthermore,
relying on adaptation exclusively appears as a sufficient option in the model to combat climate change,
although it does not go to the root of the problem, and may face technical limits at high levels of climate
change. Buob and Stephan do not explain these strong assumptions. Of course, combining four linear cost
and benefit functions must lead to the kind of switching behaviour that Buob and Stephan observe, where
either zero mitigation or adaptation is the regular case. Therefore, the authors then introduce a fix in
form of imposing the complementarity property, with adaptation costs that rely on global mitigation and
environmental quality, but they do not pay attention to the underlying assumptions, as criticized above.
8.5 Summary and conclusions
The significance of adaptation to climate change is rising, which is being increasingly reflected in economic
modelling of climate change. Integrated assessment modellers have recently ramped up efforts to include
adaptation in their models. Unfortunately, the approaches chosen raise questions. In their adaptation mod-
elling review, Agrawala et al. (2011) conclude referring to conceptual adaptation models that “investigation
in this field is however still at an early stage and generalisable conclusions cannot be drawn”82. They are
slightly more optimistic when assessing IAMs with adaptation, commenting: “Even though [their] quantita-
tive insights should be handled with care, some realibility can be placed on a number of qualitative findings
which are robust across models and scenarios”83.
The main concern arising is that too little time seems to have been spent on either an empirical or logical
grounding of the adaptation modules, some of which fail basic reality checks. The assumption inherent in
PAGE that both marginal costs and benefits of adaptation are linear is very strong, and the important feature
of increasing marginal benefits to adaptation in the modified version of FEEM-RICE remains to be justified,
let alone mentioned. The specification of adaptation in AD-DICE lets adaptation appear at least theoretically
81These properties also remain under the modified adaptation cost function (8.63), when mitigation in (8.63) is kept constant.
82Agrawala et al. (2011), p. 278.
83Agrawala et al. (2011), p. 277. This raises again the question why to bother with a numerical model if the data it provides
may anyway not be considered as robust, s. section 1.6.
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as a measure that is able to prevent even the most disastrous impacts of climate change. With AD-WITCH,
a more careful attempt has been undertaken to approximate some of the different dimensions of adaptation,
including both anticipatory and reactive adaptation and accumulable reactive adaptation knowledge. The
mathematical properties of AD-WITCH’s adaptation function also appears overall more adequate than those
of the other models’ adaptation functions.
However, at the latest after the review of the many different adaptation measures in chapter 6, it should
become clear that these IAMs pursue an insurmountable task. While it is to a certain extent justifiable to
operate with aggregate mitigation functions - since most mitigation measures are comparatively homogenous
in objectives and effects, as pointed out in 8.2 - an aggregated approach to adaptation with the ambition
to provide robust numerical results is most probably doomed to fail. The adaptation IAMs try to capture
adaptation across all sectors within a single adaptation function, although adaptation might pursue quite
different objectives and yields varying benefits in the different sectors. Regional differences of adaptation cost
structures identified by some models were poorly explained and rarely linked to considerations of differentiated
vulnerability and economic structures across the countries.
None of this would be too serious a problem if these augmented IAMs would not follow their predecessors’
tradition of calculating figures for the cost and benefits of the policy options to combat climate change, now
including adaptation, using and extrapolating real world data. This procedure may delude the uninformed
reader who, short of a better alternative, takes the results of the models as best educated guesses, whereby
I recall from chapter 1 that there is the considerable risk that some of these figures are not robust and
potentially flawed.
Serious doubts were cast on the ability of IAMs to compute optimal emissions trajectories and abatement
plans for a number of reasons discussed earlier. Due to its varying characteristics, adaptation might be more
difficult to empirically capture than mitigation and therefore adds a further, significant problem to the already
existing myriads of uncertainties that are blended in IAMs. In other words, it appears that by computing
some costs and benefits of adaptation in the way they do, IAMs go a step further into the unknown or on
the dead end street, and the confidence and the chutzpah of IAM modellers to do so may be perceived as
startling.
With respect to the stylized models reviewed, there is light and shadow. The model of Lecocq and Shalizi
(2007) provides new and useful insights. Its special contribution lies in its consideration of spatial uncertainty,
which advantages reactive and non-targeted anticipatory adaptation measures over targeted anticipatory
adaptation measures. The model however does not produce explicit solutions that e.g. allow the analysis of
comparative statics.
The modelling of mitigation and adaptation in Ingham et al. (2005) and Buob and Stephan (2010) seems
less carefully done, and especially in the latter publication in parts inappropriate. While it is to some
extent understandable that IAMs simplify to keep their models manageable and calibratable, which process
large amounts of data, those stylized models do not make much effort to capitalize on the fact that they
do not have to process data. Since they are released from the task of producing numerical estimates, but
aim at drawing general conclusions on the optimal emissions trajectories, one may certainly expect that the
assumptions on mathematical properties of their models are made with care, that they realistically reflect the
main properties of the processes under scrutiny and that their underlying intuitions are well-explained. In
all three conceptual models though some basic properties that distinguishes mitigation from adaptation were
either not or wrongly reflected and contradictions to reality often not pointed out. Ingham et al. (2005) do
not embed any conceptual difference between mitigation and adaptation at all; Lecocq and Shalizi (2007)
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do not pay attention to the different length of cost-benefit cycles of mitigation and anticipatory adaptation,
and Buob and Stephan (2010) fail to describe any property that distinguishes these options apart from
their different timing.
As a further aspect, it is surprising that while all the IAMs reviewed do not dwell much on a possible
complementarity between mitigation and adaptation and straightly assume substitutability, the fact that
Ingham et al. (2005) investigate this issue in great detail is probably owed to the fact that it is a comparatively
early model. However, it is at least very surprising that despite the broad consensus reported in section 8.2
that on an aggregate level mitigation and adaptation may be regarded as (imperfect) substitutes, Buob and
Stephan (2010) need to rely on the complementarity hypothesis to produce some non-corner solutions for
their model. Furthermore, it can be questioned whether or not the models are suited to actually answer the
question whether aggregated mitigation or adaptation are substitutes or not. The answer to this question
always seems pre-defined by the cost functions that are assumed in the model, hence the answer is determined
exogenously, not endogenously.
To conclude, economic modelling of adaptation is in its early stages, and efforts in this research area have
started only recently. While IAMs despite their theoretical problems and the lack of robust data continue
to pursue estimating optimal mitigation and, now, adaptation trajectories, the stylized models do not make
sufficient advantage of their ability to simplify.
In the next chapter, I extend SLICE to a stylized model that includes adaptation as well as offers explicit
analytical solutions, going beyond the consideration of FOCs.
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Chapter 9
A New Adaptation Characteristic:
Alleviating versus Cancelling
Adaptation
9.1 Introduction
In chapter 8.3, it transpired that some adaptation models assume very powerful means of adaptation, seem-
ingly able to clean up damages potentially completely. This chapter elaborates that adaptation functions can
be grouped into two categories. Some of them constitute what I will call “cancelling adaptation” and some
of them “alleviating adaptation”, which pair adds a new adaptation characteristic to the others compiled
in section 6.2. In the following two sections, the properties of these two types are explored and a rough
judgement is given to what kind of adaptation measures each of the two types most likely applies, before
section 9.4 discusses which type is implicitly assumed in existing IAMs that have an adaptation module. In
section 9.5, I argue that as long as aggregate adaptation (as opposed to a particular adaptation measure)
is considered, alleviating adaptation should be assumed. This result is embedded in the SLICE adaptation
module (chapter 10).
9.2 Cancelling adaptation
For the following, a standard convex damage function is assumed. Furthermore, no statement on the time
dimension is made, hence the time indices can be dropped and no distinction between reactive and anticipatory
adaptation is made. First, the case in which adaptation is assumed to effect a linear reduction of damages is
considered. The simplest possible adaptation function representing this case is
R = D −ACA, (9.1)
with absolute1 gross damages D (caused by temperature rise), absolute residual damages R and cancelling
1“Absolute” here means not defined as relative to GDP.
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adaptation ACA ≤ D.
In this setting, adaptation has the potential to bring residual damages down to zero, hence I classify it as
“cancelling adaptation”. If adaptation takes place, the damage curve shifts downwards, as illustrated in
Figure 9.1: For zero cancelling adaptation, ACA = 0, damages occur for any positive deviation from the
R
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Figure 9.1: Cancelling adaptation
global or regional mean temperature, △T > 0. With cancelling adaptation, ACA > 0, damages occur only
above a certain threshold, △T ′. Put differently, adaptation cancels all adverse impacts from climate change
up to this threshold, which is controlled through the adaptation expenditures made.
Definition 8. Cancelling adaptation can potentially reduce residual damage to zero.
In Figure 9.2, the residual damage-adaptation relationship for a fixed level of gross damages D is plotted,
assuming it as strictly linear. If A˜CA = D, residual damages are zero.
Drawing on the list of adaptation measures compiled in chapter 6, it is considered which specific adaptation
measures may be regarded as cancelling in the sense that below the threshold that they have shifted upwards
they completely avoid damages. For instance, within agriculture, planting new crop types that are better-
suited to prosper under future climatic conditions may prevent crop failures and famines, provided that
old and new crop types are perfect consumption substitutes. Alternatively or complementarily, upgraded
irrigation systems may compensate for the lack of precipitation. Despite its very high costs, desalination
of sea water may fully compensate for the disappearance of natural water reservoirs. The vaccination of
an individual may fully protect it against a disease that is likely to spread under new climatic conditions.
A stabilized railway embankment may resist more frequent and more extreme weather events triggered by
climate change. It seems that in these examples adaptation is able to neutralize impacts completely, at least
as long as climate change does not lead to catastrophic damages. These example cases are revisited at the end
of this chapter. As a comment, the residual damage function (9.1) depicted in Figure 9.1 is highly simplified.
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Figure 9.2: Residual damages and cancelling adaptation for a given level of gross damages D
In a particular sector it may look quite different, and discontinuities may appear. The example of coastal
protection as a cancelling adaptation measure is discussed in appendix B.
9.3 Alleviating adaptation
In contrast to cancelling adaptation, alleviating adaptation does not shift the damage curve outwards, but
rather reduces its slope, so that impacts still occur also for moderate temperature increases.
Definition 9. Alleviating adaptation can reduce residual damages, but never bring them down to zero.
In chapter 8, a prototype approach for modelling alleviating adaptation has already appeared. Such an
approach was taken by AD-WITCH, see equations (8.22) and (8.28). There, adaptation lowers the slope
of the (residual) damage curve and diminishes damages at any level by the same percentage rate. For the
residual damage function defined in (8.22), this rate amounts to A1+A · 100%. Figure 9.3 depicts the effect of
alleviating adaptation to the damage function: its rate of change drops. In Figure 9.4, the residual damage-
adaptation curve for a fixed level of gross damages D is drawn; in AD-WITCH, the marginal returns to
adaptation are declining. Adaptation is to be classified as alleviating, because for any AAD−WITCH ≥ 0
always R > 0.
In the following, some examples of adaptation measures that help to curb adverse impacts of climate change,
but not completely neutralize them, are given. For instance, it is unlikely that measures such as habitat
protection and habitat creation are sufficient to maintain the current level of biodiversity, because climate
change is likely to occur comparatively rapidly, so that those species that cannot successfully migrate to
another habitat become extinct. Alternatively, the installation of early-warning systems can help optimizing
the preparations against future disasters, but possibly not completely avoid their associated impacts. The
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Figure 9.3: Alleviating adaptation in AD-WITCH
same is true for any disaster management system, regardless of its level of efficiency, by definition it becomes
active once a disaster has occurred to minimize its consequences. Water transfer from another region to meet
local water scarcity triggered by climate change probably causes residual costs in the region of origin.
9.4 Cancelling and alleviating adaptation in existing adaptation
modelling approaches
In PAGE (equation ((8.1)), AD-DICE (equation (8.10)) and AD-RICE (equation (8.15)), adaptation is
modelled to effect a linear reduction of climate damages, indicating the implicit assumption of cancelling
adaptation. However, due to the fact that in these models adaptation reduces damages relatively (i.e. by a
certain percentage rate) rather than by an absolute amount, the damage function does not shift, but its rate
of change decreases. This happens in a way that is actually very similar to that in AD-WITCH; again Figure
9.3 applies, whereby damages are reduced anywhere on the damage function by the same A · 100%2.3
In disaccordance with AD-WITCH, in PAGE, AD-DICE and AD-RICE the marginal benefits to adaptation
are linear, so that Figure 9.2 applies for the residual damages-adaptation relationship, where instead of
A˜CA = D now A˜CA = 1 marks the level of adaptation that eliminates 100% of damages. These models
exhibit a striking difference compared to AD-WITCH: Adaptation is assumed to be cancelling in that sense
that through means of adaptation, at least theoretically, 100% of damages can be “cleaned up”; for any
ACA ≥ A˜CA strictly R = 0, also regardless of the size of D.4
2Referring to AD-DICE; in PAGE damages are reduced by A%.
3This raises the same conceptual issues that were pointed out below equation (8.28) in section 8.3.4.2. In absolute terms,
the same resources spent on adaptation prevent the more impacts, the stronger climate change is. Put mathematically, from
the AD-DICE adaptation function (8.10), it follows that ∂D
∂A
= −D, thus the marginal damages diminished by adaptation are
increasing in damages. This also relates to the question on the effects of multiplicative damages raised by Heal (2009), which
were discussed earlier in section 1.5.3; the common damage functions make absolute damages and abatement expenses ultimately
dependent on levels of GDP. This contentious property also applies to the adaptation extensions, in which adaptation benefits
are via the damages directly linked to the levels of GDP.
4In PAGE, only values between 50-90% are set for the adaptation variable that corresponds to this discussion, so that it is
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Figure 9.4: Residual damages and alleviating adaptation in AD-WITCH
Cancelling Alleviating
AD-DICE AD-WITCH
AD-RICE FEEM-RICE
PAGE
Adaptation
Table 9.1: Cancelling or alleviating adaptation: existing IAMs
With respect to the modified version of FEEM-RICE, as already discussed in section 8.3.3.2, its adaptation
module is somewhat odd, establishing increasing marginal benefits of adaptation. As can be seen from
equations (8.18) and (8.19), in that model adaptation can never completely restore the gross output obtained
under a scenario without climate damages, which implies that alleviating adaptation is assumed.
The classification of the IAMs, discussed in chapter 8, according to the new adaptation characteristic identified
in this chapter is summarized in Table 9.1. The adaptation modelling approaches of the stylized adaptation
models reviewed in section 8.4 are not included in this discussion, because either they do not assume an
explicit form for an adaptation function, or the assumed form is too peculiar.
9.5 Implications
In this chapter, a new adaptation characteristic was introduced, motivated by different approaches to model
adaptation in IAMs, whereby these differences were not outspoken. Cancelling adaptation is defined as such
adaptation that is generally capable of eliminating any adverse impacts from climate change; alleviating
adaptation does not possess this ability.
Not all possible shades around this issue were discussed. For instance, it may be well possible that an
exogenously ruled out that more than 90% of damages are cancelled, s. section 8.3.1.2. The reason for operating within this
range and the question what would happen with adaptation values that exceed 90% are not touched on, possibly to avoid the
debate started in this chapter.
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adaptation measure can completely cancel impacts for moderate temperature increases, but loses this ability
for more extreme climate change. Furthermore, the cancelling/alleviating characteristic does not touch on
disastrous climate change, which may mean that adaptation of any kind can no longer be of help to dampen
impacts. It should be pointed out that linearity of the adaptation function is not the crucial characteristic
that makes adaptation cancelling; it is the substractabiliy of adaptation from damages. Also an adaptation
function such as
R = D −
√
A (9.2)
would constitute cancelling adaptation, whereby the marginal benefits of adaptation are declining.
The crucial question now is which type of adaptation should be assumed, when adaptation to climate change
is modelled. Of course, if the modelling occurs at a sectoral level, the sector’s features should be represented
as close to reality as possible; as the examples indicated, different adaptation functions may prove most
appropriate for different types of adaptation measures.5 Given that in this work, in parallel with the models
reviewed earlier, the focus lies on the modelling of aggregated adaptation, the key question here is which
modelling strategy is most appropriate to approximate aggregate adaptation.
Reconsidering the examples that were given at the end of section 9.2 for adaptation measures that have
the potential to completely cancel impacts, it turns out that these measures are probably certainly able to
neutralize climate damages on an individual level, but it is questionable whether this property holds when
damages, affected regions and adaptation efforts are scaled up. Some parts of stabilized infrastructure may
withstand more frequent and heavier storms, but others will probably not; furthermore, damages to single
segments of networks such as electricity grids or water management systems may compromise the overall
services the networks provide. Desalination of sea-water to tackle problems of water scarcity is an option
only for coastal regions.6 Vaccination may provide protection against some new diseases that are likely to
spread under new climatic conditions and may save some individuals, but not all of them. Moreover, cancelling
adaptation is defined as such because of its potential power to bring residual damages down to zero. However,
many adaptation measures imply some behavioural or structural change, which often causes secondary costs
that add to the primary adaptation costs. Taking up the last example of climate-induced disease invasion
once again, even though measures such as installation of bednets and usage of indoor insecticides may be
effective in inhibiting the access of spreading transmitters of vector-borne diseases, these measures require
individuals to carefully control these actions, may limit their individual freedom to live in their homes in
the ways they have been used to before climate change and still not restore the original 100% safety level.
To come back to the first example given in section 9.2, even if two crop types are substitutable in the sense
that they both can nourish a regional population equally well, the population has to change its eating habits.
Furthermore, the new crop type imposes a structural change on the local economy, which change is likely to
produce winners and losers, whereby the latter have to bear additional costs. Finally, also coastal protection
that, if successful, clearly prevents damages from sea-level rise and storm floods, still produces residual costs,
namely the loss of wetland on which protecting sea-walls are erected. Even if the impacts of climate change
can be combatted by a mixture of adaptation measures, it seems likely that only a certain fraction of the
impacts can be negated. In AD-DICE, AD-RICE and PAGE the scenario of zero residual damages is not
dealt with, but the fact that their functional specifications allow adaptation to fully cancel damages in the
5It should be noted that there is no definite link between canceling/alleviating and anticipatory/reactive adaptation. The
adaptation characteristic identified in this chapter rather adds to the list of characteristics compiled in section 6.2.
6See section 6.3.4.
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limit, raises the serious question whether these specifications can be deemed generally appropriate or whether
they rather approximate adaptation behaviour at certain segments of the damage functions. In AD-WITCH,
this issue does not arise.
To conclude, on an aggregate level that covers all or a wide range of sectors (hence implying a large variety
of climate-change-induced problems), it seems inadequate to assume or admit cancelling adaptation in the
model framework. For this reason, the approaches taken in AD-DICE, AD-RICE and PAGE are at least
imprecise, and among the models investigated it seems that the approach of AD-WITCH to model adaptation
reflects the properties of aggregated adaptation best.
Remark. When aggregated adaptation is considered, adaptation should be modelled as alleviating.
This is taken into account in the next chapter, where the SLICE adaptation module is developed.
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Chapter 10
Adaptation in SLICE and a Rebound
Effect to Adaptation
10.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the SLICE adaptation module is developed. Section 10.2 narrates the story of the combined
mitigation and adaptation model, before, in section 10.3, the details of the adaptation module are elaborated.
At first, the focus lies on the properties of the SLICE adaptation module, without mitigation. Section 10.4 in-
cludes the standard interior solution of the model, it discusses the growth envelope of adaptation that emerges
in SLICE and the rebound effect to adaptation, furthermore the intertemporal feedback effects of adaptation
investment. Moreover, a resource-constrained economy is considered, and the risk of an adaptation poverty
trap explored. Subsequently, in section 10.5, the adaptation and the mitigation modules are combined, and
the joint model is analyzed. After sketching the standard interior solution, the scenario of a myopic social
planner is considered to highlight the implications from the different intertemporal externalities of mitigation
and adaptation, and the scenario with a binding carbon constraint is taken up again. Robustness checks
are performed to elucidate the impact of the model’s linearity assumptions. In section 10.6, the general
solution to the model for variable damage, adjustment cost and adaptation function exponents is derived and
their domains further defined. Section 10.7 introduces a variation of the adaptation module. Eventually, the
conclusions from these analyses are presented.
10.2 Storyline of the combined mitigation and adaptation model
The combined model’s time horizon consists of three periods, t, t + 1 and t + 2. Hence, the abstract “long
term” period T introduced earlier is discarded. While there is some good reason to think that the current
generation makes a decision for or against substantial mitigation that will shape the Earth’s (production)
infrastructure for a very long time, adaptation can be adjusted comparatively easily and immediately; this
is further elaborated in appendix C.1. No explicit assumption about the length of the periods is made; each
of them probably lasts several decades. In period t, “the present”, the social planner makes a decision with
far-reaching consequences. He determines the composition as well as the capacity of the future capital stock.
This fixes the income available in periods t + 1 and t + 2, but it also influences the climate in period t + 2.
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The less climate-friendly the decisions in period t, the more CO2 is emitted in period t + 1, and the more
extreme are climate change and damages in period t+ 2.
Regarding production, the planner can decide to employ capital that uses either a dirty technology or a clean
technology, or choose a mix of both capital types. The cleaner technology leads to less CO2 emissions during
the production of an aggregated output good. A “dirty, traditional technology” in this sense relies on the
use of a (more) carbon-intense source of energy; that means coal or oil. Clean capital is assumed to require
larger upfront investment per unit of accumulation.
Some clean capital may be installed or replace dirty capital rather instantaneously; but, given that currently
more than 80% of energy production draws on fossil fuels1, a transition to clean technologies on a larger
scale will pose many challenges, including adjustment costs. Electricity systems will have to be reengineered
and extended to cope with more intermittent and spatially diverse renewable generation and distribution to
consumers. Considering biofuels2 or electric cars, existing fuel supply networks have to be upgraded and
extended. Whole supply chains may have to be changed to operate with cleaner capital, e.g. if new materials
are required. In addition to the huge technical challenges to stem a large-scale-energy transition, lock-ins by
the traditional technology and associated path dependency also slow this process further down. Therefore,
in SLICE the transition from dirty to clean technology is (still) assumed to take several decades, hence one
model period. The model still abstracts from instantaneous production capacity adjustments taking place
within the short term, or intraperiodically, so that e.g. bare dirty capital extensions also take effect only with
the one-period delay.3
In all three periods, the social planner can decide to accumulate adaptation capital to alleviate adverse
impacts from climate change.4 Since the model periods are rather long, both reactive and anticipatory
adaptation measures may be assumed to take effect intraperiodically, so that in this version of SLICE no
explicit distinction between reactive and anticipatory adaptation is made. Of course, an investment cycle
of non-marginal duration may also apply to anticipatory adaptation investments, but the crucial hypothesis
here is that the time required to enhance the adaptation capacity against specific challenges arising from
climate change is usually5 significantly shorter than the time needed to fundamentally reengineer the energy
and production infrastructure of the economy, i.e. to mitigate at a large scale. Compared to mitigation,
adaptation touches in many cases less on economy-wide networks and established lock-ins. To account for
this contrast, in this model adaptation investments come into effect during the period of investment.
In acknowledging this distinction between mitigation and adaptation, SLICE follows the procedure of Bosello
et al. (2010a) in constructing AD-WITCH, who state that, compared to adaptation, mitigation has to begin
well in advance. As the first cause that requires mitigation to start earlier than adaptation, they list the
carbon cycle, which delays the benefits from mitigation investment significantly (in SLICE, from period t
to period t + 2). Second, they point out that the investments needed for a decarbonisation of the energy
sector are large and that the slow turnover of energy capital causes a further delay (in SLICE, the mitigation
investment delay occurs from period t to period t+1). In contrast, in AD-WITCH the fruits of anticipatory
adaptation are enjoyed after only maximally one model period, which in AD-WITCH lasts five years.6
1See fn. 30 in section 3.2.5.
2Sidestepping here the question of their eco-balance.
3See for more details the introduction of the mitigation capital stock in chapter 3.2.
4Since the model does not take into account potential benefits from climate change, neither associated adaptation to reap
such benefits is considered.
5An exception might be preventive measures against sea-level rise, which require careful preparation, coordination due to
long coast lines ,and long construction works.
6Cp. Bosello et al. (2010a), p. 81.
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Regarding the timing within a period, at the beginning the economy generates income through production.
Subsequently, investments are taken and residual damages substracted. Both reduce the resource base that
is available for consumption. This order is introduced owing to a technical choice. In reality over the course
of a period of time income is generated, investments are taken and climate damages accrue. Utility is gained
from the period net income spent on consumption.
10.3 The SLICE adaptation module
10.3.1 Adaptation and residual damages
The model still embeds a power function to reflect non-linearly increasing climate damages, as discussed
before in section 3.2.8:
Dt = b(St)
ψ, (10.1)
with gross damages Dt driven by cumulative atmospheric carbon emissions, St, the vulnerability parameter
b > 0 and the damage function exponent, ψ > 1.
The SLICE adaptation function ADt is specified as follows:
ADt =
1
((a+At)e)κ
, (10.2)
with κ > 0 denoting the exponent of the adaptation function. Adaptation capital, At ≥ 0, adds to the
economy’s natural capacity to adapt, a ≥ 1. The size of a is determined by factors such as education,
existing vaccine capacities and maturity of disaster management. The parameter e ≥ 1 gauges the technical
efficiency of the total adaptation capital stock.
Multiplying (10.1) and (10.2), residual damages in SLICE, Rt, are obtained
7:
Rt = Dt ×ADt = b(St)
ψ
((a+At)e)κ
. (10.3)
The adaptation function embedded in (10.3) ensures that the marginal returns to adaptation capital are non-
linear and declining, which reflects that adaptation might become more difficult, the more climate impacts
the planner aims to avert. Appendix C.2 illustrates that these properties hold for any κ > 0. Furthermore,
this form implies alleviating adaptation, which should be assumed for aggregated adaptation modelling. As
elaborated in chapter 9; in SLICE, aggregated residual damages can never be driven to zero.8
AD-WITCH uses a similar adaptation function, in which implicitly κ = 1 is set. Section 8.3.4.2 already
discussed some of the problems this approach may entail: If gross damages in the numerator rise, adaptation
7Since the parameter that captures the natural capacity to adapt, a, had in the model without adaptation been implicitly
covered by the vulnerability parameter, b, it should be noted that the latter now has a slightly reduced interpretation, reflecting
e.g. the geographical exposure of a region to climate change.
8I quickly discarded an additive adaptation function such as (9.1) or (9.2), because these functions imply cancelling adaptation.
When using such specifications, it is possible to impose a maximum condition on the damages that can be cancelled, as it is done
in the modified version of FEEM-RICE, but then the level of this upper bound should be justified, and it raises the question of
how marginal adaptation benefits develop close to bound.
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has to rise by less units to maintain an equal absolute residual damage target level, as long as the numerator
in (10.3) is larger than the denominator, or Dt > (ADt)
−1.9 To counteract this mechanism, equation (10.3)
is multiplied by St, or, put differently, ψ = 3 is set, whereas previously a quadratic damage function has been
assumed for SLICE. Furthermore, the adaptation function exponent is lowered to κ = 12 < 1. These choices
have the effect that, for a given residual damages target, adaptation has to be further scaled up increasingly,
the more cumulative emissions rise. The damage function (10.3) still shares with those residual damage
functions used in PAGE, AD-DICE, the modified version of FEEM-RICE and AD-WITCH the property
that for a given stock of adaptation (capital), adaptation always eliminates the same share of gross damages,
regardless of the absolute size of the gross damages. As a consequence, for a constant level of adaptation,
the amount of damages neutralized in absolute terms increases in gross damages. These choices define the
following residual damage function:
Rt =
b(St)
3
((a+At)e)1/2
. (10.4)
A general solution for variable sets of the damage and adaptation function exponents is derived in section 10.6,
but operating with general exponents throughout the analysis is rather cumbersome. These two particular
exponents are within the domains defined in that section, and the model exhibits the same behaviour for
any other combination of exponents that fulfills the criteria established there. From all the combinations
available, this one was chosen because in the case of an interior solution it leads as before to an optimal
period t+ 1 capital stock that increases linearly in capital productivity p.
This specification differs significantly from most previous approaches to modelling adaptation in IAMs. A
similar form has been proposed by de Bruin et al. (2009a) in AD-DICE, see equation (8.12), but was not
actually used by them. The function coming closest to it has been used in AD-WITCH, see equation (8.22),
but Bosello et al. (2010a) implicitly assume and fix κ = 1 and do not discuss either the possibility or the
consequences of other values. In the conceptual adaptation models reviewed earlier, either the adaptation
function is not specified or little attention is paid to the properties of adaptation assumed.
The functional form of (10.2) is not completely unknown within economic theory; for instance, a cognate
form has been proposed to model endogenous technological change:
Rt(At) =
b
Aκt
. (10.5)
Here, At stands for cumulative installed capacity of a technology, b describes the costs of the first unit, and
κ determines the so-called learning index. The costs of installation, Rt(At), decrease in cumulative capacity,
i.e. when experience grows, but the marginal gains from learning are assumed decreasing. According to
Gillingham et al. (2008), this function has only rarely been used in economic modelling practice owing to
its non-convexity and the associated mathematical problem this causes.10
In SLICE, despite its highly non-linear form that intertwines three control variables, namely traditional
capital and mitigation capital in the numerator, which both determine the size of cumulative emissions,
and adaptation capital in the denominator, the residual damage function (10.3) still generates an analytical
solution in this conceptual model. Therefore, I hope it may add as an innovation to the general economists’
9This effect turns around for Dt < (ADt)−1, so that Rt > 1 should be ensured when using a residual damage function similar
to (10.3).
10Cp. Gillingham et al. (2008), p. 2748. The parameter domains are neither defined in the original publication.
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toolkit applicable also to other problems. For instance, one could think of a cost function of a product that
exhibits increasing manufacturing costs (numerator). These costs can be brought down either by learning-
by-doing or by research investments to stimulate technical progress (denominator), which exhibit declining
returns. In the energy context, the numerator could describe the (currently) higher costs of renewable energy
generation. Improvements of the energy infrastructure (denominator) such as measures to optimize demand
management or smart grids upgrade could help to decrease those costs.
The carbon constraint introduced in section 3.2.9 is maintained, so that for a stock of cumulative CO2
emissions that exceeds a threshold level Ω, the economy is at (increasing) risk of suffering catastrophic
climate damages. It is assumed that these are so devastating that adaptation capital is unable to alleviate
them. Therefore despite adaptation, in SLICE’s strongly simplifying catastrophic climate damage module
catastrophic climate damages are still emblematized by (residual) damages approaching infinity.
10.3.2 Adaptation investment
As for dirty capital investment, also for adaptation investment I specify a linear cost function. This is in line
with most models reviewed. No model assumes adjustment costs of adaptation investment, and neither does
SLICE; it is deemed unlikely that adaptation faces such strong structural political and technical barriers as
mitigation does.
The investment necessary to accumulate a single unit of traditional capital, Kt+1, comes at cost of a single
unit of the consumption good, which is the model’s numéraire. In order to generally allow a difference in the
per-unit investment costs of traditional capital and adaptation capital, the adaptation investment cost price
differential r > −1 is introduced, leaving open whether adaptation capital is cheaper (−1 < r < 0) or more
expensive (r > 0) to accumulate than dirty capital. Adaptation capital depreciates by 0 ≤ d · 100% < 100%
per period, whereby d does not only capture wearout in the classic sense, but also links to changes in
the climatic challenges that may make parts of the previously accumulated adaptation capital useless. As
elaborated in section 10.2, adaptation investments come into effect in the same period during which they are
taken.11
Hence, the resource restriction of the combined mitigation-adaptation model looks as follows, with Icostt as
the investment costs in period t:
Icostt = (Kt+1 −Kt) + (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt) +
Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt)2 + (1 + r)At − (1− d)At−1. (10.6)
Diverging from other approaches, in AD-DICE/AD-RICE the marginal costs of adaptation are increasing,
but its benefits assumed constant. Therefore, AD-DICE/AD-RICE may adopt the perspective that while
the value of human life remains constant, when e.g. facing infection with a new vector-borne pathogen, the
marginal costs of adaptation are rising in the number of lives that are aimed to be saved, because it becomes
increasingly costly to reach an increasing number of people through e.g. health education campaigns. An
alternative view, taken by SLICE, is that the marginal benefits of adaptation are decreasing. Less people
are reached by the second health education campaign, because a lot of people have already been reached by
the first one. As a consequence, the second campaign saves less lives than the first one, but the marginal
costs of adaptation are assumed constant, so that the first intervention, e.g. a radio broadcast, costs the same
11For a lack of analytical interest, production capital depreciation is still omitted, but could be integrated easily.
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as the second one. Both approaches represent equivalent views of the same problem, since they both imply
declining marginal returns to adaptation.
This debate relates to the different, but equivalent ways of analyzing the standard neoclassical problem:
Farmers produce wheat on a limited area of farmland. Under perfect competition, the price of one unit of
wheat is constant, and the farmers are price-takers. In an output-focused approach, the marginal benefit of
wheat production equals its constant distribution price, while the marginal costs of wheat production are
increasing, because more labour is required to produce the tenth unit of output on the same limited area
of farmland compared to the production of the first unit. This is the view of adaptation adopted by AD-
DICE/AD-RICE. Taking an input-focused perspective, the marginal productivity or the marginal benefit of
labour is declining. The additional tenth worker produces less additional wheat than the first worker. The
wage per worker however is constant, hence also the marginal cost of labour is constant. This relates to
the SLICE approach to modelling adaptation, but this view must implicitly also have been adopted when
designing AD-WITCH, with a similar specification for adaptation. In both cases, the farmers’ problem
described differently by the two approaches is the same.
10.3.3 Changes to the welfare setup
In section 10.2, it was explained that the abstract “long term” period T is dropped12, once adaptation is
integrated into the model, in favour of a “regular” period, t + 2, in which also consumption takes place.
Therefore, also the long-term weighting factor φ, now evaluating utility enjoyed in period t + 2, loses most
of its meaning and comes closer to a standard discount factor. One could even assume that φ = β2, so that
the link to sustainable preferences is removed, but it is refrained from doing so, since no statement is made
whether the model periods are of equal length. This marks a paradigm shift in economic terms, but it is not
consequential in mathematical terms. In fact, in the earlier model versions φ can also be simply redefined as
a discount factor, not affecting the analytical solutions of the model, but simply their interpretation.
Within the model, no economic activity beyond period t+ 2 takes place, but some weight ϑ > 0 is assigned
to adaptation capital that is accumulated in period t+ 2 and bequeathed to future generations.
Throughout the analyses it is assumed that the total production capital stock, Vt,t+1 > 0, is growing, so
that climate damages are increasing over time, too, and that the discount factor β and the former long-term
weighting factor, φ, are sufficiently large, so that
Dt ≤ βDt+1 ≤ φDt+2, (10.7)
and the social planner wants to realize
At ≤ At+1 ≤ At+2. (10.8)
As a result, the issues of disinvestment in adaptation capital and reversibility of resources invested in adap-
tation capital require no treatment in the model. It should be emphasized though that condition (10.7) is
not as trivial as it may seem. In fact it is violated by most standard IAMs in which actual climate damages
are increasing over time, but ultimately dwarfed by discounting, which is itself an issue of intense debate
(section 1.5.4).
12See also appendix C.1 on this.
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Since from now on in the terminal model period, resources are required for consumption, the social planner
is no longer allowed to consume all of the production capital stock in period t+ 1. It is now kept fixed until
period t + 2 when it is transformed to adaptation capital or consumed.13 This has the desirable side-effect
that the resources available for consumption and investment are generally rising over time14, making it easier
to meet the rising demand for adaptation.15
Due to the limited time horizon of the model, the effect of emissions caused by production in period t+ 2 is
chopped off, so that no assumption on adaptation after period t+2 needs to be made. While this is somewhat
ugly, the model does not lose any of its qualitative insights from this, because the intertemporal effect that
emissions exert is already captured and can be analyzed for the periods t + 1 and t + 2. Alternatively, one
could valuate also CO2 emissions accumulating in the atmosphere after period t+2 with ϑ as a new long-term
weighting factor (which is already applied to the adaptation bequest after period t+ 2; (1− d)At+2), which
would lead to a reduction of the marginal benefits of Kt+1 by −ϑγ. However, this raises the question whether
the adaptation bequest and cumulative emissions after period t + 2 can be weighed with a same parameter
despite their different dimensions. As all this discussion is irrelevant to the model’s conclusions, it is avoided.
A third alternative to deal with this issue is presented in section 10.7.
To summarize, the welfare function (3.28) changes to
max
Ct, Ct+1, Ct+2, At+2
W = Ut(Ct) + β · Ut+1(Ct+1) + φ · UT (Ct+2) + ϑ(1− d)At+2. (10.9)
10.4 Properties of adaptation
10.4.1 Overview
Throughout this section 10.4, it is focused on adaptation exclusively, so that Mt = Mt+1 = Mt+2 = 0. The
following three sections present the optimization problem with adaptation, the standard interior solution and
discuss the rebound effect to adaptation. In section 10.4.6, intertemporal feedback effects of future adaptation
for today’s residual damages are elucidated, and in sections 10.4.7 and 10.4.8 resource constraints and an
adaptation poverty trap are considered.
10.4.2 The optimization problem with adaptation
Combining (10.6) and (10.4) with equations (3.6), (3.20), (3.21), (3.22), (3.1) and using (10.9), embedding
(3.2) and taking into account (3.24) and replacing the subscript “T” by “t+ 2”, we are confronted with the
following optimization problem:
13Still, the model assumes perfect reversibility of production capital.
14For the case of positive investment, and here not taking into account climate damages, which reduce these resources.
15In period t the resources available for adaptation investment (with the remainder flowing into consumption) amount to
pKt +Kt −Kt+1, in period t+ 1 to pKt+1 and in period t+ 2 to (1 + p)Kt+1(when clean technology is not available).
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max
Kt+1, At, At+1, At+2
Z
= pKt − (Kt+1 −Kt)− (1 + r)At − b(St)
3
((a+At)e)1/2
+β
[
pKt+1 + (1− d)At − (1 + r)At+1 − b(St + γKt)
3
((a+At+1)e)1/2
]
+φ
[
(1 + p)Kt+1 + (1− d)At+1 − (1 + r)At+2 − b(St + γKt + γKt+1)
3
((a+At+2)e)1/2
]
+ϑ(1− d)At+2
+λ1(Ct − f) + λ2(Ct+1 − f) + λ3(Ct+2 − f) + λ4[Ω− St − γKt − γKt+1]. (10.10)
The second, third and fourth lines describe consumption in the periods t, t+1 and t+2, respectively, the fifth
line accounts the bequest value of the terminal adaptation capital stock. As mentioned earlier, the carbon
constraint remains unchanged, because it is assumed that adaptation cannot help alleviating catastrophic
damages. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
∂Z
∂Kt+1
≤ 0; Kt+1 ≥ 0; Kt+1 · ∂Z
∂Kt+1
= 0 (10.11)
∂Z
∂Ai
≤ 0; Ai ≥ 0; Ai · ∂Z
∂Ai
= 0 for i = t, t+ 1 , t+ 2 (10.12)
∂Z
∂λj
≥ 0; λj ≥ 0; λj · ∂Z
∂λj
= 0 for j = 1, 2 , 3, 4, (10.13)
and relevant FOCs are16
∂Z
∂Kt+1
= −1 + βp+ φ(1 + p)− 3φbγ(St + γKt + γKt+1)
2
((a+At+2)e)1/2
− λ1 − λ4γ ≤ 0 (10.14)
∂Z
∂At
= (1 + λ1)
(
−(1 + r) + b · s
3
t
2(a+At)3/2e1/2
)
+ β(1− d) ≤ 0 (10.15)
∂Z
∂At+1
= β
[
−(1 + r) + b · (St + γKt)
3
2(a+At+1)3/2e1/2
]
+ φ(1− d) ≤ 0 (10.16)
∂Z
∂At+2
= φ
[
−(1 + r) + b · (St + γKt + γKt+1)
3
2(a+At+2)3/2e1/2
]
+ ϑ(1− d) ≤ 0 (10.17)
∂Z
∂λ1
= pKt − (Kt +Kt+1)− (1 + r)At − b(St)
3
((a+At)e)1/2
≥ 0 (10.18)
∂Z
∂λ4
= Ω− St − γKt − γKt+1 ≥ 0. (10.19)
Equation (10.15) is interpreted as follows: For an interior solution (λ1 = 0), so that Ct > f , the social
planner builds up adaptation capital stock At as long as the immediate marginal benefits to adaptation,
b·s3t
2(a+At)3/2e1/2
, from preventing some climate damages and the discounted value of the marginal bequeathed
16In the following it is always assumed that λ2,3 = 0 so that Ct+1,t+2 > 0.
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unit of adaptation capital β(1− d) are larger than the marginal costs of accumulation, which amount to the
loss in immediate period t consumption per unit of adaptation capital investment, that is −(1 + r).
10.4.3 Interior solution
At first, the case is considered in which λ1,2,3,4,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
, ∂Z∂At ,
∂Z
∂At+1
, ∂Z∂At+2 = 0, so that Kt+1, At, t+1, t+2 ≥ 0,
and in which Ct, t+1, t+2 ≥ f and the carbon constraint does not bite.
The analysis is started with the adaption decisions in periods t and t + 1. They are solely determined by
exogenous parameters and therefore trivial to derive, but nevertheless teach some interesting lessons. From
(10.15) and (10.16) are obtained:
A∗t =
(
b
2((1 + r)− β(1− d))
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
− a (10.20)
A∗t+1 =
(
b
2((1 + r)− φβ (1− d))
)2/3
· (St + γKt)
2
e1/3
− a. (10.21)
The larger committed emissions St and vulnerability to climate damage b, the more adaptation is required
and optimal. Higher investment costs r, a higher depreciation rate d and a lower valuation of bequeathed
adaptation capital stock, β and φβ , lower the return on adaptation investments and make them less attractive.
A higher natural capacity to adapt, a, reduces the need for adaptation capital accumulation. If a equals or
exceeds
(
b
2((1+r)−β(1−d))
)2/3
· S2t
e1/3
(for period t), the level of protection is deemed sufficiently high that the
social planner does not invest in adaptation. The economy will then still suffer from residual climate damages
as long as St, t+1 > 0, but the marginal costs of adaptation capital accumulation are higher than its marginal
benefits. Most striking, a rising efficiency e reduces the optimal levels of adaptation capital. This may be
counterintuitive in view of the fact that e.g. a higher production capital productivity p in standard scenarios
leads to larger production capital investments, stimulating further welfare-enhancing economic growth. In
contrast, the benefits of adaptation investment are bounded to gross climate damages, which are fixed in
periods t and t + 1. What matters for the determination of residual damages, is the “effective adaptation
capital stock”, i.e. the product of adaptation capital stock and adaptation efficiency. If e rises, less adaptation
capital is needed to reach the optimal level of adaptation. While adaptation falls in e, the optimal effective
adaptation capital stock increases in e:
∂((a+A∗t )e)t
∂e
=
2
3
(
b
2((1 + r)− β(1− d))
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
> 0. (10.22)
However, since gross climate damages are fixed, the returns to the effective adaptation capital stock are
decreasing and its enhancements are declining in e.
Proposition 10. If cumulative emissions are exogenously fixed, a rise of the adaptation efficiency, e, reduces
the demand for adaptation capital.
Moving on to K∗t+1 and A
∗
t+2, from (10.17) we obtain
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At+2 =
(
b
2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d))
)2/3
· (St + γKt + γKt+1)
2
e1/3
− a. (10.23)
Plugging (10.23) into (10.14) delivers the optimal period t+ 1 capital stock:
K∗t+1 =
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))e1/3
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− St
γ
−Kt. (10.24)
Comparing (10.24) with (10.23) results in the optimal period t+ 2 adaptation capital stock:
A∗t+2 =
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2e1/3
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))4/3
− a. (10.25)
If we compare the properties of A∗t+2 with those of A
∗
t and A
∗
t+1 ((10.20) and (10.21), respectively), it strikes
out that in contrast to the optimal adaptation capital stocks of the earlier periods, A∗t+2
1. rises in the adaptation efficiency e.
2. is independent of St (and Kt), i.e. committed past emissions.
3. falls in the vulnerability parameter b.
With respect to the third point, which at first sight is puzzling, a look at (10.24) reveals that if the vulnerability
to climate change increases, then also K∗t+1 falls, since rising climate damage costs make economic growth
less profitable; as a consequence, adaptation capital can be downsized, too.
The first result is taken up again in the following section, and the second one in section 10.4.5.
10.4.4 The growth envelope of adaptation
If the social planner in period t + 2 is able and wants to accumulate adaptation capital, he always chooses
a larger production capital stock, K∗t+1, than in the scenario in which the adaptation option is unavailable.
Hence, adaptation fosters economic growth. This result is proven in the following.
For A∗t+2 > 0, from (10.25) follows that
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2e1/3 > (3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑ
φ
(1− d)))4/3 · a (10.26)
has to hold. This can be transformed to
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))4e4/3
34γ8φ4b8/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))4/3
>
e
32γ6φ2b2
(−1 + pβ + φ(1 + p))2 · a.
Taking the fourth root and adding terms leads to
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(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))e1/3
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− St
γ
−Kt >
[
a1/2e1/2
3γ3φb
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))
]1/2
−St
γ
−Kt. (10.27)
The LHS of equation (10.27) matches K∗t+1 from equation (10.24). If for any reason the social planner
cannot invest in adaptation and must rely on the economy’s natural capacity to adapt exclusively, in this
no-adaptation case he will choose
K̂t+1 =
[
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))ae1/2
3γ3φb
]1/2
− St
γ
−Kt, (10.28)
which is derived from (10.14) with Ât+2 = 0. Hence, the RHS of equation (10.27) equals K̂t+1, and it can
be concluded that
K∗t+1 > K̂t+1 (10.29)
is true.
This proves: whenever a social planner would like and can take adaptation measures, these measures also
make larger production capital stock investments desirable. Put differently, adaptation enhances the scope
for economic growth. I name the positive difference between the optimal production capital stock with
adaption enabled, K∗t+1, and the optimal production capital stock with adaptation disabled, K̂t+1, the
“growth envelope of adaptation”. This label follows from the term “growth envelope of mitigation”, which
was coined in chapter 3 to describe the phenomenon that once mitigation capital is available, net capital
investment grows.17 Likewise, the growth envelope of adaptation describes the phenomenon that if adaptation
investment is feasible, desirable and therefore taken, the social planner chooses a higher level of production
capital than he would choose, if the option to adapt did not exist.
Proposition 11. The possibility to adapt enhances the scope for economic growth.
The reason for the growth envelope of adaptation to exist can be understood by rearranging the FOC for
period t+ 1 capital stock, equation (10.14), still assuming the interior solution:
βp+ φ(1 + p) = 1 +
3φbγ(St + γKt + γKt+1)
2
((a+At+2)e)1/2
. (10.30)
Optimality requires that marginal benefits (LHS) and marginal costs (RHS) of production capital investment
are equal. If the adaptation option is available and taken, thus At+2 > 0, the environmental costs per capital
unit decline, hence the productivity of capital rises.18 For this reason, K∗t+1 increases until the optimality
condition (10.30) is restored.
17The growth envelope of adaptation is quantified for this model in appendix C.5.2.
18A similar consequence for production capital productivity from carbon-saving technical progress was discussed in section
3.3.4.
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Returning to the adaptation capital extension in reaction to a rise in e, equation (10.30) shows that also a
rising e enhances the marginal benefit of production capital investment, and equation (10.30) reveals that
the same mechanism that was described in the previous paragraph applies, i.e. K∗t+1 must rise.
Proposition 12. The scale of production determines the need for adaptation. If cumulative emissions are
endogenous, a rise in the adaptation efficiency, e, increases the marginal benefit of production capital and
therefore its accumulation. As a consequence, a higher level of adaptation capital becomes optimal.
10.4.5 Cumulative emissions, residual climate damages and the rebound effect
to adaptation
In this section, the residual damages for the two scenarios with and without adaptation investment available
are compared.
K∗t+1 from (10.24) and K̂t+1 from (10.28), respectively, are plugged into the cumulative emissions function,
(3.13), to determine cumulative period t+ 2 emissions, S∗t+2 and Ŝt+2:
S∗t+2 =
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))e1/3
3γφb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
(10.31)
Ŝt+2 =
[
a1/2e1/2
3γφb
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))
]1/2
. (10.32)
Referring to the second item of the result list at the end of section 10.4.3, optimal adaptation capital (10.25)
is independent of exogenous committed emissions, because cumulative period t+2 emissions do also not vary
with them. S∗t+2 is independent of the natural capacity to adapt, a, because optimal adaptation investment
falls in a, so that the same level of adaptation is always reached, given in 10.25. Ŝt+2 increases in a, as a
higher capacity to adapt decreases the marginal costs of climate change.
Using (10.1), gross damages are easily derived as
D∗t+2 =
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))3 · e
(3γφ)3b(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))
(10.33)
D̂t+2 =
a3/4e3/4
(3γφ)3/2b1/2
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))3/2. (10.34)
By plugging (10.33) and (10.25) and, separately, (10.34) into (10.4), the respective period t + 2 residual
climate damages for each case are computed:
RA∗t+2 =
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2e1/3
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
(10.35)
R̂t+2 =
a1/4e1/4
(3γφ)3/2b1/2
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))3/2. (10.36)
Equation (10.36) is derived by setting Ât+2 = 0 in (10.4).
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In section 10.4.4 it was proven that K∗t+1 > K̂t+1. Therefore, for associated cumulative emissions it must be
valid that
S∗t+2 > Ŝt+2 (10.37)
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))e1/3
3γφb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
>
[
a1/2e1/2
3γφb
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))
]1/2
, (10.38)
which condition is taken up again in a moment. With (10.37) being fulfilled,
D∗t+2 > D̂t+2 (10.39)
is true. However, the relationship between the residual climate damages of the two scenarios is less obvious.
Equation (10.38) can be transformed to
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))e1/3
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))1/2 >
a1/4e1/43γφb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
(3γφb)1/2
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2e1/3
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))3/2 >
a1/4e1/4(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
(3γφ)3/2b1/2
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2e1/3
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
>
a1/4e1/4
(3γφ)3/2b1/2
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))3/2. (10.40)
Looking back at equations (10.31) and (10.32), it immediately follows that
R∗t+2 > R̂t+2. (10.41)
This result may come as a surprise: When adaptation investments are admitted and taken optimally, not
only gross damages, but also residual damages are larger than in the scenario without adaptation. In other
words, the accumulation of adaptation capital does not fully compensate the additional damage caused by
the production increase that is triggered by that accumulation.
Proposition 13. If adaptation investment is desirable and can be taken, not only gross damages, but also
residual damages are larger than when adaptation is disabled. Adaptation exerts a rebound effect on (residual)
climate damages.
Taking up the terminology of chapter 4, the model actually shows backfire, i.e. residual damages rise in
adaptation. The term “rebound effect” could also describe the less extreme finding that residual damages do
fall in response to adaptation investment, but not as much as they could if production capital was kept fixed.
This finding from SLICE confirms and contradicts some results of the modified version of FEEM-RICE.
Bosello (2010) also finds that enabling adaptation leads to more CO2 emissions and gross climate damages,
but that it still lowers residual damages.19. Hence a rebound effect takes place, but no backfire; without a
19S. Bosello (2010), pp. 12ff.
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rebound effect gross climate damages should be unaffected by adaptation and residual damages even lower.
Unfortunately, the article does not debate (the determinants of) these phenomena, and a rebound effect to
adaptation has not been discussed yet. I return to FEEM-RICE and this aspect in section 10.5.9.
Another light on this feature is shed by analyzing the model’s comparative statics in the case of a rise of the
adaptation efficiency parameter, e:
∂RA∗t+2
∂e
=
1
3
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3e2/3
> 0. (10.42)
Counterintuitively, the optimal residual damages increase in e. This implies that
∂DA∗t+2
∂e
>
∂AA∗t+2
∂e
. (10.43)
To better understand this model result, it is instructive to decompose the marginal welfare effects that arise
from a rise of e to marginal cost and benefits. For this purpose, I extract from the optimal welfare function
Z, given in (10.10), the terms that are associated with Kt+1 and the terms the Kt+1 investment decision has
an impact on, namely those that involve At+2 and Rt+2, so that the reduced welfare function Z˜ only includes
the following terms:
Z˜∗ = (−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p)) ·K∗t+1 − (φ(1 + r)− ϑ(1− d)) ·A∗t+2 − φR∗t+2. (10.44)
Since, as a consequence of a rise in e, the social planner expands the production capital stock and puts
up with larger residual damages, the hypothesis is that the marginal benefits of the capital expansion must
exceed the period t+2 marginal costs, consisting of additional expenditures on adaptation and higher residual
damages, so that net welfare is enhanced. Mathematically,
∂Z˜∗
∂e
= (−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p)) · ∂K
∗
t+1
∂e
− (φ(1 + r)− ϑ(1− d)) · ∂A
∗
t+2
∂e
− φ∂R
∗
t+2
∂e
(10.45)
=
1
3
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3e2/3
− 1
18
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3e2/3
− 1
9
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3e2/3
=
1
6
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3e2/3
> 0. (10.46)
The intermediate calculations are provided in appendix C.3. The result in the last line confirms the hypoth-
esis.20
Proposition 14. If cumulative emissions are endogenous, in SLICE a rise in the adaptation efficiency, e,
triggers backfire, i.e. residual damages increase.
20I assume that this result holds for all exponents combinations admitted in section 10.6.2, but this is not explicitly verified
yet.
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This finding comes close to the backfire observed in section 3.3.4. There, a reduction of the emissions
coefficient, γ, increased the production capital productivity and in total led to a rise of cumulative emissions;
here, an increase of the adaptation capital efficiency, e, results in larger residual damages.
When the adaptation option becomes available or the adaptation efficiency improves, increasing production at
the cost of larger residual damages is the optimal strategy, as long as no ecological limits are reached. However,
it should be stressed that this strategy is able to enhance human welfare only. Any other vulnerable creatures
apart from human beings suffer from the larger (residual) climate damages made possible by adaptation, while
they commonly do not benefit from larger human consumption.
10.4.6 Intertemporal feedback effects for residual damages in the present
The residual damages of the first two model periods are computed from combining (10.20) and (10.21) with
(10.4):
R∗t =
bS3t
((A∗t + a)e)
1/2
= b2/3S2t
[
2((1 + r)− β(1− d))
e
]1/3
(10.47)
R∗t+1 = b
2/3(St + γKt)
2
[
2((1 + r)− φβ (1− d))
e
]1/3
, (10.48)
The slower adaptation capital wears off (d falls) and the more an adaptation capital bequest is appreciated (β
and φ increase, respectively), thus the more value adaptation capital has in the future, the more adaptation
capital is accumulated already in the present. This however has the desirable consequence that not only future,
but also present residual damages climate damages fall. Put differently, the more the present generation takes
the welfare of future generations into account, the more it will protect itself against climate change. This
finding also applies to adaptation in period t + 2, see equation (10.25), i.e. when ϑ rises, residual damages
fall in the present.
Proposition 15. The current level of adaptation is increasing in the usefulness of adaptation capital for
future generations.
10.4.7 Resource-constrained economy
In this section, as in section 3.3.7, a scenario is investigated in which resources are insufficient to both satisfy
minimum consumption and meet optimal investment demand.
If λ2,3,4,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
, ∂Z∂At ,
∂Z
∂At+1
, ∂Z∂At+2 = 0 and λ1 > 0, then Kt+1, At, t+1, t+2 ≥ 0 and Ct+1, t+2 ≥ f , but Ct = f .
Relevant FOCs are (10.14), (10.15), (10.17) and (10.18). Ct = f , and production and adaptation capital
compete for scarce resources.
As in the resource-constrained case of the mitigation model, an analytical solution cannot be obtained, but
nevertheless some insights gained. Similar steps as those laid out in section 10.4.3 are taken to derive:
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A˘t =
(
b
2((1 + r)− β(1−d)/1+λ1
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
− a (10.49)
K˘t+1 =
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p)− λ1)e1/3
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− St
γ
−Kt (10.50)
A˘t+2 =
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p)− λ1)2e1/3
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))4/3
− a. (10.51)
For period t+ 1 adaptation, A˘t+1 = A
∗
t+1 holds, since λ2 = 0.
Repeating most parts of the line of argument given in section 3.3.7, it can be argued as follows: λ1 still
denotes the marginal welfare gain for the case that the budget constraint is slackened by one marginal unit of
initial resource endowment. This unit then flows into production capital and adaptation capital investment,
as long as the economy remains resource-constrained. Since production capital investments exhibit constant
production returns, but lead to rising climate damages, their total return is declining. The latter is true also
for adaptation investments due to the functional form of the adaptation function (10.2). Hence, the marginal
utility gains made available by an increasing budget are declining, too. Therefore, a high λ1 is associated
with a comparatively small budget available for investments, whereas a low λ1 correspondends to a larger
budget. Equations (10.52), (10.53) and (10.54) describe the marginal investment responses in reaction to a
budget cut that is associated with a marginal rise in the shadow value, λ1, leading to a welfare loss.
21
∂A˘t
∂λ1
= −2S
2
t (2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d))2/3
3(ebβ(1− d)))1/3 (10.52)
∂K˘t+1
∂λ1
= − e
1/3
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
(10.53)
∂A˘t+2
∂λ1
= − 2(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p)− λ1)e
1/3
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))4/3
. (10.54)
All investments fall when the investment budget is cut, for instance, when f , the minimum consumption
level, rises. Interestingly, while production capital investments fall linearly, the cuts in period t adaptation
investments are increasing and the cuts in period t+ 2 adaptation investment are decreasing in budget cuts.
This is because if production capital investments are reduced linearly, their marginal benefits rise non-linearly
owing to the non-linear damage function, and period t adaptation investments need to decrease more than
linearly to keep the marginal benefits of the different investment options equal. From the residual damage
function (10.4), it is apparent that the marginal benefits of production capital investments are more rapidly
declining than those of adaptation investments. Since linear cuts in production capital investment reduce
damages in period t + 2 overproportionally, period t + 2 adaptation is reduced non-linearly. However, the
more production capital investment is cut, the less damages are avoided, therefore reductions of period t+2
adaptation become smaller, when λ1 increases.
From a development policy view, these results may be interpreted as somewhat good news, since they signify
that for a shrinking budget the economy economizes increasingly on short-term-focused period t adaptation
rather than on its growth-enhancing investments.
21The steps to derive (10.52) are broken down in appendix C.4.
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10.4.8 The adaptation poverty trap
However, considering a slightly different scenario in which the resource budget tightens due to a rise of
exogenous committed cumulative carbon emissions, St (and, as a consequence, larger period t gross damages),
the good news turn bad. Starting off with the non-constrained case of the interior solution, from equations
(10.20), (10.21), (10.23) and (10.24) it is obtained:
∂A∗t
∂St
= 2
(
b
2((1 + r)− β(1− d)
)2/3
· St
e1/3
(10.55)
∂A∗t+1
∂St
= 2
(
b
2((1 + r)− φβ (1− d)
)2/3
· (St + γKt)
e1/3
(10.56)
∂K∗t+1
∂St
= − 1
γ
(10.57)
∂A∗t+2
∂St
= 0 (10.58)
If St rises, the marginal benefits of period t and t + 1 adaptation rise, triggering intensified adaptation
accumulation, so that adaptation absorbs more of the scarce resources. At the same time, production
capital investments are reduced to attain the optimal cumulative carbon stock. Period t + 2 adaptation
remains unaffected, because the cumulative emissions S∗t+2 remain unchanged. This scenario is what should
be recognized as an “adaptation poverty trap”. With rising damages more and more period t and t + 1
consumption is lost to satisfy the rising demand for adaptation. Once a resource-constrained scenario is
reached, also production capital investments will be further cut. For very high climate damages, the economy
is doomed, because resources are tied to coping with the consequences of past emissions and cannot be used
to pursue economic development.22
Proposition 16. An economy falls into an adaptation poverty trap, when the climate problem is not tack-
led, but becoming increasingly severe and a growing amount of resources is spent on adaptation, at cost of
consumption and/or economic growth.
This result reveals another drag particularly on developing countries. Not only that climate damages simply
diminish their investment resources, they may also make adaptation more “profitable”, so that adaptation
investments might be increasingly preferred to other uses of resources, ultimately posing a threat to economic
growth.
10.5 Mitigation and adaptation modules synthesized
10.5.1 Introduction
We are now ready to synthesize the mitigation and adaptation modules. Once the related optimization
problem in section 10.5.2 is set up, in section 10.5.3 and 10.5.4, respectively, the standard interior solution
22Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) discuss poverty traps in economic growth literature. They may occur if a country is too
poor to afford the setup costs for e.g. a public infrastructure or legal system that is necessary to spread a new technology, which
would allow the economy to achieve a higher level of productivity and economic growth, cp. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004),
pp. 74.
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and the growth envelope of the joint problem are derived. Subsequently, in section 10.5.6 the investment
decisions are investigated that would be considered optimal by a myopic planner who neglects long-term
welfare effects. After the resource-constrained case is briefly revisited in 10.5.5, it is turned towards the
analysis of the scenario of a binding carbon constraint in section 10.5.7. In sections 10.5.8 and 10.5.9,
respectively, the impact of operating with a non-linear production function and a non-linear utility function
on model results is scrutinized.
10.5.2 The optimization problem
With Mt,t+1 ≥ 0, the optimization problem is
max
Kt+1,Mt+1, At, At+1, At+2
Z
= p(Kt +Mt)− (Kt+1 −Kt)− (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)− Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt)2 − (1 + r)At − b(St)
3
((a+At)e)1/2
+β
[
p(Kt+1 +Mt+1) + (1− d)At − (1 + r)At+1 − b(St + γKt + µMt)
3
((a+At+1)e)1/2
]
+φ
[
(1 + p)(Kt+1 +Mt+1) + (1− d)At+1 − (1 + r)At+2 − b(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
3
((a+At+2)e)1/2
]
+ϑ(1− d)At+2
+λ1(Ct − f) + λ2(Ct+1 − f) + λ3(Ct+2 − f) + λ4[Ω− St − γKt − µMt − γKt+1 − µMt+1], (10.59)
with the interpretation of the lines as provided in section 10.4.2 still valid.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
∂Z
∂Kt+1
≤ 0; Kt+1 ≥ 0; Kt+1 · ∂Z
∂Kt+1
= 0 (10.60)
∂Z
∂Mt+1
≤ 0; Mt+1 ≥ 0; Mt+1 · ∂Z
∂Mt+1
= 0 (10.61)
∂Z
∂Ai
≤ 0; Ai ≥ 0; Ai · ∂Z
∂Ai
= 0 for i = t, t+ 1 , t+ 2 (10.62)
∂Z
∂λj
≥ 0; λj ≥ 0; λj · ∂Z
∂λj
= 0 for j = 1, 2 , 3, 4, (10.63)
and relevant FOCs are23
23In the following it is always assumed that λ2,3 = 0, so that Ct+1,t+2 > 0.
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∂Z
∂Kt+1
≤ −1 + βP + φ(1 + P )− 3φbγ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
2
((a+At+2)e)1/2
−λ1 − λ4γ = 0 (10.64)
∂Z
∂Mt+1
≤ (1 + λ1) [−(1 + ζ)−Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt)] + βp+ φ(1 + p)
−3φbµb(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
2
((a+At+2)e)1/2
− λ4µ = 0 (10.65)
∂Z
∂At
≤ (1 + λ1)
(
−(1 + r) + b · s
3
t
2(a+At)3/2e1/2
)
+ β(1− d) = 0 (10.66)
∂Z
∂At+1
≤ β
[
−(1 + r) + b · (St + γKt + µMt)
3
2(a+At+1)3/2e1/2
]
+ φ(1− d) = 0 (10.67)
∂Z
∂At+2
≥ φ
[
−(1 + r) + b · (St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
3
2(a+At+2)3/2e1/2
]
+ ϑ(1− d) = 0 (10.68)
∂Z
∂λ1
≥ p(Kt +Mt) +Kt −Kt+1 − (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)− Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt)2
−(1 + r)At − b(St)
3
((a+At)e)1/2
− f = 0 (10.69)
∂Z
∂λ4
≥ Ω− St − γKt − µMt − γKt+1 − µMt+1 = 0. (10.70)
10.5.3 Interior solution
The interior solution describes the scenario in which Ct, t+1, t+2 > f ; furthermore, it is assumed that all
capital stocks are greater than zero at all times. It turns out that when the mitigation and adaptation
modules are merged, the optimal solutions for the mitigation and the adaptation capital stocks in this
version of SLICE structurally match24 those obtained from the submodules separately. The optimal solution
of period t+1 traditional capital stock is composed of elements already observed in the submodules. In other
words, the investments from the two submodules add up, and even though in section 10.3.1 mitigation and
adaptation were clearly established as substitutes25, in this optimal case they exhibit neither substitutability
nor complementarity, but co-exist neutrally. The maths and complete solutions for this case are provided in
appendix C.5.1.
This result is easy to explain: In section 3.3.5 it was found that compared to the scenario with no clean
technology, for a linear utility function the partial adoption of a clean technology does not change the
optimal level of cumulative CO2 emissions in the terminal model period; consequentially, also the level of
period t+ 2 adaptation remains unchanged. This result is revisited in section 10.5.9.
10.5.4 The joint growth envelope
As the analysis in appendix C.5.2 reveals, for the same reasons as just stated, the two growth envelopes of
mitigation and adaptation that had been identified earlier simply add up; no synergy from drawing on both
mitigation and adaptation simultaneously emerges.
24Differences trace back only to the changes made to the setup of the production structure when introducing the adaptation
module.
25The residual damage function (10.4) for period t+ 2 is Rt+2 =
b(St+γKt+µMt+γKt+1+µMt+1)
3
((A0+At+2)e)1/2
. More adaptation capital,
but also more mitigation capital accompanied by simultaneous reductions in dirty capital both lead to lower residual damages.
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10.5.5 Resource-constrained economy
Again, in the resource-constrained scenario the solutions from the submodules carry over; the interpretations
in sections 3.3.7 and 10.4.7 still apply. For the sake of completeness, the solutions are reported in appendix
C.5.3.
10.5.6 Business as Usual or the myopic social planner and intertemporal exter-
nalities
The scenario of a social planner is considered who is myopic in the sense that he is solely focused on welfare in
the short term, so that he neglects any incidents taking place after period t+1, leading to a Business-as-Usual
scenario, as defined in section 3.3.3. In the model, this is reflected by setting φ = ϑ = 0 (as well as λ4 = 0,
because the social planner does not care about any carbon constraint in period t + 2).26 The optimization
problem is:
max
Kt+1,Mt+1, At, At+1, At+2
Z
= pKt − (Kt+1 −Kt)− (1 + ζ)Mt+1 − Ψ
2
M2t+1 − (1 + r)At −
b(St)
3
((a+At)e)1/2
+β
[
(1 + p)(Kt+1 +Mt+1) + (1− d)At − (1 + r)At+1 − b(St + γKt + µMt)
3
((a+At+1)e)1/2
]
+λ1
(
pKt +Kt −Kt+1 − (1 + r)At − b(St)
3
((a+At)e)1/2
− f
)
. (10.71)
As in section 3.3.3, the social planner will spend as many investment resources as possible on production
enhancement due to the disregard of the adverse long-term consequences of production for the climate. Still,
Aˇt =
(
b
2((1 + r)− β(1− d))
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
− a = A∗t , (10.72)
because the social planner cares about the present the same as much as he did in the previous scenarios.
Since the long-term environmental advantage of mitigation capital is irrelevant to the myopic planner, but
mitigation capital investment costs exceed those of dirty capital investments,
Mˇt+1 = 0. (10.73)
Then all available period t resources neither destined for satisfying minimum consumption nor period t
adaptation flow into dirty capital investment, with λ1 > 0 and Ct = f .
Kˇt+1 = pKt +Kt − (1 + r)
[(
b
2((1 + r)− β(1− d))
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
− a
]
− b
2/3S2t (2((1 + r)− β(1− d))1/3
e1/3
− f.
(10.74)
26It is therefore assumed here that production capital is back at the social planner’s disposal already in period t+ 1 instead
of period t+ 2. Furthermore, the economy starts with zero mitigation capital.
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As this optimal dirty capital investment level exceeds the level of the interior solution, or Kˇt+1 > K
∗
t+1, it
follows that
Sˇt+2 > S
∗
t+2, (10.75)
with S∗t+2 referring to the cumulative emissions level of the interior solution. The period t + 1 adaptation
decision bears an interesting insight:
Aˇt+1 =
(
b
2(1 + r)
)2/3
· (St + γKt + µMt)
2
e1/3
− a. (10.76)
Aˇt+1 < A
∗
t+1
27, because due to φ = 0 the bequest of adaptation capital to the generation alive in period t+2
is not appreciated. However, at least this smaller adaptation capital stock Aˇt+1 is bequeathed, so that
0 < Aˇt+1 = Aˇt+2 < A
∗
t+2, (10.77)
assuming that adaptation capital is not consumed in the terminal model period (which may be reasonable
to assume as the myopic planner does not make plans for period t+ 2).
Of course, a myopic approach to climate change leads to an insufficient if not, as in this strongly simpli-
fied scenario, non-existent mitigation policy. The intertemporal climate externality, i.e. the delay of climate
change from the time point of emission, has in contrast a less severe impact on adaptation, since the benefits
of adaptation occur more immediately and incentives to accumulate present adaptation capital are com-
paratively high. While it is apparent from other scenarios such as the one described in section 10.5.3 that
some early mitigation investment is optimal, even though if the world as a whole acts myopically on climate
change and does not take sufficient mitigation action, at least the then required “second-best” adaptation
response may be expected to come closer to theoretically optimal levels than the first-best response with
more ambitious mitigation.
Proposition 17. A myopic planner does not undertake any mitigation, but he accumulates adaptation
capital, a part of which is bequeathed to future generations. The intertemporal externality of climate change
has a more severe impact on mitigation than on adaptation.
This is a key result from this model. It may be deemed obvious given the shorter cost-benefit-cycle of
adaptation, but it should be recalled here that the conceptual models reviewed in section 8.4 pay little or no
attention to emulating the difference in cost-benefit-cycles of mitigation and adaptation adequately.
10.5.7 Binding carbon constraint: limits to substitution revisited
In section 3.3.8, the implications of a binding carbon constraint were scrutinized. Above the threshold level,
a risk of unbearable, catastrophic climate damages exists. Due to this discontinuity of the damage function,
the social planner adopts St+2 = Ω rather than a St+2 > Ω, which would be chosen if the damage function
was a purely convex, continuous function. This scenario in which the limits to substitution between man-
made goods and climate change are reached, so that St+2 = Ω, is revisited in this section, now allowing
27A∗t+1 is given in appendix C.5.1, equation (C.7).
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additionally for adaptation and assuming that λ1,2,3,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
, ∂Z∂Mt+1 ,
∂Z
∂At
, ∂Z∂At+1 ,
∂Z
∂At+2
= 0 and λ4 > 0, so
that Kt+1, Mt+1, At, t+1, t+2 > 0 and Ct, t+1, t+2 > f .
Combining (10.64) and (10.65) provides
M˜t+1 =Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
, (10.78)
and (10.70) and (10.78) together,
K˜t+1 =
Ω
γ
− St
γ
−Kt − 2µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
· 1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
. (10.79)
The solutions for M˜t+1 and K˜t+1 look very similar to those derived in section 3.3.8; compared to the uncon-
strained case the social planner curbs dirty capital (investment) only. This time the social planner can also
invest in adaptation; (10.78) and (10.79) are plugged into (C.9) of appendix C.5.1 to obtain
A˜t+2 =
(
b
2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d))
)2/3
· Ω
2
t
e1/3
− a. (10.80)
The solution looks structurally very similar to the optimal adaptation capital levels of the first two periods,
see (C.6) and (C.7) in appendix C.5.1. It can be solved for λ4 by plugging (10.64) (10.78), (10.79) and (10.80)
into (10.64):
λ˜4 =
βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1
γ
− 3φb2/3Ω
(
(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d))
e
)1/3
. (10.81)
λ˜4 gauges the welfare gain in response to a marginal slackening of the carbon constraint, e.g. owing to a
scientific upward correction of Ω. The first term in (10.81) describes the welfare-improving effect of a rise
in Ω, stemming from the “safe” production enhancement it makes possible. The second term captures the
negative effect caused by the marginally increased residual damages. Note that the difference between the
two terms is always greater than zero, otherwise the carbon constraint would be non-binding. The larger Ω,
the lower the welfare gain through a further upwards correction of Ω due to the non-linearly rising climate
damages. It is worth comparing the values of the shadow parameters in (10.81) and (3.71), as it becomes
apparent that adaptation helps to alleviate the climate damages triggered by a marginal emissions unit. For
instance, the shadow parameter is less sensitive to b than before even though the damage function exponent
of the earlier model was set lower, at ψ = 2 instead of ψ = 3. Furthermore, the cheaper (falling r) or more
efficient adaptation (rising e) is, the larger the welfare gain stimulated by a marginal slackening of the carbon
constraint.
While in section 10.5.4 adaptation bore a growth envelope, the fact that M˜t+1 and K˜t+1 remain structurally
unchanged compared to the carbon-constrained mitigation-only case tells us that in this scenario adaptation
does not stimulate investments in period t+1 production capital. It cannot, since cumulative emissions need
to be restricted due to the biting carbon constraint; adaptation does not help against catastrophic damages.
Instead of enhancing production in periods t + 1 and t + 2, adaptation raises period t + 2 consumption by
decreasing residual climate damages during that period.
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Proposition 18. Even though adaptation does not help to cope with catastrophic climate damages and, for a
biting carbon constraint, therefore does not exhibit a growth envelope, it is still welfare-enhancing by reducing
residual damages and increasing consumption.
10.5.8 Decreasing returns to production
In appendix C.6, the interior solution of the model is derived for the case of a non-linear production function.
The latter was already assumed in section 3.6, where it was shown that this change does not affect the
results of the linear mitigation models crucially. The simulations show that this conclusion also holds for
the combined model and that any changes to the behaviour of optimal adaptation capital investment can be
traced down to those changes to dirty and clean capital investment that had already been observed in section
3.6.
10.5.9 Declining marginal utilities
In chapter 3, section 3.6.3, it was learnt that for a non-linear CES utility function (3.3) in which σ > 0, for
higher values of σ the growth envelope of mitigation may disappear; the mechanics of which were explored
in chapter 4.
The impacts from a CES utility function on adaptation investment behaviour are less significant, as can be
derived through economic reasoning. After replacing the linear utility function by a CES utility function,
the welfare function of the combined model, given in (10.5.2), changes to:
max
Kt+1,Mt+1, At, At+1, At+2
Z
=
[
p(Kt +Mt)− (Kt+1 −Kt)− (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)− Ψ2 (Mt+1 −Mt)2 − (1 + r)At − b(St)
3
((a+At)e)1/2
]1−σ
1− σ
+β
[
p(Kt+1 +Mt+1) + (1− d)At − (1 + r)At+1 − b(St+γKt+µMt)
3
((a+At+1)e)1/2
]1−σ
1− σ
+φ
[
(1 + p)(Kt+1 +Mt+1) + (1− d)At+1 − (1 + r)At+2 − b(St+γKt+µMt+γKt+1+µMt+1)
3
((a+At+2)e)1/2
]
1− σ
1−σ
+ϑ(1− d)At+2
+λ1(Ct − f) + λ2(Ct+1 − f) + λ3(Ct+2 − f) + λ4[Ω− St − γKt − µMt − γKt+1 − µMt+1], (10.82)
and associated Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Since the adaptation investment decisions and resulting adaptation actions are assumed to take place within
the same periods, they are not immediately affected by changes in σ. Adaptation still makes production
capital investment more productive, and for a given σ and compared to a situation with no adaptation,
adaptation will stir up production capital investment and an adaptation rebound effect applies. The adap-
tation bequest though accrues in the next period and is affected by the desire to smooth consumption over
time. This desire is increasing in σ. For instance, if initially consumption is higher in the second period than
in the first period, for an exogenous rise in σ and ceteris paribus the adaptation bequest from the first to the
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second period is less appreciated and therefore adaptation investment in the first period somewhat reduced
in favour of consumption in the first period.
However, in section 10.4.3 it was concluded that adaptation follows changes in production capital investment,
so that changes to (the structure of) dirty and clean capital investment triggered by a σ > 0 will also affect
adaptation investment accordingly. Again, if initially Ct+1 > Ct, if σ rises, the planner wants to readjust
production capital investment to reduce consumption in the second and increase consumption in the first
period, leading to a reduction in cumulative emissions (s. section 3.6.3). As a result, climate damages fall
and ultimately less adaptation is required.
With σ > 0, mitigation and adaptation become substitutes. In section 3.6.3, it was found that when clean
technology becomes available and is adopted, for a σ > 0, the optimal level of cumulative emissions in the
terminal model period falls. As a consequence of lower damages, the optimal level of adaptation would fall,
when included. Similarly, when mitigation is added to the adaptation-only model and makes cumulative
emissions fall, adaptation drops too, so that mitigation investment crowds out adaptation investment.
In both scenarios described in table 3.6.3, whether consumption was initially higher in period t or vice versa,
the differences in cumulative emissions between the no-clean-technology and the clean-technology scenarios
in the final period were always rising in σ, implying that the larger σ, the more emissions are abated. As a
consequence, with rising σ also the need for adaptation falls. These pieces of evidence might suggest research
that goes beyond the scope SLICE was designed for, but altogether they indicate that:
Proposition 19. The elasticity of utility with respect to consumption, σ, influences how much mitigation
substitutes for adaptation and vice versa.
This may appear a trivial conclusion, since investment behaviour must be sensitive to the utility function,
but this further determinant was not described in any of the models investigating the question whether or
not mitigation or adaptation are substitutes and introduced them as either substitutes or complements. As
SLICE showed, for σ = 0 mitigation and adaptation coexist neutrally, even though they were defined as
substitutes.
With respect to the comparison of the results from FEEM-RICE and SLICE carried out in section 10.4.5,
differences in the values assumed for σ may explain why in FEEM-RICE no “adaptation backfire”28 occurs,
that is optimal residual damages do not increase, but decrease in adaptation. FEEM-RICE operates with
a logarithmic utility function, i.e. σ = 1. While also in FEEM-RICE enabling adaptation leads to more
production capital and gross damage levels, capital investment does not rise enough to lead to a net increase
in residual damages. The reason is that with increasing σ the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with
respect to consumption, σ−1, decreases. If net consumption is higher in future periods, the propensity
to upscale investments in the present is decreasing in σ, as they increase the intertemporal consumption
imbalance even more. Then, adaptation lowers residual damages by more than marginal production capital
enhancements increases them. In other words, adaptation always raises the production capital productivity
and stimulates investments to some extent, but for higher values of σ considerations of intergenerational
equity kick in, for a growing economy leading to a dampening of the adaptation rebound effect.
Proposition 20. The elasticity of utility with respect to consumption, σ, crucially influences the size of the
adaptation rebound effect. With consumption growing over time, the size of the adaptation rebound effect is
decreasing in σ.
28S. section 4.2 for the definition of backfire.
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10.6 The general solution
10.6.1 Interior solution
In this section, again the standard interior solution is derived, where λ1,2,3,4,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
, ∂Z∂Mt+1 ,
∂Z
∂At
, ∂Z∂At+1 ,
∂Z
∂At+2
=
0 so that Kt+1, Mt+1, At, t+1, t+2 > 0, Ct, t+1, t+2 > f and the carbon constraint does not bite. The solution
that is presented in the following is general in the sense that the model is solved for unspecified exponents, in-
cluding the mitigation capital investment adjustment cost function exponent ν, the damage function exponent
ψ and the adaptation function exponent κ. The optimization problem changes to
max
Kt+1,Mt+1, At, At+1, At+2
Z
= p(Kt +Mt)− (Kt+1 −Kt)− (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)− Ψ
ν
(Mt+1 −Mt)ν
−(1 + r)At − b(St)
ψ
((a+At)e)κ
+β
[
p(Kt+1 +Mt+1) + (1− d)At − (1 + r)At+1 − b(St + γKt + µMt)
ψ
((a+At+1)e)κ
]
+φ[(1 + p)(Kt+1 +Mt+1)
+(1− d)At+1 − (1 + r)At+2 − b(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
ψ
((a+At+2)e)κ
]
+ϑ(1− d)At+2. (10.83)
Relevant FOCs are
∂Z
∂Kt+1
= −1 + βp+ φ(1 + p)− ψφbγ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
ψ−1
((a+At+2)e)κ
= 0 (10.84)
∂Z
∂Mt+1
= −(1 + ζ)−Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt)ν−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p)
−ψφbµ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
ψ−1
((a+At+2)e)κ
= 0 (10.85)
∂Z
∂At
= −(1 + r)− bsψt · κ((a+At)e)−κ−1e+ β(1− d) = 0 (10.86)
∂Z
∂At+1
= β
[−(1 + r)− b(St + γKt + µMt)ψ · κ((a+At+1)e)−κ−1e]+ φ(1− d) = 0 (10.87)
∂Z
∂At+2
= φ
[−(1 + r)− b(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)ψ · κ((a+At+2)e)−κ−1e]
+ ϑ(1− d) = 0 (10.88)
The transformations leading to the following results are obviously more tedious than before, but generally
follow the same steps that were laid out in section 10.5.3. The general solution is
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Ât =
(
β(1− d)− (1 + r)
−κb
)− 11+κ
S
ψ
1+κ
t e
−κ
1+κ − a (10.89)
Ât+1 =
(
φ
β (1− d)− (1 + r)
−κb
)− 11+κ
(St + γKt + µMt)
ψ
1+κ e
−κ
1+κ − a (10.90)
K̂t+1 =
(
βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1
ψφ
) 1+κ
ψ−κ−1
b
1
1+κ−ψ γ
ψ
1+κ−ψ
(
κe
(1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)
) κ
ψ−κ−1
−St
γ
−Kt − 2µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
· 1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
) 1
ν−1
(10.91)
M̂t+1 = Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
) 1
ν−1
(10.92)
Ât+2 =
(
βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1
ψφγ
) ψ
ψ−κ−1
e
κ
ψ−κ−1 b
1
1+κ−ψ
(
(1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)
κ
) 1−ψ
ψ−κ−1
− a (10.93)
Note that the adjustment cost exponent v does not have a large impact on the model outcomes.
To put equations (10.89)-(10.93) to the test, ψ = 3; κ = 12 can be plugged in, and the solutions that are
computed in appendix C.5.1 are obtained.
It is an interesting feature that the SLICE adaptation function is able to breed this array of analytical
solutions, whereby the restrictions to the range of applicable damage and adaptation function exponents are
not that large. Those restrictions are explored in the next section.
10.6.2 Functional form of damage and adaptation function
The mathematical conditions to be fulfilled by the exponents of the damage and the adaptation functions
can be refined, using the results from the previous section. Increasing adjustment and climate damage costs
require ν, ψ > 1; decreasing returns to adaptation are reflected by any κ > 0. Furthermore, from the exponent
of the first term in (10.91) it can be derived that
1 + κ
ψ − κ− 1 > 0 (10.94)
must hold, otherwise K̂t+1 would be declining in productivity p. The numerator in (10.94) is positive, hence
the range of sensible adaptation and damage function exponents is constrained by
ψ − 1 > κ > 0. (10.95)
Furthermore, the condition ψ − 1
!
Ó= κ rules out the most appealing exponent combination with a quadratic
damage function and the simplest adaptation function possible, i.e. (ψ = 2; κ = 1), which leads to no solution.
In the model, the exponents were calibrated so that K̂t+1 is still linear in p, as in the earlier model variants
without adaptation, thus
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1 + κ
ψ − κ− 1 = 1
⇐⇒ κ = ψ
2
− 1. (10.96)
Produced by equation (10.96), the following sets of exponents lead to such a solution:
ψ κ
3/2 −1/4
2 0
5/2 1/4
3 1/2
7/2 3/4
4 1
Table 10.2: Exponents value table
The first two combinations make no economic sense and are therefore not permitted.29 Any value ψ > 2
in table 10.2 can be selected jointly with the according adaptation function exponent to generate a solution
with K̂t+1 being linear in p. The choice of exponents impacts the absolute optimal values, but should not
influence any of the qualitative properties above. In most deterministic and stochastic IAMs the damage
function exponent is drawn from the range 2 ≤ ψ ≤ 3, see chapter 1. The adaptation modelling literature
review showed that a variation of the SLICE adaptation function has been used only once before, in AD-
WITCH, and that no value apart from κ = 1 for such an adaptation function that exhibits decreasing returns
to scale has been used so far. Accounting for the common damage exponents range, the exponents pair that
leads to the least cumbersome transformations was picked for the model specification (ψ = 3; κ = 12 ).
10.7 Pure anticipatory adaptation
Throughout this chapter, it has been continuously assumed that adaptation investment takes place and pays
off within a - long - model period. This represents a modeller’s choice, and there is an alternative option
that slightly changes the SLICE adaptation module, so that adaptation pays off after a delay of one period.
Adaptation investment made in period t (t + 1) leads to adaptation capital accumulation in period t + 1
(t+ 2), representing anticipatory adaptation exclusively. In this case, the welfare function looks as follows:
max
Kt+1,Mt+1, At+1 At+2
Z = p(Kt +Mt)− (Kt+1 −Kt)− (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)
− Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt) ·max (Mt+1 −Mt; 0)− (1 + r)At+1 − b(St)
3
(ae)1/2
+ β
[
(1 + p)(Kt+1 +Mt+1)− ((1 + r)At+2 − (1− d)At+1)− b(St + γKt + µMt)
3
((a+At+1)e)1/2
]
+ φ
[
(1− d)At+2 − b(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
3
((a+At+2)e)1/2
]
, (10.97)
29For κ = − 1
4
, adaptation would even increase climate damages rather than alleviate them.
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plus side and Kuhn Tucker conditions. Following very similar steps to those laid out in appendix C.5.1, the
standard interior solution can be derived as:
A∗t+1 =
(
b
2( 1β (1 + r)− (1− d))
)2/3
· (St + γKt + µMt)
2
e1/3
− a (10.98)
M∗t+1 = Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
. (10.99)
K∗t+1 =
(β(1 + p)− 1)e1/3
3γ2φb2/3(2(βφ (1 + r)− (1− d)))1/3
−St
γ
−Kt − 2µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
· 1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
. (10.100)
A∗t+2 =
(β(1 + p)− 1)2e1/3
(3γφ)2b2/3(2(βφ (1 + r)− (1− d)))4/3
− a. (10.101)
S∗t+2 =
(β(1 + p)− 1)e1/3
3γφb2/3(2(βφ (1 + r)− (1− d)))1/3
(10.102)
As apparent from a comparison with the solution set of the previous combined model, provided in appendix
C.5.1, the solution sets are mathematically virtually the same.30 However, conceptually the two approaches
are somewhat different and exhibit different virtues. One reason to model adaptation intratemporally was
to aggregate over and capture both anticipatory and reactive adaptation; it was argued that a SLICE model
period is long enough to accommodate both types of adaptation. Furthermore, with reactive adaptation as
part of the mix, neglecting uncertainty is easier to justify. Most importantly, the former approach emphasized
the difference of mitigation and adaptation with respect to intertemporal external effects; in section 10.5.6
we learnt that even with a perfectly myopic social planner there will be adaptation capital available in all
three periods, whereas in this new setting such a planner would not invest in anticipatory adaptation at all
during period t+ 1, as he does not care about welfare in period t+ 2.
In contrast, the approach established in (10.97) only captures anticipatory adaptation; in order to also reflect
reactive adaptation, the model would have to be further extended. Furthermore, since the two adaptation
decisions are modelled to exert structurally the same effect onto the next periods at the same investment
costs, now it must be assumed that the model periods are of equal length. However, this approach also
exhibits some virtues. First, it saves notation: Now, the number of adaptation investment decisions drops
from three to two, the first one is made in period t taking effect in period t + 1 and still determined by
exogenous parameters only. The second one in period t+ 1, which leads to lower damages in period t+ 2, is
influenced by the investment decisions made in period t. Since previously both the period t and t+1 optimal
adaptation capital stocks were determined by exogenous parameters, not much information is lost by reducing
the number of adaptation investment decisions to two. Second, since now there is no (adaptation) investment
decision in period t + 2, there is no longer a need to generate resources in period t + 2, and the production
capital stock is already consumed at the end of period t + 1. This makes the somewhat ugly omission of
emissions generated during period t+2 in the previous, mixed-type adaptation model unnecessary; by taking
into account anticipatory adaptation exclusively, the model retrieves its “closed form” of the mitigation-only
model.31 Third, all three types of investments are now treated equally, with investments taking effect after
30Therefore, the results from the previous sections, e.g. on adaptation backfire in SLICE, still apply.
31Although I would refrain from restoring the abstract long-term period. Adaptation can be adjusted comparatively easily
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one period. Before, it had been argued with some good reason that mitigation investments aiming at a large-
scale energy transition should be assumed to take more time to take effect than adaptation investments,
however, it had been less clear why the size of adaptation capital stock can be adjusted intratemporally, but
the size of traditional production capital stock cannot.32
The SLICE adaptation approach is flexible enough to work with either specifications of the adaptation module,
since analytically they cause only little difference. After operating so far with the mixed-adaptation model,
I prove this flexibility by adopting the pure-anticipatory-adaptation-approach in the two-region extension
introduced in chapter 12, principally for the first reason: it saves notation.
10.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, the SLICE adaptation module was developed. As key properties, in SLICE the marginal
benefits to adaptation are modelled as decreasing, and its marginal costs assumed constant; adaptation helps
alleviate the consequences of climate change, but is not powerful enough to potentially reverse the effects
of climate change. Regarding its functional form, it shares some of its characteristics with the AD-WITCH
adaptation module of Bosello et al. (2010a), but allows for flexibility with respect to the adaptation
function exponent. SLICE presents the first conceptual climate model that operates with such a residual
damage function.
Apart from the fact that SLICE currently treats aggregate adaptation exclusively and thus neglects sector-
specific considerations, further limitations catch the eye. First, due to the highly discrete nature of the
model, no explicit distinction between anticipatory and reactive adaptation is made. Second, the model
lacks so far a spatial dimension, which was paid substantial attention to in Lecocq and Shalizi (2007);
to a limited extent, this issue is taken up in the chapter 12, when two regions have to deal with climate
change. Third, adaptation is conceptually strictly limited to alleviating actual climate damages and does
not include measures against second order impacts.33 Moreover, none of the models reviewed makes an
attempt to reflect the implications of a possible adaptation deficit caused by a lack of development34, and
SLICE provides no exception. As elaborated in section 7.1, a higher level of development should usually also
improve an economy’s resilience against climate change. Therefore, modellers could also consider establishing
a link between e.g. wealth or production capital and vulnerability to climate change or adaptive capacity. It
was refrained from doing so here mainly because of a concern that this would either add a another linear term
or, with a further non-linear interweaving between the control variables, the model would no longer be able
to produce an analytical solution. Finally, SLICE cannot solve the dimensional problem of adaptation either.
In section 8.2, it was explained that there exists a rather uniform indicator for the success of mitigation,
namely GHG saved. Due to its sector-dependent and varying features, the success of adaptation investment
is much harder to monitor, and there is no common success indicator for adaptation measures. Hence, as in
and should not be assumed fixed in the long term, whereas there is some good reason that the current generation has to make
a decision for or against substantial mitigation that will shape the Earth’s (production) infrastructure for a very long time.
32Although the question whether dirty capital investments should take less time to take effect than mitigation investments
could be raised in the mitigation-only model already, especially when the capacity adjustments are small and incremental.
33None of the models reviewed takes into account adaptation costs to be born by e.g. some economies that are heavily reliant
on fossil fuel export. For these economies, a transformation of energy systems away from the use of fossil fuels to renewable
energy generation and less energy consumption enforces a structural change.
34Fankhauser (2009), p. 21, complains that “most [adaptation] cost estimates deliberately and understandably ignore the
overlap between adaptation and development and focus on incremental adaptation over and above a vaguely defined baseline
that includes climate-relevant development programmes”.
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all other models that include adaptation, here too the money spent on adaptation, which in SLICE leads to
the accumulation of an adaptation capital stock, serves as the proxy for successful adaptation.
During the analysis, some surprising results emerged. First, when considering the scenario with non-binding
side constraints, it was shown that optimal adaptation investment decreases when adaptation capital becomes
more efficient, as long as climate damages are exogenous and a predetermined stock of effective adaptation
capital is optimal. However, once climate damages are endogenous, i.e. can be controlled via the produc-
tion capital investment decisions, optimal adaptation investment increases in adaptation efficiency. This is
because adaptation generally raises the (environmental) productivity of production capital, which, owing to
adaptation, causes less residual climate damages per unit of production. A similar phenomenon was observed
in chapter 3 when investigating the consequences to exogenous emissions-saving technical progress. The
productivity enhancement naturally leads to larger production capital investment, i.e. a growth envelope of
adaptation emerges. In the standard version of SLICE, the rebound effect to adaptation is so strong that
adaptation does not keep pace with the production capital enhancements it stimulates, so that in total op-
timal residual damages rise once adaptation is enabled; that is backfire occurs. As long as the cost-benefit
cycle of adaptation takes place within a single period, the adaptation decision is only marginally affected by
modifications of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with respect to consumption, σ−1. However, this
parameter significantly influences production capital decisions; it determines how much substitution actually
takes place between mitigation and adaptation, and it affects the size of the adaptation rebound effect. In
FEEM-RICE of Bosello (2010), a rebound effect to adaptation also occurs, that is enabling adaptation
triggers more extreme climate change, but the rebound effect is not powerful enough to offset the alleviating
effect of adaptation on residual damages.
A rebound effect to adaptation has not been discussed in the literature so far, and attempts to empirically
estimate its size will probably prove even more difficult than quantifying rebound effects to mitigation ac-
tivities, due to the nature of adaptation that is difficult to analytically capture. Beyond this issue, it should
be asked whether or not the rebound effect to adaptation is a purely theoretical issue. Regardless of the
particular size of the net effect to residual damages, the essential feature here is that adaptation helps to cope
with and therefore optimally leads to higher levels of gross climate damages. This is, in a narrow perspective,
inconsequential to, in fact wanted by those who have the means to adapt, but it will increase the burden
on those who cannot (easily) adapt. This group not only includes human beings in poorer regions that are
often more exposed to climate change, but also creatures that do not benefit from higher levels of human
consumption made possible by adaptation. Adaptation is likely to take place when human beings want to
protect themselves or when (potential) damages are valued at economic markets, and such adaptation raises
the tolerable level of climate change. However, protection against non-marketable damages might have less
priority. This is not at all a theoretical phenomenon; one only needs to recall the ’classic’ ways to discharge
local pollutants, such as piping untreated sewage water to water bodies out of immediate reach or build-
ing taller smokestacks, as allegories for adaptation to environmental problems. While such a dislocation of
pollutants certainly makes the recipient creatures worse off, these measures allow a higher level of economic
activity, as long as the pollutants’ adverse effects can successfully be kept away from the polluter(s) and an
internalization of external effects does not take place.
While, as chapter 12 reveals, the fact that adaptation largely pays off locally (rather than globally) presents an
opportunity, adaptation may also increase the propensity to develop local, second-best solutions to a global
problem. This risk is higher the greater the potential of adaptation is to prevent and alleviate damages.
Further research on these dynamics seems potentially fruitful.
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The chapter also touched on the risk of an adaptation poverty trap. This occurs when a rising amount of
(exogenous) cumulative emissions accumulates, so that the (marginal) benefit of adaptation and its investment
levels increase. This process diverts resources away from consumption and (ultimatively) from production
capital investment, so that in the extreme case adaptation endangers economic development. A developing
country may have little impact on the world’s emissions, but if they keep growing, the country is forced
to carry out more adaptation measures. If these measures do not simultaneously promote development (in
the model they do not), development is not only thwarted by climate damages, but also by rising marginal
benefits of adaptation.
In the chapter, some desirable characteristics of adaptation with respect to its intertemporal feedback effects
were elaborated. First, once adaptation is modelled as an accumulable capital stock, the more valuable or
the more appreciated adaptation capital bequests to the future are, the more adaptation takes place in the
present. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to mitigation, due to the shorter cost-benefit cycle of adaptation,
adaptation measures are taken and some adaptation capital bequeathed even if the long-term consequences
of climate change are completely ignored.
Eventually, the general solution for unspecified exponents was derived and the parameter space elaborated,
and a slightly changed, alternative adaptation module was introduced, which is applied in chapter 12.
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Part III
Two Regions
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Chapter 11
Game-theoretic Applications to the
Climate Problem
11.1 Introduction
Stern (2007) calls climate change “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen”1. Not only are the
potential consequences of climate change at an unprecedented scale, but it is also caused by and affects the
whole planet. In all previous chapters, it has been assumed that there is a social planner that controls and
maximizes unitary world welfare. Reality is tougher though. There is no world government in place; countries
often put their national interests first and may or may not care about external effects they impose on other
countries. Only in the best case scenario, their interaction leads to a coordinated effort that maximizes the
world’s welfare.2
A common way to capture the nature of the climate change cooperation problem in simple terms is the
“prisoners’ dilemma”3, see Figure 11.1. In this one-stage game, two symmetric, non-altruistic and perfectly
rationally acting countries, or world regions, have two available, discrete strategies at their disposal; either
to pollute or to abate GHG emissions. If they both choose a clean development path (i.e. abate), both
receive the payoff or utility “1”. If region Y abates, region X is better off though by deviating to pollute,
as it then gains the payoff “2”. This is because it saves the own abatement effort, but still enjoys a rather
clean environment, as it shares the benefit of Y’s abatement effort. However, Y’s payoff drops to “-1” in this
scenario, as it bears the costs of abatement, but suffers from X’s emissions. Y improves its payoff by switching
to “pollute” as well, resulting in the “0,0” outcome for both regions. The dilemma is that, both regions would
be better off if they both abated, which marks the cooperative, desirable outcome. However, “pollute” is
the “dominant strategy” for both regions: Regardless of which strategy the other region chooses, the own
best response is to pollute, establishing “pollute, pollute” as the Nash equilibrium4, which “in the idealized
setting correspondends to a steady state [... as] there is no pressure on the action profile to change”5.
1Stern (2007), p. viii.
2Of course, reality is even more twisted. There may be other issues dominating the agendas, vested interests and issues
that may be linked to climate change, such as trade policy and issues of international competitiveness. In democratic states,
governments and goals change from time to time. Multi-national corporations act across borders. Hence, assuming regions as
separable units that are led by a single, forward-looking regional planner still implies strong simplifications.
3See for a description of the original prisoners’ dilemma story e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp. 9f.
4Cp. Wood (2010), pp. 5ff. and Barrett (2003), pp. 54ff.
5Osborne (2004), p. 22.
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0,02,-1Pollute
-1,21,1Abate
PolluteAbate
X
Y
Figure 11.1: The climate problem as a prisoners’ dilemma. Source: Barrett (2003), p. 55.
The prisoners’ dilemma well illustrates the inter-country externality associated with climate change mitiga-
tion. All countries suffer from other countries’ emissions - but also all countries benefit from other countries’
abatement efforts. Hence, if other countries abate, there is a great incentive to “free-ride”, i.e. save the
expenses for abatement, but still enjoy a rather healthy climate, as long as their own contribution to global
warming is marginal. However, the more countries decide to free-ride at the costs of others, the lower the
motivation for the remaining countries to agree on or comply with a stringent international climate change
mitigation agreement might be. The question of how to provide incentives that motivate a sufficient number
of countries to sign a stringent mitigation agreement has been largely the focus of economic analysis that
applies game theory to the climate problem. The roots of the associated discussion are briefly presented in
section 11.2.6
However, this work has a different focus. Unfortunately, as outlined in the Motivation chapter at the beginning
of this thesis, twenty years of international climate diplomacy have not brought yet a stringent international
mitigation agreement, which casts doubts on whether such an agreement can be formed in the (near) future.
It is therefore important to investigate what future, non-cooperative climate change regimes7 in absence of
such an agreement may look like, and whether under such circumstances some collaboration on climate change
issues may still occur. In order to be able to pursue a clean(er) development path, it has repeatedly been
brought forward that less developed countries should receive clean technology transfers from the industrialized
nations. Section 11.3 summarizes the surprisingly sparse economic modelling literature on this. Furthermore,
uncontrolled climate change that remains largely unabated is likely to raise the demand for adaptation
measures, which poses the question whether the industrialized countries should fund adaptation in developing
countries. Section 11.4 sums up the state of the related economic debate.
11.2 International climate change mitigation agreements
Barrett (1994) pioneered investigating how stable International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) can be
6The focus lies on non-cooperative game theory, according to which stability of an agreement obtains if no individual signatory
has the incentive to free-ride. In cooperative game theory (first applied to climate change by Chander and Tulkens (1994,
1997)), if an agreement is stable, a member or a subset of members of the grand coalition, gathering all countries, has no incentive
to leave it and free-ride, because in this case also the remaining countries stop cooperation and free-riding is unprofitable, cp.
Bréchet et al. (2011), pp. 50 and 52. As the work in chapter 12 involves only two countries, no coalitions forming a stable core
can be considered, so that cooperative game-theory is not further reviewed here.
7As defined in fn. 37 of the Motivation chapter.
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formed among symmetric countries. He calls an IEA that is attractive enough, so that everybody wants to
join it and comply to its regulation, a “self-enforcing” agreement. He shows that when all countries abate,
that is cooperation is maximal, total and individual abatement efforts (and welfare levels) are higher than in
a Cournot game, in which each country sets its abatement level individually against the best responses of the
other countries. This relates to the prisoners’ dilemma described above and is a standard result arising from
positive external effects exerted on others, which are not taken into account when calculating the benefits
of abatement. Barrett then introduces the option to sign an IEA that obliges each signatory to abate and
calls it stable, if in the non-cooperative equilibrium none of the signatories wants to defect. His key result
is that an IEA can only be stable as well as binding for a large fraction of parties if the net benefits from
the full-cooperative over the non-cooperative outcome are comparatively small, i.e. when the problem does
not matter too much. If the marginal benefits from a higher level of abatement are smaller, a larger number
of signatories is needed to make it actually attractive for the other signatories to stay under the agreement.
This suggests that when a rather significant problem is faced, only few countries want to join an IEA, and if
the number of parties to an IEA is large, then it probably does not cost much to sign and comply to it.
In Barrett (2003), Barrett again emphasizes that for an IEA to become successful, i.e. self-enforcing, it must
set the right incentives to motivate joining it and complying with its regulation as well as make free-riding a
non-beneficial option. In the basic, non-cooperative game just described, it is optimal for those parties that
are signatories to sign the IEA, hence the threat to withdraw from it is not credible, as it would worsen a
signatory’s payoff. Barrett also discusses credible threats to punish non-signatories by linking negotiations
to other issues affecting inter-country relationships. Potential instruments to increase participation may be
limiting access to R&D for non-signatories, or imposing tariffs or trade bans on non-signatories, which, as
Barrett shows, can be credible or non-credible threats. He critizes that not enough effort was taken to develop
the Kyoto Protocol as a self-enforcing IEA.8
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) show that welfare transfers from signatories to other countries to encourage
(buy) their participation may help to form a larger and more forceful coalition, but only if it can be ensured
that signatories never withdraw from an IEA - a condition that may not be not fulfilled in reality.
Addressing the problem of stratospheric ozone depletion, Barrett (2001) adds that such side payments
become a necessary instrument if the countries are highly asymmetric, so that some countries that only
enjoy a small benefit from a successful agreement need to be compensated for joining it. He states that
“asymmetric games of international cooperation are notoriously difficult to work with and must usually be
solved numerically”9. In the context of climate change, a great deal of asymmetry exists, with those who
(have) emit(ted) most GHGs and who have the greatest potential to abate emissions probably being least
affected by climate change. Asymmetries are often not well-reflected in the models, as they are analytically
more difficult to tackle; the technique of Negishi-weighting to assimilate such asymmetries was critically
discussed in section 1.5.4. With respect to the result of FUND, which was mentioned in section 1.4.3, it
is hardly imaginable that the developing countries compensate the developed countries for their mitigation
efforts; first, since the former are much poorer; second, because of the latters’ large responsibility for GHGs
already emitted, as elaborated in the next section. The model developed in chapter 12 exclusively focuses on
the asymmetry case.
As most of this literature has a rather different focus and is therefore only of limited relevance to this work,
I cut this basic review of international environmental agreement literature off here. It is growing fast and
8Cp. Barrett (2003), pp. 18, 33ff., 307ff., 360ff.
9Barrett (2001), p. 1838.
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by now includes features such as uncertainty, catastrophic damages, dynamic and repeated games; game
theory is also used to solve for Nash equilibria in integrated assessment models such as WITCH (Bosetti
et al. (2011)). I refer to literature surveys provided by Wood (2010),Chander and Tulkens (2008) and
Barrett (2005) for an overview of further IEA literature.
11.3 Clean technology transfer
Clean technology transfer describes the shifting of abatement technology to curb emissions abroad. Embodied
technology transfer is limited to the exportation of equipment, while disembodied transfer refers to the trans-
portation of know-how.10 Traditionally it has been imagined that the transfer should be from industrialized
countries to developing countries, mainly for three reasons:
1. To compensate developing countries for the industrialized countries’ historical responsibility for the accu-
mulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. Estimated over the period 1880-2004, industrialized countries such as
the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany have released the bulk of cumulative CO2 emissions,
both in absolute as well as in average per-capita terms11, so that developing countries claim assistance in
form of technology transfers.12
2. It seems obvious that a forward-looking country that is particularly vulnerable to climate change does not
want to exacerbate global warming through its own development, but if it is poor, i.e. resource-constrained,
we learnt in section 3.3.7 that it may have to cut clean capital investment in order to be able to fund at least
(dirty) mid-term growth. Then, clean technology transfer may be necessary to allow such countries pursuing
a clean(er) development path. This was also one of the main motivations behind the Clean Development
Mechanism, embodied in the Kyoto Protocol, although it has been criticized for only providing incentives to
save emissions at lowest cost rather than promoting support for serving the most urgent needs of developing
countries.13
3. Advanced R&D is generated mainly in developed countries, but innovators want to restrict access to
the knowledge they have accumulated. As a result, many poor countries have insufficient access to clean
technologies or have available only inefficient technologies.14
While transfer payments that add to the recipient’s general consumable resource budget are a standard
subject of the IEA literature briefly outlined in the previous section, surprisingly little modelling work has
been published on clean technology transfer in particular.15
Yang (1999) introduces a related model in which two regions, the rich North and the developing South, suffer
from each other’s externalities that nourish climate change; their emissions feed into a joint global pollution
stock. Both regions may carry out emissions abatement domestically, but the North may also transfer
its abatement technology to the South. In the stylized optimal growth model that Yang introduces first,
abatement, transfer and damage costs diminish the resources available for consumption linearly, i.e. damages
are additive. Consumption is the single argument of a concave utility function. The emissions are determined
10Cp. Popp (2011), p. 137.
11Cp. MacKay (2009), p. 14. Due to their large population, Russia and China rank second and third, respectively, behind
the USA in terms of absolute contributions, s. ibid., p. 26.
12S. Tolba (2011), p. 97.
13Cp. van der Gaast et al. (2009), pp. 230f.
14Cp. Popp (2011), pp. 134ff.
15While there exists a separate strand of literature on the Clean Development Mechanism, which literature usually has a more
applied focus, see e.g. van der Gaast et al. (2009).
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from some non-explicit emissions function; they rise with output and fall with abatement and, in region B,
received clean technology. It is assumed that clean technology transfer costs follow the same pattern as the
North’s linear domestic abatement costs and are independent of the South, i.e. each (transferred) abatement
unit costs one consumption unit. Importantly, when the North decides on its optimal mix of domestic
abatement and further abatement abroad through clean technology transfer, it takes the optimal emissions
(and abatement) level of the South as given, which does not further adjust it in reaction or anticipation to
receiving such transfers. As each unit of the two actions costs the same, the North will allocate its resources
as to ensure that the marginal benefits of both actions are equal. In a second step, Yang merges this setup
with RICE-96, in which he downsizes the number of regions to two. With RICE, damages are no longer
additive, but multiplicative like in equation (1.2), section 1.3, of the DICE-2008 model; also abatement costs
apply in a multiplicative manner, like in (1.6). Yang runs the model using two different setups: First, a
benevolent social planner maximizes the sum of world welfare, and optimal abatement levels in North and
South are obtained from standard cost-benefit analysis. Second, like in the stylized model, the North decides
on its optimal resource allocation over domestic abatement and clean technology transfer taking the South’s
abatement level as given. As is to be expected, overall emissions are lower with the single social planner, as
the mutual externalities are internalized. Yang emphasizes that even if the North does not take into account
the South’s welfare, it may decide to invest in abatement abroad if this saves more emissions than abatement
at home. He concludes that if the South is unable or unwilling to abate, it could potentially use this as a
credible threat to exploit the North’s willingness to abate and force the North to transfer clean technology.
However, such strategic interactions are not modelled; in fact there is no game theory involved at all in the
model. Whenever the North maximizes its sole welfare, the South’s abatement and pre-transfer emissions
levels are assumed exogenous to the North, and the South does not react to the transfers either. While
the criticism of section (1.5.2) on the lack of abatement capital accumulation still applies, also no learning
processes are considered; for instance, the South could anticipate future transfers and hence reduce its
abatement efforts in advance. Yang and Nordhaus (2006) present an update of Yang’s work also using the
RICE framework, but now in a multi-region setting.
Also Aronsson et al. (2010) create a model dealing with clean technology transfer from an aggregated North
to an aggregated South on the basis of RICE-96. In addition to a dampening effect on the South’s carbon
dioxide emissions, both the South’s domestic abatement efforts as well as the clean technology transfer is
assumed to boost Hicks-neutral technical progress in the South by raising the technology parameter in its
production function, which makes the process look like learning-by-doing.16 In contrast to the model of
Yang (1999), clean technology transfer costs increase in abatement carried out by the South, as marginal
abatement costs are assumed rising and the South is assumed to generally pick the low-hanging fruits first.
It is not clear though why domestic abatement by the North reduces its output in a multiplicative manner,
but clean technology transfer costs are substracted from output. Aronnson et al. solve the model for four
overall scenarios. In the first one, no abatement is taken. In the second, to emulate the Kyoto Protocol,
only the North undertakes moderate abatement action; if it is allowed to transfer clean technology, it does
so to take advantage of lower marginal abatement costs abroad. The authors stress that this reflects the
idea of the Clean Development Mechanism, namely to motivate Annex I countries (the North) to exploit the
abatement cost differential for cost-efficient emissions reductions, and via the model’s link to productivity
it promotes the South’s development. In the cooperative scenario, a single social planner maximizes global
welfare, leading to a full internalization of external effects. If technology transfers are allowed, the North
16Although the authors do not explicitly label the process as such; also note that abatement is assumed to improve the total
factor productivity, but not specifically the efficiency of abatement.
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is even worse-off than in the scenario with no controls, but the welfare gains of the South more than offset
this. In the final scenario, Aronsson et al. model a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Only if the South
undertakes zero abatement, it is worthwhile for the North to engage in abatement abroad; if the South
chooses its optimal abatement level first, then abatement has become too expensive for the North and no
clean technology transfer takes place.
11.4 Adaptation funding
For similar reasons that have been brought forward in favour of international clean technology transfer,
also international assistance with adaptation is promoted. Again, the developed countries may have access
to more efficient technology, and they bear the bulk of the historic responsibility for climate change, but
Paavola and Adger (2006) also state a moral reason: “Developed countries can be considered responsible
for assisting developing countries irrespective of being responsible for climate change impacts. Duty to assist
is based on the capacity to assist while responsibility arises from the harm to others”17.
The focus of this analysis lies on whether or not it may be optimal to supply international monetary sup-
port determined for adaptation. Hence, the questions in what ratio the expenses should be shared among
the donors, how (efficiently) these means are distributed at the national level, how pure monetary transfers
should be distinguished from knowledge transfers or how effective such funding may be in supporting au-
tonomous adaptation at the individual level are not dealt with here. Paavola and Adger also state that a
fair climate change adaptation regime should make sure that emissions levels are avoided that are associated
with potentially catastrophic climate change, whose impacts cannot or only be marginally alleviated through
adaptation.18
As adaptation modelling literature is just emerging (chapter 8), naturally the modelling of the impact of
adaptation (funding) on the international level is in its infancy. Barrett (2008) sets out to analyze how
the ability to adapt improves the prospects for concluding a self-enforcing IEA. He assumes that countries
can either abate, adapt or both, not in a continuous, but a binary manner. Mitigation and adaptation are
deemed substitutes, and therefore in the full-cooperative outcome, all countries abate and none adapts. In a
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, nobody abates though and everybody adapts. When analyzing a treaty
participation game, Barrett finds that adaptation raises the number of signatories that do not want to eject
from a self-enforcing IEA. However, this is because adaptation waters down the benefits of mitigation, and
as Barrett had already shown in Barrett (1994) (see section 11), the lower the net benefits from an IEA,
the larger the number of participants.
In de Bruin et al. (2010), the authors built on previous work in de Bruin et al. (2009a,b), which introduced
AD-DICE and AD-RICE, reviewed in section 8.3.2.1. Now, the regions are allowed to transfer adaptation
funds to other regions. In addition, costs for adaptation funding are expressed in terms of GDP and add as
a second summand to domestic adaptation costs on the LHS of (8.12). From the authors’ portrayal, it is
not immediately evident in what form these transfers arrive, i.e. with which productivity the recipient region
can use them. As usual in multi-region models such as (AD-)RICE, de Bruin et al. apply Negishi weighting,
which method is explained in section 1.5.4, but set three distinct scenarios:
1. The non-cooperative Nash solution: The Negishi weights attached to utilities of the different regions
equal the reciprocal value of the marginal benefits of consumption. This implies that, for a utility
17Paavola and Adger (2006), p. 597.
18Cp. Paavola and Adger (2006), p. 602.
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function that exhibits declining marginal returns, the welfare of poor regions, in which the marginal
benefits of consumption are comparatively high, is devalued.
2. Climate cooperation: The Negishi weights are defined as the reciprocal values of the regions’ gross
output, before climate damages occur. This bears the consequence that global welfare is maximized if
more resources are transferred to those regions that are more affected by climate change, while initial
income differences are ignored.
3. Full cooperation: All Negishi weights are equal, triggering the large equitable redistribution of wealth
that is usually prevented by introducing such a weighting.
De Bruin et al. find that foreign adaptation funding perfectly crowds out domestic adaptation expenditures,
if the latter are set at their optimal levels. The recipient regions rather withdraw resources from adaptation
to spend them on other purposes than exceeding optimal levels of adaptation. No adaptation funding takes
place in the non-cooperative scenario. In the climate cooperation scenario, resources for adaptation are
transferred to more vulnerable regions from regions that are, in the model, less affected by climate change,
such as Russia and China.19 With full cooperation, adaptation funding further increases, as it provides a
means to balance out the global inequalities.
Buob and Stephan (2009) investigate the prospects for adaptation funding in a conceptual North-South
model. Like Buob and Stephan (2010), whose article was critically discussed in section 8.4.3, motivated
by case-study based examples they build on the assumption that mitigation and adaptation are (weak)
complements, i.e. an increased demand for mitigation raises (leaves unaffected) the demand for adaptation.
They model a two-stage game: At the first stage, the North decides on an adaptation transfer to the South. At
the second stage, both regions decide simultaneously on mitigation. Domestic adaptation efforts by the South
are assumed exogenous. From the complementarity assumption it is concluded that the South’s mitigation
efforts increase in adaptation. Hence, the North can be motivated to provide adaptation funds in order to
shift some of the mitigation burden to the South. The South only benefits from the transfer if the funds are
large enough to compensate for its now larger mitigation costs. The authors illustrate this process as follows:
“Suppose the North invests in water conservation projects in the South to reduce the South’s vulnerability
regarding potential water scarcity. Such an investment positively affects mitigation since it reduces energy use
for transporting, heating and cooling of water. The South then reacts by investing in mitigation to further
reduce the energy use as a response to the increased marginal productivity of mitigation caused by the
adaptation funding. In turn, the North reduces its mitigation level due to the South’s willingness to increase
its mitigation efforts”20. In Buob (2009), the ideas are further developed. Assuming that the developed
countries will be committed to some Kyoto-like mitigation target in the future, the North’s mitigation level
is fixed. Then, three different stage games are analysed. In a Stackelberg game, the North decides on domestic
adaptation and adaptation funding first, and anticipates the South’s corresponding optimal mitigation and
adaptation levels; the outcome confirms the results of Buob and Stephan (2009). If the South’s mitigation
decision is taken first, then there is no incentive for the North to transfer adaptation funds as they cannot
influence the South’s mitigation level.
As it was elaborated in section 8.2, the complements hypothesis that is crucial for the work of Buob and
Stephan is probably not tenable on the aggregated scale they consider. Second, it is not clear why in the first
19This comes to a surprise at least for China, which is predicted to be significantly affected by climate change, see Met Office
Hadley Centre (2011a). In comparison, Russia seems less vulnerable to climate change, see Met Office Hadley Centre
(2011b).
20Buob and Stephan (2009), p. 11.
224
CHAPTER 11. GAME-THEORETIC APPLICATIONS TO THE CLIMATE PROBLEM
paper adaptation in the South is modelled as exogenous, as this eliminates the adaptation funding response
dynamics from the model. The example also does not make clear why the South is forced to increase its
mitigation efforts after receiving adaptation funds; apart from the general mathematical mechanism imposed
by the complements hypothesis. In case the South’s situation is worsened by receiving adaptation funds that
forces it to scale up its mitigation efforts, why can it not simply reject the funds? Finally, with the many
scenarios introduced in the second publication and embedding different orders of investment decisions, the
timing of mitigation and adaptation investments seems rather arbitrary.
11.5 Concluding remarks
Game-theoretic methods have been applied to explore the prospects for stringent and effective international
environmental agreements to be concluded, and economic research on this subject is advanced. In comparison,
surprisingly little modelling work has been published on clean technology transfer. Furthermore, either the
option to respond to other regions’ actions is excluded, so that interaction is banned in favour of exogenous
behaviour, or the analysis focuses on the classic comparison between the non-cooperative and cooperative
outcomes. It is not a distinct feature of climate change mitigation that actions that exert positive external
effects on others increase when external effects are internalized. It is an interesting feature of the model of
Aronsson et al. (2010) that clean technology transfer may even occur in a non-cooperative setting, namely
when the South’s abatement level is zero, so that for the North it is more effective to invest in abatement
abroad than to curb emissions in its own territory.
Again, it does not come to a surprise that international adaptation assistance increases with the level of
cooperation between the countries, and the model of de Bruin et al. (2010) predicts none to take place
in their non-cooperative scenario. Only Buob and Stephan (2009) identify strategic reasons to provide
adaptation funding even in absence of a global benevolent planner, however their results are based on strong,
arguably implausible assumptions. Hence, more work especially on clean technology transfers as well as
adaptation funding, and possibly also on prospects for them to occur in absence of cooperation, seems
desirable. In their adaptation literature review, also Agrawala et al. (2011) come to the conclusion that
“the role of adaptation in international climate change negotiations, which is presently growing in importance,
remains largely unexplored”.21 I investigate the impact of adaptation on a non-cooperative climate regime
as well as the prospects for clean technology transfer and adaptation funding in a non-cooperative scenario
with two asymmetric regions in the next chapter.
21Agrawala et al. (2011), p. 278.
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Chapter 12
Two-Region Games with Mitigation,
Adaptation and Transfers
12.1 Overview
The previous chapter elaborated that, within the climate change literature, game-theoretic tools have mostly
been applied in order to explore pathways that may lead to stringent international environmental agreements,
i.e. cooperative climate regimes. When non-cooperative scenarios have been considered, then mostly to
compare their outcomes with those of the cooperative ones and to suggest how the the rules could be changed
to reach cooperation, but not to investigate their own strategic implications. Furthermore, mechanisms
underlying clean technology transfer and adaptation funding have not yet received much attention and leave
plenty of scope for future research.
In this chapter, I intend to address these topics and make a contribution to filling the gaps. In the following,
I replace the social planner that maximizes the world’s welfare by two planners, who manage two interacting
regions. The regions have asymmetric characteristics, where one region prefers a higher cumulative carbon
target than the other. In the Motivation chapter at the beginning of this thesis, it was questioned whether the
world may continue to lack a stringent mitigation agreement. Therefore, I start to investigate the strategic
implications of a non-cooperative climate regime1 under a range of scenarios. In section 12.2, the focus lies
on the basic model, in which neither clean nor adaptation capital is available. I compare the outcomes of the
Cournot game, a Stackelberg game and the cooperative scenario. In section 12.3, I again discuss the Cournot
game, now with the mitigation option enabled. I also stress the importance of the minimum consumption
constraint and introduce a new one, which I call the sustainability constraint. After the implications of a
zero emissions technology are elaborated, I analyze clean technology transfer games. Finally, in section 12.4
it turns out that the option to adapt may affect the regions’ investment behaviour and their outcomes, and
the sustainability constraint is revisited. Eventually, I discuss the prospects for clean technology transfer and
adaptation funding under a non-cooperative climate regime, before conclusions are offered.
1As defined in fn. 37 of the Motivation chapter.
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12.2 Two regions in the basic model
12.2.1 Overview
In the following section, first the structure of the basic two-region game is explained, in which neither a
mitigation technology is available nor the option to adapt exists.2 It is assumed that one region is superior to
the other in the sense that it is willing to cope with a higher cumulative emissions level in the long term. For
a Cournot game, in which the players are assumed to take decisions simultaneously, the Nash equilibrium is
derived. In section 12.2.3, a Stackelberg game is assumed in which the inferior region is able to take decisions
first, before the superior region moves second. Section 12.2.4 discusses as a reference case the cooperative
scenario with one social planner that maximizes the welfare of both regions jointly. Section 12.2.5 briefly
deals with the case of two symmetric regions.
12.2.2 Two non-cooperative regions in a Cournot game
The “one world” of the basic model (without mitigation and adaptation) is disaggregated into two regions3,
A and B. In each region, a regional planner seeks to maximize the region’s intertemporal welfare and is
not concerned about the other region’s welfare. Both regions are confronted with a symmetric optimization
problem, which from region A’s perspective looks as follows:
max
KAt+1
ZA = pAKAt − (KAt+1 −KAt)− bA(St)2 + βA
[
(1 + pA)KAt+1 − bA (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)2
]
−φA
[
bA (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
]
, (12.1)
with Kuhn-Tucker condition
∂ZA
∂KAt+1
≤ 0;KAt+1 ≥ 0;KAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂KAt+1
= 0. (12.2)
The region-specific parameters may vary across the regions to allow for asymmetries; therefore they now have
a subscript A or B. Both regions have to cope with the same global amount of committed CO2 emissions
St, and in periods t + 1 and T
4 emissions from both regions add to the global cumulative emissions pool.
Arithmetically, the world capital stock is given as5
Kt = KAt +KBt. (12.3)
Assuming an interior solution, region A decides on the base of its FOC:
2Other interdependencies established by trade relations, multinational corporations or market competition are also ignored,
see also chapter 11, fn. 2.
3As the analysis focuses on the behaviour of two players, it is spoken of (broad) regions rather than specific countries,
although this is a semantic issue for the model.
4For the moment, I reintroduce the long term “T”, as long as adaptation is disabled.
5Issues of trade and capital markets are not considered in the model.
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∂ZA
∂KAt+1
= −1 + βA(1 + pA)− 2φAbAγA (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1) = 0
⇐⇒ KAt+1 = βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγ2A
− St
γA
−KAt − γB
γA
KBt − γB
γA
KBt+1. (12.4)
Equation (12.4) captures region A’s best investment response, which is dependent on region B’s investment
decision. Region A’s optimal capital investment level is not only influenced by emissions generated during
its own production, but also by emissions from region B. However, neither of the regions takes the adverse,
external effect into account that its emissions exert on the other region. This is the standard story about the
lack of cooperation in preventing climate change, see chapter 11.
The best response function of region B is symmetric.
KBt+1 =
βB(1 + pB)− 1
2φBbBγ2B
− St
γB
−KBt − γA
γB
KAt − γA
γB
KAt+1. (12.5)
For a Cournot game to apply, it is assumed that both players (i.e. the regions and associated planners) take
their decisions simultaneously. Nobody knows or can anticipate the other player’s action in its own decision-
making process; the other player’s decision is taken as “given”.6 A Nash equilibrium of a Cournot game is
reached when each player cannot enhance his or her outcome, here intertemporal welfare, by deviating from
his or her best response, given that the other player acts according to his or her best response. Mathematically,
a Nash equilibrium is described by the intersection of the two best response functions.7 If (12.5) is plugged
into (12.4) though, no immediate solution is obtained. Nevertheless, a Nash equilibrium exists.
If region A (region B) was on its own in the world, so that it exclusively could control cumulative period
T emissions, from the results of the simple model presented in section 3.3.4 we know that it would set and
achieve the cumulative world emissions target SAT
(
SBT
)
:
SAT =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγA
(12.6)
SBT =
βB(1 + pB)− 1
2φBbBγB
. (12.7)
In the following, it is assumed that region A prefers a higher level of cumulative CO2 emissions than region
B, as avoiding climate change is for region A either more costly or less beneficial than for region B. This may
be because region A possesses the more efficient production technology, either in terms of output generation,
pA > pB , or in terms of its environmental properties, γA < γB . Alternatively or additionally, it values
the mid-term benefits of production more than region B, implying βA > βB , or it is either less concerned
about long-term climate damages, φA < φB , or less vulnerable to climate change, bA < bB . Maybe for some
parameters the opposite relationship holds, but it is assumed that the following asymmetry condition holds:
SAT =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγA
>
βB(1 + pB)− 1
2φBbBγB
= SBT . (12.8)
6Cp. Osborne (2004), p. 187.
7Not considering mixed strategies here.
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Definition 21. In the following, region A is referred to as the superior region, as its productivity, vulnerability
and preference parameters in total support a higher world cumulative emissions level than the inferior region
B would like to attain. The respective optimal levels in (12.6) and (12.7) are referred to as the regions’
“cumulative emissions targets”.
Hence, it may be the case that e.g. φA > φB , but the asymmetry condition (12.8) claims that in total
SAT > S
B
T . I call region A the “superior region”, because it is able and willing to cope with a higher
cumulative emissions level than region B. Less precise, I may sometimes refer to the “superior” (“inferior”)
region as the “rich” (“poor”) region or the developed (developing) countries.
Equation (12.5) is solved for KAt+1 to obtain:
KAt+1 =
βB(1 + pB)− 1
2φBbBγAγB
− St
γA
−KAt − γB
γA
KBt − γB
γA
KBt+1. (12.9)
The two best response functions ((12.4) and (12.9)) are depicted in Figure 12.1. They have the same slope
−γBγA , so that they run parallel. Region A never chooses a KAt+1 that lies above its best response function,
1+AtK
1+BtK
Region A‘s best response function
1
1+AtK
2
1+BtK
3
1+AtK
4
1+BtK
5
1+AtK
Region B‘s best response function
7
1+AtK
6
1+BtK
Figure 12.1: Two asymmetric regions: best response functions
because for such high investments region A’s optimal world emissions level would be exceeded. To derive the
Nash equilibrium of this Cournot game, let us assume that region A first considers a relatively low investment
level, K1At+1. Incorporating the climate damages caused by region A’s period t + 1 production in its best
response, region B would in this case like to accumulate K2Bt+1. However, that investment level leaves a lot
of leeway for further investment by region A, and from its best response function it can be read that it would
like to accumulate K3At+1. The rules of the game assume simultaneous decisions; if region B stuck to K
2
Bt+1,
it would face a cumulative emissions level associated with the sum of K3At+1 and K
2
Bt+1, which would exceed
SBT , leading to overpollution of region B. Therefore, it is region B’s best response to reduce its investments
to build up the lower period t+ 1 capital stock K4Bt+1. This investment level in turn stimulates region A to
increase its investments to K5At+1. The long-term climate damages associated with this investment level are
229
CHAPTER 12. TWO-REGION GAMES WITH MITIGATION, ADAPTATION AND TRANSFERS
overwhelming for region B, so that it has no better choice than to completely stop its production, K6Bt+1 = 0.
Because region A then does not face any climate damages from production abroad, it can further expand its
production to K7At+1. The outcome of this game also is geometrically identifiable by the intersection of the
two complete best response (bold lines) functions at the KAt+1-axis, the solution is depicted in Figure 12.2.
8
1+AtK
1+BtK
*
1+AtK
0
*
1
=+BtK
Region A‘s best response function
Region B‘s best response function
Figure 12.2: Solution of the Cournot game in the basic model
In algebraic terms:
K¯At+1 =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγ2A
− St
γA
−KAt − γB
γA
KBt (12.10)
K¯Bt+1 = 0 (12.11)
S¯T =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγA
= SAT . (12.12)
D¯T = bA(S
A
T )
2 + bB(S
A
T )
2 (12.13)
Facing K¯At+1, which leads to cumulative emissions S¯T that exceed region B’s optimal emissions target, S
B
T ,
region B does not want to engage in any period t + 1 production, because in that situation the marginal
climate damages caused by any non-zero region B production outweigh its marginal benefits.9
It should be noted that the sum of region B’s period t+ 1 and long-term utilities is negative, because it has
no production and consumption in period t+1, but nevertheless needs to cope with climate damages caused
by region A and previous committed emissions. Region B would like to reduce the world investment level
even below Kt+1 = K¯At+1, but it has no means of forcing region A to attain a lower investment level that
satisfies the interests of region B. Furthermore, even if there was a critical cumulative emissions threshold ΩB
8This is in line with the analysis of Finus (2001), who states that, in case of two parallel best response functions, the region
with the lower response function does not emit at all, s. Finus (2001), pp. 129f.
9One might wonder whether there really is not any case left for period t+1 production in region B. For instance, what would
happen if region B started by bidding its own optimal period t+1 capital stock corresponding to SBT ? In diagram 12.1, this bid
is represented by the intersection of region B’s best response function with the KBt+1-axis. Then though again the two players
would move upwards along their best response functions and end up in (K¯At+1; K¯Bt+1).
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beyond which region B suffered from potentially catastrophic climate damages (introduced in section 3.2.9),
region A would ignore this and nevertheless stick to its optimal period capital stock K¯At+1.
Proposition 22. In the Cournot game of the basic two-region model, the superior region can meet its optimal
emissions target and is the only region that runs production in period t+ 1. The inferior region does neither
produce nor consume in period t+ 1 and is overpolluted.
It may be viewed a surprising feature of the model that the two best response functions do not intersect
“earlier”, i.e. at a point where K¯Bt+1 > 0. This stems again from the linear utility and production functions.
If e.g. production were concave so that δf(K=0)δK →∞, for low levels of period t+1 capital investment in region
B the marginal benefits of close-to-zero investment would outweigh the marginal, environmental costs, thus
K¯Bt+1 > 0. It furthermore seems reasonable to predict that region B will not stop its production entirely
in the face of climate change in order to satisfy at least basic consumption needs; this issue is taken up in
section 12.3.3. Nevertheless, the crude model architecture is sufficient to capture some essential features of
the climate problem.
The results draw a bleak picture. The winner - region A, which enforces its optimal investment and cumulative
emissions levels - takes it all. If we think of region A as the representative of the industrialized world that is
less vulnerable to climate change than region B, representing the developing world10, it can be concluded that
the industrialized countries prove to have on average little incentive to curb emissions down to levels that
would be more favourable to the more vulnerable countries, as long the former do not (partially) share in the
welfare losses of the latter (or some sort of internalization takes place). Representatives of a region B, such
as poor developing countries or a small-island state, may urge the industrialized countries to more ambitious
mitigation (in the simple model: less investment), but have no means of retaliation, if the industrialized
countries do not follow their appeals.
12.2.3 Two non-cooperative regions in a Stackelberg game: is there a first-mover
advantage?
Intuitively, one might wonder why region B does not take action to prevent its devastating outcome and want
to ask why region B does not simply stick to a positive investment level, as otherwise region A exploits the
atmospheric sinks. This is because in a Cournot game, the players are unable to announce decisions, but react
to each others’ best responses simultaneously. This is different in a Stackelberg game, where a rule change
is imposed by allowing a player to make his or her decision first, while the other player has to cope with the
credible (emissions) commitment made by the first mover. In a business context, Osborne (2004) describes
a Stackelberg game as follows: ”Firms make their decisions sequentially, rather than simultaneously: One
firm chooses its output, then the other firm does so, knowing the output chosen by the first firm”11. In the
climate context, a credible emissions commitment could be a large-scale investment programme that promotes
high-carbon technologies, e.g. by constructing a high number of coal-fired power plants. They must run for
a long time, so that the investments can pay for themselves. The programme essentially ensures a long-term
10Neglecting at this point shades in between - in particular intermediate emerging economies. There may be countries that
despite high vulnerability to climate change prefer high mid-term growth, maybe because β is very high and/or φ rather low.
11Osborne (2004), p. 187. Furthermore: “A firm that buys equipment today signals that it will be around tomorrow if it
cannot resell the equipment. Thus, we may conjecture that the buying of equipment - if it is observed by one’s rivals - may have
strategic effects [...]. Rivals may interpret the purchase of equipment as bad news about the profitability of the market and may
reduce their scale of entry or not enter at all [...]. First-mover advantages thus allow the established firms to restrict or prevent
competition”, Tirole (1988), pp. 314f.
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high-carbon technology lock-in, which establishes a credible emissions commitment. Currently, China might
come closest to being a potential Stackelberg leader, as it is still setting up its energy infrastructure, which
will fix China’s emissions profile for a long time.
Naturally, if region A is the first mover, the Stackelberg outcome will coincide with the Cournot game
outcome; region A will stick to its optimal investment level K¯At+1, and region B will consume its entire
resource endowment in period t to prevent further pollution. The industrialized countries have moved first
in terms of exploiting large parts of the atmospheric carbon sink, leaving the second movers in terms of
development, the developing countries, with a more limited choice of development options.12
In order to test the sensitivity of the outcomes to the game setting, I investigate how the outcome of the
game changes, if the inferior region, which aspires for a lower long-term cumulative world emissions level, is
able to make an emissions commitment first. The optimization problem of region B, assumed to be the first
mover, is
max
KBt+1
ZB = pBKBt − (KBt+1 −KBt)− bB(St)2 + βB
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1 − bB (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)2
]
−φB
[
bA (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
]
, (12.14)
with the Kuhn-Tucker condition
∂ZB
∂KBt+1
≤ 0;KBt+1 ≥ 0;KBt+1 · ∂ZB
∂KBt+1
= 0. (12.15)
As decisions are not taken simultaneously, region B can strategically use its commitment to influence the
behaviour of region A, taking region A’s reaction to its commitment into full account. This is reflected by
region A’s best response function (12.4) being plugged into (12.16), so that:
max
KBt+1
Z = pBKBt − (KBt+1 −KBt)− bB(St)2 + βB
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1 − bB (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)2
]
−φB
[
bb
(
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγA
)2]
. (12.16)
The last term in (12.16) in round brackets equals S¯T = S
A
T (equation (12.12)) from the Cournot game.
Region B anticipates that regardless of what it does, the world’s cumulative emissions level will in the long
term always reach region A’s target level, S¯T , a level which exceeds region B’s preferred level. Equipped
with that knowledge, from region B’s perspective eventual cumulative emissions are therefore exogenous.
Put differently, given that S¯T is achieved in any case, from region B’s perspective it is better to at least
create them itself. Region B will invest in period t + 1 capital up to the level that correspondends to S¯T ,
so that while it still suffers from climate damages that lie above its optimum, it at least enjoys the benefits
of additional period t + 1 consumption, which in the Cournot game fell entirely upon region A. Obviously,
region B can only do so if it is sufficiently endowed from the onset. Formally, this is described by
12The analogy is lopsided though, as the environmental risks of fossil fuel use had not been well understood from the beginning
of the fossil age, i.e. had not been foreseen from the beginning of the game. No deliberate commitments were made.
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K´Bt+1 =
(1 + pB)KBt − bB(St)2, if γB
(
(1 + pB)KBt − bB(St)2
) ≤ S¯T
γA
γB
K¯At+1 =
βA(1+pA)−1
2φAbAγAγB
− StγB −
γA
γB
KAt −KBt if γB
(
(1 + pB)KBt − bB(St)2
)
> S¯T .
(12.17)
From region A’s best response function (12.4), it can be derived
K´At+1 =

βA(1+pA)−1
2φAbAγ2A
− StγA −KAt −
γB
γA
KBt − γBγA ((1 + pB)KBt − bBS2t ), if γB
(
(1 + pB)KBt − bB(St)2
) ≤ S¯T
0, if γB
(
(1 + pB)KBt − bB(St)2
)
> S¯T .
(12.18)
If the two first lines of the solutions for K´Bt+1 and K´At+1, respectively, apply, then region B is resource-
constrained and cannot afford the higher, otherwise optimal investment level described by the second line in
(12.17). For verification,
S´T =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγA
= S¯T . (12.19)
The solution of the Stackelberg game is illustrated in diagram 12.3 for the case γA = γB .
1+AtK
1+BtK01 =+
STACK
At
K
11 ++ = At
STACK
Bt
KK
BA
γγ =
and if region B not resource-constrained
for
Figure 12.3: Inferior region as the Stackelberg leader: solution
To summarize, as region B is able to take actions first, it is better off than in the Cournot game. It still
cannot enforce a cumulative emissions level that is lower than S¯T = S
A
T , but may at least enjoy a certain
share of the benefits from creating those emissions. If region B is sufficiently resource-rich, it even reaps all
benefits from production exclusively, and ironically region A is left with no better option than zero period
t+ 1 production.
Proposition 23. If the inferior region is the Stackelberg leader, for a sufficiently large initial resource
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endowment, the regions swap sides compared with the Cournot outcome; the superior region neither produces
nor consumes in period t+ 1, but the inferior region does, though it remains overpolluted.
These results may indicate that the order of development matters. Furthermore, they may shed light on the
fact why a country such as China, which is regarded as considerably vulnerable to climate change13, still
follows a rather carbon-intense development path.14 As long as a binding and inclusive climate agreement
is lacking that sets stringent world mitigation targets, more extreme climate change that is bearable by the
industrialized, less vulnerable countries will be reached in any case. As a consequence, the more vulnerable
countries may indeed be better off by seeking cheap and dirty, i.e. carbon-intense growth, in order to race
for consuming some slices of the carbon cake whose size is determined by the industrialized countries. If
any more vulnerable country realizes that the developed countries do not significantly reduce their carbon
emissions even if it is willing to do so itself, then, in provocative terms, it makes sense to join the party before
it is over.
12.2.4 Two cooperative regions with a single social planner
In this section, it is investigated how a single social planner deals with the regions’ interests jointly. Their
differences are still summarized by the asymmetry condition (12.8), but it is further specified here that
region A has a superior production technology, either in terms of output per capital unit or with respect to
its environmental properties, i.e. pA > pB and/or γA < γB . Still it is allowed that βA Ó= βB and φA Ó= φB ,
i.e. the social planner could have different preferences towards the two regions. The social planner now
determines both the level of global damages and the investment levels of the regions, and faces the following
optimization problem15:
max
KAt+1,KBt+1
Z
= pAKAt − (KAt+1 −KAt)− bA(St)2 + βA
[
(1 + pA)KAt+1 − bA (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)2
]
− φA
[
bA (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
]
+ pBKBt − (KBt+1 −KBt)− bB(St)2 + βB
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1 − bB (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)2
]
− φB
[
bb (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
]
, (12.20)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions
∂Z
∂Kjt+1
≤ 0;Kjt+1 ≥ 0;Kjt+1 · ∂Z
∂Kjt+1
= 0 ∀j ǫ J = {A,B} . (12.21)
13S. Met Office Hadley Centre (2011a).
14Despite the pledges China has made at COP15 in Copenhagen to reduce its carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 from the
2005 level, s. Department of Climate Change, National Development & Reform Commission of China (2010), absolute
CO2 emissions are projected to continue to rise due to China’s fast economic growth, cp. Gambhir et al. (2012), pp. 7ff.
15One could argue here that implicitly Negishi weighing is applied, which instrument was criticized in section 1.5.4. The
same linear utility function is applied to both regions, although one region may be substantially poorer than the other, so that
the associated marginal utilities of consumption should be higher than those of the richer region. In order to maximize global
welfare, wealth should be redistributed to make marginal utilities across regions equal. Imposing equal marginal utilities upon
both regions has an effect similar to Negishi weighing. However, the cooperative scenarios are not the focus of this work, and
the further analysis presented in this section compares world production and emissions levels to those obtained in the non-
cooperative scenarios and does not elaborate the spatial distribution of the benefits of consumption, which could in principle be
shared equally.
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Given that regions A’s production technology is better, the social planner moves all investment resources to
region A to make most out of them, so that KˇBt+1 = 0.
16 Hence, it is sufficient to derive only the FOC with
respect to KAt+1:
∂Z
∂KAt+1
= −1 + βA(1 + pA)− 2φAbAγA (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1)
−2φBbBγA (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1) (12.22)
⇐⇒ KˇAt+1 = βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγ2A + 2φBbBγ
2
A
− St
γA
−KAt − γB
γA
KBt (12.23)
SˇT =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγA + 2φBbBγA
. (12.24)
A comparison of results shows that KˇAt+1 < K¯At+1 and SˇT < S¯T = S
A
T . Furthermore, SˇT < S
B
T .
Proposition 24. In a cooperative scenario, both the world’s period t + 1 production as well as period T
emissions are lower than in the non-cooperative scenarios.
This replicates the classic result of e.g. Barrett (1994): Once the external environmental effects exerted
on the other players are internalized through the means of a single social planner, it turns out that it is
optimal to reduce emissions from the level reached in a non-cooperative scenario. This result also holds when
the options to mitigate and/or adapt are enabled. The general difference between the non-cooperative and
the cooperative outcome has been discussed widely in the literature (see chapter 11); therefore it presents a
reference point, but shall not be the focus of the further analysis.
12.2.5 Two symmetric, non-cooperative regions
If the two regions have completely identical characteristics, equation (12.8) holds with equality and all region-
specific subscripts can be dropped from the parameters. As a consequence, the two distinct best response
functions (12.4) and (12.9) fall together to a single, joint best-reponse function that is valid for both regions:
KAt+1 =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ2
− St
γ
−KAt −KBt −KBt+1. (12.25)
This game has multiple Nash equilibria; any (KAt+1;KBt+1) allocation that fulfills (12.25) is a Nash equi-
librium. With rule (12.3), the optimal world capital stock and optimal cumulative emissions follow, whereby
no statement on the allocation of the former and the origin of the latter can be made:
Kˆt+1 =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ2
− St
γ
−Kt (12.26)
SˆT =
β(1 + p)− 1
2φbγ
. (12.27)
16The reasons for the zero-investment outcomes are different across the scenarios. In the non-cooperative scenario, region B’s
regional planner eventually comes to the conclusion that it has no better option than complete disinvestment. Region B is left
with zero period t + 1 consumption, but nevertheless environmental damages in the long term. In contrast, in this cooperative
scenario, the social planner completely disinvests in region B solely because investments are more profitable in region A, where
they create more resources, which are potentially available for consumption in both regions. However, for the linear utility
function used in this model, period t + 1 consumption would take place in region A (B) only, if βA > βB (βB > βA).
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These optimal solutions replicate the optimal solutions of the basic one-world model derived in section 3.3.4. I
do regard the perfect symmetry case as an artifact case though and report it for the sake of completeness only;
the stakeholders to the climate problem are strongly asymmetric. Therefore, I assume that the asymmetry
condition (12.8) applies.
12.3 Two regions with clean technology
12.3.1 Overview
In section 12.3.2, the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game is derived, when clean technology is available.
Like in the Cournot game of the basic model, the inferior region achieves zero period t + 1 consumption.
Therefore, in section 12.3.3 the minimum consumption constraints are reconsidered. Subsequently, a more
ambitious constraint, the so-called “sustainability constraint” is introduced, which requires the sum of mid-
term consumption and long-term damages to be greater or equal than zero. In section 12.3.5, the special
case of a zero-emissions technology is investigated, and in section 12.3.6 clean technology transfer games are
considered. The section finishes with a brief summary of the outcomes, before adaptation is introduced to
the two-region model.
12.3.2 Two non-cooperative regions with clean technology in a Cournot game
In the previous scenarios, the only way the regions could save emissions was by investing less. Now, a clean
technology is (re-)introduced, which allows the regions to create less emissions per unit of output, but the
accumulation of associated clean capital requires larger per-unit investments costs and entails adjustment
costs (for details, see chapter 3).17 Furthermore, the minimum consumption constraints are added again,
which were silently neglected in the past sections. The regions face the following symmetric optimization
problem, which, drawing on the setup of the optimization problem with clean technology in section 3.2.10,
is stated in the following from region A’s perspective:
max
KAt+1,MAt+1
ZA
= pA(KAt +MAt)− (KAt+1 −KAt)− (1 + ζA)(MAt+1 −MAt)
− ΨA
2
(MAt+1 −MAt) ·max (MAt+1 −MAt; 0)− bA(St)2
+ βA
[
(1 + pA)(KAt+1 +MAt+1)− bA(St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt + µBMBt)2
]
− φAbA
[
(St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt + µBMBt + γAKAt+1 + µAMAt+1 + γBKBt+1 + µBMBt+1)
2
]
+ λA1(CAt − fA) + λA2(CAt+1 − fA), (12.28)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions
17For simplicity, it is assumed that no synergies arise among the regions from deploying clean technology. Therefore, the clean
technology adjustment costs in one region do not decrease with adoption of clean technology in the other, e.g. because they are
too remote from each other. The model neither addresses carbon leakage, that is the “escape” of carbon-intense industry to
countries with less stringent carbon regulation.
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∂ZA
∂KAt+1
≤ 0; KAt+1 ≥ 0; KAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂Kt+1
= 0 (12.29)
∂ZA
∂MAt+1
≤ 0; MAt+1 ≥ 0; MAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂MAt+1
= 0 (12.30)
∂ZA
∂λAi
≥ 0; λAi ≥ 0; λAi · ∂ZA
∂λAi
= 0 for i = 1, 2. (12.31)
It is assumed that both dirty and clean capital are employed by region A, i.e. KAt+1,MAt+1 > 0, and that the
constraints do not bite, λA1,2 = 0. In fact, I ignore the minimum consumption restrictions for the moment
and discuss their implications in the next section. I drop the carbon constraint from the model to save
notation; its potential consequences were analyzed in sections 3.3.8 and 10.5.7. If it bit in the two-region
case, the regions would have to reduce their emissions and economic activity accordingly. Following the same
steps as in section 3.3.5, the structurally same result of that section for optimal clean capital is derived:
M˜At+1 = MAt +
1
ΨA
((
1− µA
γA
)
(βA (1 + pA)− 1)− ζA
)
. (12.32)
Clean capital investment is independent on the other region’s investments.18 Carrying out the same manip-
ulations as in section 3.3.5, region A’s best response function for dirty capital investment is obtained:
KAt+1 =
βA (1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγ2A
− St
γA
−KAt− γB
γA
KBt− µA
γA
MAt− µB
γA
MBt− γB
γA
KBt+1− µA
γA
M˜At+1− µB
γA
MBt+1,
(12.33)
Region B’s best response function is symmetric:
KBt+1 =
βB (1 + pB)− 1
2φBbBγ2B
− St
γB
−KBt− γA
γB
KAt− µB
γB
MBt− µA
γB
MAt− γA
γB
KAt+1− µB
γB
MBt+1− µA
γB
M˜At+1.
(12.34)
These curves run again in parallel, as in the game analyzed in section 12.2.2, with the same corner Nash
equilibrium. Region A meets its higher optimal cumulative emissions target, and region B is eventually left
with no better option than completely disinvesting in period t to avoid any period t+1 production that adds
further emissions at negative net marginal benefits:
18Which certainly is a result of the linear utility and production functions the model assumes, see section 3.6.
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K˜At+1 =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγ2A
− St
γA
−KAt − γB
γA
KBt − 2µA
γA
MAt − µB
γA
MBt
− µA
γA
1
ΨA
((
1− µA
γA
)
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)− ζA
)
. (12.35)
M˜At+1 = MAt +
1
ΨA
((
1− µA
γA
)
(βA (1 + pA)− 1)− ζA
)
. (12.36)
K˜Bt+1 = 0 (12.37)
M˜Bt+1 = 0 (12.38)
S˜T =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγA
= S¯T = S
A
T . (12.39)
In fact, this result should come as no surprise. It was found earlier that, with a linear utility function, the
partial adoption of clean technology does not lead to a different cumulative emissions target, and, similarly,
in the two-region game region A adheres to the same target that was optimal when the clean technology
was not available. Region B would still like to enforce a regime with less extreme climate change, but the
availability of a clean technology does not provide the means for doing so. In other words:
Proposition 25. The possibility to abate CO2 emissions does not change the incentive structure of the
climate game;
which is a result that has been obtained in the IEA literature repeatedly; the existence of abatement options
does not automatically lead to a self-enforcing IEA.
12.3.3 The minimum consumption constraints revisited
When determining the solution of the game analyzed in the previous section, given in equations (12.35)-
(12.39), the minimum consumption constraints were actually ignored. For any fB > 0 though, with K˜Bt+1 =
M˜Bt+1 = 0, region B’s period t+1 the minimum consumption constraint must inevitably be violated. Region
B’s minimum period t+ 1 consumption constraint reads:
CBt+1 = (1 + pB)(KBt+1 +MBt+1)−DBt+1 ≥ fB . (12.40)
As long as region B’s period t resources are sufficient to accumulate a period t+1 production capital stock that
is large enough to fuel a CBt+1 = fB
19, the consumption restriction is fulfillable. To find the outcome of this
game with a fB > 0, it can be argued as follows. Reconsidering Figure 12.1, region B would never “bid” a total
period t+1 capital stock that cannot supply fB . Region A knows that region B is not willing to compromise
on its period t+ 1 minimum consumption by any means and that region B will run sufficient production to
fulfill its commitment. As a consequence, region A needs to lower its economic activity accordingly in order
to avoid that its own preferred cumulative emissions level is exceeded. In the Nash equilibrium, region B
just bids the total capital stock level corresponding to fB , and region A exhausts the remainder to reach S
A
T .
With respect to the technology mix of region B, for a situation in which it considers accumulating some clean
period t+ 1 capital, region B realizes that region A’s best response is to realize SAT anyway. Therefore, it is
19Which is assumed here and in the following - otherwise region B is unable to satisfy the consumption constraints in both
periods.
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region B’s best available strategy to just stick to dirty capital investment and obtain fB as cheap as possible.
From (12.40),
K`Bt+1 =
fB +DBt+1
1 + pB
. (12.41)
Using region A’s best response function (12.33), the complete solution to the game can be found:
K`At+1 =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγ2A
− St
γA
−KAt − γB
γA
KBt − 2µA
γA
MAt − µB
γA
MBt
− µA
γA
1
ΨA
((
1− µA
γA
)
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)− ζA
)
− γB
γA
(
fB + bB (St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt + µBMBt)
1 + pB
)
(12.42)
M`At+1 = MAt +
1
ΨA
((
1− µA
γA
)
(βA (1 + pA)− 1)− ζA
)
. (12.43)
K`Bt+1 =
fB + bB (St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt + µBMBt)
1 + pB
(12.44)
M`Bt+1 = 0 (12.45)
S`T =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγA
= S¯T = S
A
T . (12.46)
A graphical representation of the solution for the case M`At+1 = 0 is provided in Figure 12.4.
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Figure 12.4: Biting minimum period t+ 1 consumption constraint in region B: solution
Proposition 26. Due to its binding minimum consumption constraint, region B is better off than in the
previous Cournot games. While it is still overpolluted, the constraint works as a credible threat, which forces
region A to lower economic activity and allows region B to consume parts of the carbon cake, whose overall
size is still determined by region A.
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However, still SAT is reached:
Proposition 27. As long as it faces overpollution regardless of its own action, there is no incentive for
region B to move onto a more expensive clean development path.
12.3.4 The sustainability constraint
The regional planners may push for a more ambitious constraint than the period t+1 minimum consumption
constraint, namely extend it to a so-called sustainability constraint,
βjCjt+1 − φjDjT = βj [(1 + pj)(Kjt+1 +Mjt+1)−Djt+1]− φjDjT ≥ fj , ∀j ǫ J = {A,B} . (12.47)
This condition claims that period t + 1 resources are potentially sufficient to satisfy not only minimum
consumption in period t+ 1, but also to cope with long-term damages.20 This may be a reasonable claim to
be made by a forward-looking social planner. The sustainability constraint was not an issue in the one-world
model, as there the all-mighty social planner only accumulates period t+ 1 capital as long as the associated
mid-term benefits exceed the costs arising from the long-term consequences. In other words, for a sufficiently
low period t+1 minimum consumption, the sustainability constraint was fulfilled automatically through the
planner’s cost-benefit analysis.21
This changes once emissions cannot be controlled unilaterally. The previous section showed that region B
is able to prevail its period t+ 1 minimum consumption constraint, i.e. reach CBt+1 = fB . In order to also
fulfill the sustainability constraint, either damages have to be reduced or production increased. DBt+1 are
exogenous, and region A cannot be forced to reduce DT from the Nash equilibrium level. However, given DT ,
any further production in region B that goes beyond fulfilling its minimum consumption constraint would
add more environmental costs than production benefits, i.e. move region B away from fulfilling the constraint.
Proposition 28. In the Cournot game with a clean technology, the inferior region cannot defend its sus-
tainability constraint.
The sustainability constraint does not function as a credible threat, because while region B controls its period
t+ 1 consumption exclusively, long-term damages are determined solely by region A.
12.3.5 Two non-cooperative regions with a zero-emissions technology in a Cournot
game
In section 12.3.2, it was shown that the availability of a clean technology does not change the main outcome
of the Cournot game in the basic model. Region A still overpolluted region B, and in order not to further
stir up climate damages, region B took neither dirty nor clean capital investments. In the following game, it
is assumed that a zero-emissions technology is available to region B, referring to a technology that generates
zero CO2 emissions when employed for production, i.e. µB = 0.
22 Region A still invests in the same way as
before23, while region B’s optimization problem changes to
20This suggests that some sort of saving is made in period t + 1, which is not explicitly modelled here.
21If the economy had not been overpolluted already from the onset.
22Some low-carbon technologies such as wind power electricity generation may be considered as approximate zero-carbon
technologies, see MacKay (2009), pp. 41f.
23Assuming that region A still uses its clean technology with µA > 0. Of course, it could be assumed that also µA = 0.
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max
KBt+1,MBt+1
ZB
= pB(KBt +MBt)− (KBt+1 −KBt)− (1 + ζB)(MBt+1 −MBt)
− ΨB
2
(MBt+1 −MBt) ·max (MBt+1 −MBt; 0)− bB(St)2
+ βB
[
(1 + pB)(KBt+1 +MBt+1)− bB(St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt)2
]
− φBbB
[
(St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + µAMAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
]
+ λB1(CBt − fB) + λB2(CBt+1 − fB), (12.48)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions
∂ZB
∂KBt+1
≤ 0; KBt+1 ≥ 0; KBt+1 · ∂ZB
∂KBt+1
= 0 (12.49)
∂ZB
∂MBt+1
≤ 0; MBt+1 ≥ 0; MBt+1 · ∂ZB
∂MBt+1
= 0 (12.50)
∂ZB
∂λBi
≥ 0; λBi ≥ 0; λBi · ∂ZB
∂λBi
= 0 for n = 1, 2. (12.51)
For fB = 0, region B sets þKBt+1 = 0, as with ST > S
B
T being reached, any non-zero period t+ 1 production
from dirty capital stock exhibits negative net benefits. However, now region B has a development option at
its disposal that does not feed the atmospheric emissions pool; it can choose an þMBt+1 > 0:
∂ZB
∂MBt+1
= −(1 + ζB)−ΨB ·max (MBt+1 −MBt; 0) + βB(1 + pB) = 0 (12.52)
⇐⇒ þMBt+1 = MBt + 1
ΨB
(βB(1 + pB)− 1− ζB) , (12.53)
which is the correct solution as long as region B is initially sufficiently resource-endowed to afford this level
of capital accumulation. It is needless to say that investing in a zero-emissions technology exclusively that
is probably considerably more expensive than traditional, fossil-fuel based technologies, might exceed the
budget of most developing countries, pooled in region B. However, it can be concluded that
Proposition 29. The zero-emissions technology provides region B with an option to develop without wors-
ening climate change, which makes investment an optimal strategy despite of overpollution.
12.3.6 Clean technology transfer games
In the literature review of models that deal with clean technology transfer from a superior to an inferior region,
it was found that such a transfer takes place in cooperative scenarios regularly, to abate CO2 emissions at
the least marginal costs available. Within a non-cooperative setting, in the model of Aronsson et al. (2010)
such transfers only occur under a particular assumption, but generally incentives to provide them are lacking.
The results this chapter has brought to light so far indicate that such rich-to-poor clean technology transfer
is unlikely to take place in SLICE either. All scenarios repeatedly showed that it is ultimately the rich and/or
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less vulnerable region that determines the amount of cumulative emissions achieved. As its self-interest in
climate-friendly development is less pronounced, it is unlikely to have interest in funding mitigation abroad.
Beyond this point, industrialized countries are further reluctant to make clean technology transfers, because
these usually involve involuntary intellectual property transfer, which potentially threatens the competitive
advantages of their enterprises.24 In section 11.3, it was further elaborated that especially owing to the
industrialized countries’ almost exclusive responsibility for historical cumulative emissions created, and due
to the poverty and limited access to clean technology, it is expected to occur from rich to poor. However, the
evidence collected so far rather seems to suggest that if there is any potential for a clean technology transfer,
it must be the region with the lower preferred level of cumulative carbon that transfers mitigation technology
to push the region with a larger climate damage tolerance onto a cleaner development path. If an agreement
exists that guarantees the inferior region that the export of clean capital to the superior region leads to a
lower global cumulative emissions level, it may have the incentives to do so. I elaborate such a scenario
to show how such a contract could be modelled in a SLICE Stackelberg game, but since such a scenario is
probably purely theoretical, I present it in appendix D.1.1. There is one scenario in which a rationale for the
superior region to provide clean technology actually exists. This scenario is moved to appendix D.1.2 for the
single reason that the underlying mechanism is taken up again in section 12.4.5, where clean technology and
adaptation funding are addressed jointly.
12.3.7 Summary
Before adaptation in the two-region game is considered, I briefly recap. In both the Cournot games with
and without clean technology, the superior region enforces its same cumulative emissions target, and the
inferior region is left without period t+ 1 production and consumption as well as long-term damages caused
by the superior region. If the inferior region is restricted by and credibly insists on fulfilling a minimum
consumption constraint, this may force the superior region to share with the inferior region parts of the
carbon cake, whose overall size is determined by the superior region. This is because if the superior region
does not reduce its emissions accordingly in response to economic activity in the inferior region, the superior
region would be overpolluted, too. However, the inferior region has no means to assert a sustainability
constraint, which claims that the sum of its mid-term consumption and long-term damages is greater than
some positive constant, because the superior region determines the world’s long-term cumulative emissions
and damage level.
If the inferior region had access to a zero-emissions technology, it potentially could move onto a clean de-
velopment path with investing in clean capital exclusively, whereby the superior region could still attain its
cumulative emissions target. If the inferior region was the first mover of a Stackelberg game and sufficiently
resource-endowed, it would be its optimal choice to completely preempt the emissions otherwise created by
the superior region.
24Cp. Yang (2003), pp. 163ff.
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12.4 Two regions and adaptation
12.4.1 Overview
For the moment, the mitigation option is disabled, but adaption introduced to the two-region model. In
the following section, the Cournot game with adaptation is presented. In section 12.4.3, the sustainability
constraint is reconsidered. Section 12.4.4 elaborates what might happen if the superior region deviates from
its cumulative emissions target. Finally, in section 12.4.5 it is investigated whether and for which reasons
the superior region provides clean technology and adaptation funding to the inferior region, despite the
non-cooperative setting.
12.4.2 Two adapting non-cooperative regions in a Cournot game
The pure anticipatory adaptation formulation introduced in section 10.7 is used.25 It is assumed that there
are no synergies from both regions investing into adaptation; neither is the benefit of adaptation dependent
on adaptation in the other region. The analysis is started off with the optimization problem of region A:
max
KAt+1, At+1, At+2
ZA = pAKAt − (KAt+1 −KAt)− (1 + rA)AAt+1 − bA(St)
3
(aAeA)1/2
+ βA
[
(1 + pA)KAt+1 − ((1 + rA)AAt+2 − (1− dA)AAt+1)− bA(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3
((aA +AAt+1)eA)1/2
]
+ φA
[
(1− dA)AAt+2 − bA(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
3
((aA +AAt+2)eA)1/2
]
+ λA1(CAt − fA) + λA2(βACAt+1 − fA), (12.54)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions26
∂ZA
∂KAt+1
≤ 0; KAt+1 ≥ 0; KAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂KAt+1
= 0 (12.55)
∂ZA
∂AAt+1
≤ 0; AAt+1 ≥ 0; AAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂AAt+1
= 0 (12.56)
∂ZA
∂AAt+2
≤ 0; AAt+2 ≥ 0; AAt+2 · ∂ZA
∂AAt+2
= 0 (12.57)
∂ZA
∂λAi
≥ 0; λAi ≥ 0; λAi · ∂ZA
∂λAi
= 0 for i = 1, 2. (12.58)
Adaptation is assumed an action exerting exclusively domestic effects, with no externalities or transboundary
cooperation associated.
Assuming a standard interior solution, the derivation of the FOCs yields
25And hence period T is again replaced by period t + 2.
26Minimum consumption in period t+1 is discounted by βB to reduce the need for mathematical derivations in the following
sections; the problem could also be easily solved for undiscounted minimum consumption.
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∂ZA
∂AAt+1
= −(1 + rA) + βA
(
(1− dA) + bA(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3
2((aA +AAt+1)3/2e
1/2
A
)
= 0
⇐⇒ ÂAt+1 =
(
bA
2( 1βA (1 + rA)− (1− dA))
)2/3
· (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
2
e
1/3
A
− aA (12.59)
∂ZA
∂AAt+2
= −βA(1 + rA) + φA
(
(1− dA) + bA(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
3
2((aA +AAt+2)3/2e
1/2
A
)
= 0
⇐⇒ AAt+2 =
 bA
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
)
2/3 · (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)2
e
1/3
A
− aA
(12.60)
∂ZA
∂KAt+1
= −1 + βA(1 + pA)− 3φAbAγA(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
((aA +AAt+2)eA)1/2
= 0 (12.61)
Plugging (12.60) into (12.61),
βA(1 + pA)− 1 =
3φAb
2/3
A γA
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3
e
1/3
A
· St+2, (12.62)
delivers both
KAt+1 =
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)e1/3A
3φAb
2/3
A γ
2
A
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3 − StγA −KAt − γBγAKBt − γBγAKBt+1 (12.63)
SAt+2 =
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)e1/3A
3φAb
2/3
A γA
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3 . (12.64)
SAt+2 denotes region A’s desired level of emissions. In a world in which it exclusively creates emissions, a
region B with different characteristics and preferences would desire to attain
SBt+2 =
(βB(1 + pB)− 1)e1/3B
3φBb
2/3
B γB
(
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
))1/3 . (12.65)
In methodological accordance with the asymmetry condition (12.8), I define
SAt+2 > S
B
t+2,
hence in the spirit of definition 21, region A, still referred to as the superior region, is willing to cope with
a higher level of global warming than the inferior region, region B. Neither region has a rationale to exceed
SAt+2. For the moment, I assume that, like in the previous scenarios, in the final period always S
A
t+2 is reached.
Hence, regardless of how many emissions region B creates, like in the no-adaptation scenarios region A always
tops them up, leading to Ŝt+2:
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Ŝt+2 ≡ SAt+2 =
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)e1/3A
3φAb
2/3
A γA
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3 , (12.66)
and with (12.60),
ÂAt+2 =
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)2e1/3A
(3γAφA)2b
2/3
A (2(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)))4/3
− aA. (12.67)
Turning to region B’s optimal strategy, in sections 12.2.2 and 12.3.2, it was found that in Cournot games
without adaptation, region B does not produce in period t+ 1. It finds itself already overpolluted from the
economic activity of region A, and a non-zero own period t + 1 capital stock exhibits larger environmental
marginal costs than the marginal benefits coming in form of period t+1 consumption. However, adaptation
changes region B’s investment incentives fundamentally. If region B’s adaptation costs are not generally
prohibitively high and permit non-zero adaptation investment, even in a Cournot game region B has now a
rationale to run production in period t+ 1. To verify this, it can be argued as follows:
If region B chooses KBt+1 = 0, it implies that no resources are available in period t+ 1, so that necessarily
ABt+2 = 0. Compared to this situation, region B is better off by choosing non-zero production, so that it
is able to accumulate adaptation capital ABt+2 > 0. While region B expects KBt+1 > 0 to further fuel
overpollution, the expected marginal environmental costs are far outweighed by the marginal benefits from
enabling an ABt+2 > 0. For instance, a KBt+1 > 0 is anticipated to add some marginal damage compared
to the situation with zero period t+ 1 capital, but for aB = eB = 1 switching from ABt+2 = 0 to ABt+2 = 1
reduces residual period t+ 2 damages ceteris paribus by almost 30%.
However, after switching to Kt+1 = 1 and ABt+2 = (1+pA)Kt+1, region B realizes that St+2 does not change
(as region A reduces its own investments in response to region B investments, see (12.63)), and as long as
adaptation is sufficiently cheap, region B may want to further expand the period t + 2 adaptation capital
stock.
Proposition 30. If adaptation is enabled and affordable, it becomes optimal for the inferior region to run
non-zero period t+ 1 production to fund its adaptation efforts.
The question of how much adaptation capital region B accumulates is answered by its optimization problem:
max
KBt+1, AB+1, AB+2
ZB = pBKBt − (KBt+1 −KBt)− (1 + rB)ABt+1 − bB(St)
3
(aBeB)1/2
+ βB
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1 − ((1 + rB)ABt+2 − (1− dB)ABt+1)− bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3
((aB +ABt+1)eB)1/2
]
+ φB
[
(1− dB)ABt+2 − bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
3
((aB +ABt+2)eB)1/2
]
+ λB1(CBt − fB) + λB2(βBCBt+1 − fB), (12.68)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions analogous to those given in (12.55)-(12.58). Allowing for a λB2 > 0 and
assuming non-zero solutions for the other model variables, the FOCs deliver
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∂ZB
∂KBt+1
= −1 + (1 + λB2)βB(1 + pB)− 3φBbBγB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
((aB +ABt+2)eB)1/2
= 0
(12.69)
∂ZB
∂ABt+1
= −(1 + rB) + (1 + λB2)βB
(
(1− dB) + bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3
2((aB +ABt+1)3/2e
1/2
B
)
= 0
⇐⇒ ABt+1 =
 bB
2
((
1+rB
(1+λB2)βB
)
− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)2
e
1/3
B
− aB (12.70)
∂ZB
∂ABt+2
= −(1 + λB2)βB(1 + rB) + φB
(
(1− dB) + bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
3
2((aB +ABt+2)3/2e
1/2
B
)
= 0
⇐⇒ ABt+2 =
 bB
2
(
(1+λB2)βB(1+rB)
φB
− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St+2)2
e
1/3
B
− aB . (12.71)
Following the process described earlier, region B decides to incrementally increase resources available in
period t + 1 to accumulate further period t + 2 adaptation capital. As period t + 2 gross damages do not
decrease in reaction to this adjustment process, this process comes to a hold not earlier than until region B’s
optimal adaptation level is reached. This level is derived through plugging the solution for the - from region
B’s perspective too high - cumulative emissions, Ŝt+2 from (12.66), into (12.71):
ÂBt+2 =
 bB
2
(
(1+λB2)βB(1+rB)
φB
− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (Ŝt+2)2
e
1/3
B
− aB . (12.72)
However, in period t+1, when ABt+2 investments are taken, region B is resource-constrained: For an fB = 0,
all resources available in period t + 1 are generated solely for the purpose of adaptation. If the adaptation
option was disabled, region B would rather consume its whole capital endowment in period t, as seen before,
but now it provides just enough resources to fund ÂBt+2. Region B has two options to increase available
period t+ 1 resources (at cost of period t consumption):
1. Enhance Kt+1 to increase period t+ 1 output.
2. Enhance At+1 to reduce period t+1 residual damages as well as increase the adaptation capital bequest.
Recalling the economic meaning of the shadow value λB2, it denotes by how much region B’s welfare would
increase if an additional resource unit in period t+1 became available. If λB2 rises, the social planner makes
some more resources available through enhancing Kt+1 and At+1, as apparent from (12.69) and (12.70),
respectively.
Combining (12.72) with (12.69) leads to
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0 = −1 + (1 + λB2)βB(1 + pB)−
3φBb
2/3
B γB(Ŝt+2)
(
2
(
(1+λB2)βB(1+rB)
φB
− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B⇐⇒
λB2 =
φBb
2/3
B γB
(
(1+λB2)βB(1+rB)
φB
− (1− dB)
)1/3
e
1/3
A
φAb
2/3
A γA
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
)1/3
e
1/3
B
· βA(1 + pA)− 1
βB(1 + pB)
+
1
βB(1 + pB)
− 1
> 0, (12.73)
after plugging in Ŝt+2 from (12.66). λ̂B2 cannot be obtained in closed analytical form, but the solution for
λ̂B2 can be used to derive ÂBt+1 from (12.70) and ÂBt+2 from (12.72). KBt+1 can then be obtained from
the budget constraint:
0 = βB
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1 − ((1 + rB)ABt+2 − (1− dB)ABt+1)− bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3
((aB +ABt+1)eB)1/2
(+fB)
]
⇐⇒ K̂Bt+1 = (1 + rB)ÂBt+2 − (1− dB)ÂBt+1 + R̂Bt+1(+fB)
(1 + pB)
. (12.74)
The availability of the option to adapt already changes the incentives of this Cournot game fundamentally so
that region B, instead of ending up withKBt+1 = 0, accumulates aKBt+1 > 0. It does not need the minimum
consumption constraint as a “credible threat” to start investing, as it was the case in section 12.3.3, hence
for the structure of the solution it does not matter whether or not the period t + 1 minimum consumption
constraint exists or bites from the onset. If additionally fB > 0 though, with adaptation available region B
raises its production capital investment in period t (see (+fB) in equation (12.74)), so that it both satisfies
the minimum consumption constraint in period t+ 1 as well as needs for adaptation in period t+ 2.
The availability of the adaptation option enhances the position of region B. Owing to its adaptation efforts,
residual damages in period t+2 are lower than the gross damages that it would experience without adaptation.
This has contrasting consequences for the welfare of region A. With K̂Bt+1 > 0, region A is forced to reduce
K̂At+1, which is obtained from (12.63), in order to avoid overpollution, S
A
t+2 = Ŝt+2. Put differently:
Proposition 31. Adaptation empowers the inferior region. With adaptation available, global climate change
still remains a public bad that the inferior region cannot control, but adaptation partially privatizes residual
damages. While the inferior region cannot prevent being overpolluted, it enforces a more equitable distribu-
tion27 of the cumulative emissions budget set by the superior region.
12.4.3 The sustainability constraint revisited
In fact, adaptation empowers the inferior region even further. In section 12.3.4 the so-called sustainability
constraint was introduced, according to which a regional planner claims that the sum of mid-term consump-
tion and long-term damages in its region is greater than some lower boundary f . However, in contrast to
the minimum consumption constraint, the sustainability constraint could not be used as a credible threat
27In contrast to the cases in which the inferior region does not create emissions in period t+ 1 at all.
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by region B, as region A ruled over the degree of climate change and associated damages exclusively. At
least the latter changes with adaptation. As proposition 31 summarized, adaptation empowers region B with
partial control over the residual damages in its region, and it can prevail its sustainability constraint.
I amend the sustainability constraint (12.47) to take into account adaptation,
βj [(1 + pj)Kjt+1 − ((1 + rj)Ajt+2 − (1− dj)Ajt+1)−Rjt+1]+φj [(1− dj)Ajt+2 −Rjt+2] ≥ fj , ∀j ǫ J = {A,B} .
(12.75)
It claims that the sum of mid-term consumption and long-term damages (plus adaptation bequest) is greater
than f . In the following, the sustainability constraint is imposed on both regions. Assuming that it is fulfilled
with inequality for region A, its optimization problem described in the previous section remains unchanged,
including the solutions for adaptation capital, AˇAt+1 = ÂAt+1 and AˇAt+2 = ÂAt+2, as well as the cumulative
period t+ 2 emissions, Sˇt+2 = Ŝt+2. Region B’s optimization problem in (12.68) extends to
max
KBt+1, AB+1, AB+2
ZB
= pBKBt − (KBt+1 −KBt)− (1 + rB)ABt+1 − bB(St)
3
(aBeB)1/2
+ βB
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1 − ((1 + rB)ABt+2 − (1− dB)ABt+1)− bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3
((aB +ABt+1)eB)1/2
]
+ φB
[
(1− dB)ABt+2 − bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
3
((aB +ABt+2)eB)1/2
]
,
+ λB1(CBt − fB)
+ λB2βB
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1 − ((1 + rB)ABt+2 − (1− dB)ABt+1)− bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3
((aB +ABt+1)eB)1/2
]
+ λB2φB
[
(1− dB)ABt+2 − bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
3
((aB +ABt+2)eB)1/2
]
− λB2fB , (12.76)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions as before. The period t+ 2 minimum consumption constraint is dropped here,
as the sustainability constraint is stricter.28 Assuming that KBt+1, ABt+1, ABt+2, λB2 > 0 (and λB1 = 0),
first it becomes apparent that the intermediate solution for ABt+1 is the same as before (from (12.70)):
ABt+1 =
 bB
2
((
1+rB
(1+λB2)βB
)
− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)2
e
1/3
B
− aB . (12.77)
The intermediate solution for ABt+2 does change, to
28Anticipating here that period t+2 residual damages exceed that period’s adaptation bequest, i.e. (1− dB)AˇBt+2 < RˇBt+2,
which is proven below.
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∂ZB
∂ABt+2
= 0
= (1 + λB2)
[
−βB(1 + rB) + φB
(
(1− dB) + bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
3
2((aB +ABt+2)3/2e
1/2
B
)]
⇐⇒ ABt+2 =
 bB
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St+2)2
e
1/3
B
− aB . (12.78)
Plugging in Sˇt+2 = Ŝt+2 from (12.66),
AˇBt+2 =
 bB
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (βA(1 + pA)− 1)2
(3φAγA)
2
b
4/3
A
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3 e2/3A
e
2/3
B
− aB . (12.79)
Like in the previous section, region B’s period t + 1 resources are constrained, but now At+2 investment is
not anymore affected by this, because the most resource-saving strategy to fulfill the sustainability constraint
is to optimally reduce period t+ 2 residual damages. The FOC for KBt+1 is:
∂ZB
∂KBt+1
= −1 + (1 + λB2)
[
βB(1 + pB)− 3φBbBγB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
((aB +ABt+2)eB)1/2
]
= 0
(12.80)
In combination with (12.77) and (12.66), this leads to the following explicit solution for the Lagrange multi-
plier, λˇB2:
0 = −1 + (1 + λB2)
βB(1 + pB)− 3φBb2/3B γB(Ŝt+2)
(
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B

λˇB2 =
1
βB(1 + pB)−
φBb
2/3
B
γB
(
βB
φB
(1+rB)−(1−dB)
)1/3
e
1/3
A
φAb
2/3
A
γA
(
βA
φA
(1+rA)−(1−dA)
)1/3
e
1/3
B
· (βA(1 + pA)− 1)
− 1 > 0 (12.81)
This can be further transformed to obtain the following inequality:
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)e1/3A
3φAb
2/3
A γA
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3 > (βB(1 + pB)− 1)e1/3B
3φBb
2/3
B γB
(
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
))1/3 (12.82)
SAt+2 > S
B
t+2. (12.83)
Compare (12.82) with (12.64) and (12.65). The shadow value associated with the sustainability constraint
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becomes greater than zero, λˇB2 > 0, just because the game’s period t+2 cumulative emissions exceeds region
B’s target level. Region B responds to this by taking optimal adaptation effort that corresponds to the level
reached, but this forces region B to procure more resources in period t+1 than it would do in absence of the
overpollution it faces.
Furthermore,
RˇBt+2 > (1− dB)AˇBt+2. (12.84)
This can be proven by plugging the intermediate solution for AˇBt+2 from (12.78) into the RHS of (12.84)
and using it to compute residual period t+ 2 damages on the LHS of (12.84):
b
2/3
B (Sˇt+2)
2
e
1/3
B
·
(
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
))1/3
>
[
b
2/3
B (Sˇt+2)
2
e
1/3
B
·
(
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
))−2/3
− aB
]
(1− dB). (12.85)
This confirms that more resources are needed to satisfy the sustainability constraint than the minimum
consumption constraint, i.e. that the sustainability constraint is stricter, as it was anticipated in fn. 28. Period
t+ 1 resources can either be raised through enhancing production capital or adaptation capital investments
in period t. With λˇB2, via (12.77) AˇBt+1 can be obtained, and eventually, from the sustainability constraint
(12.75):
KˇBt+1 =
(1 + rB)AˇBt+2 − (1− dB)AˇBt+1 + RˇBt+1 − φBβB
(
(1− dB)AˇBt+2 − RˇBt+2
)
+ fB
(1 + pB)
. (12.86)
With (12.84), it can be concluded that
KˇBt+1 > K̂Bt+1, (12.87)
with K̂Bt+1 given in (12.74). Hence region B’s investment level is higher than in the scenario without the
sustainability constraint.
From region A’s optimal response for production capital investment, (12.63), follows that
KˇAt+1 < K̂At+1.
With the option to adapt at hand, region B is able to defend its sustainability constraint. Its commitment
is now credible, as it can partially control not gross, but residual damages. Region B increases its economic
activity and pollution above the level at which it ensures its minimum consumption level only, and region A
is forced to further reduce its own period t+1 production in order not to avoid overpollution. Also in welfare
terms, region B is better off than before; now the sum of period t+ 1 consumption and period t+ 2 residual
damages (and adaptation bequest) is equal to fB , whereas with the minimum consumption constraint in
place this sum may well have been negative.
250
CHAPTER 12. TWO-REGION GAMES WITH MITIGATION, ADAPTATION AND TRANSFERS
Proposition 32. Adaptation empowers the inferior region to fulfill the sustainability constraint. Even more
economic activity shifts from the superior region to the inferior region than in the scenario with a bare
minimum consumption constraint.
12.4.4 Reducing the world’s cumulative emissions level
In section 12.4.2, equation (12.66), it was assumed that ultimately always region A’s emissions target, SAt+2, is
reached. In fact, region A may do better by emitting less, so that SAt+2 is not reached. Another look at region
B’s optimal response function for period t + 1 capital investment, KBt+1, in equation (12.86), reveals that
all of its arguments, namely ABt+1, ABt+2, RBt+1 and RBt+2, are dependent on cumulative emissions St+2.
Exactly these are de facto controlled by region A though. Hence, instead of anticipating that Sˇt+2 ≡ SAt+2,
equation (12.86) can be plugged back beforehand into region A’s optimal response function (12.63), to obtain:
KAt+1 =
 (βA(1 + pA)− 1)e
1/3
A
3φAb
2/3
A γ
2
A
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3 − StγA −KAt − γBγAKBt︸ ︷︷ ︸

≡X
− γB
γA
[
(1 + rB)ABt+2 − (1− dB)ABt+1 +RBt+1 − φBβB ((1− dB)ABt+2 −RBt+2) + fB
(1 + pB)
]
= X − γB
γA(1 + pB)
[(
(1 + rB)− φB
βB
(1− dB)
)
ABt+2 − (1− dB)ABt+1 +RBt+1 + φB
βB
RBt+2 + fB
]
(12.88)
= X − γB
γA(1 + pB)
(
(1 + rB)− φB
βB
(1− dB)
)
 bB
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St+2)2
e
1/3
B
− aB

− γB
γA(1 + pB)
−(1− dB)

 bB
2
((
1+rB
(1+λB2)βB
)
− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St+1)2
e
1/3
B
− aB


− γB
γA(1 + pB)
b
2/3
B (St+1)
2
(
2
(
1+rB
(1+λB2)βB
− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B
(12.89)
− γB
γA(1 + pB)
φB
βB
b
2/3
B (St+2)
2
(
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B
− γB
γA(1 + pB)
· fB (12.90)
Now, this is a pretty cumbersome equation. However, worse, while St+1 is exogenous, I recall that
St+2 = St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1. (12.91)
This not only implies that in both terms that contain St+2, KAt+1 needs to be separated and be brought to
the LHS of (12.90). It also means that in all terms that contain St+2, KBt+1 needs to be - again - replaced
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by region B’s optimal response function (12.86), and so on and so on. We are confronted with a problem of
circular reference29, which cannot be solved analytically.
However, it is well-possible to make an educated guess, arguing on the base of line (12.88): Region A controls
the gross damages included in RBt+2, and if it lowers them, it is not only easier for region B to fulfill its
sustainability constraint, but it can also spend less on ABt+2. Both reduces the need for resources in period
t + 1, and region B can downsize its production capital stock, KBt+1, creating more leeway for region A to
emit and increase KAt+1. This is the strategic rationale for reducing Sˇt+2 below S
A
t+2.
However, there is a dampening effect as well: As was shown in the previous section (equation (12.83)), the
difference St+2 − SBt+2 crucially determines the value of the shadow price λB2. If region A moves away
from its target, this difference becomes smaller. The smaller the difference, i.e. perceived overpollution in
region B, the lower λB2, and the less resources region B needs in period t + 1 to accumulate period t + 2
adaptation capital. Hence, if λB2 goes down, RBt+1 may increase, as verified by line (12.89); region B cuts
some adaptation investment in period t+1. As the ABt+1 bequest becomes smaller and RBt+1 larger, region
B needs to expand its period t + 1 production (capital) in order to generate sufficient resources for funding
ABt+2, thereby removing some of region A’s leeway for economic activity. It may be expected that the impact
of lowering region A’s cumulative emissions target is larger on RBt+2/ABt+2 than on RBt+1/ABt+1, so that
in total the measure creates leeway for region A. Region A reduces the overall emissions budget, but as this
lowers the burden on region B to protect itself, KAt+1 can increase at cost of KBt+1.
Even in the scenario without the sustainability constraint (section 12.4.2), in which region B is resource-
constrained due to overpollution, region A may adjust its emissions emissions target downwards, so that the
demand for ABt+2 (equation (12.72)) decreases.
30
To summarize, reading equation (12.88), it seems well-possible that when the inferior region can adapt,
SAt+2 > Sˇt+2 > S
B
t+2.
Conjecture 33. If the inferior region can adapt, it might be rational to for the superior region to avoid
reaching its cumulative emissions target SAt+2. This lowers the burden on region B, which as a consequence
spends less on period t+2 adaptation (to fulfill the sustainability constraint), needs to accumulate less resources
and creates less emissions. As a consequence, region A can extend its economic activity. Region B is also
probably better off from this than in the case in which region A sticks to its original emissions target, as
it needs to respond to less overpollution. Adaptation may be more effective in actually bringing cumulative
emissions down than the availability of the mitigation technology.
The general results obtained in sections 12.4.2 and 12.4.3 should hold nonetheless, even though assumption
(12.66) may be incorrect. As equation (12.90) is analytically intractable, in section 12.4.5 I will continue
to impose the workhorse assumption that region A sets SAt+2 ≡ St+2, which allows further analyses and
conclusions.
29As there also is not a way to solve (12.86) with standard methods, when St+2 is not predetermined by region A’s general
preferences.
30Although there is the dampening effect as well, as with St+2 falling, λB2 becomes smaller, too, increasing ABt+2 in (12.72).
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12.4.5 Two non-cooperative regions with clean technology transfer and adapta-
tion funding
In section 12.4.3, it emerged that adaptation empowers region B to fulfill the sustainability constraint. This
stimulates the demand for adaptation investment, and region B increases its economic activity, so that region
A is forced to reduce its period t+1 production in order not to exceed its desired level of cumulative emissions.
Put differently, through the sustainability constraint region B’s slice of the carbon cake is enlarged, at cost
of region A’s slice, whereby the overall size of the cake is determined by region A. Now, if there were options
for region A to “win back” some parts of its carbon cake, region A might consider taking these. As this
section reveals, clean technology transfer and adaptation funding may serve as such strategic instruments
and improve the welfare of both regions, and hence may take place even in absence of a stringent climate
agreement, in a non-cooperative setting. The general idea underlying these transfers is to induce region B to
create less emissions, so that region A can expand its own production.
I start by reformulating region B’s optimization problem:
max
KBt+1, AB+1, AB+2
ZB
= pBKBt − (KBt+1 −KBt)− (1 + rB)ABt+1 − bB(St)
3
(aBeB)1/2
+βB [(1 + pB)KBt+1+(1 + pA)M
A
Bt+1 − ((1 + rB)ABt+2 − (1− dB)(ABt+1+AABt+1)
− bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3
((aB +ABt+1)eB+AABt+1eA)
1/2
]
+φB
(1− dB)(ABt+2+AABt+2)− bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)3
((aB +ABt+2)eB+AABt+2eA)
1/2
 ,
+λB1(CBt − fB)
+λB2βB
·
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1+(1 + pA)M
A
Bt+1 − ((1 + rB)ABt+2 − (1− dB)(ABt+1+AABt+1)−
bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3
((aB +ABt+1)eB+AABt+1eA)
1/2
]
+λB2φB
[
(1− dB)(ABt+2+AABt+2)−
bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
3
((aB +ABt+2)eB+AABt+2eA)
1/2
]
− λB2fB , (12.92)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions
∂ZB
∂KBt+1
≤ 0; KBt+1 ≥ 0; KBt+1 · ∂ZB
∂KBt+1
= 0 (12.93)
∂ZB
∂ABt+1
≤ 0; ABt+1 ≥ 0; ABt+1 · ∂ZB
∂ABt+1
= 0 (12.94)
∂ZB
∂ABt+2
≤ 0; ABt+2 ≥ 0; ABt+2 · ∂ZB
∂ABt+2
= 0 (12.95)
∂ZB
∂λBi
≥ 0; λBi ≥ 0; λBi · ∂ZB
∂λBi
= 0 for i = 1, 2. (12.96)
It is assumed that only region A possesses a clean technology. In order to simplify the model maths, it
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is further assumed that the clean technology is a zero-emissions technology, i.e. µA = 0. The terms that
were added to the optimization problem without transfers, defined in (12.76), are underlined to highlight the
changes. Region B may from region A receive clean capital MABt+1, which increases region B’s output and is
consumed in period t+ 1. Furthermore, adaptation capital funded by region A, AABt+1 and A
A
Bt+2, may add
to region B’s adaptation capital stocks. Imported mitigation and adaptation capital perform at the same
level as in the region of the origin, that is they are associated with region A’s productivity parameters, pA
and eA, respectively. This takes for granted that the capital is in region B deployed the same as efficient
as in region A. In contrast to Aronsson et al. (2010) (see section 11.3), receiving clean technology transfer
does not affect region B’s productivity parameters.
I derive the FOCs and best response functions for adaptation capital investment, assuming that ∂ZB∂ABt+1 ,
∂ZB
∂ABt+2
=
0, so that ABt+1, ABt+2 > 0; and λB2 > 0 (while λB1 = 0). The sustainability constraint bites.
∂ZB
∂KBt+1
= −1 + (1 + λB2)βB(1 + pB)− 3φBbBγB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
((aB +ABt+2)eB +AABt+2eA)
3/2
= 0 (12.97)
∂ZB
∂ABt+1
= −(1 + rB) + (1 + λB2)βB
(
(1− dB) + bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3eB
2((aB +ABt+1)eB +AABt+1eA)
3/2
)
= 0 (12.98)
⇐⇒
ABt+1 =
 bB
2
(
1+rB
(1+λB2)βB
− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)2
e
1/3
B
−AABt+1
eA
eB
− aB (12.99)
∂ZB
∂ABt+2
= (1 + λB2)
[
−βB(1 + rB) + φB
(
(1− dB) + bB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
3eB
2((aB +ABt+2)eB +AABt+2eA)
3/2
)]
= 0
⇐⇒
ABt+2 =
 bB
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St+2)2
e
1/3
B
−AABt+2
eA
eB
− aB . (12.100)
As there are unique optimal levels of adaptation capital, if region B receives adapation funding from region
A, it reduces its own investments accordingly. This matches the result of de Bruin et al. (2010), who too
find that adaptation funding perfectly crowds out domestic adaptation expenditures, if the recipient region
is optimizing (section 11.4).
As seen in section 12.4.3, with λB2 > 0, region B’s adaptation investment in period t + 1 exceeds the level
that it would choose if it controlled the global pollution level exclusively, in order to provide additional
resources for period t + 2 adaptation, which is needed due to the overpollution caused by region A. From
(12.97), (12.99) and (12.66), hence assuming S∗t+2 ≡ SAt+2, the same value for the shadow multiplier as before
in section 12.4.3 is derived:
0 = −1 + (1 + λB2)
βB(1 + pB)− 3φBb2/3B γB(Ŝt+2)
(
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B

λ∗B2 =
1
βB(1 + pB)−
φBb
2/3
B
γB
(
βB
φB
(1+rB)−(1−dB)
)1/3
e
1/3
A
φAb
2/3
A
γA
(
βA
φA
(1+rA)−(1−dA)
)1/3
e
1/3
B
· (βA(1 + pA)− 1)
− 1 = λˇB2 (12.101)
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I use it to compute optimal residual damages:
R∗Bt+1 =
b
2/3
B (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
2
(
2
(
1+rB
(1+λ∗
B2
)βB
− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B
(12.102)
R∗Bt+2 =
b
2/3
B (St+2)
2
(
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B
. (12.103)
As the optimal levels of adaptation are unaffected by the origins of adaptation capital investment, conse-
quently also optimal residual damages are independent of adaptation funding transfers. I plug R∗Bt+1 and
R∗Bt+2 and the intermediate solutions for ABt+1 and ABt+2 into the sustainability constraint (12.4.3):
βB
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1 + (1 + pA)M
A
Bt+1 + (1− dB)(ABt+1 +AABt+1)− (1 + rB)ABt+2 −RBt+1
]
+ φB
[
(1− dB)(ABt+2 +AABt+1)−RBt+2
]− fB = 0
⇐⇒ βB
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1 + (1 + pA)M
A
Bt+1
]
+ βB(1− dB)

 bB
2
(
1+rB
(1+λ∗
B2
)βB
− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St+1)2
e
1/3
B
+
(
1− eA
eB
)
AABt+1 − aB

− βB
(1 + rB)

 bB
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St+2)2
e
1/3
B
− eA
eB
·AABt+2 − aB


− βB
b2/3B (St+1)2
(
2
(
1+rB
(1+λ∗
B2
)βB
− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B

+ φB(1− dB)

 bB
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St+2)2
e
1/3
B
+
(
1− eA
eB
)
AABt+2 − aB

− φB
b
2/3
B (St+2)
2
(
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B
− fB = 0. (12.104)
I move terms associated with KBt+1 to the LHS, which include terms that contain St+2; furthermore I
aggregate the latter terms:
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(1 + pB)KBt+1
+

(
−(1 + rB) + φB
βB
(1− dB)
) bB
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · 1
e
1/3
B
− φB
b
2/3
B
(
2
(
βB
φB
(1 + rB)− (1− dB)
))1/3
βB · e1/3B︸ ︷︷ ︸

≡X
· (St+2)2
= −(1 + pA)MABt+1 − (1− dB)

 bB
2
(
1+rB
(1+λ∗
B2
)βB
− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St+1)2
e
1/3
B
+
(
1− eA
eB
)
AABt+1 − aB

+(1 + rB)
(
−eA
eB
·AABt+2 − aB
)
+
b
2/3
B (St+1)
2
(
2
(
1+rB
(1+λ∗
B2
)βB
− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B
−φB
βB
(1− dB)
((
1− eA
eB
)
AABt+2 − aB
)
+
fB
βB
. (12.105)
The terms on the RHS are all independent of KBt+1. I summarize some constants under X in the second
line of (12.105) in order to ease notation. From (12.84) it is known that optimal residual damages are greater
than the optimal adaptation capital bequest in a period; as here moreover optimal adaptation investment
costs are added, it can be concluded that X < 0.
The aim is to solve (12.105) for KBt+1, and one could expand (St+2)
2
to do so; in order to avoid too messy
transformations, I rather perform a Taylor approximation for (St+2)
2
, denoted by ˜(St+2)
2
.
(St+2)
2
= (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
˜(St+2)
2
= (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
+ 2γB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)(KBt+1 −KBt+1). (12.106)
KBt+1 denotes the reference level around which the linear approximation is performed. In (12.105), I sub-
stitute (St+2)
2
by ˜(St+2)
2
, and only leave the terms associated with KBt+1 on the LHS, while making use of
the substitute parameter X:
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(1 + pB)KBt+1 +X · 2γB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)KBt+1
= −(1 + pA)MABt+1 − (1− dB)

 bB
2
(
1+rB
(1+λ∗
B2
)βB
− (1− dB)
)
2/3 · (St+1)2
e
1/3
B
+
(
1− eA
eB
)
AABt+1 − aB

+(1 + rB)
(
−eA
eB
·AABt+2 − aB
)
+
b
2/3
B (St+1)
2
(
2
(
1+rB
(1+λ∗
B2
)βB
− (1− dB)
))1/3
e
1/3
B
− φB
βB
(1− dB)
((
1− eA
eB
)
AABt+2 − aB
)
+
fB
βB
−X · [(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)2 − 2γB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)KBt+1]
≡ H (12.107)
All terms on the RHS are independent of KBt+1; I summarize them altogether under H. Region B’s best
response function for period t+ 1 production capital investment is
KBt+1 =
H
(1 + pB) +X · 2γB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
(12.108)
To find out the sign of Q (knowing that X < 0), we can draw on the following plausibility considerations:
If the sustainability constraint bites and the required minimum consumption, fB , rises, then KBt+1 always
increases. As with fB > 0 also H rises, it can be concluded that H > 0, and since KBt+1 > 0, it must be the
case that Q > 0. Making combined use of (12.107) and (12.108), I compute region B’s marginal investment
responses to clean technology transfer and adaptation funding from region A:
∂KBt+1
∂MABt+1
=
1
Q
(−(1 + pA)) < 0 (12.109)
∂KBt+1
∂AABt+1
=
1
Q
(−(1− dB))
(
1− eA
eB
)
> 0 if eA > eB
= 0 if eA = eB
< 0 if eA > eB
(12.110)
∂KBt+1
∂AABt+2
=
1
Q
[
(1 + rB)
(
−eA
eB
)
− φB
βB
(1− dB)
(
1− eA
eB
)]
< 0. (12.111)
If region B receives clean capital, which both increases its output and is consumed in period t+1, it becomes
easier to fulfill the sustainability constraint, so that region B reduces the accumulation of KBt+1 and can
consume more in period t.
If eA > eB , an adapation capital unit from region A reduces damages by more than an adaptation capital
unit from region B. In this case, ∂KBt+1
∂AA
Bt+1
> 0, i.e. if region B is donated period t + 1 adaptation capital, it
will increase its production capital investments. From (12.99) it is known that if region B receives foreign
adaptation capital, it will reduce its own adaptation investments. The costs for adaptation investment taken
in period t do not enter the sustainability constraint; however, if eA > eB , less adaptation capital units are
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needed to achieve R∗Bt+1. As a consequence, the adaptation capital bequest to period t + 1 and the period
t+1 resources are reduced. In order to still fulfill the sustainability constraint, region B needs to raise period
t+ 1 production, and therefore KBt+1.
Moving on to (12.111), even for eA > eB it should be expected that
∂KBt+1
∂AA
Bt+2
< 0.31 The superior region A’s
adaptation capital (i.e. larger the difference between eA and eB), the more own adaptation capital investment
region B can drop per unit of received period t+2 adaptation funding, and it needs to accumulate less KBt+1
to fulfill the sustainability constraint.32
I turn to region A:
max
KAt+1,Mt+1, At+1, At+2,M
A
Bt+1, A
A
Bt+1, A
A
Bt+2
ZA
= pA(KAt +MAt)− (KAt+1 −KAt)− (1 + rA)AAt+1 − (1 + ζA)(MAt+1 −MAt)
−ΨA
2
(MAt+1 −MAt) ·max (MAt+1 −MAt; 0)− bA(St)
3
(aAeA)1/2
−(1 + ζA)MABt+1 −
ΨB
2
(MABt+1)
2 − (1 + rA)AABt+1
+βA
[
(1 + pA)(KAt+1 +MAt+1) + (1− dA)AAt+1 − (1 + rA)AAt+2−(1 + rA)AABt+2 −
bA(St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
3
((aA +AAt+1)eA)1/2
]
+φA
[
(1− dA)AAt+2 − bA(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
3
((aA +AAt+2)eA)1/2
]
,
+λA1(CAt − fA) + λA2(βACAt+1 − φDT − fA), (12.112)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions
∂ZA
∂KAt+1
≤ 0; KAt+1 ≥ 0; KAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂KAt+1
= 0 (12.113)
∂ZA
∂MAt+1
≤ 0; MAt+1 ≥ 0; MAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂MAt+1
= 0 (12.114)
∂ZA
∂AAt+1
≤ 0; AAt+1 ≥ 0; AAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂AAt+1
= 0 (12.115)
∂ZA
∂AAt+2
≤ 0; AAt+2 ≥ 0; AAt+2 · ∂ZA
∂AAt+2
= 0 (12.116)
∂ZA
∂MABt+1
≤ 0; MABt+1 ≥ 0; MABt+1 ·
∂ZA
∂MABt+1
= 0 (12.117)
∂ZA
∂AABt+1
≤ 0; AABt+1 ≥ 0; AABt+1 ·
∂ZA
∂AABt+1
= 0 (12.118)
∂ZA
∂AABt+2
≤ 0; AABt+2 ≥ 0; AABt+2 ·
∂ZA
∂AABt+2
= 0 (12.119)
∂ZA
∂λAi
≥ 0; λAi ≥ 0; λAi · ∂ZA
∂λAi
= 0 for i = 1, 2. (12.120)
31Otherwise the value of the adaptation capital bequest would exceed the investment costs, which would reflect some sort of
a perpetuum mobile.
32With respect to the latter term in (12.111), if eA > eB and foreign adaptation investment replaces domestic adaptation
investment, the same effect as described in the previous paragraph occurs, diminishing the KBt+1 reduction in response to
adaptation funding.
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The terms associated with clean technology transfer, MABt+1, and adaptation funding, A
A
Bt+1 and A
A
Bt+2, are
underlined. Like in Yang (1999), it is assumed that transfer costs are additive and that clean technology
transfer costs match the per-unit costs of domestic abatement, that is region A’s price differential, ζA, applies,
since the transferred capital is manufactured in region A. As that clean capital is installed in region B, where
it competes with dirty capital, it is assumed that region B’s adjustment costs, ΨB , accrue. Adaptation capital
is provided at region A’s manufacturing costs (with price differential rA).
For a standard interior solution, the optimal period t+ 1 clean capital stock is
∂ZA
∂MAt+1
= −(1 + ζA)−ΨA ·max (MAt+1 −MAt; 0) + βA(1 + pA) = 0
⇐⇒ M∗At+1 = MAt +
1
ΨA
(βA(1 + pA)− 1− ζA) . (12.121)
Following the same steps as in section 12.4.2, the following (intermediate) solutions are obtained:
A∗At+1 =
(
bA
2( 1βA (1 + rA)− (1− dA))
)2/3
· (St + γAKAt + γBKBt)
2
e
1/3
A
− aA (12.122)
AAt+2 =
 bA
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
)
2/3 · (St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)2
e
1/3
A
− aA
(12.123)
KAt+1 =
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)e1/3A
3φAb
2/3
A γ
2
A
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3 − StγA −KAt − γBγAKBt − γBγAKBt+1 (12.124)
S∗t+2 ≡
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)e1/3A
3φAb
2/3
A γA
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3 = SAt+2 (12.125)
A∗At+2 =
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)2e1/3A
(3γAφA)2b
2/3
A (2(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)))4/3
− aA. (12.126)
Regarding the use of region A’s potential strategic instruments, the analysis is started with optimal clean
technology transfer:
∂ZA
∂MABt+1
= −(1+ζA)−ΨBMABt+1−
3φAbAγB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
2
((aA +AAt+2)eA)1/2
· ∂KBt+1
∂MABt+1
= 0
(12.127)
Using the intermediate solution for AAt+2 from (12.123):
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−(1 + ζA)−ΨBMABt+1
−
3φAb
2/3
A γB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3
e
1/3
A
· ∂KBt+1
∂MABt+1
= 0. (12.128)
Replacing St+2 by S
∗
t+2 from (12.66) leads to
MABt+1 =
1
ΨB
[
−(1 + ζA)− γB
γA
· ∂KBt+1
∂MABt+1
]
(12.129)
In (12.109), region B’s investment response to marginal clean technology transfer, ∂KBt+1/∂MABt+1 was formu-
lated, and is plugged in:
MABt+1 =
1
ΨB
[
−(1 + ζA) + γB
γA
· 1
Q
(1 + pA)
]
MA∗Bt+1 (12.130)
=
1
ΨB
[
−(1 + ζA) + γB(1 + pA)
γA
(
(1 + pB) +X · 2γB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
)] .
A higher level of clean technology transfer becomes optimal, if
1. region B’s clean technology adjustment costs, ΨB , fall.
2. the price differential, ζA, decreases.
3. the productivity of the provided capital, pA, rises, or the productivity of region B’s production capital
falls, as a transferred unit is more effective in crowding out region B’s domestic investment.
4. region B’s emissions coefficient, γB , increases, as more emissions are saved per unit of triggered dirty
capital reduction in region B.
5. region A’s emissions coefficient, γA, goes up. In this case, the clean technology transfer is more profitable
for region A; the cleaner its own production technology, the more it benefits from an emissions reduction
in region B, as then it can scale up its own production by even more while still achieving SAt+2 = S
∗
t+2.
6. committed emissions, such as St, rise (recall that X < 0). Due to the exponential effect of emissions
onto damages, for higher St region A benefits relatively more from a emissions reduction in region B,
as this leaves more leeway for region A until its desired level of damages is reached.
7. increases in the reference point of the Taylor approximation, KBt+1, for the same reason as just
described.
Clean technology transfer is also sensitive to region B’s adaptation parameters, contained in X. For instance,
if the adaptation investment price differential, rB , rises, this leads to higher adaptation costs and demand
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for resources in region B. Hence, KBt+1 must rise to satisfy the sustainability constraint, and clean capital
transfer becomes more worthwhile for region A.
Proposition 34. The superior region transfers clean capital to the inferior region, as long as the marginal
benefits from reducing the inferior region’s emissions through clean capital transfer, namely to create leeway
for raising own production and associated emissions, exceed the marginal costs..
Turning to optimal adaptation funding, the FOC for AABt+1 is:
∂ZA
∂AABt+1
= −(1 + rA) (12.131)
−
3φAb
2/3
A γB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3
e
1/3
A
· ∂KBt+1
∂AABt+1
.
Performing the same manipulations as when deriving the solution for optimal clean capital transfer delivers
∂ZA
∂AABt+1
= −(1 + rA) + γB
γA
1
Q
(1− dB)
(
1− eA
eB
)
(12.132)
AA∗Bt+1
= 0 if eA > eB= 0 if eA = eB . (12.133)
If eA > eB , i.e. region A’s adaptation capital is more effective in alleviating climate damages than region A’s
one, for the reasons described above, if it is provided with foreign period t+ 1 adaptation capital, region B
accumulates even more period t+ 1 dirty capital, further reducing region A’s slice of the carbon cake. Such
adaptation funding does not serve the interests of region A and is not undertaken.33
The incentive structure of period t+ 2 adaptation funding is different:
∂ZA
∂AABt+2
= −βA(1 + rA)
−
3φAb
2/3
A γB(St + γAKAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + γBKBt+1)
(
2
(
βA
φA
(1 + rA)− (1− dA)
))1/3
e
1/3
A
· ∂KBt+1
∂AABt+2
= −βA(1 + rA)− γB
γA
1
Q
[
(1 + rB)
(
−eA
eB
)
− φB
βB
(1− dB)
(
1− eA
eB
)]
. (12.134)
This implies that there is a bang-bang solution for period t+2 adaptation funding. Region A supplies either
all of region B’s period t+ 2 optimal adaptation capital or none; if it does, the exact amount is determined
by region B’s best response function for adaptation capital investment, ABt+2 (12.100):
33For eA < eB , there may be a theoretical range of parameters in which A
A∗
Bt+1 > 0; for sufficiently large rA, still A
A∗
Bt+1 = 0.
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AA∗Bt+2 = (12.135)
0 if βA(1 + rA) >
γB
γA
1
Q
[
(1 + rB)
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− eAeB
)
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eB
eA
[(
bB
2
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e
1/3
B
− aB
]
if βA(1 + rA) <
γB
γA
1
Q
[
(1 + rB)
(
− eAeB
)
− φBβB (1− dB)
(
1− eAeB
)]
.
Any adaptation funding AABt+2 > A
A∗
Bt+2 does not lead to a further reduction of region B’s dirty capital
investment, as the sustainability constraint is already satisfied. Any funding that goes beyond that level
region B will not use to accumulate further period t + 2 adaptation capital, but rather consume in period
t + 1, as the marginal benefits from consuming it exceed the marginal benefits from an even lower level of
period t+ 2 residual damages.34
This all-or-nothing solution is an artifact caused by the linearities of the model; it could be avoided by
introducing a quadratic cost function similar to the clean capital adjustment cost function. However:
Proposition 35. The superior region provides adaptation capital to the inferior region, as long as the
marginal costs of adaptation funding fall below the marginal benefits, namely reducing the inferior region’s need
for generating resources that are sufficient for optimal adaptation and hence reducing associated emissions,
so that leeway for production and associated emissions in the superior region is raised.
With the solutions for MA∗Bt+1, A
A∗
Bt+1 and A
A∗
Bt+2, from (12.108) we obtain K
∗
Bt+1, and from (12.124) K
∗
At+1
- the model is solved.
The model results may come to a surprise. Even in a non-cooperative world, in which regions assign zero
weight to other regions’ welfare (or harm), there may still be incentives and prospects for both clean tech-
nology transfer and adaptation funding, which other models usually see happening in cooperative scenarios
exclusively. Such transfers lead to a Pareto improvement of the game’s outcome: Region A is better off by
providing support, as it wins back scope for own economic activity. Region B benefits from the transfers as
they provide a “free lunch”. This result stands in contrast to the one derived by Buob and Stephan (2009),
where the inferior region actually may be worse off from receiving adaptation funds. SLICE confirms the
perfect crowding out of domestic adaptation expenditure by foreign funding under optimal investment, which
was also observed by de Bruin et al. (2010), but in their model in a non-cooperative scenario potential donor
regions lack incentive to provide adaptation funding.
In the model of Yang (1999), the emissions level of the inferior region is exogenous to the superior region.
Here, it is not exogenous, but can be influenced by region A, as the adaptation needs of region B depend on
the global cumulative emissions level, which is factually controlled by region A. The credible threats discussed
are also quite different. In Yang (1999), the South may consider to abate so little that it becomes optimal
for the North to engage in mitigation abroad; here the credible threats of the inferior region are built on its
investment demands.
One may claim that in the “real world” the inferior region would not stick to its commitment formulated
in the constraints and commit moral hazard, i.e. first take the free lunch, but ultimately not reduce its
34These results inevitably raise questions about the reversibility of adaptation capital that were successfully avoided earlier.
If region A provides region B’s entire period t + 2 adaptation capital stock, this implies that region B consumes the domestic
adaptation capital bequeathed to period t+1. Furthermore, if any adaptation funding that exceeds AA∗Bt+2 is consumed, it must
be consumable. This is a classic shortcoming of a one-good model, which though already applies to the model versions without
adaptation, where it was assumed that the entire production capital is consumed after the final production has taken place.
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economic activity (although in the Cournot game as formulated, the inferior region actually wants to limit
its emissions, while the superior region targets a higher cumulative emissions level). However, if in the “real
world” incentives for such a moral hazard exist, then there probably a repeated game applies, too, in which
the superior region can stop donations over time to punish moral hazard. Possibly, such a repeated game is
already being played. As was elaborated in the Motivation chapter of this thesis, in the spirit of the leadership
paradigm established in the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol required only the developed countries to commit
to certain mitigation targets. However, the developed countries now demand that the developing countries
also commit to certain mitigation targets, when a new climate agreement is formed. While annual adaptation
funding amounting to 100 billion USD by 2020 has been promised by the developed countries, it is still not
clear how this money is raised. It is imaginable that the developed countries hold back clean technology
transfer and adaptation funding until the developing countries have committed to certain mitigation targets,
too.
It is important to recognize that the fundamental mechanisms revealed in this scenario are not dependent on
the sustainability constraint. It is recalled that in the scenario in which the social planner of region B does
not impose the sustainability constraint upon itself (section 12.4.2), region B is still resource-constrained in
period t+ 1, as it needs to protect against overpollution in period t+ 2. Hence, region A might still provide
adaptation funding for the same motives.
In section 12.4.4, it was shown that apart from clean technology transfer and adaptation funding as a further
strategic instrument to optimize its outcome, region A may emit less CO2, so that its overall cumulative
carbon target is not reached, in order to release pressure on region B to adapt, produce and to create
emissions. If this option had not been ruled out in this section, it is well-possible that a mix of all three
options would occur. This is however hard to show in this analytical framework and left for future research.
12.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, the assumption of a single social planner maximizing global welfare is replaced by a setup
in which two regions compete for exploitation of the common atmospheric carbon sink. These regions are
allowed to have different characteristics in terms of their preferences, productivities and vulnerabilities,
which determine the respective cumulative carbon targets. The region that wants to attain a higher level
of cumulative carbon emissions is labelled the “superior” region, in other models referred to as the North,
whereas the inferior region - traditionally referred to as the South - prefers a lower level.
In the basic Cournot game without clean technology and adaptation, the superior region is able to enforce its
cumulative carbon target without having to compromise. In contrast, the inferior region ends up with zero
production and overpollution caused by the superior region. The fact that such a corner solution occurs is
owed to the linearities of the model, but the overall message it conveys is nevertheless credible: The region
that wants to make more use of the atmospheric carbon sink can do so, while the other can do nothing against
it. Put differently, the superior region rules climate change according to its own preferences exclusively, while
the inferior region is unable to do so. If the investment decisions were not made simulteanously and instead
the inferior region could as the leader of a Stackelberg game make its emissions commitment first, it would
be optimal for the superior region to preempt the superior region’s investments, as the superior region’s
cumulative carbon target is reached in any case. The superior region may be left with no better choice than
zero period t+1 production to avoid its overpollution. In line with standard results, in a cooperative scenario
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in which the externalities from the emissions are internalized, the social planner chooses a level of optimal
cumulative emissions that is lower than the targets of both regions.
The availability of a clean technology changes little. Like in the one-world model, the superior region optimizes
its capital mix, but does not lower its cumulative emissions target. Maybe this should not come at a too
big surprise. One reason that has prevented a stringent mitigation agreement from being reached might be
that the industrialized countries have less interest in mitigation than some developing countries may have. In
the special case of a zero-emissions technology being available, the inferior region actually accumulates clean
capital, since it has no effect on global emissions. Once the minimum consumption constraint is reintroduced,
it actually serves as a credible threat. In order to fulfill this constraint, the inferior region needs to produce
sufficient resources. This forces the superior region to lower its emissions somewhat to avoid a cumulative
emissions level that exceeds its target level. There, however, the inferior region’s ambitions must come to an
end; if it announced to commit to the sustainability constraint, which claims that the sum of its mid-term
consumption and long-term damages must be greater than some lower bound, it would be unable to do so,
as it has no control over the level of long-term damages.
Adaptation changes the rules of the climate game fundamentally. The superior region still rules the level
of gross climate damages, but with adaptation residual damages become partially privatized. Both regions
can adjust the amount of adaptation capital individually. Suddenly, in a Cournot game too it becomes the
optimal strategy for the inferior region to produce in period t+1, namely in order to fund adaptation taking
an effect in the final period, and the more so if it is overpolluted. Of course, such economic activity causes
emissions, dragging away slices of the carbon cake from region A, which determines the overall size of the
cake. Hence, adaptation leads to a more equitable distribution of the benefits of the atmospheric sink among
the two regions and, especially, the inferior region is no longer doomed to be overwhelmed by climate damages
without being able to do anything about it. Moreover, since it is the superior region’s emissions that push
the investment demands in the inferior region, the superior region may actually be better off by preventing
that its emissions target is reached and by emitting less, in order to reduce the pressure for adaptation and
production investment demand abroad. To conclude, adaptation may possibly lower the level of cumulative
carbon emissions desired and set by the superior region, and be more effective in enforcing some mitigation
of climate change than the availability of a clean technology.
Additionally, adaptation empowers the inferior region even further. Since it can now partially control its
residual damages, the sustainability constraint becomes a credible threat. As it is more demanding than the
minimum consumption constraint, the inferior region expands its period t+1 production even further. While
this further improves the welfare of the inferior region, it goes at cost of the superior region’s welfare, which
needs to reduce its economic activity to avoid overpollution.
Two options to improve its position are identified though, namely clean technology transfer and adaptation
funding. As the inferior region is committed to achieving a certain adaptation target in the final period,
which leads to the economic activity and creation of emissions that the superior region is affected by, the
superior region can either supply the other region with clean capital. This allows it to fulfill its investment
target at lower costs and in a less emissions-intense way, and the superior region wins back some shares of its
carbon cake. Alternatively, the superior region can provide some of the inferior region’s adaptation capital
to reduce the inferior region’s need to generate resources and emissions.
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Summary
At the beginning of the thesis, I summarized the course of international climate negotiations and expressed
doubts over the prospects for future climate negotiations to deliver a stringent climate agreement that prevents
dangerous climate change. This provided the motivation for analyzing the characteristics of climate policy
in a non-cooperative scenario.
Chapter 1 discussed integrated assessment models of climate change, which integrate the physical and the
economic dimension of the climate problem in order to compute the optimal balance between emissions
abatement and climate damages. Unfortunately, the strong sensitivity of the results to the model assumptions
casts doubt on the robustness of the data produced. Therefore, informed by a review of stylized clean
technology adoption models in chapter 2, in chapter 3 the work of Buckle (2009a,b) was taken up to craft
a conceptual, transparent climate model, called SLICE. The model was reengineered so that despite the
clean capital stock extension, the model still produces analytical solutions. A central insight gained from
analyzing different clean technology adoption scenarios was that the availability of a clean technology does
not necessarily lead to a lower optimal level of cumulative emissions, but may instead enable a higher level
of economic growth. Emissions-saving technical progress may raise the optimal cumulative emissions level.
Chapter 4 investigated that the linear utility function conditions these strong rebound effects. Ultimately, the
chapter posed the question whether an economy-wide rebound effect may be a realistic reflection of reality,
and it turned out that this question cannot be answered yet. In chapter 5, it was shown that the strong
result of Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan (2011) that the optimal level of long-term cumulative
atmospheric CO2 is independent of technological change is not robust and driven by their specific model
setup.
Once the mitigation module of SLICE was created, the attention was turned to developing an adaptation
module for SLICE. In contrast to mitigation that either achieves emissions reductions or increases the terres-
trial carbon sinks, adaptation measures may have various aims. Chapter 6 presented attempts to categorize
adaptation measures and gave examples for adaptation measures in different sectors potentially affected by
climate change. In chapter 7, studies that predict future adaptation costs were reviewed. The development
of robust estimation methods in this field is a thorny task and at an early stage. In chapter 8, a compre-
hensive literature review on approaches to implement adaptation into existing IAMs and conceptual models
was carried out. It seemed that the models reflected the properties of adaptation to different degrees of
adequacy. Among the IAMs reviewed so far, AD-WITCH appears to take the most sophisticated approach
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to model aggregate adaptation. None of the conceptual models reviewed were both convincing and provided
fully explicit solutions. The literature review revealed that many adaptation models make an implicit choice
on an adaptation property that I introduce in chapter 9. Adaptation can be either cancelling, i.e. fully avoid
any harmful impact from climate change, or only alleviate it. I argue that when aggregate adaptation is
considered, adaptation should be assumed alleviating. Chapter 10 develops the SLICE adaptation module,
whose structure turns out to share some characteristics with the AD-WITCH approach. The chapter re-
veals that adaptation also causes a rebound effect. Adaptation makes climate change more bearable, and
therefore raises the tolerable level of cumulative emissions. Hence, adaptation leads to more gross climate
damages, whereby the effect on residual damages might be dependent on the model assumptions. In SLICE,
endogenous residual damages increase in adaptation.
Applying game-theoretic tools, most economic research on climate change has focused on finding pathways
towards a global stringent mitigation agreement. In addition, in chapter 11, models of clean technology
transfer and adaptation funding were reviewed. They had in common that these actions took place usually
only in cooperative scenarios, in which a social planner manages the interests of countries jointly. Finally, in
chapter 12 I extended SLICE to a two-region model and introduced asymmetry; one region prefers a higher
cumulative emissions level than the other one. In the Cournot games with or without clean technology, the
superior region that prefers a higher level meets its target, while the inferior region’s target level is exceeded,
even though it does not produce in the mid term. Adaptation fundamentally changes the incentives of the
game. It forces the inferior region to develop in order to be able to prepare against overpollution in the long
term. The associated economic activity causes emissions and drags away some slices of the carbon cake from
the superior region, which determines the overall size of the cake. While gross climate damages remain a
public bad, adaptation partially privatizes residual damages and empowers the inferior region to even fulfill
the sustainability constraint, that is, generate sufficient resources in the mid term to compensate for damages
occurring in the long term. In response, the superior region may choose a lower cumulative emissions level in
order to reduce the pressure on the inferior region to adapt and produce. Alternatively, the superior region
can transfer clean technology to the inferior region, so that the inferior region uses less dirty capital; the
emissions saved in the inferior region can be emitted by the superior region. If the superior region provides
adaptation funding, the inferior region needs to create less resources for domestic adaptation investment, and
again economic activity shifts to the superior region. Both clean technology transfer and adaptation funding
take place in a non-cooperative scenario, are entirely selfishly motivated and lead to Pareto improvements.
Policy Implications
Turning to policy implications, adaptation may shape future climate regimes in a range of ways. I want
to recall that adaptation is different from mitigation mainly because a.) the effect of adaptation is more
immediate b.) it targets a certain region or individual c.) it is not able to prevent climate change from
happening and might have a limited potential in dealing with catastrophic climate damages. The two first
features are advantageous, but the latter implies that the prospects for solving the climate problem by
adaptation exclusively are limited.
Due to the carbon cycle, the effect of high-carbon economic activity on the climate is delayed. Some may
hope that when the effects of climate change become more perceptible in all parts of the world, the pressure
to craft a stringent mitigation agreement increases. The analysis in chapter 10 suggests that such hopes
may be misguided. If those powers that contribute most to climate change and therefore potentially bear
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the bulk of mitigation costs also have access to rather cost-effective adaptation measures, they may simply
invest into adaptation and otherwise follow even more carbon-intense Business As Usual development paths.
Put in simple terms, it may be regarded as a cheaper option to enhance the coastal protection year-by-year
than to enforce the transition to a low-carbon-economy. Adaptation causes rebound effects and raises the
optimal emissions levels for those who are protected. This however has dramatic consequences for human
beings that may not have equal access to such adaptation measures. They might suffer from an elevated
level of climate change triggered by adaptation of the economically powerful. Furthermore, the economically
less advantaged are at risk of falling into an adaptation poverty trap. Climate change increases the pressure
on them to adapt, increasing their resource scarcity and potentially leading to a crowding out of growth-
stimulating production investments by increasingly useful adaptation investments. Higher optimal emissions
levels resulting from adaptation rebound effects also pose further challenges to animals and plants, whose
short-term adaptation capabilities might be limited. The availability of adaptation measures on one side of
the planet may exacerbate the climate crisis on the other side.
However, the last chapter has shown that with adaptation the power of some developing countries35 may
increase, if they recognize the strategic potential that adaptation offers. Without adaptation, all that they
can do is to maintain a minimum consumption level that allows their citizens’ survival. Apart from this,
the developing countries appear to be doomed to be spectators of climate change, unable to share in the
economic benefits of industrial production that have been giving rise to the problem.
With adaptation, the leaders of these countries are able to tell a different story. It is only natural and morally
very justifiable to proclaim that one wants to fulfill the sustainability constraint, which means countries will
want to accumulate enough resources today to be able to deal with the challenges of tomorrow.36 If the world
continues to stir up climate change though, it becomes increasingly challenging to fulfill the sustainability
constraint. Developing countries can blame the industrialized countries for a lack of willingness to fight
climate change, which directly exerts pressure on them to develop. Only if they develop, that is accumulate
production capital in the mid term, they are able to (partially) protect in the long term against climate
change mainly created by others. This economic activity stimulated by the need to adapt forces the developed
countries to reduce their economic activity in order to prevent their overpollution. A redistribution of benefits
from exploiting the atmospheric carbon sink takes place, even though the developing regions have to put up
with overpollution. In section 7.1, it was stated that it is commonly held that development strengthens
the resilience to climate change, as health and education improve. Furthermore, development provides the
financial means for carrying out adaptation, which is confirmed by this analysis.
It is no longer straightforward to assign all countries to one of two groups; for this reason, I avoid the classic
North/South terminology scheme. Ultimately, a higher degree of differentiation within the regions under
consideration is required, whose number in the model has been limited to two. While countries such as
the USA, Japan or the United Kingdom certainly fit into the category “superior region” and the inferior
region may be representative of many poor African countries, there is an increasing need for at least one
other “box”, which contains the emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil.37 Considering these
rising nations, they seem to have enough economic power to fuel their further development, and may have
a remarkable carbon footprint already now or in the foreseeable future. Maybe a race for the exploitation
of the scarce atmospheric carbon sinks is already in full swing, as even the Western world is increasingly
35Assuming here that developing countries share the characteristics of the inferior region - for a more careful differentiation,
see below. Developed countries are here associated with the superior region.
36Recalling that saving was not explicitly modelled, but rather the resource budgets of the mid and the long term simply
added up.
37And a country as large as China again is very heterogenous in itself, s. Nagle (2011), pp. 601f.
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worried about the world’s largest emitter of CO2, China, continuously growing its emissions. While the
Chinese officials have announced ambitious relative emissions reduction targets38, they also have repeatedly
stated that China has the need and the right to grow rapidly to avoid uprisings and because the bulk of
the historical responsibilty for climate change falls on the developed world.39 It may be only one more step
for China to announce that it needs to grow also to prepare for future climate change adaptation and that
a substantial share of this growth will be created using high-carbon technologies. This may put developed
countries under pressure to reduce their emissions accordingly, whether it be due to their own fear of extreme
climate change, for altruistic concerns about third countries that may be unable to adapt appropriately, or
for both, and cause a relocation of CO2 emissions creation from the West to China. Of course, there is
the risk that the Western world nevertheless does not take substantial action to decarbonize its economy,
leading to even more extreme climate change and possibly catastrophic damages against which no adaptation
helps. However, the developing countries’ alternative option is, as stated earlier, to just watch climate change
happening and end up with a lack of capacity to protect against it.
If the West40 feels affected by such a proclamation, there are different ways how it may respond to it. One
way is to reduce overall cumulative emissions, to lower the burden on those countries that want to fulfill the
sustainability constraint. If this happened, the “threat” of the developing countries to prepare for adaptation
would trigger mitigation of climate change. Two further options were considered, the ethical implications of
which I want to discuss. It was shown that even in a non-cooperative world, non-altruistic motives may exist
to provide clean technology and adaptation funds. Clean capital is sent to the inferior region to lower the need
for production capital accumulated domestically. While the installation of clean capital abroad does not lead
to less CO2 emissions, as the superior region provides it only to increase its own emissions by the reductions
achieved abroad, such clean technology transfer does not undermine the development of the recipient region
either. On the contrary, it receives a free lunch, and it is pushed onto a cleaner development path and
may in the long term possibly also benefit from the knowledge transfer associated with the clean capital
import. The motivation behind adaptation funding is somewhat shadier though, or even cynical: the foreign
funds reduce the need of the inferior region to generate own funds to finance adaptation in the long term.
Hence, the funds are essentially provided to suppress the inferior region’s need to develop and as such might
support a neocolonial dependence model of development, leading to a perpetuation of underdevelopment.41
Such development aid that satisfies the recipient countries’ needs in the short term, but does not assist them
in building up the competencies to develop in the long term, has been criticized for only paving long-term
dependence.42
As a caveat, a prerequisite to pursue the strategy just outlined is that there are enough resources available
in the present to accumulate the production capital in the mid term that is needed to finance adaptation in
the long term. If the initially available resources are not sufficient to execute the strategy, the sustainability
constraint cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, serious doubts may be cast on whether very poor, initially resource-
constrained countries could credibly use the sustainability constraint to voice such a threat. Furthermore,
38At COP15 in Copenhagen China announced that it wants to reduce its carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 from the 2005
level, s. Department of Climate Change, National Development & Reform Commission of China (2010). Nevertheless,
absolute CO2 emissions are projected to continue to rise due to China’s rapid economic growth, cp. Gambhir et al. (2012), pp.
7ff.
39Cp. Nagle (2011), p. 603 and 597ff. See also section 11.3.
40The increasing heterogeneity of the developed world should be emphasized. Among the industrialized countries too there
might be no agreement on the optimal cumulative emissions level. It is recalled that the Kyoto Protocol was pushed forward
by members of the European Union and other developed countries, while the USA never ratified it. Furthermore, developed
economies also exist in the East.
41S. Todaro and Smith (2009), pp. 122ff.
42S. Habisso (2009).
271
SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND BEYOND
if they are disorganized and act as separate, small units, their impact on the world climate is probably too
low, so that their emissions commitments matter only marginally to the developed world.
While it appears clear that adaptation changes the dynamics of the climate game, and may, if used as a
strategic instrument, force developed countries to lower their overall emissions, it is not yet clear whether
it also facilitates a cooperative climate regime to emerge, something which Barrett (2008) has started to
address. This remains for further study.
To conclude, a rising significance of adaptation may have different consequences for different countries.
The industrialized countries benefit from adaptation, as it adds a second climate policy option to their
toolkit. Considering mitigation and adaptation as substitutes, more adaptation, in their perspective, reduces
the need for mitigation. The emerging economies, which are sufficiently resource-endowed to pursue this
strategy, benefit from adaptation insofar as it enables them not only to partially cope with overpollution
and associated consequences in the long term, but also to credibly proclaim the sustainability constraint
and to enforce a shift of carbon-intense economic activity from the industrialized to the emerging economies.
The losers are the least developed countries that are very poor at the outset. They struggle with satisfying
minimum consumption at the present, and resource-constrained as they are, they are unable to build up the
production capacities necessary for adaptation in the future. Furthermore, they suffer from the higher level
of climate change that becomes optimal for those countries that adapt and are at risk of falling into the
adaptation poverty trap.
And Beyond
The last chapter has shown that the potential of SLICE as an analytical, transparent model is reaching its
limits, once mitigation and adaptation are introduced to the two-region framework. The model has yielded
important insights, but becomes increasingly cumbersome as its complexity increases. Nevertheless, it is
quite surprising that even in this version of SLICE with its embedded strong linearities a case of circular
reference was hit. The model will inevitably become more complex, if the linearity assumptions are given up.
This should allow a more thorough analysis of the sensitivity of the model to certain functional forms and
parameter values, but it should be kept in mind that computer-supported simulations may come at the costs
of lower transparency and a less profound understanding of the model mechanisms, changing the original aim
for developing SLICE.
Uncertainty over the magnitude and the spatial realization of climate damages is a prominent feature of
climate change, and the future innovation and economic growth trends are largely unknown. The work of
Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), which was presented in section 8.4.2, shed light on implications of spatial
uncertainty, while uncertainty over the magnitude of climate change was briefly dealt with when developing
the SLICE catastrophic climate damages toy approach, leading to the carbon constraint introduced in section
3.2.9. Nevertheless, SLICE has so far essentially been kept as a deterministic model, primarily to keep it
simple and analytically tractable. Introducing uncertainty to SLICE would lead to another extension of
SLICE, the consequences of which have not been thought through yet, but might yield interesting insights. For
instance, uncertainty over the spatial realization of climate-change-induced events may blur the boundaries
between the superior and inferior region, as it becomes less clear which region will be more affected by climate
change.
As chapter 8 made evident, adaptation modelling is at an early stage, and other authors may disagree with the
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AD-WITCH / SLICE approach. Further research may take on alternative approaches to model adaptation
and see whether and how this affects the conclusions gained from SLICE.
In the previous section it was highlighted that it might make sense to consider at least a third category of
countries to allow a higher degree of differentiation. It might be interesting to introduce a third region to the
model, but of course this will further complicate it. In case of doubt, I prefer to keep an interpretable model
like this whose weaknesses I can oversee to a fully-fledged model that produces results whose derivation is
not fully transparent to me. Ultimately, this may be a matter of purpose and preference.
The time structure of the model has been kept simple, considering only three periods and allowing the
planner(s) only a limited number of decisions. At the end of section 12.4.5 it was indicated that if the inferior
region does not reduce its emissions in the mid term in response to receiving clean technology or adaptation
funding from the superior region at the beginning, the superior region may want to reduce such transfers
in the future to punish moral hazard. To capture such more complex dynamics, a multi-period model is
required.
In the Motivation chapter to this work, the climate problem was broadly categorized into two dimensions, the
economic-theoretical one and the political-practical one. This thesis has dealt with the economic fundamentals
of the problem. However, economics is always at risk of embedding too many assumptions or oversimplifying
a problem. This risk also applies to SLICE. For instance, while it seems a convincing result that the superior
region dominates the inferior region by enforcing its cumulative carbon target in the two-region model, the
particular result found in chapter 12 that the inferior region may end up not producing and consuming at
all seems unrealistic. As a consequence, the minimum consumption constraints were introduced.
Ostrom (2009) raises a more fundamental question about the standard economic approach to analyze the
climate problem. She refers to the Conventional Theory of Collective Action, according to which a situation
is a dilemma (such as the Prisoners’ dilemma, see section 11.1), if individual incentives lead to a Nash
equilibrium whose outcome is suboptimal to the one that could be produced from cooperation. Ostrom
reminds us that most game-theoretic models assume that:
– all players have complete knowledge of the game and the payoffs for all possible action profiles chosen
by the players.
– in a Cournot game, decisions are taken simultaneously.
– no communication between the players takes place.
– no central authority exists that promotes the agreement process.
These assumptions must be fulfilled for a one-shot or finite game to lead to zero cooperation. Ostrom reports
empirical evidence that the zero-cooperation prediction often is too pessimistic, as groups that are affected by
common-property problems often organize themselves to develop small to medium scale solutions. The greater
the mutual trust among the actors is, the more effective cooperation can be achieved. Furthermore, standard
top-down analysis often dismisses externalities on a more microeconomic level, which can prevent actors from
efficiently cooperating even when there is top level agreement.43 For instance, adaptation appears to suffer
less from inter-country externalities than mitigation, but it may well be possible that adaptation at the local
level is in certain circumstances perceived as a common good, leading to the problem of underprovision.
Issues below the strongly aggregating regional level have not yet been addressed by SLICE.
43Cp. Ostrom (2009), pp. 6ff.
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The political-practical dimension of the climate problem briefly outlined in the Motivation chapter has hardly
been explored in this work. Nevertheless, political dynamics will be critical. To give just a few examples, the
failure of COP15 in Copenhagen to produce (a roadmap to) a stringent mitigation agreement has severely
damaged political efforts and slowed down the momentum. Shorter-term economic crises distract attention
away from long-term environmental problems. Countries are not only worried about climate change, but also
about competitiveness, i.e. that too strict carbon regulation triggers a “carbon leakage” of domestic high-
carbon industry into foreign countries. It is important to have in mind that cross-linked issues may have a
detrimental impact, but again collaboration in other fields may build trust and promote climate cooperation.
For these reasons, Barrett (2005), one of the pioneers of international environmental agreement research,
advises: “The economics literature may be better than the theories of international relations at telling us, or
at least directing us to ask, which features of an IEA really help, but this kind of abstract logic needs to be
tested against actual experience. My advice to the graduate student thinking of working in this area would
be to start by reading some case studies; after that to read the agreements that were actually negotiated; and
only after doing this to read through the economics papers reviewed in this essay. If you start by thinking
about a real problem – the kind that this applied theory is meant to illuminate – you may find it easier to
spot weaknesses in the theory”44.
Finally, while SLICE adopted standard economic theory by making use of economic growth and game theory,
it also accepted a standard axiom of economics. In chapters 3 and 10 the growth envelopes of mitigation
and adaptation, respectively, were highlighted. It was concluded that mitigation and adaptation measures
may increase the scope for economic growth, which is per se assumed a good thing in economics, not least
driven by the common assumption that utility is indefinitely growing in consumption and unaffected by other
factors. However, it may be important to start focusing on the quality of growth. In section 3.3.9, it was
briefly analyzed that close to the limits of substitution between a healthy climate and man-made goods,
emissions-saving technical progress may be more valuable than raising the productivity of an economy. In
terms of economic growth, this may mean that low-carbon growth should be preferred to high-carbon growth.
Standard national accounting does not make such a distinction. Jackson (2009) points to the empirical
observation that, once basic consumption means are satisfied, relative wealth may be more significant than
absolute wealth in terms of determining happiness. Hence, a possible conclusion from this could be that
slowly-growing wealth of many could be preferable to fast-growing wealth of few, another issue ignored
in national accounting. Jackson even questions the feasibility of maintaining current consumption (and
population) growth levels unchanged, because he sees no evidence that absolute decoupling of economic
growth and CO2 emissions has yet occurred at a worldwide scale and regards it as unlikely that the carbon
intensities can fall fast enough to maintain a chance to meet the 2°C target for global mean temperature
rise.45 All that I want say here is that a more careful use of the common economic success indicator “growth”
seems advisable, and that it is important to be aware of these current limitations of economic analysis.
44Barrett (2005), p. 1512.
45Cp. Jackson (2009), pp. 49ff. and pp. 71ff.
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A.1 Equivalence of clean technology modelling approaches
A.1.1 The transition to clean technologies in Buckle (2009a)
In Buckle (2009a), the social planner can decide on the size of the total capital stock, Vt+1, and the clean
capital share in period t+1, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 (so that 1−η denotes the dirty capital share).1 ζ > 0 still reflects the
constant marginal price differential between a unit of dirty capital and a unit of clean capital, with the clean
technology exhibiting higher per-unit investment costs. It is assumed that the economy starts with zero clean
capital and that adjustment costs rise quadratically with the size of investments, while Ψ > 0 determines the
scale of the adjustment costs, so that investment costs, Icostt , are given as
(1− η)Vt+1 + η(1 + ζ)Vt+1 + 1
2
Ψ(ηVt+1)
2 − Vt = Icostt
⇐⇒ Vt+1(1 + ηζ) + 1
2
Ψ(ηVt+1)
2 − Vt = Icostt . (A.1)
Production using clean capital results in 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 less CO2 emissions than traditional production. This
changes the CO2 accumulation equation (3.12) for period T cumulative emissions to
ST = St + γVt + γ(µηVt+1 + (1− η)Vt+1)
⇐⇒ ST = St + γVt + γ(µη + (1− η))Vt+1. (A.2)
The third term of this equation, which stems from CO2 emissions in period t + 1, resembles the functional
form of the emissions function (1.6) of the DICE model, where the abatement control variable was ηDICEt
and for the zero-carbon backstop technology µ = 0 is assumed.
Hence, the optimization problem changes to
max
Ct, Ct+1
W = Ut(Ct) + βUt+1(Ct+1) + φUT (−DT ), (A.3)
subject to
1In Buckle (2009a), η denotes the dirty capital share and 1− η the clean capital share.
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Ut(Ct) = Ct
Ct = Yt − Icostt −Dt
Φ =
φ
γ
> 0
Icostt = Vt+1(1 + ηζ) +
1
2
Ψ(ηVt+1)
2 − Vt
Yt = pVt
St+1 = St + γVt
ST = St + γVt + γ(µη + (1− η))Vt+1
Dt = b(St)
2
Vt = Vt > 0
ηVt = 0
St = St > 0
Ct, t+1 ≥ f
After plugging the side conditions into the welfare function, the following Lagrangian is maximized over both
the total period t+ 1 capital stock, Vt+1, and the period t+ 1 share of clean capital, η:
max
Vt+1, η
Z =
[
pVt + Vt − Vt+1(1 + ηζ)− 1
2
Ψ(ηVt+1)
2 − b(St)2
]
+ β
[
pVt+1 + Vt+1 − b(St + γVt)2
]
− φb [St + γVt + γ(µη + (1− η))Vt+1]2 + λ1(Ct − f) + λ2(Ct+1 − f) (A.4)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions
∂Z
∂Vt+1
≤ 0; Vt+1 ≥ 0; Vt+1 · ∂Z
∂Vt+1
= 0
∂Z
∂η
≤ 0; η ≥ 0; η · ∂Z
η
= 0 (A.5)
∂Z
∂λi
≥ 0; λi ≥ 0; λi · ∂Z
∂λi
= 0 for i = 1, 2
Assuming an interior solution in which λ1,2,
∂Z
∂Vt+1
, ∂Z∂η = 0 and Ct,t+1, Vt+1, η > 0, implying that in period
t+ 1 both dirty and clean capital are in use, the FOC for the capital stock is:
∂Z
∂Vt+1
= −(1 + ηζ)−Ψη2Vt+1 + β(1 + p)
− 2φbγ(µη + (1− η))(St + γVt + γ(µη + (1− η))Vt+1) = 0 (A.6)
This equation can be rearranged to solve for V ∗t+1:
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V ∗t+1 =
1
1 + x
(
β(1 + p)− (1 + ηζ)
2φbγ2(µη + (1− η))2 −
St + γVt
γ(µη + (1− η))
)
, (A.7)
where
x =
Ψη2
2φbγ2(µη + (1− η))2 . (A.8)
The first order condition for the clean capital share is:
∂Z
∂η
= −Vt+1ζ −ΨηV 2t+1 − 2φbγ(µ− 1)(St + γVt + γ(µη + (1− η))Vt+1)Vt+1 = 0 (A.9)
The first term reflects the fact that accumulating clean capital is more expensive than investing in dirty capital
on a per-unit cost basis; the second term arises from the adjustment costs, which are rising in η, because
technical and political challenges are assumed to grow with an expanding clean capital stock. The third term
is positive, but decreasing in η. The marginal benefit of a growing clean capital stock - less climate change
- diminishes, because climate damages increase exponentially with (dirty) capital accumulation; therefore
early replacement of dirty capital with clean capital produces the largest benefit.
Also (A.9) can be solved for V ∗t+1:
V ∗t+1 = −
ζ + 2φb(µ− 1)(St + γVt)
Ψη + 2φbγ2(µ− 1)(µη + (1− η)) (A.10)
After setting (A.7) and (A.10) equal, the joint equation cannot be solved analytically for η. Therefore, Buckle
performs numerical simulations to illustrate the significance of adjustment costs in allowing or preventing
a transition to clean technologies. One central model result is that with a decreasing investment price
differential ζ the share of clean capital η in the total capital stock as well as the total capital stock K∗t+1 rises,
but cumulative emissions S∗T remain constant. Hence, falling abatement costs extend the scope for economic
growth, but do not affect pollution. S∗T only decreases once the economy has completely switched to the
clean technology and when its price further declines. These results equal those obtained in chapter 3.
A.1.2 Proof of equivalence
This section proves the equivalence of the two approaches to model the transition to clean technology,
presented in the previous section and in chapter 3. With (A.7) and (A.10), V ∗t+1 and η
∗ are to be determined
from
Vt+1 =
1
1 + x
(
β(1 + p)− (1 + ηζ)
2φbγ2(µη + (1− η))2 −
St + γKt
γ(µη + (1− η))
)
= − ζ + 2φγb(µ− 1)(St + γKt)
Ψη + 2φbγ2(µ− 1)(µη + (1− η))(A.11)
x =
Ψη2
2φbγ2(µη + (1− η))2 . (A.12)
For η = 0, it can be easily verified that the left hand side of equation (A.11) collapses to equation (3.42),
which gave the optimal dirty capital stock in the absence of clean technologies, K̂t+1. For the complete
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transition, in which case η = 1, it can be shown analytically that equation (3.56), which computes the
optimal clean capital stock in the complete transition case, M¨t+1, replicates the third equation on page 13
in Buckle (2009a), describing the same.
However, both these cases reflect the extreme scenarios. The question is whether the two modelling ap-
proaches lead to the same results for a partial adoption of clean technologies. Since the problem of the
original model was that the system (A.11)-(A.12) could not be solved with standard methods, in the follow-
ing I also need to use a numerical proof of equivalence. The first link between the approaches in Buckle
(2009a) and in chapter 3 is the solution of the total capital stock, V ∗t+1, which was given in (3.54) and should
coincide with Vt+1 in (A.11). The second link is the clean capital share η, which was not considered explicitly
in chapter 3, but can easily be derived from (3.47) and (3.54). It should be defined as
η =
Mt+1
Kt+1 +Mt+1
=
Mt+1
Vt+1
, (A.13)
so that in the optimal case
η∗ =
Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µγ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
.
β(1+p)−1
2φbγ2 − Stγ −Kt + (1− 2µγ )Mt + (1− µγ ) 1Ψ
((
1− µγ
)
(β(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
) . (A.14)
I simulate the model for the following arbitrarily chosen parameter values: p = 2; ζ = 0.12; Ψ = 0.0002;
γ = 1; µ = 0.9; b = 0.0006; β = 0.95; φ = 0.9; f = 0; St = 2; Kt = 700; Mt = 0.
2 This immediately produces
M∗t+1 = 325 and V
∗
t+1 = 1043, from (3.47) and (3.54). Using these values to compute the optimal clean
capital share in (A.14), this gives η∗ = 31%. Plugging η∗ together with the parameters defined above into
either the left hand side of (A.11) or its right hand side, Vt+1 = 1043 is obtained, which - voilà - matches the
optimal period t+ 1 total capital stock just derived from (3.54), V ∗t+1 = 1043.
3 Both approaches lead to the
same result, q.e.d.
2In Buckle’s approach, an Mt > 0 is not considered, so that also here Mt = 0 is assumed.
3When double-checking these results, note that the solution values are rounded.
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B.1 Coastal protection as a cancelling adaptation measure with a
discontinuous residual damage function
Even though a cancelling adaptation measure may avoid adverse impacts from climate change for a moderate
temperature increase, the damage curve may not simply shift out in parallel, as depicted in Figure 9.1
in section 9.2, as further structural changes may occur. For instance, a new crop type may not only be
completely resistant against e.g. longer dry periods for lower temperature rise, but the new residual damage
curve may also be generally flatter for higher temperature regimes, too. As another prominent example
of cancelling adaptation, coastal protection could be considered. Erecting and raising sea walls aims at
protecting against sea-level rise and storm floods to exclude the risk of land loss and damages to urbanized
coastal regions completely. The effect of this adaptation measure may be better described by Figure B.1
than by Figure 9.1 though: Hypothetically, the scenario of a small island state is sketched that is situated in
a region that neither at present nor in future is at risk of being hit by occasional storm floods. Therefore, it
has not built up any coastal protection yet, but will be threatened by sea-level rise as a likely consequence of
global warming. Because most industry and housing is often located close to water reservoirs, so that most
capital is lost with the first (centi-)metres of sea-level rise, it is assumed that the island states’ unmodified
damage function (thin line) is concave rather than convex. If dykes are erected as a cancelling adaptation
measure, all coastal regions remain unscathed up to a certain sea level that correspondends to △T ′. Once
this threshold is exceeded, the dykes are overflowed and the same area is flooded that would have been lost
with the same temperature increase △T ′, but without dykes. Against further sea level rise as a result of
temperature increases that are higher than△T ′, the sea walls provide no protection, and the damage function
with (bold line) and without adaptation have the same shape.
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Figure B.1: Coastal protection of a small island state
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C.1 Single adaptation decision for two periods
The complete adaptation module of SLICE is elaborated in detail in section 10.3; here I adopt a reduced
specification, with an adaptation capital stock that persists unchanged for two periods instead of being
adjusted in each period (as it is the case in the main text).
The alternative Lagrangian has the following form:
max
Kt+1, At, At+1, T
Z
= pKt − (Kt+1 +Kt)−At − b(St)
2
(a+At)1/2
+β
[
pKt+1 +Kt+1 +At −At+1,T − b(St + γKt)
2
(a+At+1,T )1/2
]
+ φ
[
At+1,T − b(St + γKt + γKt+1)
2
(a+At+1,T )1/2
]
,(C.1)
whereby all adaptation parameters introduced in section 10.3 apart from the natural capacity to adapt, a,
have been dropped, so that there is neither an investment cost price differential nor depreciation takes place,
and for the adaptation capital efficiency, e = 1 is assumed. The crucial difference to the adaptation module
of the main text is that while adaptation capital At still helps to alleviate damages intratemporally in period
t, adaptation investments taken in period t + 1, At+1,T , reduce damages both in period t + 1 as well as in
the long term, T . No further adaptation decision takes place in period T .
For an interior solution and with At+1,T > At > 0, Kt+1 > 0 , optimal A
∗
t is easily derived from
δZ
δAt
= −1 + b(St)
2
2(a+At)3/2
+ β = 0 ⇐⇒ A∗t =
(
b
2(1− β)
)2/3
· S4/3t − a. (C.2)
Furthermore,
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δZ
δAt+1, T
= β
[
−1 + b(St + γKt)
2
2(a+At+1,T )3/2
]
+
[
φ
b(St + γKt + γKt+1)
2
2(a+At+1,T )3/2
]
= 0
⇐⇒ At+1, T =
[
(St + γKt)
2 + φ(St + γKt + γKt+1)
2
2(β − φ)
]2/3
− a (C.3)
δZ
δKt+1
= −1 + β(1 + p)− φ
[
2γφb(St + γKt + γKt+1)
(a+At+1,T )1/2
]
= 0
⇐⇒ Kt+1 = (β(1 + p)− 1) (a+At+1,T )
1/2
2γ2φb
− St
γ
−Kt, (C.4)
so that
Kt+1 =
(β(1 + p)− 1)
[
(St+γKt)
2+φ(St+γKt+γKt+1)
2
2(β−φ)
]1/3
2γ2φb
− St
γ
−Kt, (C.5)
Due to the double use of adaptation capital in t + 1 and T and the non-linear adaptation function, the
optimization problem does not bear an analytical solution for Kt+1 and At+1,T that is obtainable with
standard methods.
Beyond this technical problem, it is somewhat odd to assume that adaptation capital can in the long term
(or even just during a simple period) no longer be adjusted, given the rather long model periods in SLICE.
These considerations led to enabling a separate adaptation decision in the main text for the terminal model
period.
C.2 Properties of the adaptation function
In the table of values C.1, simulation results for the following simplified residual damage function are provided:
R =
10
(1 +A)κ
,
whereby three scenarios were assumed, in which κ = 1/2, κ = 1 or κ = 2, and increasing A and constant
gross damages, D = 10, in all scenarios. The simulation results show that residual damages behave in all
three scenarios similarly. Residual damages are decreasing in A, but the reductions become smaller. The
marginal benefits to adaptation are declining.
C.3 On the rebound effect of adaptation
FOC (10.45) is repeated here:
∂Z˜∗
∂e
= (−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p)) · ∂K
∗
t+1
∂e
− (φ(1 + r)− ϑ(1− d)) · ∂A
∗
t+2
∂e
− φ∂R
∗
t+2
∂e
.
For the three terms, with optimal solution equations (10.24), (10.25) and (10.35) follows:
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A κ = 1/2 κ = 1 κ = 2
0,1 95,35 90,91 82,64
0,2 91,29 83,33 69,44
0,3 87,71 76,92 59,17
0,4 84,52 71,43 51,02
0,5 81,65 66,67 44,44
0,6 79,06 62,50 39,06
0,7 76,70 58,82 34,60
0,8 74,54 55,56 30,86
0,9 72,55 52,63 27,70
1 70,71 50,00 25,00
1,5 63,25 40,00 16,00
2 57,74 33,33 11,11
3 50,00 25,00 6,25
4 44,72 20,00 4,00
5 40,82 16,67 2,78
6 37,80 14,29 2,04
7 35,36 12,50 1,56
8 33,33 11,11 1,23
9 31,62 10,00 1,00
10 30,15 9,09 0,83
100 9,95 0,99 0,01
1000 3,16 0,10 0,00
Residual damages
Table C.1: Residual damages for a range of adaptation function exponents
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p)) · ∂K
∗
t+1
∂e
=
1
3
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3e2/3
.
−(φ(1 + r)− ϑ(1− d)) · ∂A
∗
t+2
∂e
= −1
3
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))4/3e2/3
· φ((1 + r)− ϑ
φ
(1− d)) · 2φ
2φ
= −1
3
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))4/3e2/3
· 2((1 + r)− ϑ
φ
(1− d)) · φ
2
= − 1
18
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3e2/3
−φ∂R
∗
t+2
∂e
= −1
3
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3e2/3
· φ
−1
9
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))2
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3e2/3
.
These are the intermediate solutions plugged into FOC (10.45) in section 10.4.5.
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C.4 On the resource-constrained case with adaptation
The derivation of ∂A˘t∂λ1 in (10.52) in section 10.4.7 is made explicit in the following:
A˘t =
(
b
2((1 + r)− β(1−d)/1+λ1
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
− a =
(
b
2((1+r)(1+λ1)/(1+λ1)− β(1−d)/1+λ1
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
− a
=
(
b(1 + λ1)
2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d)
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
− a =
(
b(1 + λ1) [2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d)]−1
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
− a
∂A˘t
∂λ1
=
2S2t
3e1/3
[
b [2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d)]−1 − 2b((1 + r)(1 + λ1) [2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d)]−2
]−1/3
=
2S2t
3e1/3
·
[
b
2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d) −
2b((1 + r)(1 + λ1)
(2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d))2
]−1/3
=
2S2t
3e1/3
·
[
b(2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d))
(2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d))2 −
2b((1 + r)(1 + λ1)
(2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d))2
]−1/3
=
2S2t
3e1/3
·
[
− bβ(1− d))
(2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d))2
]−1/3
=
2S2t
3e1/3
·
[
− (2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d))
2
bβ(1− d))
]1/3
= −2S
2
t (2((1 + r)(1 + λ1)− β(1− d))2/3
3(ebβ(1− d)))1/3 .
C.5 Solutions of the combined mitigation-adaptation model
C.5.1 Interior solution
In this scenario, whose implications are summarized in section 10.5.3, it is valid that
λ1,2,3,4,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
, ∂Z∂Mt+1 ,
∂Z
∂At
, ∂Z∂At+1 ,
∂Z
∂At+2
= 0, so that Kt+1, Mt+1, At, t+1, t+2 > 0, Ct, t+1, t+2 > f , and the
carbon constraint does not bite.
The solutions for A∗t and A
∗
t+1 as well as the associated interpretations given in section 10.4.3 remain virtually
unchanged. They are reported for the sake of completeness:
A∗t =
(
b
2((1 + r)− β(1− d))
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
− a (C.6)
A∗t+1 =
(
b
2((1 + r)− φβ (1− d))
)2/3
· (St + γKt + µMt)
2
e1/3
− a. (C.7)
The FOCs (10.64) and (10.65) are solved for 3φb b(St+γKt+µMt+γKt+1+µMt+1)
2
((a+At+2)e)1/2
and equated with each other,
which delivers
M∗t+1 =Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
. (C.8)
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Solving (10.68) for At+2 results in
At+2 =
(
b
2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d))
)2/3
· (St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
2
e1/3
− a. (C.9)
Plugged into (10.64), it delivers
Kt+1 =
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)e1/3
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− St
γ
−Kt − µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
Mt+1, (C.10)
and, combined with (C.8), finally
K∗t+1 =
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)e1/3
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− St
γ
−Kt− 2µ
γ
Mt− µ
γ
· 1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
.
(C.11)
From (C.8), (C.9) and (C.11), we find
A∗t+2 =
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)2e1/3
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))4/3
− a. (C.12)
Two results catch the eye: The optimal solution forM∗t+1 in (C.8) and the optimal solution of the mitigation-
only model for M∗t+1 in (3.47) differ from each other only because now also during the last model period
production takes place, but otherwise they are structurally equal. The optimal period t + 2 adaptation
capital stock in (C.12) matches the optimal period t + 2 adaptation capital stock of the adaptation-only
model, which is given in (10.25). The solution for K∗t+1 reflects a synthesis of the solutions for K
∗
t+1 from
the two submodules, compare with equations (3.50) and (10.24).
C.5.2 The joint growth envelope
In order to facilitate the comparability of the solutions of the mitigation-only and the combined model, the
interior solution of the model as specified in section 10.5.2 is derived, but this time adaptation investments
are disabled, hence At = At+1 = At+2 = 0. It is proceeded as in section C.5.1 to obtain
M˜t+1 = Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
(C.13)
K˜t+1 =
[
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))a1/2e1/2
3γ3φb
]1/2
− St
γ
−Kt
−2µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
· 1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
(C.14)
V˜t+2 =
[
(−1 + βp+ φ(1 + p))a1/2e1/2
3γ3φb
]1/2
− St
γ
−Kt
+(1− 2µ
γ
)Mt +
(
1− µ
γ
)
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
. (C.15)
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This is the interior solution of the mitigation-only model, but now the production structure matches that of
the combined model, and the natural capacity to adapt, a, is included.
The growth envelope of mitigation, defined as the difference between total period t + 1 production capital
in which the mitigation option is enabled and the period t + 1 production capital that is chosen when no
mitigation takes place, amounts to
V˜t+1 − K̂t+1 = (1− 2µ
γ
)Mt +
(
1− µ
γ
)
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
, (C.16)
whereby K̂t+1 still denotes the optimal period t+ 1 capital stock when neither mitigation nor adaptation is
allowed to take place, given in (10.28).
The growth envelope of adaptation is described by
K∗t+1 − K̂t+1
=
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)e1/3
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− St
γ
−Kt (C.17)
−
[(
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)a1/2e1/2
3γ3φb
)1/2
− St
γ
−Kt
]
=
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)1/2a1/4e1/4
(3φb)1/2γ3/2
(
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)1/2e1/12
(3γφ)1/2b1/6a1/4(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− 1
)
, (C.18)
where K∗t+1, from (10.24), is the optimal total period t + 1 production captital stock that is chosen when
adaptation is allowed, but mitigation is disabled.
The total optimal total production capital stock1 of the combined model, V ∗t+2, in which both mitigation and
adaptation take place, equals
V ∗t+1 = K
∗
t+1 +M
∗
t+1 =
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)e1/3
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− St
γ
−Kt
+(1− 2µ
γ
)Mt +
(
1− µ
γ
)
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
, (C.19)
with K∗t+1 and M
∗
t+1 taken from (C.11) and (C.8) respectively. The joint growth envelope amounts to
V ∗t+1 − K̂t+1 =
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)1/2a1/4e1/4
(3φb)1/2γ3/2
(
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)1/2e1/12
(3γφ)1/2b1/6a1/4(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− 1
)
+ (1− 2µ
γ
)Mt +
(
1− µ
γ
)
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1)− ζ
)
. (C.20)
1As adaptation capital does not enhance production, it is therefore not included in the calculation of the total production
capital stock.
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The joint growth envelope is equal to the sum of the two single growth envelopes in (C.16) and (C.18),
confirming the statement made in section 10.5.4.
C.5.3 Combined model: resource-constrained economy
If λ2,3,4,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
, ∂Z∂Mt+1 ,
∂Z
∂At
, ∂Z∂At+1 ,
∂Z
∂At+2
= 0 and λ1 > 0, Kt+1, At, t+1, t+2 > 0 and Ct+1, t+2 > f , but
Ct− f = 0, so that the resources available for investment in period t are limited. The optimal solutions that
were announced in section 10.5.5 are
A¨t =
(
b
2((1 + r)− β(1−d)/1+λ1
)2/3
· S
2
t
e1/3
− a (C.21)
K¨t+1 =
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1− λ1)e1/3
3γ2φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− St
γ
−Kt (C.22)
M¨t+1 = Mt +
1
Ψ
((
1− µ
γ
)
(βp+ φ(1 + p)
(1 + λ1)
− 1)− ζ
)
(C.23)
A¨t+2 =
(βp+ φ(1 + p)− 1− λ1)2e1/3
(3γφ)2b2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))4/3
− a. (C.24)
C.6 Combined model: decreasing returns to production
C.6.1 Introduction
In the following, the interior standard solution of the model for the case of decreasing marginal returns to
production is derived. Following the same methodology as in section 3.6.2.2, it is assumed that in production
function (3.6) α < 1. Since in this case the model no longer generates an analytical solution, numerical
simulations are performed in order to examine the model properties.
C.6.2 Methodology
The optimization problem with an output elasticity α < 1 is
max
Kt+1,Mt+1, At, At+1, At+2
Z
= p(Kt +Mt)
α +Kt −Kt+1 − (1 + ζ)(Mt+1 −Mt)− Ψ
2
(Mt+1 −Mt)2 − (1 + r)At − b(St)
3
((a+At)e)1/2
+β
[
p(Kt+1 +Mt+1)α+ (1− d)At − (1 + r)At+1 − b(St + γKt + µMt)
3
((a+At+1)e)1/2
]
+φ
[
(1 + p)(Kt+1 +Mt+1)α+ (1− d)At+1 − (1 + r)At+2 − b(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
3
((a+At+2)e)1/2
]
+ϑ(1− d)At+2
+λ1(Ct − f) + λ2(Ct+1 − f) + λ3(Ct+2 − f) + λ4[Ω− St − γKt − µMt − γKt+1 − µMt+1], (C.25)
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together with the unchanged Kuhn-Tucker conditions (10.60)-(10.63). For the standard interior solution,
it is valid that λ1,2,3,4,
∂Z
∂Kt+1
, ∂Z∂Mt+1 ,
∂Z
∂At
, ∂Z∂At+1 ,
∂Z
∂At+2
= 0, implying that Kt+1, Mt+1, At, t+1, t+2 > 0,
Ct, t+1, t+2 > f and that the carbon constraint does not bite. The optimal solutions for short and mid term
adaptation remain unchanged from the scenario with a linear production function, so that the solutions for
A∗t and A
∗
t+1, given in equations (C.6) and (C.7), respectively, still apply. The relevant remaining FOCs are:
∂Z
∂Kt+1
≤ −1 + β [αp(Kt+1 +Mt+1)α−1]
+φ
[
αp(Kt+1 +Mt+1)
α−1 + 1− 3bγ(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
2
((a+At+2)e)1/2
]
= 0 (C.26)
∂Z
∂Mt+1
≤ −(1 + ζ)−Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt) + β
[
αp(Kt+1 +Mt+1)
α−1
]
+φ
[
αp(Kt+1 +Mt+1)
α−1 + 1− 3bµ (St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
2
((a+At+2)e)1/2
]
= 0 (C.27)
∂Z
∂At+2
≤ φ
[
−(1 + r) + b · (St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
3
2(a+At+2)3/2e1/2
]
+ ϑ(1− d) = 0 (C.28)
The first order condition for At+2 is the same as before, therefore also the intermediate solution for At+2
remains unchanged:
At+2 =
(
b
2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d))
)2/3
· (St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
2
e1/3
− a. (C.29)
It is plugged into (C.26) and (C.27) to derive
−1 + (β + φ)(αp)(Kt+1 +Mt+1)α−1 + φ =
3φγb2/3(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
2(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
e1/3
(C.30)
−1 + (β + φ)(αp)(Kt+1 +Mt+1)α−1 + φ =
3φµb2/3(St + γKt + µMt + γKt+1 + µMt+1)
2(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
e1/3
+ ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt). (C.31)
These two equations are equalized to eliminate the terms on the left hand sides, from which operation follows:
Kt+1 =
(ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt)) · e1/3
γ(γ − µ)3φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− St
γ
−Kt − µ
γ
Mt − µ
γ
Mt+1. (C.32)
Plugging this intermediate solution for Kt+1 into (C.30) provides
φ− 1 + (β + φ)(αp)
[
(ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt)) · e1/3
γ(γ − µ)3φb2/3(2((1 + r)− ϑφ (1− d)))1/3
− St
γ
−Kt − µ
γ
Mt − (1 + µ
γ
)Mt+1
]α−1
= γ
(
ζ +Ψ(Mt+1 −Mt)
γ − µ
)
. (C.33)
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For α = 1, equation (C.33) collapses to the combined model’s optimal solution for M∗t+1 in the case of a
linear production function, see equation (C.8). With α Ó= 1, equation (C.33) cannot be analytically solved
forMt+1, but it containsMt+1 as the only endogenous variable. Once parameter values have been defined, it
can be numerically estimated which Mt+1 balances the left and right hand sides of (C.33). Once the optimal
period t + 1 mitigation capital stock has been derived, with its help the optimal period t + 1 dirty capital
stock can be computed from (C.32), and then the optimal period t+1 adaptation capital stock from (C.29).
The model is solved for the following parameter values that lead to a standard interior solution: initial dirty
capital stock Kt = 1000; initial clean capital stock Mt = 200; natural capacity to adapt a = 5; production
capital productivity p = 3; adaptation capital efficiency e = 10; adjustment cost parameter ψ = 0, 007;
mitigation capital investment cost price differential ζ = 1; adaptation capital investment cost price differential
r = 5; adaptation capital stock depreciation rate d = 0, 6; vulnerability parameter b = 0, 001; dirty capital
emissions coefficient γ = 0, 26; clean capital emissions coefficient µ = 0, 0005; short-term discount factor
β = 0, 95; long-term weighting factor φ = β2; rate of appreciation of adaptation capital stock bequest
ϑ = 0, 6; minimum consumption f = 200. Furthermore, four scenarios are compared with each other; in
scenario 1 the initial stock of cumulative CO2 emissions is St = 80 and the elasticity of output with respect
to production capital α = 1; in scenario 2 it is St = 120 and α = 1; in scenario 3 St = 80 and α = 0, 98,
and in scenario 4 St = 120 and α = 0, 98. These parameter values do not have an empirical grounding, but
are calibrated to produce in all scenarios solutions, in which Kt+1, Mt+1, At, t+1, t+2 > 0 and Ct, t+1, t+2 > f .
The simulation results are reported in Table C.2.
1 2 3 4
α = 1, S(t) = 80 α = 1, S(t) = 120 α = 0.98, S(t) = 80 α = 0.98, S(t) = 120
Dirty capital stock (t+1) 1542 1388 1157 1026
Clean capital stock (t+1) 836 836 731 737
Total capital stock (t+1) 2377 2223 1888 1763
Adaptation capital stock (t) 1 8 1 8
Adaptation capital stock (t+1) 102 129 102 129
Adaptation capital stock (t+2) 496 496 370 377
Cumulative emissions (t+2) 741 741 641 647
Consumption (t) 373 528 1394 1492
Consumption (t+1) 5317 4399 3851 3017
Consumption (t+2) 818 213 1065 455
Welfare 6282 5018 6103 4859
Optimal solutions
Table C.2: Combined mitigation-adaptation model: simulation results
Comparing the results of the scenarios 1 and 2 with a linear production function, it can be seen that an
increase in exogenous cumulative CO2 emissions, St, effects a reduction of the optimal level of dirty capital
investment, whereas the clean capital investment decision remains unaffected. Furthermore, cumulative
period t + 2 emissions are the same in both scenarios. For this reason, the period t + 2 adaptation capital
stock is the same in both scenarios. Since in scenario 2 cumulative emissions during the first two model
periods are larger than in scenario 1, the adaptation capital stocks of the two earlier periods are larger in
scenario 2.
The simulation reveals a further interesting aspect regarding the intertemporal distribution of welfare. As
to be expected, a higher level of committed emissions, St, reduces welfare. Interestingly though, it increases
period t consumption (and utility)2, which however does not compensate the consumption losses in periods
t+ 1 and t+ 2. The rise in exogenous cumulative emissions and resulting damages stimulates larger period
2Recall the equality of utility and consumption in SLICE.
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t adaptation investments, but dirty capital investments fall by a greater amount, so that in total more
resources remain available for consumption in period t. In period t+ 1, cumulative emissions are higher and
the production capital stock smaller than in scenario 1, which both diminishes period t+ 1 consumption. In
period t+2, cumulative emissions are the same as high in both scenarios, but less output is generated, causing
the drop in period t+2 consumption. This behaviour reflects the adaptation poverty trap, discussed in section
10.4.8: A higher level of committed emissions leads to a crowding out of production capital investment by
adaptation investment and effectively threatens economic development.
The results from scenarios 3 and 4 are based on simulations with a non-linear production function. In
response to the rise of committed CO2 emissions, dirty capital investments still drop, but now mitigation
capital investments increase to some extent. Still, the total period t + 1 capital stock is reduced, but not
enough to compensate the higher committed emissions; cumulative period t+ 2 emissions rise from scenario
3 to scenario 4. For this reason, also the period t + 2 adaptation capital stock grows. The effects on
intertemporal welfare are qualitatively unchanged from those seen in scenarios 1/2.
The non-linearity of the production function does not have any significant impact on the adaptation module;
the rise in period t+ 2 adaptation capital stock from scenario 3 to 4 is solely owed to the rise in cumulative
period t+ 2 emissions, which rise would already be observed in the mitigation-only model.
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D.1 Clean technology transfer games
D.1.1 Clean technology transfer in a Stackelberg game
Like in section 12.2.3, it is assumed that the inferior region B is a first mover of a Stackelberg game. A clean
technology is available to both regions, but region B is able to initially decide to transfer clean capital to
the superior region A. It is potentially willing to do so because it is assumed that both regions have formed
a contract that, for each clean capital unit MBAt+1 that region B supplies to region A free of charge, region
A agrees to deviate from its optimal cumulative emissions target SAT , reached in the Cournot games with
and without clean technology, by emissions equivalent to the emissions difference between clean and dirty
production of a single output unit. Hence, the idea is that for each clean capital unit provided by region
B, a dirty capital unit is cut down in region A. Region A benefits twice from this, as it needs to invest
less in period t, while maintaining its period t + 1 consumption, and it experiences less long-term climate
damages. Region B may benefit from such a transfer, as long as the marginal costs of a transfer are smaller
than the marginal gains from a less extreme climate. While no attention is paid to the process of how such
a contract may have emerged, making use of it may lead to Pareto improvements beneficial for both parties.
In mathematical terms, the contract is described by
ST ≤ SAT − γAMBAt+1 + µBMBAt+1 =
βA(1 + p)− 1
2φAbAγA
− (γA − µB)MBAt+1.
⇐⇒ βA(1 + p)− 1
2φAbAγA
− ST − (γA − µB)MBAt+1 ≥ 0 (D.1)
Region A’s cumulative emissions target, SAT , was given in (12.6). For simplicity, it is specified that pA =
pB = p. To solve this Stackelberg game, as before backward induction is used, starting with analyzing the
optimization problem of region A, which takes its decisions second:
292
APPENDIX D.
max
KAt+1,MAt+1
ZA (D.2)
= p(KAt +MAt)− (KAt+1 −KAt)− (1 + ζA)(MAt+1 −MAt)
−ΨA
2
(MAt+1 −MAt −MBAt+1) ·max
(
MAt+1 −MAt −MBAt+1; 0
)− bA(St)2
+βA
[
(1 + p)(KAt+1 +MAt+1 +M
B
At+1)− bA(St+1)2
]
−φAbA
[
(St+1 + γAKAt+1 + µAMAt+1 + γBKBt+1 + µBMBt+1 + µBM
B
At+1)
2
]
+λA3
·
(
βA(1 + p)− 1
2φAbAγA
− St+1 − γAKAt+1 − µAMAt+1 − γBKBt+1 − µBMBt+1 − µBMBAt+1 − γAMBAt+1 + µBMBAt+1
)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions
∂ZA
∂KAt+1
≤ 0; KAt+1 ≥ 0; KAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂Kt+1
= 0 (D.3)
∂ZA
∂MAt+1
≤ 0; MAt+1 ≥ 0; MAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂MAt+1
= 0 (D.4)
∂ZA
∂λA3
≥ 0; λA3 ≥ 0; λA3 · ∂ZA
∂λA3
= 0. (D.5)
Since region B acts first, it is assumed that its commitment to transfer clean technology lowers the adjustment
costs for clean capital investments of region A in the same way as previously accumulated domestic clean
capital does (line 3 of equation (D.2)). The foreign investment enhances production in region A (line 4),
but it also increases world cumulative emissions in the long term (line 5). Since the clean technology is
manufactured in region B, it is assumed that a unit of transferred clean capital increases emissions by
region B’s clean technology emissions coefficient µB . To simplify the problem, the minimum consumption
restrictions are ignored, but the contract equation (D.1) is added in line 6 of the problem, in which the
two µBM
B
At+1-terms cancel out, as the additional emissions caused by transferred clean capital were allowed
in the contract. To save some further notation, in lines 4, 5 and 6 the exogenous cumulative period t + 1
emissions are abbreviated, using
St+1 = St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt + µBMBt. (D.6)
It is assumed that the contract (D.1) is fulfilled with equality, so that λA3 > 0. If KAt+1,MAt+1 > 0, region
A’s FOCs are:
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∂ZA
∂KAt+1
= −1 + βA(1 + p)− 2φAbAγAST − λA3γA = 0
⇐⇒ 2φAbAST + λA3 = βA(1 + p)− 1
γA
(D.7)
∂ZA
∂MAt+1
= −(1 + ζA)−ΨA
(
MAt+1 −MAt −MBAt+1
)
+ βA(1 + p)
− 2φAbAµAST − λA3µA
⇐⇒ 2φAbAST + λA3 =
βA(1 + p)− (1 + ζA)−ΨA
(
MAt+1 −MAt −MBAt+1
)
µA
. (D.8)
Setting (D.7) and (D.8) equal delivers the clean capital best response function of region A:
MAt+1 =MAt +M
B
At +
1
ΨA
((
1− µA
γA
)
(βA (1 + pA)− 1)− ζA
)
. (D.9)
Own clean capital investment carried out by region A is promoted by clean capital transfers from region B.
Equation (D.9) is plugged into the contract equation (D.1) to obtain the best response function for period
t+ 1 dirty capital accumulation of region A:
KAt+1 =
βA (1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγ2A
− St
γA
−KAt − 2µA
γA
MAt − γB
γA
KBt − µB
γA
MBt − γB
γA
KBt+1 − µB
γA
MBt+1
−
(
1 +
µA
γA
)
MBAt −
µA
γA
1
ΨA
((
1− µA
γA
)
(βA (1 + p)− 1)− ζA
)
. (D.10)
In response to a marginal clean technology transfer from region B, region A reduces its dirty capital invest-
ments for two reasons, namely because
1. the contract forces it do so.
2. the foreign clean capital investment stimulates own clean capital investment, amplifying the crowding
out of dirty capital by clean capital in region A.
Turning to region B, its optimization problem is at first:
max
KBt+1,MBt+1,M
B
At+1
ZB (D.11)
= p(KBt +MBt)− (KBt+1 −KBt)− (1 + ζB)(MBt+1 −MBt +MBAt+1)
− ΨB
2
(MBt+1 −MBt) ·max (MBt+1 −MBt; 0)− ΨA
2
(MABt+1 −MAt) ·max
(
MABt+1 −MAt; 0
)− bB(St)2
+ βB
[
(1 + p)(KBt+1 +MBt+1)− bB(St+1)2
]
− φBbB
[
(St+1 + γAKAt+1 + µAMAt+1 + γBKBt+1 + µBMBt+1 + µBM
B
At+1)
2
]
+ λB3
·
(
βA(1 + p)− 1
2φAbAγA
− St+1 − γAKAt+1 − µAMAt+1 − γBKBt+1 − µBMBt+1 − µBMBAt+1 − γAMBAt+1 + µBMBAt+1
)
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with Kuhn-Tucker conditions
∂ZB
∂KBt+1
≤ 0; KBt+1 ≥ 0; KBt+1 · ∂ZB
∂KBt+1
= 0 (D.12)
∂ZB
∂MBt+1
≤ 0; MBt+1 ≥ 0; MBt+1 · ∂ZB
∂MBt+1
= 0 (D.13)
∂ZB
∂MBAt+1
≤ 0; MBAt+1 ≥ 0; MBAt+1 ·
∂ZB
∂MBAt+1
= 0 (D.14)
∂ZB
∂λB3
≥ 0; λB3 ≥ 0; λB3 · ∂ZB
∂λB3
= 0. (D.15)
The clean capital units sent abroad are manufactured in region B, with per-unit costs (1+ ζB). Furthermore,
it is assumed that region B investments abroad face region A’s adjustment costs (line 3 in (D.11)). Shipping
costs are neglected and furthermore it is assumed that no clean technology transfers have been made yet,
so that MBAt = 0. Both parties fulfill the contract as stated, so also λB3 > 0. According to the rules of a
Stackelberg game, region B takes its decisions first. Region A’s best response functions (D.9) and (D.10) are
plugged into (D.11), delivering
max
KBt+1,MBt+1,M
B
At+1
ZB
= p(KBt +MBt)− (KBt+1 −KBt)− (1 + ζB)(MBt+1 −MBt +MBAt+1)
− ΨB
2
(MBt+1 −MBt) ·max (MBt+1 −MBt; 0)− ΨA
2
(MABt+1 −MAt) ·max
(
MABt+1 −MAt; 0
)− bB(St)2
+ βB
[
(1 + p)(KBt+1 +MBt+1)− bB(St+1)2
]
− φBbB
[
βA(1 + p)− 1
2φAbAγA
− (γA − µB)MBAt+1
]2
+ λB3 · (0) . (D.16)
This time region B does not only have an interest, but also the means to reduce cumulative period T emissions
from region A’s optimal level, which without the contract is inevitably reached, even in the Stackelberg game
that equips region B with the first mover advantage, as seen in section 12.2.3. As λB3 > 0, the last line
in (D.16) the Kuhn-Tucker condition (D.15) is fulfilled, ∂ZB∂λB4 = 0. Assuming that clean technology transfer
costs start from a level that permits an MBAt+1 > 0, the optimal level of clean technology transfer is:
∂ZB
∂MBAt+1
= −(1 + ζB)−ΨA
(
MBAt+1 −MAt
)
+ 2φBbB(γA − µB)
(
βA(1 + p)− 1
2φAbAγA
− (γA − µB)MBAt+1
)
= 0
(D.17)
⇐⇒ M˘BAt+1 =
ΨAMAt − (1 + ζB) + φBbB(γA−µB)φAbAγA (βA(1 + p)− 1)
ΨA + 2φBbB(γA − µB)2 . (D.18)
Possibly counterintuitively, the dirtier region A’s traditional technology is (γA high), the less clean technology
transfer takes place. This is because according to the contract (D.1), for high γA each transfer leads to larger
emissions reductions, so less transfers are required to bring cumulative emissions down. If region A is rather
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vulnerable to climate change (bA high), or it places a large long-term weight on climate damages (φA high),
also region A’s optimal emissions level, SAT , sinks, and approaches S
B
A . As a consequence, also damages
decrease, and clean technology transfer becomes less beneficial for region B.
Like in section 12.2.3, region B preempts region A in exploiting the - via the transfers reduced - carbon
cake, whose overall size is determined by the preferences of region A. Hence, region B invests until region A’s
optimal cumulative emissions level minus the induced reductions is reached. Without specifying region B’s
optimal technology mix to reach S˘T , the solution set is:
K˘At+1 = 0 (D.19)
M˘At+1 = 0 (D.20)
K˘Bt+1 =
βA(1 + p)− 1
2φAbAγAγB
− St
γB
− γA
γB
KAt − µA
γB
MAt −KBt − µB
γB
MBt − µB
γB
M˘Bt+1
− γA
γB
ΨAMAt − (1 + ζB) + φBbB(γA−µB)φAbAγA (βA(1 + p)− 1)
ΨA + 2φBbB(γA − µB)2 . (D.21)
M˘BAt+1 =
ΨAMAt − (1 + ζB) + φBbB(γA−µB)φAbAγA (βA(1 + p)− 1)
ΨA + 2φBbB(γA − µB)2 . (D.22)
S˘T =
βA(1 + p)− 1
2φAbAγA
− (γA − µB)
ΨAMAt − (1 + ζB) + φBbB(γA−µB)φAbAγA (βA(1 + p)− 1)
ΨA + 2φBbB(γA − µB)2 , (D.23)
whereby it is assumed that region B can afford these investments. Note that the solution for S˘T equals the
first line of the contract equation (D.1). S˘T should be somewhere between the two cumulative carbon targets
favoured, that is
SAT =
βA(1 + p)− 1
2φAbAγA
> S˘T >
βB(1 + p)− 1
2φBbBγB
= SBT . (D.24)
It is unlikely that region B enforces its own preferred cumulative emissions target, because clean technology
transfer is costly, so that there is a trade-off between defending its own target and bearing the cost of doing
so. Compared to the outcome of the Stackelberg game without the contract (section 12.2.3), complying to
the contract benefits both regions:
Z˘A > Z´A and Z˘B > Z´B . (D.25)
Despite this Pareto improvement, it should be emphasized that this contract is bizarre, as it does not reflect
reality. As stated in section 11.3, it does not meet the concerns regarding the historical responsibility for
climate change, and representatives of the inferior region might be too poor to transfer technology to richer
countries. In fact, this contract game shares some of the perversion of FUND’s result that North America
becomes a net recipient of transfer payments in order to compensate it for mitigation efforts, see section
1.4.3.
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D.1.2 Clean technology transfer in a Cournot game with a binding minimum
consumption constraint
There is a scenario in which it is rational for the superior region to supply clean technology to the inferior
region, namely when the latter is committed to defend its minimum consumption. In section 12.2 it was
learnt that region B has no incentive to accumulate own clean capital apart from the case of a zero-emissions
technology, therefore I assume straight away MBt = MBt+1 = 0. I reformulate region B’s optimization
problem, now allowing for the reception of clean capital transfers MABt+1:
max
KBt+1
ZB = pBKBt − (KBt+1 −KBt)− bB(St)2
+ βB
[
(1 + pB)KBt+1 + (1 + pA)M
A
Bt+1 − bB (St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt)2
]
− φB
[
bA
(
St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + µAMAt+1 + γBKBt+1 + µAM
A
Bt+1
)2]
+ λB1(CBt − fB) + λB2(CBt+1 − fB), (D.26)
with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
∂ZB
∂KBt+1
≤ 0; KBt+1 ≥ 0; KBt+1 · ∂ZB
∂KBt+1
= 0 (D.27)
∂Z
∂λBi
≥ 0; λBi ≥ 0; λBi · ∂Z
∂λBi
= 0 for i = 1, 2. (D.28)
It is assumed thatMABt+1 manufactured in region A produces with productivity pA, even though it is deployed
in region B, and its associated emissions coefficient is µA. If the minimum consumption constraint of period
t+ 1 bites, i.e. ∂Z∂λB2 = 0, then similarly to (12.41) in section 12.3.3:
KBt+1 =
fB − (1 + pA)MABt+1 +DBt+1
1 + pB
, (D.29)
and so
∂KBt+1
∂MABt+1
= −1 + pA
1 + pB
. (D.30)
For each unit of clean capital donated to region B, region B reduces dirty capital accumulation by − 1+pA1+pB ,
while still achieving its minimum consumption level in period t + 1. Region A’s optimization problem is
almost identical to that stated in (D.2), but this time it also decides on clean technology transfer:
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max
KAt+1,MAt+1
ZA
= pA(KAt +MAt)− (KAt+1 −KAt)− (1 + ζA)(MAt+1 −MAt)
− ΨA
2
(MAt+1 −MAt) ·max (MAt+1 −MAt; 0)− bA(St)2
− (1 + ζA)MABt+1 −
ΨB
2
(MABt+1)
2
+ βA
[
(1 + pA)(KAt+1 +MAt+1)− bA(St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt + µBMBt)2
]
− φAbA
[
(St + γAKAt + µAMAt + γBKBt + γAKAt+1 + µAMAt+1 + γBKBt+1 + µAM
A
Bt+1)
2
]
+ λA1(CAt − fA) + λA2(CAt+1 − fA), (D.31)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions
∂ZA
∂KAt+1
≤ 0; KAt+1 ≥ 0; KAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂Kt+1
= 0 (D.32)
∂ZA
∂MAt+1
≤ 0; MAt+1 ≥ 0; MAt+1 · ∂ZA
∂MAt+1
= 0 (D.33)
∂ZA
∂MABt+1
≤ 0; MABt+1 ≥ 0; MABt+1 ·
∂ZA
∂MABt+1
= 0 (D.34)
∂ZA
∂λAi
≥ 0; λAi ≥ 0; λAi · ∂ZA
∂λAi
= 0 for i = 1, 2. (D.35)
The clean technology price differential of region A applies; clean capital is manufactured in region A, whereas
adjustment costs accrue in region B. Assuming a standard interior solution results, as before, in
M˜At+1 =MAt +
1
ΨA
((
1− µA
γA
)
(βA (1 + pA)− 1)− ζA
)
. (D.36)
Furthermore,
∂ZA
∂MABt+1
= −(1 + ζA)−ΨBMABt+1 − 2φAbA
(
−γB ∂KBt+1
∂MABt+1
+ µA
)
· ST = 0
⇐⇒ M˜ABt+1 =
1
ΨB
(
γB
1 + pA
1 + pB
− µA
)(
βA (1 + pA)− 1
γA
− (1 + ζA)
)
. (D.37)
For certain parameter values, region A wants to export clean technology. If region A helps region B to reach
its minimum period t + 1 consumption, region B needs to accumulate dirty capital and contributes less to
pollution. As a result, region A can produce and emit more. Basically, by transferring clean capital, region A
“buys” slices of the carbon cake from region B that region B would otherwise consume to satisfy its minimum
consumption. Region B is also better off since if it has to invest less to maintain minimum consumption in
period t+ 1, it can consume more in period t while not losing on period t+ 1 consumption.
Clean capital transfer
– decreases in µA, as less emissions are “saved” per transfer unit.
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– increases in γB , as each transfer saves more emissions.
– increases in pA, as per transfer more of region B’s dirty capital investments can be saved.
– decreases in pB , as more transfer is needed to fully compensate region B for reducing dirty capital
investment.
Using (D.29),
K˜Bt+1 =
fB − (1 + pA) 1ΨB
(
γB
1+pA
1+pB
− µA
)(
βA(1+pA)−1
γA
− (1 + ζA)
)
+DBt+1
1 + pB
. (D.38)
After deriving the related FOC from (D.31) and solving for KAt+1 and plugging in the solutions for M˜At+1,
M˜BAt+1 and K˜Bt+1, K˜At+1 is obtained:
K˜At+1 =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγ2A
− St
γA
−KAt − γB
γA
KBt − 2µA
γA
MAt − µA
γA
1
ΨA
((
1− µA
γA
)
(βA(1 + pA)− 1)− ζA
)
− γB
γA
(fB +DBt+1)
1 + pB
−
(
µA
γA
− γB
γA
(1 + pA)
(1 + pB)
)
1
ΨB
(
γB
1 + pA
1 + pB
− µA
)(
βA (1 + pA)− 1
γA
− (1 + ζA)
)
. (D.39)
Still,
S˜T =
βA(1 + pA)− 1
2φAbAγA
(D.40)
as can be obtained in the usual manner from the FOC for KAt+1. The clean capital transfer does not
bring cumulative period T emissions down, but it allows a Pareto improvement compared to the scenario
without transfers, but with the minimum consumption constraints in place, as region A can produce and
consume more, while region B receives free resources. Wider issues regarding the implications and ethics
of this solution are addressed in section 12.4.5, where clean technology transfer and adaptation funding are
considered jointly.
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